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Marx and Marxism 
Today, radical thinking about social alternatives stands under pro-
hibition. According to defenders of the neoliberal transformation of 
every facet of human existence into a market, Marxism has failed. The 
catastrophe of historical Communism - the human rights abuses and 
totalitarian repression characteristic of the so-called ((socialist states" 
of the former Soviet Union and contemporary China - is adduced as 
the proof. Anything that goes beyond the advocacy of human rights, 
it is claimed, necessarily ends in disaster. Parliamentary democracy is 
the final horizon of good government; capitalism is the ultimate form 
of the just society; Marx is supposed to be directly responsible for the 
atrocities of Stalin and Mao; and Marxism, benevolent as it might 
seem, is said to result in totalitarian dictatorship. Anybody who dares 
to question this is promptly arraigned on charges of moral and political 
irresponsibility. 
Not so long ago, a philosopher in the pay of a multinational think 
tank linked to the US State Department triumphantly announced that 
radical free-market capitalism was the '(end of history': Such voices have 
muted somewhat of late, in light of unprecedented financial crises and 
continuing foreign wars. They have had little to say in the face of the 
persistence of untold millions in the slums of this planet, whose quiet 
misery silently refutes the great lie of our time, that the market is the 
best and fairest way to deliver prosperity and justice to all. But the apolo-
gists for the status quo rise to a great crescendo whenever the unquiet 
ghost of Marx is invoked. Marx is dead; Marxism is finished - and it 
must stay that way! 
1ntroduct1on marx and marx1sm 
The aim of this book is to defy that prohibition on radical thinking 
about social alternatives. Marxism as an intellectual movement has been 
one of the most important and fertile contributions to twentieth-century 
thought. The influence of Marxism has been felt in every discipline 
in the social sciences and interpretive humanities, from philosophy, 
through sociology and history, to literature. The emancipatory social 
movements of the future will draw their inspiration from Marx, and 
Marxism, among others. This is because Marxism is a politics of mass 
struggle and popular mobilization in the name of a social alternative 
to the profit system, and this is likely to remain a feature of political life 
in the future. 
Announcements of the death of Marxism are seriously premature. 
Indeed, no social theory in the twenty-first century that retains an 
emancipatory intent can be taken seriously unless it enters a dialogue 
not just with the legacy of Marx, but also with the innovations and 
questions that spring from the movement that he sparked, Marxism. 
For Marxism - this book will argue - has two characteristics that mean 
that engagement with it is a must for any resolutely modern thought: 
1. Marxism is the most serious normative social-theoretical chal-
lenge to liberal forms of freedom that does not at the same time 
reject the modern world. 
2. Marxism is the most sustained effort so far to think the present 
historically and to reflexively grasp thought itself within its socio-
historical context. 
(''Normative" here has the philosophical meaning of tending to establish 
a value, that is a standard of correctness, by prescription of rules that 
are evaluative rather than descriptive. A normative social theory states 
how society should be, as well as how things are now. It should not be 
confused with "normalized': meaning statistically regular and conform-
ing to the normal distribution, or {(bell-shaped curve':) 
Accordingly, Marx and Marxism claim to burst the horizon of 
modernity through a progressive radicalization of its premisses, rather 
than a reactionary repudiation of the modern world's distinctive histori-
cal consciousness and practical freedom. 
Firmly convinced that Marxism matters, and will continue to matter 
in the future, this book seeks to understand the greatness and limitations 
of Marx and of Marxism. Marx is a controversial figure whose work is 
sometimes rightly criticized, but more often simply misrepresented, 
even demonized. Expressions such as «the dictatorship of the proletariaf: 
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which in its context very clearly meant a radically new form of participa-
tory democracy, lend themselves to the facile equation between Marx 
and totalitarianism. Marx was not a totalitarian. The "socialist" states 
run by Stalin and Mao (for instance) bear no resemblance whatsoever 
to Marx's description of socialism. But this book advocates intellectual 
autonomy, not political conversion: it is not a defence and vindication of 
Marx, but a dear-headed effort to understand and to explain Marxism. 
In the right place, I will explain how limitations in Marx's position left 
the door open for a form of politics that is the direct opposite of the 
emancipatory intention that frames historical materialism. 
If Karl Marx (1818-83) is a controversial figure, Marxism is an abso-
lute commotion of dissent. The fierce debates begin with the devel-
opment of Marx's own thought. Because of the radically historical 
character of Marx's thinking, Marx was "the philosopher of eternal new 
beginnings, leaving behind him many incomplete drafts and projects" 
(Balibar 1995: 6). Accordingly, some distinguish between the philo-
sophical "young Marx" (1843-58) and the scientific "mature Marx" 
(1859-83). What is the relationship between them? Transcendence of 
youthful naivety or betrayal of an original insight? In this book, I reject 
the fiction of an iron wall between youth and maturity, along with the 
idea that Marx had a watertight system. Marx's thought is characterized 
by unresolved tension as well as by an astonishing power of synthesis 
and integration. 
Then there is the lifelong collaboration between Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels (1820-95). Is Engels an independent thinker, the first 
Marxist, or the first distorter of Marx's thought? It is all too convenient 
to celebrate Marx as an unsystematic genius in possession of a radical 
anti-philosophy, in order to place a dunce's cap on Engels and parade 
him around as responsible for the disasters produced under the banner 
of Marxism. In this book, I treat Engels as an independent thinker who 
influenced Marx, and who in turn systematized Marx's research into 
party educational material while making original contributions to 
historical materialism. There is, however, a tension within Marxism, 
between social philosophy and "scientific socialism': Historical material-
ism as a social philosophy makes normative claims. Scientific socialism 
is a non-philosophical research programme that uses the methodologies 
of the natural sciences in sociology and politics. Marx described the 
working class as the key to universal human emancipation, while Engels 
invented. the term "scientific socialism': But although this opposition 
helps describe the difference between Marx and Engels, it is also internal 
to the thought of the mature Marx. 
1ntroduct1on marx and marx1sm 3 
F' all there are the differences between various sorts of Marxism. 
iny, · h ·1 ·· f 
Th · theoretical Marxism and there 1s t e practlca activity o ere is . " M . ,, d s · 
the communist movement. There 1s Western arxrsm an ov1et 
M xism and there is the Marxism of the intellectuals and the Marxist ar , Wh h d "M . " ? p· theory of the party leaders. at, t en, oes arx1sm mean. irst, 
we can speak about the century of Marxism in terms of the commu-
nist movement (1890-1990). This is the hundred years of mass par-
ties whose programmes were based exclusively on the work of a single 
Marxist figure, for instance Lenin or Mao, as the "authentic" interpre-
tation of Marx. The history of the communist movement is essential 
to an understanding of Marxism, but it is not the central focus of this 
book. Accordingly, although I will discuss Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg, 
Gramsci, Stalin and Mao, some of the most fascinating non-canonical 
theoretical writings of other party leaders must be merely mentioned 
in passing. Related to this decision, second, the Marxist theory of the 
party leaders that I do discuss is not the centre of this book. Soviet 
Marxism, and more generally historical materialism as scientific social-
ism, is treated as less important than Marxism as a social philosophy. 
What that effectively means is that this book seeks to understand the 
Marxism of the intellectuals, especially so-called ((Western Marxism': 
There is a compelling reason for this decision. Within the Marx-
ism of the intellectuals, we can distinguish (somewhat schematically) 
between the social-scientific and the normative social-theoretical 
approaches. Historical materialism as an approach in the social sci-
ences is all about the role of economic factors, regarded as involving 
a relation between classes and production, in historical explanations. 
This is Marx's most important contribution to contemporary social 
scientific research. No body of thought can be considered to be a 
form of Marxism if it does not include central reference to the idea 
(explained in Chapter 1) of a class-based understanding of "eco-
nomic determination in the final instance" (MESW: 682-3). Indeed, 
the majority of Marx's research was aimed at formulating a scientific 
theory of social systems and a science of history capable of explain-
ing how societies emerge, mature and decay. On the basis of scientific 
analysis of the contradictions of capitalism's political economy, Marx 
predicted that the system was headed for deep crisis and long-term 
stagnation. He maintained that capitalism would be overthrown by the 
exploited class of that system, the working class, or "proletariat", in a 
socialist revolution that would lay the foundation for a radically new 
form of society, communism. The social scientific side of Marxism is 
concerned with the revision and correction of these hypotheses and 
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predictions, in light of economic developments, political history and 
sociological data. 
But that is not why Marx is a controversial figure, and it is not the 
main reason why Marxism will remain relevant in the future. Marx was 
also a political activist whose allegiance to the oppressed sections of the 
population led him to participate in the foundation of international 
parties with communist politics. The partisan side of Marx's work is 
expressed in his theoretical writings through a keen interest in politi-
cal strategy and moral condemnation of what he described as capitalist 
exploitation. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels do not only 
claim that history can be explained through class struggle - they also 
advocate taking the side of the proletariat in the forthcoming revolution. 
Marx memorably declared that "the proletarians have nothing to lose 
but their chains", and encouraged the international unity of the work-
ing class in winning the world for communism (MESW: 63). Historical 
materialism as a normative social theory is a philosophy of liberation. 
It makes a series of striking claims that the social scientific historical 
research is intended to support, not to establish. These claims involve 
ideas about what human existence through creative labour ought to be, 
how the working class embodies moral universality, the roots of social 
inequality in the exploitation of labour, and the material interests rep-
resented by the capitalist state. They mandate the realization of freedom 
in a new society. In other words, Marxism justifies revolution. That is 
controversial - extremely so. It is the fundamental reason why Marx has 
been accused of totalitarianism. It is also the reason why the encounter 
with Marx is transformative, not only of the way people think, but of 
their lives as well. Marxism is a distinctively historical theory that nor-
matively challenges liberalism in a way no other modern theory does. 
This side of Marxism, then, can be defined as the series of efforts to 
update and correct Marx's outline of a modern social philosophy that 
is based on an emancipatory practical intention to change the world. 
Historical materialism 
At the heart of the Marxist vision is the idea that proletarian struggles 
potentially represent a new ethical basis for human society beyond capi-
talism. But we cannot understand this political commitment in isolation 
from the social scientific aspect of Marx's theory, which, among other 
things, is supposed to determine what is realistically possible. To formu-
late the historical materialist position on society, Marx used dialectical 
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philosophy (explained in Chapter 1 ), to bring together three threads. 
These are an understanding of the historical process as driven by class 
struggle to attain higher and higher forms of society, a theory of the 
terrain of the class struggle in terms of how social structure is shaped by 
economic factors, and a concept of the roots of class struggle as located 
in the fundamental relation between humanity and nature, the labour 
process. According to Marx and Engels's Communist Manifesto: 
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class 
struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and 
serf, guild-master and journeyman - in a word, oppressor and 
oppressed - stood in constant opposition to one another, car-
ried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open, fight, a fight 
that, each time, ended either in a revolutionary reconstitution 
of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending 
classes. (MESW: 35-6) 
For Marx, the social classes involved in historically decisive struggles 
are defined through antagonistic relations in economic production. 
In the celebrated "1859 Preface" to A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy, Marx summed up his conception of the connec-
tions between class, production, society and history. He also mapped 
out the central categories of historical materialism and thereby defined 
the major parameters of what would become Marxism. Few summaries 
can match it for concision and accessibility; it is well worth reading it 
slowly through in its entirety. 
The general conclusion at which I arrived and which, once 
reached, became the guiding principle of my studies can be 
summarised as follows. In the social production of their exist-
ence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are 
independent of their will, namely relations of production 
appropriate to a given stage in the development of their mate-
rial forces of production. The totality of these relations of pro-
duction constitutes the economic structure of society, the real 
foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure 
and to which correspond definite forms of social conscious-
ness. The mode of production of material life conditions the 
general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not 
the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but 
their social existence that determines their consciousness. At 
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a certain stage of development, the material productive forces 
of society come into conflict with the existing relations of 
production or ~ this merely expresses the same thing in legal 
terms - with the property relations within the framework of 
which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development 
of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. 
Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the 
economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transforma-
tion of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such 
transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between 
the material transformation of the economic conditions of 
production, which can be determined with the precision of 
natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or 
philosophic - in short, ideological forms in which men become 
conscious of this conflict and fight it out. ... No social order is 
ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is 
sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of 
production never replace older ones before the material condi-
tions for their existence have matured within the framework 
of the old society. . . . In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, 
feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production may be 
designated as epochs marking progress in the economic devel-
opment of society. The bourgeois mode of production is the last 
antagonistic form of the social process of production ... but the 
productive forces developing within bourgeois society create 
also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism. 
The prehistory of human society accordingly closes with this 
social formation. (MESW: 181-2) 
What Marx does in the "1859 Preface" is to set up a relationship between 
three major terms: production, structure and history. 
Marx concentrates on production because, for him, "praxis': the 
active transformation of the natural environment, human nature and the 
social world, is centred on the social labour involved in the "production 
of material existence': In other words, Marx holds a production-centred 
theory of praxis (for present purposes, social practice) that is modelled 
on the labour process. The labour process is accordingly not only the 
kernel of economic practice, but also the model for non-economic (that 
is, political, juridical and ideological) practices. 
Marx defines the forces of production as the sum of the means of 
production (technological capacity, plant and equipment, instruments 
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of labour, raw materials) and labour power (human energy to perform 
work, including knowledge of technique). Marx, impressed by the con-
nection between technological development and social progress, once 
quipped that "the hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the 
steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist" (MECW 6: 166). That 
sounds like technological determinism, the idea that social development 
is caused by technological advances. But the centrality of the social rela-
tions of production, defined as the ownership of the means of produc-
tion and consequently the ability to exploit labour, demonstrates that 
Marx is not a technological determinist. It is the relations of production, 
or property relations, that foster, correspond with and then retard the 
advance of the productive forces. 
Structure, the resulting totality of material institutions and social 
relations, can in turn be divided into economic infrastructure, and 
political, juridical and ideological superstructure. Marx's "base-and-
superstructure" model in the "1859 Preface" can helpfully be repre-
sented in a diagram (Figure 1). 
Marx's conception of structure in the "1859 Preface" involves the idea 
that the economic foundation sets limits of variation to the superstruc-
tural levels. Marx holds that the economic foundation has particular 
laws of motion, necessary laws of economic development specific to 
the mode of production in question, which account for its emergence, 
operation and degeneration. By contrast, developments in the super-
structural levels depend on the interplay of economic factors with a mul-
titude of other factors. Accordingly, in abstract and formal terms, the 
economic foundation is the space oflogical necessity, while the super-
structures are a space of historically contingent variation. Accordingly, 
in the "1859 Preface'' the progression of society through a series of 
L IDEOLOGY (philosophy, religion, etc.} 





The Economic < RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION 
(socio-econom1c property relations) 
or 
Mode of Production FORCES OF PRODUCTION 
(technology, ecology, labour) 
Figure 1 Marx's base-and-superstructure model (based on Jameson 1981: 32). 
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modes of production (Asiatic, ancient, feudal and bourgeois) represents 
an upwards ascent in humanity's productive forces, from scarcity to the 
threshold of abundance, unfolding with historical necessity through the 
lawful evolution of the economic infrastructures. Political revolutions, 
juridical transformations and ideological struggles execute (or seek to 
retard) this historical necessity, under conditions where, as Engels clari-
fies, ((the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary" (MESW: 
682). By contrast with the blind process of pre-communist revolutions, 
however, the communist revolution will involve a conscious transforma-
tion of society, first into socialism (eradication of residual inequalities), 
then communism (full material abundance and the withering away of 
the state). Although communism represents the logically necessary con-
clusion of class history, conscious political, juridical and ideological 
struggle is essential to the realization of the historical potentials released 
by capitalism. By seizing the state as the lever of social transformation 
in a revolutionary insurrection, the communists set about the planned 
and deliberate renovation of society. Humanity, under the flag of com-
munism, although it does not make history under circumstances of its 
own selection, nonetheless becomes fully the author and agent of its 
own destiny. 
From Marx ... to Marxism 
This book's central thesis, then, is that that there are three threads in 
Marx: history, structure and praxis. Against the background of the influ-
ence of Hegel's dialectical philosophy, Marx succeeded in producing 
a synthesis of these elements that provided a compelling normative 
vision of a liberated humanity, reconciled to the natural world. He also 
produced a social scientific research programme, outlined in the (( 1859 
Preface': that provided a powerful explanatory framework for grasping 
historical change. This was intended to situate his normative vision 
within the limits of political realism, as opposed to utopian speculation. 
For Marx, historical materialism as a comprehensive social theory 
represented the end of philosophy. Philosophical systems had inter-
preted the world and indicated the potential for the actualization of 
reason in society. But the achievement of a rational society could only 
happen through political action guided by enlightened consciousness. 
Philosophy, with its contemplative stance and its treatment of the his-
torically developed world as a social fact, stood condemned as little 
more than an apology for alienated social conditions. Yet, paradoxically, 
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Marx's synthesis of the potentially disparate elements of history, struc-
ture and praxis in fact represented a new social philosophy, integrated 
through a materialist interpretation of the Hegelian dialectic. As social 
and political conditions changed and new intellectual challenges to 
Marx's social philosophy arose, the Marxist theorists sought to update 
his social theory, rectify the sociological positions ofhistorical material-
ism and respond to philosophy with a Marxist reply. Their interrogation 
of philosophy remains one of the most morally serious and intellectually 
comprehensive challenges of the last hundred years, and the result is 
Marxism as an intellectual current in twentieth-century thought. 
After a concise explanation of Marx's theory (Chapter 1), I turn to 
the development of Marxism for the bulk of the book. While paying 
attention to the complexity of Marxism as a movement, I intend to adapt 
a schema initially developed by the neo-Marxist philosopher Jurgen 
Habermas as an interpretive device (Habermas 1979a: 130-77). (I deal 
with Habermas in the chapter on Critical Theory.) My intention is to 
provide the book with a strong narrative that explains how and why 
Marx's original synthesis broke up and to clarify why Marxism today 
is necessarily a dispersion of Marx's original theoretical unity. The idea 
is that the evolution of a research programme happens through stages 
of "restoration", "renaissance" and ('reconstruction'1. Restoration means 
the recovery of an original doctrine from its subsequent distortion, 
which happens when the connection between praxis, structure and 
history is reasserted. Renaissance means opening up new directions 
through a variation of an argument's premisses; in this case through 
taking any two of praxis, structure and history, and varying the third. 
Restoration means complete redesign of an argument to fit its goals to 
new premisses; in other words rethinking praxis, structure and history, 
and their connection, from the ground up. Habermas proposes this as 
a theoretical description of the Marxist field without discussing the 
empirical complexity of the movement and the many variants of the 
Marxist renaissance and efforts towards its reconstruction, as I shall do. 
The relevant developments are: 
• The attempted restoration of Marx's doctrine in the classical, or 
"orthodox': Marxism of the Second, Third and Fourth Internationals 
(Chapter 2). Marx had integrated praxis, structure and his-
tory through dialectical philosophy. These thinkers and leaders 
responded to new conditions which seemed to invalidate Marx's 
synthesis and, for them, called for the re-integration of history, 
structure and praxis through the procedures of the natural sciences. 
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• The renaissance in historical materialism sought by the Western 
Marxists, who selectively highlighted elements of Marx's com-
bination and brought in fresh philosophical ideas, to integrate 
the parts in a new synthesis. In the context of a return to the 
Hegelian roots of Marxism, the Hegelian Marxists highlighted 
praxis and history in Marx, which enabled a novel conceptualiza-
tion of structure (Chapter 3). By contrast, the Frankfurt School 
was most interested in the relation between structure and history, 
which soon led to a radical interrogation of praxis itself, with star-
tling results (Chapter 4). Structural Marxism entirely rejected the 
teleological implications of Marx's conception of history, generat-
ing a rich research programme in the relation between practices 
and structure that made possible a striking reconceptualization 
of the historical process (Chapter 5). 
• Although this strategy produced impressive results, it ultimately 
ran its course and ceded place to efforts to reconstruct Marx's 
insights into social alienation and political liberation around new 
concepts of history, structure and practice. Although Analytical 
Marxism has posed significant challenges to central parts of Marx's 
synthesis, instead of turning aside from Marxism, it has sought to 
reconstruct historical materialism from the perspective of meth-
odological individualism and using the methods of contemporary 
philosophical research (Chapter 6). The efforts of the successors 
to the Frankfurt School in Critical Theory, and centrally Jurgen 
Habermas, have sought to generate a "critical theory of society 
with an emancipatory intent" by engaging with a wide variety of 
non-Marxist sources in a highly critical reconstruction of his-
torical materialism (Chapter 7). Finally, the post-Marxism aris-
ing initially from a critical reconstruction of Structural Marxism 
is examined, to illustrate the potentials of encounters between 
post-structuralism and the Marxist renaissance for future research 
(Chapter 8). 
Throughout, the aim is to position the reader to grasp the stakes in 
many current debates and the essential conceptual background to some 
of the most exciting and important contemporary thinkers. To achieve 
these aims, it has been necessary to restrict the scope of the treatment. 
Although I aim to integrate social history, theoretical development and 
philosophical arguments into a concise and accessible analysis of his-
torical materialism, I have not been able to discuss every thinker or the 
broader history of the socialist movement. Concentrating on Marxism 
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as a contribution to the intellectual project of modern thought, I have 
been forced to neglect the detailed geographical and historical treat-
ment of socialist politics in the twentieth century. Likewise, there are 
many important contributions to Marxist historiography, sociology and 
anthropology, political science and philosophy of science that I have had 
to pass over in silence. Several important thinkers in twentieth-century 
Marxism, such as the Praxis Group, the Austro-Marxists, Jean-Paul 
Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Ernst Bloch and Walter Benjamin, 
Giovanni Della Volpe and Lucio Colletti, have been neglected in the 
interests of precision of exposition and clarity of explanation. Finally, I 
have not been able to cover contemporary classical Marxism, although 
I do suggest further reading in my conclusion. 
In its exposition of Marx and Marxism, the book highlights a series 
of key social-theoretical and philosophical topics that have been at the 
core of debate in the twentieth century. The Marxist theory of history, 
its thesis of the primacy of economic determinations, the concepts of 
ideology and social class, Marxist theory of the state and the emancipa-
tory vision of Marxism are introduced, and then the progressive revi-
sion of these ideas is explained as each school of thought is discussed. 
Each chapter is relatively free-standing, with a survey of the movement 
in question's position on the major topics of Marxist social philoso-
phy. Although I thereby introduce the major schools of Marxist social 
thought and critically assess their strengths and weaknesses, this is not 
a partisan argument designed to evaluate which part of the tradition is 
the most authentic or correct. Instead, it seeks to understand how and 
why Marxism developed as it did and to position readers to draw their 
own conclusions about Marxism's advantages and limitations. 
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-
Marx before Marxism 
Marx's social philosophy is a theory of freedom in the spirit of the 
Enlightenment, which holds that only the rational society makes the 
good life possible. By linking moral independence and individual fulfil-
ment to rational conduct and reasoned debate, the Enlightenment inau-
gurated critical social theory, the study of the degree to which the social 
conditions necessary for rational living have been achieved. Marx's 
innovation in this programme is to have seen that the achievement of 
reason in society means that social theory must issue in political strat-
egy if it is not to become an apology for the unreasonable conditions it 
detects (Marcuse 1999: 252-7). Marx's social philosophy accordingly 
developed a theory of the historical sequence of modes of production, 
which matured through several phases, as his research turned from 
practical politics to political economy and back again. Throughout, it 
is the relation between praxis, structure and history that guides Marx's 
conception of social struggles and political freedom. 
This chapter explores the central ideas of Marx - alienation, the labour 
theory of value, the contradictions of capitalism, the state and ideology, 
classes and revolution - as the essential background to understanding 
Marxism. I trace Marx's development from the materialist inversion 
of Hegelian philosophy of the "young Marx" to the more scientific 
theory of the "mature Marx': indicating breaks and continuities between 
the ''two Marxes". I close with an extended reflection on the tension 
between descriptive-explanatory and normative-evaluative accounts 
in Marx. I propose that these are crucial for grasping the impact of 
historical experiences and intellectual challenges that arose after Marx. 
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Dialectical phitosophy 
The dialectical philosophy of G. W F. Hegel (1770-1831) was a major 
intellectual inspiration for Marx. The most important descriptive 
meaning of "dialectics'' is that Hegel's philosophy focuses on the idea 
of historical development through social and intellectual contradic-
tions, where the contradiction between antagonistic forces is eventually 
resolved by means of revolutionary change. The basic schema operating 
in Hegel's model of history is that social evolution begins from a pri-
mordial unity, then divides and becomes alienated, opposing individuals 
to the society, before finally reconciling the individual to society. Every 
stage of development involves both increasing antagonism between the 
individual and society, and expanded possibilities for individual self-
realization. The final social form retains the individuality that alienation 
made possible but resolves the contradictory divisions which generated 
alienation. Because for Hegel freedom means the ability of individuals 
to self-realize under conditions of moral autonomy, he describes the 
historical process as a series of stages of progress in the consciousness 
of freedom (Hegel 1956: 19). History, from Hegel's perspective, has an 
underlying built-in goal (or "teleologi'), which operates independently 
of individual intentions, consisting of a final stage of history in a free 
and rational society. For Hegel, capitalism is the "end of history" (Hegel 
1956: 103, 442), which mandates the reform of capitalism rather than 
anti-capitalist revolution. 
Although the complexity of Hegelian philosophy means that it defies 
quick summary (see Sinnerbrink 2007, also in this series), its norma-
tive core can be economically stated. Hegel thinks that the social con-
ditions necessary for moral autonomy and individual self-realization, 
which together he calls freedom, have developed historically. The 
Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) defined moral 
autonomy as individual self-determination through rational reflection 
on norms of action. Refusing to be dictated to by authorities, the morally 
autonomous individual would test practical actions for their universal-
ity, and in this way become a rationally self-legislating person guided 
only by universal principles. This Enlightenment ideal is crucial to the 
liberal vision of a social contract involving "negative liberty", that is 
protection of the freedom of autonomous individuals from interference 
and representative government. 
Although there is no doubt that Hegel was a sort of liberal, he found 
Kant's philosophical execution of this programme extremely disappoint-
ing. Hegel argued that Kant's idea of the autonomous subject failed to 
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understand its social and historical conditions (Hegel 1977: 355-74). 
Further, socio-historical alienation is still present in the Kantian picture. 
Notoriously, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (theory), Critique of Pure 
practical Reason (practice or morality) and Critique of Judgment (art) 
have significant tensions between them. For Kant, theoretical reasoning 
about the natural environment regards the world as determined by natural 
laws, while practical (moral) reasoning about social action considers the 
world as an arena for free self-determination. Kant's aesthetics, intended 
to resolve the potential contradiction between freedom (practical reason) 
and determinism (theoretical reason), only demonstrated that the idea 
of teleology provided a possible way out of the impasse, but went no fur-
ther. Furthermore, at the heart of Kantian moral autonomy lurks a split 
between virtue and happiness, between doing one's universal duty and 
satisfying the basic human end of attaining wellbeing. That undermines 
the motivations of the self-legislating rational agent supposed to support 
the social contract and representative government. Unless it 'could be 
shown that general prosperity resulted from the same conditions as those 
that mandated action according to universal principles, Hegel reasoned, 
many would conclude that the road to human happiness lay through 
irrational and immoral behaviour (for example exploiting others). 
Against this intellectual background, it is perhaps not surprising that 
Hegel hit upon the idea of a historical teleology, one that generated a 
series of social stages in the evolution of freedom and whose final result 
would be the reunification of social prosperity (i.e. human happiness) 
with universal principles (i.e. moral autonomy). The core driver of this 
process is the evolution of the social conditions for moral autonomy 
and social prosperity in what Hegel called "mutual recognition", the 
ability of each individual to recognize the other as free and to ration -
ally consent to the liberty of each as the condition for the freedom of 
all. Hegel insisted that this was not an intellectual process alone, but 
was instead institutionally embedded in the social structures of "ethi-
cal life': the normatively rich arrangement of the family, civil society 
(meaning economic organizations and civic associations) and the state. 
Struggles for recognition by individuals seeking the full realization of 
their moral autonomy and human happiness were shaped by their insti-
tutional location in the alienated social structures of ethical life. These 
structures matured through a series of historical changes expressing an 
increasing consciousness of freedom, until finally a society emerged that 
self-consciously represented a de-alienated condition. In The Philosophy 
of Right (1821), Hegel described capitalism as such a society: rational, 
free and universal. 
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Hegel's synthesis of the social practices of mutual recognition, the 
social structures of ethical life and a historical teleology of the realiza-
tion of freedom influenced Marx tremendously. Yet from the beginning, 
Marx detected a tension in Hegel's philosophy, which Engels later spelt 
out in terms of a contradiction between system and method (MESW: 
591). On the one side was its character as a finished system, announcing 
such baroque achievements as "absolute knowledge'' of the ''rationality 
of the real" in capitalism as the "end of history': On the other side was 
its relentlessly historical character, as an effort to think through ever-
changing social contradictions. Hegel regarded social antagonisms as a 
"unity of opposites,,, that is as a contradiction between opposed forces, 
generated by the historical limitations of the situation of conflict. The 
dialectical method proposed that the resolution of these contradictions 
happened through the "determinate negation" of current limitations. 
Intellectually, this means the process of holistically specifying the causal 
determinants of isolated phenomena and abstract ideas, thereby locating 
them in their social and historical context. Practically, it describes the 
emergence and actualization oflatent potentials for expanded freedom 
from the very core of the existing conflict situation, through concrete 
historical processes of struggle that formed an ascending series of higher 
and higher stages in the liberation of humanity. In Hegel's philosophy, 
the methodology is harnessed to the system through the figure of the 
"negation of the negation', the idea that the sequence of determinate 
negations that constitute the stages of history have a teleological goal 
in a final, positive society lacking all contradictions. Controversially, 
Marx retained the basic schema of a series of determinate negations as 
upwards progress towards a society free from contradiction, but insisted 
that because he had no blueprint for the future society, this was not a 
historical teleology. 
Marx's inversion of Hegel 
The death of Hegel resulted in a political split among his followers into 
conservative «Right Hegelians" and progressive "Left Hegelians': Among 
the Left Hegelians was a young Doctor Marx, who had just finished a 
thesis on Greek materialist philosophy. After graduating, Marx became 
involved with Left Hegelian and pro-democratic journals, but following 
important early involvement in Germany with the Rheinische Zeitung, 
he was forced by police censorship to shift to Paris to work on the 
Deutsche-Franzosische Jahrbiicher in 1843. In left-wing France, Marx 
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came into contact not only with other progressive exiles, but also with 
the French working-class socialist movement, which had developed as a 
result of the social conditions created by the industrial revolution. Here, 
Marx began to diverge from the Left Hegelians on two decisive points. 
First, consistent with their idealist assumption that history was the 
progressive development of rational freedom, the Left Hegelians argued 
for an intellectual revolution as the key to "true democracy" (i.e. a par-
liamentary system of representative government). They considered 
religion, still used in the 1800s to justify the rule of princes, the main 
obstacle to democracy. The Left Hegelians' proposals, however, went 
beyond Enlightenment denunciations of religious superstition in one 
crucial respect. They considered the core of religious ideals to be a legiti-
mate, but distorted, expression of human solidarity. Marx adopted these 
ideas in his famous "Theses on Feuerbach': but he criticized the idea that 
a purely intellectual grasp of what he was soon to call ((ideology" was 
the key. The new philosophy must provide a materialist interpretation of 
distorted ideas about the human essence - such as religious beliefs and 
idealist philosophies. That meant it must concentrate on social practices 
in relation to the natural environment, especially material production. 
As Marx later wrote, this would enable a recovery of Hegelian philoso-
phy for materialist ends: ((the mystification which dialectic suffers in 
Hegel's hands by no means prevents him from ... present[ing] its gen-
eral form ... [but] it must be turned right side up again, if you would 
discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell" ( C 1: 20). 
Second, the Left Hegelians followed Hegel in maintaining that the 
state is (or should be) a neutral universal arbiter standing above society 
and representing the public interest. From their intellectual revolution, 
the Left Hegelians proposed, would flow the reform of the state, so that 
the state could finally achieve its philosophical goal in the representa-
tion of universal human interests. But through contact with the French 
socialist movement, Marx began to fully realize the limitations of the 
Left Hegelians. In his Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy 
of Law" (1844), Marx contested the neutrality and universality of the 
capitalist state. Moral reform through an intellectual revolution was 
unlikely to succeed when the state defended private property. 
Political revolutions patterned on the French Revolution created 
private individuals ((separated from the community': Marx proposed, 
whereas a social revolution that abolished private property would 
achieve "human emancipation" (MECW3: 164, 168). He proposed that 
the social revolution in Germany must be undertaken by the prole-
tariat, because this is the social movement with "radical chains" whose 
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emancipation entails the complete restructuring of society (ibid.: 186). 
The new philosophy is to lead this "passive element" so that "the head 
of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart is the proletariat" (ibid.: 
187). In a decisive encounter in 1844, Marx met Friedrich Engels and 
read his The Condition of the English Working Class (1843), beginning 
a lifelong intellectual collaboration. 
By 1844, then, Marx had become a communist. Unlike the Left 
Hegelians, Marx)s political commitments did not remain armchair 
convictions but formed the basis for intense organizational work that 
led, with Engels) to the Communist Manifesto in 1848. The defeat of the 
revolutions of 1848 and the subsequent political reaction confirmed the 
main thesis of the Manifesto that history was the result of class struggles. 
This radical position meant that Marx was forced into another exile, 
this time in England, and an extended period of further research into 
political economy. 
Ironically, in turning to political economy to understand revolu-
tionary failure, Marx followed Hegel, whose "dialectic of lordship and 
bondage" (i.e. master-slave dialectic) is based on a reading of classical 
political economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo (Lukacs 1975: 
301-466). Not knowing this history, Marx saw this as a radical break 
with Hegel, claiming that: 
My dialectical method is not only different from the Hegelian, 
but its direct opposite. To Hegel ... the process of thinking, 
which under the name of "the Idea" he even transforms into 
an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and 
the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the 
Idea': With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than 
the material world reflected by the human mind and translated 
into forms of thought. (Cl: 19) 
There is considerable evidence that the materialist content of Marx's cri-
tique of political economy is expressed within dialectical forms directly 
derived from Hegel's philosophy (Rosdolsky 1977). Marx's preparatory 
work for Capital, the Grundrisse, employs a dialectical schema taken 
from Hegel's Logic (Uchida 1988), and Capital itselfis best reconstructed 
through dialectical forms (Smith 1989). That is not surprising, because, 
as Marx says, his methodology is formally Hegelian, and his conception 
of "science" is based on Hegel's idea of a dialectical reconstruction of 
the results of natural and social sciences (Zeleny 1980). Marx's break 
with Hegel is also a return to Hegel. 
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Species being and creative praxis 
.Many brief introductions to Marx scarcely mention Ludwig Feuerbach 
(1804-72), the radical philosopher who inspired Marx (and Engels) to 
turn to materialism. In The Essence of Christianity (1841), Feuerbach 
inverted Hegel by using the dialectical method together with a material-
ist anthropology. Instead of studying historical forms of consciousness, 
Feuerbach regarded "the subject" as the human animal in the natural 
environment. As Engels afterwards summarized, Feuerbach maintains 
that "nothing exists outside of nature and man, and the higher beings 
our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of 
our own essence" (MESW: 592). The human animal projects its natural 
capacities onto abstract ideas and an imaginary being: divine love and 
Christian morality are really humanity's capacity for natural affection 
and social solidarity. Christ is the "species being" of humanity in an 
alienated, inverted form. 
According to Feuerbach's reading, then, idealist philosophy turned 
out to be an alienated expression of social capacities grounded in human 
nature. Consequently, Feuerbach called for a radical "new philosophy 
[that] makes human beings (including nature, as the basis for human 
beings) into the sole, the universal, and the highest object of philosophy. 
It therefore makes anthropology, including physiology, into the univer-
sal science" (Schmidt 1971: 25, Feuerbach cited). In Feuerbach's concept 
of species being, Marx found the inspiration for a new philosophy. What 
Feuerbach lacked, though, according to Marx, was the relentlessly his-
torical approach of Hegel. The idealist philosopher had grasped the his-
torical development of the human essence, but failed to understand this 
in terms of humanity's natural species being. Feuerbach's materialism 
had understood humanity's natural species being, but he had imagined 
that this was something static and ahistorical (MESW: 29). 
For Marx, the idea that human beings are natural animals, who must 
satisfy basic needs through the collective transformation of the natural 
environment in order to generate their material conditions of exist-
ence, has revolutionary implications. The human being is a labouring 
animal, whose species being consists in the social transformation of the 
natural world (MECW3: 277), so that "labour [is] the essence of man'' 
(ibid.: 333). The human being, Marx went on to claim, is a "universal 
animal" who, because it is conscious, can imitate the transformations of 
nature performed by any other animal and, indeed, can imaginatively 
transcend the instinct-driven "work'' of the animal kingdom. Labour, 
though, is historical: as the implements and methods of labour vary, 
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human beings alter the expression of their essence. The consequence 
is that labour is both generated by human species being and in turn 
forms that species being as a historical product. Furthermore, labour 
is collective and therefore social: 
The human being is in the most literal sense a zoon politikon [a 
socio-political animal], not merely a gregarious animal, but an 
animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society. 
Production by an isolated individual outside society . . . is as 
much an absurdity as is the development of language without 
human beings living together. (Marx 1973: 84) 
To summarize, social labour by this universal animal transforms the 
natural environment into the material conditions of human society, and 
at the same time transforms the historical expression of the labourers' 
essence through the actualisation of human potentials. 
Marx's materialism has been described as ((non-ontological" (Schmidt 
1971). That description is intended to highlight something important 
about Marx's idea of human nature. Marx most definitely has a theory 
of human nature, but, as Norman Geras {1983) points out, it is the 
Greek concept of physis (potential powers) rather than the Roman idea 
of natura naturans (fixed nature). Marx is proposing a shifting equilib-
rium between the natural environment and human society, in which the 
((retreat of the natural boundary", that is the gradual transcendence of 
natural necessity by creative labour, shapes humanity as it forms soci-
ety and transforms nature. History means the development of human 
nature, that is, of human powers, capacities and needs (Sayers 1998: 
164). This is the fundamental meaning of Marx's famous dictum that 
"human nature is ... the ensemble of social relations" (MESW: 29). 
Marx's insistence that social labour is creative self-transformation, at 
the same time as it is the transformation of nature and the production 
of society, informs the normative conception of "praxis" that guides 
Marxism. For Marx, praxis is not only a material activity, but also rep-
resents an intellectual synthesis of theory, practice and art. Praxis as the 
completely free, creative transformation of nature, society and human-
ity can only happen in a social condition of material abundance, Marx 
thinks. Marx therefore often contrasts praxis, as a normative standard, 
with labour, as the historical reality of brutal drudgery under conditions 
of semi-starvation and social domination. 
Marx's materialist inversion of Hegel, a prolongation of Feuerbach's 
breakthrough, leads him to concentrate on the history of labour as the 
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key to human history. The history of labour, undertaken through an 
investigation of political economy, especially the works of Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo, discloses the extent to which praxis, as the potential 
of human nature, has been realized in actual societies. 
Against the background of his social and political concerns, Marx 
understood that the historical development of the labour process was 
both beneficial and destructive. Following the political economists, 
Marx holds that the division of labour - the social practice of spe-
cialized work, beginning with the splits between domestic and public 
labour, and then the division between mental and manual labour - is 
the key to productivity increases, and therefore to social prosperity. The 
labour process develops historically only through increasing speciali-
zation within the social division of labour. This is crucial for creating 
a situation of material abundance, freedom from want, said to release 
human creative potentials. But at the same time, unlike the political 
economists, Marx holds that the division of labour is also the key to 
generating a class society. The polarization of wealth observed by Marx 
and Engels during the Industrial Revolution had, they both argued, 
historical roots lying in the development of the division oflabour. This 
went right back to the development in pre-historical socities of a labour-
based split between men and women. On this foundation, they argued, 
class society emerged from the division between manual and mental 
labour, with the creation of a group specialized in attending to the affairs 
of society as a whole. 
Alienated labour 
In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx frames 
the historical and materialist version of the "new philosophy" as a 
reflection on the "alienation" of praxis into labour. For Hegel, aliena-
tion describes the way that an idea, once externalized in an object, can 
appear as something estranged from the subject. In particular, society is 
generated from the idea of freedom by humanity as a collective subject, 
but because of historical limitations in the development ofliberty, soci-
ety appears to the individual as an alien, coercive reality. Significantly, 
when Hegel formulated this idea, he was also engaged in research into 
political economy (Lukacs 1975). But unlike Hegel, Marx supposes that 
this condition of alienation is grounded in material conditions, not 
just in historical ideas. Accordingly, Marx's term "alienation" must not 
be confused with psychological suffering and the individual's personal 
feeling of anomie (lack of integration into society). 
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For Marx, alienation is caused by the link between the social division 
of labour and the institution of private property in capitalist society. 
The institution of private property appears as the "product, result and 
inevitable consequence of the alienated mode of labour" and derives 
from the mechanisms of the social division of labour, within which 
"each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced 
upon him and from which he cannot escape" (MECWS: 47). In Adam 
Smith's famous example of the pin factory, breaking down the entire 
(skilled) labour process into detail tasks, and assigning individual 
workers to these repetitive and unskilled routines, yields tremendous 
efficiencies and vast profits. In fact, the general principle of the divi-
sion of labour operates across entire economies, with major divisions 
between agriculture, manufacture and trade, and ramifying distinctions 
between specialized industries. From the perspective of those individu-
als condemned within the division oflabour to unskilled, manual work, 
capitalism involves loss of control over the labour process and material 
impoverishment. But from the standpoint of the "collective worker", of 
the society as a whole, the opposite is true: there is massive expansion 
in material wealth, immense increase in technological sophistication, 
intellectual and cultural revolutions unprecedented in human history, 
and an impressive new raft of rights and institutions, pointing the way to 
self-government. When it is not simply tragic, history, regarded through 
this lens, is a paradox, an enigma. 
To solve the "riddle of history': Marx conceptualizes alienated labour 
as an existential condition, rooted in the mutilation of praxis caused by 
the division of labour. According to Marx, alienation has four aspects 
(MECW3: 275-7): 
1. from the product oflabour (which, as social wealth, contributes 
only to the worker's impoverishment); 
2. from the natural world (which appears only as raw materials); 
3. from the other person (human beings' mutual relations are medi-
ated by commodities); and 
4. from themselves (the worker's animal functions become the refuge 
of their humanity, while their human creativity is bestialized in 
labour). 
In alienated labour, the worker "does not affirm but contradicts his 
essence" - "instead of developing his free physical and mental ener-
gies, he mortifies his body and ruins his mind" (ibid.: 274). This means 
that "the more the worker toils, the more powerful becomes the alien 
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world of objects he produces to oppose him, and the poorer he himself 
becomes'' (ibid.: 272). 
The alienation of labour, the mutilation of praxis caused by the divi-
sion of labour and private property, is a negation of the labourer's self-
realization as a free and creative individual. As Herbert Marcuse points 
out (Marcuse 1999: 282), this provides a powerful insight into Marx's 
version of the dialectical method, and in particular into the otherwise 
arcane terms the ((unity of opposites" and the ((negation of the nega-
tion'~ The opposition between labour and capital is one in which capital 
"negates" labour. But this is a unity of opposites, because both poles of 
the opposition spring from the contradictory nature of capitalism. But, 
Marx adds, the negation oflabour by capital will itself be negated with the 
abolition of alienated labour, through the elimination of the institution 
of private property and its enforced division oflabour (MECW3: 342). 
Now, there is something important to notice about all of this. Until 
the 1850s, Marx thinks that the problem with capitalism is alienated 
labour, which leads to maldistribution of economic wealth and the exis-
tential mutilation of the working class. Consequently, Marx claims that 
the proletariat is: 
a class with radical chains ... which has a universal character by 
its universal suffering and claims no particular right because no 
particular wrong, but wrong generally, is perpetuated against it; 
which can invoke no historical, but only human, title; ... which 
. . . is the complete loss of man and hence can win itself only 
through the complete re-winning of man. (ibid.: 186) 
Accordingly, many things might be said of capitalism - it is unnatural, 
immoral and oppressive. The fact of classes, arising from the division of 
labour and private property, transforms freedom into an empty abstrac-
tion. What Marx does not say is that it is exploitative. Marx thinks that 
commodity production, under a system of free competition and waged 
labour, means that the labour contract represents an equal exchange: 
money wages in return for commodities produced. 
During the 1850s, as Marx's research into political economy deep-
ened, Marx realized that the wage contract involved economic exploita-
tion and not just alienated labour conditions. This shift was catalysed 
by historical developments, for in the European revolutions of 1848, the 
bourgeoisie shifted decisively to the side of anti-liberal aristocracies, 
breaking its alliance with the emergent proletariat by abandoning the 
barricades. The bourgeoisie had achieved economic dominance and, 
marx before marx1sm 23 
more frightened of proletarian insurrection than aristocratic reaction, 
became a conservative class. This momentous change triggered a major 
transition in Marx, from the materialist inversion of Hegel to a properly 
historical materialism, and it profoundly altered his conception of the 
relation between practice, structure and history. 
Marx's insight into capitalist exploitation is based on a critical read-
ing of David Ricardo's Principles of Political Economy (1817). In many 
respects, however, Marx now breaks with the normatively rich theory 
of alienation, moving in the direction of descriptive social science. 
For where the young Marx had thought that alienation was a moral 
wrong, perhaps surprisingly the mature Marx maintains that exploita-
tion is ((a natural consequence of the relations of production" ( C3: 333 ). 
Nonetheless, the idea of exploitation relies on what Marx described as 
his most important contribution to the critique of political economy in 
the first volume of Capital (1867). This was Marx's philosophical analy-
sis of the oppositions between use-value and exchange-value, concrete 
and abstract labour, paid labour time and unpaid labour time. These 
oppositions, explained in a moment, effectively recast, in the terms of 
political economy, the opposition between praxis and labour that was 
central to the idea of alienation. The result is contradictory. On the one 
hand, Marx rejects moral language in describing exploitation. On the 
other hand, because exploitation recasts alienation in terms of political 
economy, the whole idea relies on the normatively rich philosophical 
anthropology of Marx's early work. The mature Marx both has and does 
not have a theory of human nature with moral implications. 
The labour theory of value 
Marx's critique of Ricardo is crucial to the difference between Hegel 
and Marx, for Hegel had uncritically adopted Ricardo's results. Ricardo 
recasts the political economy of Adam Smith in two decisive ways. First, 
he regards the source of wealth for capitalists, labourers and landown-
ers as arising from different things (profits, wages and rent), breaking 
Smith's undifferentiated connection between the entire population and 
the ((wealth of nations" into three component parts. The implication is 
that capitalism is a class society where different groups have distinct 
material interests, rather than society being just a national aggregate of 
roles in the total social production process. And second, Ricardo rejects 
as absurd Smith's idea that commodities have a natural value, expressed 
as a monetary price, which is based on supply and demand. According 
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to Ricardo, the natural value of a commodity is the socially average 
("necessary") labour time that went into the manufacture of the item. 
According to Ricardo, capitalism is fair because although labour is 
the source of value, proportionality is retained. The labourers are paid 
the equivalent in monetary wages of the value of the commodities that 
they produce (minus costs and rent). But then what is profit? Brilliant 
as it is, Ricardo's theory has a major hole in it: if labour is the source of 
value, and profit is a surplus beyond the recovery of the capitalist's costs 
and the expense on wages, then profit must be surplus value extracted 
from labour beyond the share of the total product that wages, rent and 
the capitalist's expense represent. Profit must ultimately come from 
labour performed for free. This is the germ of the specifically Marxist 
version of the labour theory of value. 
To explain this insight theoretically, Marx had to develop a philo-
sophical analysis of the commodity form of the social product and relate 
this to the ability, or power, of the labourer to perform socially useful 
work. Commodities are items that satisfy socially defined human needs 
and which are produced under two special conditions: the units of pro-
duction are not communal but mutually separated ("private property"» 
and the exchange generally happens through the medium of money. 
Thus the definition of a commodity as "a utility made by private produc-
ers for sale on the market" implies a conceptual division in the object 
between its ability to satisfy a socially determined human need (its use 
value) or utility for the consumer) and the end for which it was pro-
duced (its exchange value, or tradable worth). Money, as "the embodi-
ment of social labour" (TSV3: 130), is a special commodity that reflects 
the exchange value of other commodities by functioning as a universal 
equivalent, that is a medium for the representation of value, as well as 
being something that is bought and sold on the market. 
The separation of the units of production and the integration of their 
products through the exchange process means that capitalism is paradoxi-
cally both more and less social than other modes of production. Labour 
is a social process not only because individuals must cooperate in a work-
place, but because in a capitalist society with an extensive division of 
labour, the satisfaction of the totality of needs in the community requires 
a vast collaboration by the entire society. Yet this collaboration is accom-
plished through the blind mechanism of the market and is accompanied 
by the private appropriation of the surplus social product. Although 
capitalism goes beyond communal production and barter systems in its 
socialization of labour, it is at the same time deeply anarchic and indi-
vidualistic in its organization of production and distribution, respectively. 
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The difference between use and exchange mirrors another distinc-
tion, between concrete and abstract labour. Concrete labour is the 
expenditure of human effort by a specific individual in the production 
of a determinate item with a socially defined use value, whereas abstract 
labour is the socially necessary labour time required by an average indi-
vidual, which determines the exchange value of the item. Significantly 
modifying Ricardo, Marx argues that the exchange value of a commod~ 
ity reflects the socially necessary labour time required for its production 
at the moment of exchange. Thus, according to the labour theory of 
value, advances in production techniques actually devalue existing com-
modities. With the distinction between abstract and concrete labour in 
mind, what Marx means by "socially necessari' is the average labour 
time required by a worker of median skill under the generally obtaining 
conditions in the industry in question to produce the thing in question 
(Cl: 44-5). What Marx calls "real abstraction' is the social dominance 
of abstract labour over concrete labour: 
All labour is, speaking physiologically, an expenditure of 
human labour power, and in its character of identical abstract 
human labour, it creates and forms the value of commodities. 
On the other hand, all labour is the expenditure of human 
labour power in a special form and with a definite aim, and 
in this, its character of concrete useful labour, it produces use 
values. (Cl: 46) 
Following the twofold character of labour and the difference between 
use and exchange, Marx introduces a further distinction within the 
notion of labour. The exchange value of the commodity labour power, 
reflected in the wage, is the amount required to sustain the workers 
and their dependents (that is the value needed to reproduce labour 
power). The use value oflabour power is labour itself, the transforma-
tion of nature into items of utility. The implication is that for part of 
the day the labourer reproduces their labour power. For the rest of the 
day, they perform labour for the capitalist. The value produced by the 
worker therefore consists of two parts: the paid labour that is reflected in 
wages, and unpaid labour or surplus value, appropriated by the employer 
as profit, in the uniquely capitalist form of the extraction of the social 
surplus product: 
[A] false appearance distinguishes waged labour from other 
historical forms of labour. On the basis of the wages system 
even the unpaid labour seems to be paid labour. With the 
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slave, on the contrary, even that part of his labour which is 
paid appears to be unpaid. Of course, in order to work the slave 
must live, and one part of his working day goes to replace the 
value of his own maintenance. But since no bargain is struck 
between him and his master, and no acts of selling and buying 
are going on between the two parties, all his labour seems to 
be given away for nothing. Take, on the other hand, the peas-
ant serf ... This peasant worked, for example, three days for 
himself on his own field or the field allotted to him, and the 
three subsequent days he performed compulsory and gratui-
tous labour on the estate of his lord. Here, then, the paid and 
unpaid parts of labour were sensibly separated, separated in 
time and space ... In point of fact, however, whether a man 
works three days of the week for himself on his own field and 
three days for nothing on the estate of his lord, or whether 
he works in the factory or the workshop six hours daily for 
himself and six for his employer, comes to the same, although 
in the latter case the paid and unpaid portions of labour are 
inseparably mixed up with each other, and the nature of the 
whole transaction is completely masked by the intervention 
of a contract and the pay received at the end of the week. The 
gratuitous labour appears to be voluntarily given in the one 
instance, and to be compulsory in the other. That makes all 
the difference. ( MESW: 211) 
The commodity form of labour power - the workers' capacity to per-
form multiples of socially average labour time - depends on their free-
dom. This means both their freedom from extra-economic coercion, 
unlike the slave and the serf, but also their "freedom" from possession 
of the means of production. Finally, the value of the wage, the value of 
the commodity labour power, reflects a dynamic equilibrium. There is 
a tendency to decrease because of advances in techniques for producing 
workers' necessities. There is also a tendency to increase because of what 
Marx called a "historical and moral element", that is improvements in 
education and training resulting from high-tech production and gains 
that reflect successful union struggles. 
Capital accumulation and historical dedine 
The details of Marx's discussion of labour power and the commodity 
form are crucial to understanding Marxism. By contrast, when we turn 
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to the other volumes of Capital, only the results of Marx's investigation 
of the accumulation of capital and the crisis tendencies of the system are 
important for present purposes. It is beyond the scope of this book to 
examine Marx's formulae or to consider questions of the transformation 
of values into prices, the mathematical form of the falling rate of profit 
tendency or other specialized issues. 
That is not to imply that Marxian economics is unimportant. 
Alongside the development of Marx's social philosophy, of course) 
Marxian economics is now a completely mathematical and highly spe. 
cialized field whose predictive capacity and sophisticated modelling 
rivals neo-classical economics. Highlights include Pierro Sraffa's neo. 
Ricardian reconstruction of Marxian economics (Sraffa 1975), Makoto 
Ito's mathematical consideration of Marxian economics (Ito 1988), 
Michel Aglietta's analysis of post-war American capitalism (Aglietta 
1979), Samir Amin's examination of the world economy (Amin 1974) 
and Giovanni Arrighi's study of finance capitalism in the twentieth cen. 
tury (Arrighi 1994). 
Marx's "general law of capitalist accumulation'' describes the replace-
ment of variable capital, or "living labour': in the production process by 
constant capital, or "dead labour': Marx proposes that although absolute 
surplus value can be generated by increasing the duration and intensity 
oflabour, the specifically capitalist form of exploitation is the generation 
of relative surplus value, through improving the productivity of labour 
(Cl: 508-18). Through the introduction of new machinery, capitalism 
stimulates technological innovation, but "like every other instrument for 
increasing the productivity oflabour, machinery is intended to cheapen 
commodities, and, by shortening the part of the working day in which 
the worker works for himself, to lengthen the part he gives the capitalist 
for nothing,, (ibid.: 371). The drive to technological innovation, whose 
mechanism is exploitation through the production of surplus value, 
increases labour productivity (new techniques, improved machinery) 
and reduces the value oflabour power (cheap goods, weakened unions). 
The major philosophical point is that class struggle and the exploitation 
oflabour are therefore the same thing as the accumulation of capital and 
the expansion of value. Capitalist exploitation is driven by the "world 
spirit)) of money, that is, by the dynamic of accumulation and the logic 
of value. ('Accumulate, accumulate!" Marx writes: ('Accumulation for 
accumulation's sake, production for production's sake: by this formula 
[is] expressed the historical mission of the bourgeoisie" (ibid.: 595). 
Marx devotes the second volume of Capital to the complex proc-
ess of expanded reproduction, which involves a dynamic equilibrium 
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between different economic sectors that he divides, for simplicity, into 
Department I (means of production) and Department II (consumer 
goods). In the third volume of Capital, Marx introduces competition 
and brings two aspects of accumulation - the generation of relative sur-
plus value through technological innovation and the cannibalization of 
firms in competition - together. The "concentration and centralization 
of capital" means the concentration of means of production through 
technological innovation and the centralization of many capitals into 
vast corporations. 
Marx demonstrates is that there is a relationship between market 
competition and the class dimension of exploitation, because compe-
tition enforces capitalist discipline on "individual capitals", who then 
"must conduct themselves as capital" (Marx 1973: 657). Although 
competition imposes capitalism's inherent tendencies on individual 
entrepreneurs, the main mechanism generating the concentration and 
centralization of capital is the periodic crises that beset the system. 
According to Marx, periodic crises of the over-production of com-
modities happen as a natural consequence of the anarchy of capitalist 
production, thanks to the tendency of capital to migrate in the direc-
tion of higher rates of profit, combined with the inability to rationally 
plan the capitalist economy. When this happens, an economic "busC 
or crisis is triggered fol1owing a spectacular boom, with the result that 
many firms are made bankrupt and cannibalized by the survivors. "The 
violent destruction of capital': he writes in the Grundrisse, "not by rela-
tions external to it, but rather as a condition of its self-preservation, is 
the most striking form in which it is given to it to be gone and to give 
room to a higher state of social production" (ibid.: 749-50). 
Periodic crises result in a temporary increase in the general rate of 
profit as a consequence of the destruction of some capitals (plus some-
times a lowering of wages because of high unemployment). The proc-
ess precipitates a new round of technological innovation together with 
the concentration and centralization of capital, until a point is reached 
where capitalism has eliminated backward areas. Then the remaining 
firms are so huge that their failure, catalysed by over-production but 
fundamentally caused by declining profits, would imply the complete 
collapse of the economy. Once this happens, the dynamism of capitalism 
is lost. For Marx, therefore, the periodic crises of capitalism culminate 
in a long-term historical tendency to stagnation in the capitalist mode 
of production. 
To explain this, Marx develops an analysis of the tendency of capi-
tal to migrate away from advanced economic sectors, industries and 
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countries to backward sectors, industries and countries, in search 
of higher rates of profit. Marx believes that he can demonstrate~ 
tendency for investment costs to rise with technological innovation. 
When combined with an equilibrium rate of profit generalized across 
the entire economy, this means a general tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall (Tendency of the Falling Rate of Profit: TFRP). Mane 
stated that "this is in every respect the most important law of political 
economy, and the most essential for understanding the most difficult 
relations. It is the most important law from the historical standpoint,, 
(ibid.: 748). 
The implication of the TFRP is historical in the Hegelian sense that 
it indicates the epochal rise and fall of capitalism. Because the dynam-
ics of capitalism lead to the migration of capital to under-developed 
sectors, this industrialization spreads nationally and then internation-
ally, but ultimately, "beyond a certain point, the development of the 
forces of production becomes a barrier for capital; hence the capital-
relation a barrier for the development of the productive powers of 
labour" (ibid.: 749). This barrier has the phenomenal appearance of the 
TFRP, whose consequence is generalized stagnation, in the capitalist 
version of the long crisis of feudalism. To explain why this had not 
already transpired, Marx hypothesized that several counter-tendencies 
to the TFRP existed, which prolonged the life-expectancy of capitalism 
through temporarily raising profits. Probably the most important of 
these from the historical perspective is foreign investment and colo-
nial exploitation, since these provide potentially vast opportunities for 
generating superprofits. 
Marx and Engels both anticipated the collapse of capitalism within 
their lifetimes. Volume 1 of Capital closes on exactly this note of expec-
tation: "the [death] knell of capitalist property sounds; the expropria-
tors are expropriated!" (Cl: 763). Many Marxists have continued this 
tradition, with every generation bringing forth a new prediction of the 
imminent end of exploitation in a catastrophe scenario. 
Social classes 
The intention behind Capital is now clear: the proletarian revolution 
merely prosecutes the inherent contradiction of the capitalist mode of 
production, its historical tendency to stagnation, through to its final 
consequence. Accordingly, Marx's concept of class is one that is based 
on exploitation and is relational and antagonistic, where classes embody 
30 understanding marx1sm 
the historical movement of social contradictions. He writes that the 
roletarian and the capitalist are merely «personifications" of the pro-
~uctive forces and relations of production (respectively) (Marx 1973: 
J03-4). The main idea is that the exploitation relation is the basis for 
the objective material interests of social classes. This is certainly not an 
income stratification or occupational status model. It is therefore quite 
unlike common sociological and popular conceptions of "class". It is also 
incomplete: Volume 3 of Capital broaches the question of definitions 
_ and here the manuscript trails off into the ellipsis of Marx's death. In 
an incredible historical irony, Marx's influential theory of class struggle 
did not provide a full definition of social class. 
Nonetheless, Marx did provide voluminous historical writings on 
class struggles (Draper 1977). Taking Marx's historical writings as a 
basis, a straightforward model of classes as formed through exploita-
tion at the point of production has been successfully applied to ancient 
society and slave-based production (de Ste Croix 1981), and to feudal 
society in the late middle ages (Bois 1984). Nonetheless, Marx acknowl-
edges in his historical writings that status gradations and control over 
the labour process play a significant role in the complexities of histori-
cally existing social classes. 
Turning to capitalism, the working class, according to Marx, is the 
waged, collective worker who engages in the productive and unpro-
ductive labour that generates a social surplus product. Because of 
lack of ownership of the means of production, this surplus product is 
appropriated by the capitalists indirectly through the wage form. Marx 
considers not just manual production of surplus value, but also the 
unproductive waged work of domestic servants, commercial employ-
ees and administrative clerks (Marx 1973: 305-6). The capitalist class 
is the class that exploits waged labour through its ownership of the 
means of production. Marx argues that the entire class of exploiters 
redistributes the social surplus product through market mechanisms, 
so that industrial capitalists, financial capitalists and stock-holding 
"rentiers" are part of the same class (TSV2: 29). Capitalists generally 
delegate the control function implicit in property ownership to man-
agers who may not be members of the ruling class. And third, there 
are the landed aristocracy, who live by exploiting ground rent from 
tenant farmers. Marx in general acknowledges that although there are 
"three great classes of modern society>: there are many "intermediate 
and transitional strata [that] obliterate line of [class] demarcation,, {C3: 
794, 862). These are in addition to the family businesspeople ("petite 
bourgeoisie"), who are in Marx's terms small capitalists, because they 
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labour collectively and share profits, while owning their own means of 
production. Finally, Marx describes as the «lumpenproletariat" those 
who are semi-permanently not in legal employment, including crimi-
nals and beggars. 
In fact, many of the "classes" from the Communist Manifesto (and 
elsewhere) are actually status groups and not social classes. Marx and 
Engels acknowledge that the "manifold gradation of social rank'' has 
an important role in pre-capitalist societies. The "intermediate strata» 
of capitalism suggest that the situation has remained complicated. 
Sometimes, Marx does indeed recognize that the proletariat "constit-
ute[s] [a] constantly declining proportion (even though it increases 
absolutely) of the total population" (TSV3: 63). There is an extensive 
debate in Marxist theory on how to define the middle strata, so-called 
because, first, the middle class is not a fundamental class of produc-
tion, but rather a series of gradations between bourgeoisie and pro-
letariat, and, second, the term "middle class" is sometimes confused 
with the bourgeoisie, on grounds that the bourgeoisie were the class in 
between peasantry and aristocracy in the feudal mode of production. 
Erik Olin Wright helpfully defines classes primarily by the exploitation 
relation (e.g. wages), secondarily by a control relation in the means of 
production (e.g. management and employees) and thirdly by control 
over the labour process itself (e.g. professional occupations, salaried 
employees and waged workers; Wright 1979: 14-21). These definitions 
provide for a segmented scale with bourgeois and proletarian at either 
end, and a series of "contradictory class locations" that shade from 
fractions of the ruling class (e.g. senior corporate executives), through 
the vast middle strata, to fractions of the working class (e.g. office work-
ers). Many salaried professionals with educational credentials would 
qualify on these definitions as members of the middle strata, because 
of their control of the labour process and direction of other employees, 
together with employment permanence and material privileges associ-
ated with social prestige. 
Despite the ramifying complexity of class societies, Marx and Engels 
announce in The Communist Manifesto that "[capitalist] society as a 
whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps,, 
(MESW: 36). In Capital, Marx holds that an historical process of pro-
letarianization of the working population is a necessary consequence 
of the general law of capital accumulation (Cl: 763). This thesis on the 
simplification of class formation in advanced capitalism is stated with 
qualifications, but it performs important theoretical work, because it 
clearly links economic history with political strategy. 
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Women's liberation 
Class formation - already complex - is further complicated by the gen-
dered division of labour involving (mainly) unpaid domestic labour, 
performed mostly by women, and waged productive labour, undertaken 
most often by men. According to Lise Vogel, "Marx put forward posi-
tions that upheld the rights of women and protected, to the best of his 
understanding, the interests and future of all members of the working 
class" (Vogel 1983: 70). Marx was a consistent advocate of women's 
liberation, and Engels's work The Origin of the Family, Private Property 
and the State (1884) is a major Marxist statement on the oppression of 
women that is based on Marx's ethnographic notebooks of 1880-81. 
Marx and Engels identified the subordination of women as involv-
ing lack of political rights, denial of access to socially recognized and 
monetarily rewarded labour, and loss of control over their actions and 
bodies in the patriarchal household. They also denounced the system 
of enforced participation in an asymmetrical system of sexual moral-
ity - monogamy - that restricted women's sexuality while encourag-
ing male promiscuity. Despite describing the position of the woman in 
the household of both bourgeois and proletarian families as "slavery': 
however, Marx does not regard the modern relation between men and 
women as a class relation. 
The young Marx regards the relation between men and women as 
an elementary indicator of emancipation in general, for "the extent to 
which the other person, as a person, has become for him a need [is] 
the extent to which he in his individual existence is a social being" 
(MECW3: 296). In these passages (as elsewhere), Marx uses the German 
word Mensch, which means "human being': rather than Manner, which 
means "men': but English translations from the 1950s and 1960s give the 
misleading impression that Marx thinks that men exemplify humanity 
and that women are merely an additional specification. In fact, Marx 
was highly radical for his time, believing that the liberation of men 
and women would not only eliminate social inequalities, but also cul-
minate in the abolition of the family and in a non-exclusive sexuality. 
By contrast, Engels, perhaps more conservatively, holds that human 
emancipation would make exclusive lifelong sexual bonds possible for 
the first time in history since the advent of class society (Draper 1972). 
Both Marx and Engels documented the terrible social conditions of 
the European working classes. They described widespread child labour, 
the inability of pregnant women to stop working, and the leap in pros-
titution and alcoholism during the nineteenth century as bestialization 
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and demoralization. They also described the "latent slavery in the 
family" that involved domestic labour and the agency of the male worker 
as a broker for the labour of his wife and children (Vogel 1983: 44-50). 
But in actuality, Marx and Engels maintained, patriarchal authoritarian-
ism and property relations had been combined long before capitalism. 
Engels's explanation for this situation, based on Marx's notebooks, 
was that the subordination of women originated with the advent of 
classes and that in fact the conditions of women's oppression improved 
with the progress of the productive forces. The institution of bourgeois 
marriage was basically a property transaction involving legalized pros-
titution, but the dissolution of traditional familial bonds at least fatally 
weakened the patriarchal authority of the male head of the household 
(MESW: 499, 507). 
Tracing the evolution of the family and its relation to property, Engels 
argued that the division of labour with the advent of agrarian communi-
ties was the basis for class society, because it enabled the production of 
a social surplus. Engels proposed that the appropriation of the social 
surplus directly implied property relations, with the consequence that 
the accumulation of wealth becomes a social question for the minority 
able to command the surplus. This minority, Engels conjectured, con-
sisted of men who had been charged in the natural division of labour 
with supplying the household with food and defending it from raids. 
The production of a surplus made possible the consolidation of power 
in men's hands, with the consequence that ('mother right': the supremacy 
of the female head of the household, was defeated. "The overthrow of 
mother right was the world historic defeat of the female sex'', Engels 
wrote: "the man seized the reins in the house; the woman was degraded, 
enthralled, the slave of the man's lust, a mere instrument for breeding 
children'' (ibid.: 488). 
In this context, Engels claimed that the monogamous family was 
"the first form of the family to be based not on natural but on eco-
nomic conditions - on the victory of private property over primitive, 
natural, communal property" (ibid.: 494). He therefore maintains that 
"the first class antagonism which appears in history coincides with the 
development of the antagonism between man and woman in monoga-
mous marriage, and the first class oppression is that of the female sex 
by the male" (ibid.: 495). The first classes, in other words, are men and 
women. For this reason, monogamous marriage appears at the end of 
the pre-historic era "as the subjection of one sex by the other, as the 
proclamation of a conflict between the sexes entirely unknown hith-
erto" (ibid.: 494). 
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The struggle to overcome the remainders from maternal right and 
matrilineal succession was historically protracted, Engels argues, and 
continued into antiquity. But sexual class antagonism quickly yielded 
to slave-based production as the social division oflabour ramified and 
the productive forces increased. Marx and Engels accept the compli-
cation of the major theses of historical materialism that this implies. 
However, they argue that although the male member of an exploited 
class (slave, serf, worker) has the female member of that class perform 
domestic labour for him, that labour reproduces the labour power of 
the male, which is then exploited by the ruling class. Thus, Marx and 
Engels appear to reason, familial relations are oppressive (political 
and ideological), but not economically exploitative. Nonetheless, their 
hypothesis suggests that the family represents quasi-class oppression 
with potentially exploitative characteristics, something that sits uneasily 
with the demand for proletarian unity. 
At any rate, the political programme of Marx and Engels is clear: the 
proletarian revolution must involve women's liberation. They demand 
the transformation of domestic labour into publically recognized and 
materially rewarded services, socialization of childcare and the edu-
cation of children, abolition of the inheritance of property, and full 
political rights, labour market access and civic participation for women. 
With the nationalization of property, Engels predicts, "the single family 
ceases to be the economic unit of society [and] private housekeeping is 
transformed into a social industry" (MESW: 503). The economic basis 
for women's oppression is eliminated. 
The state 
Marx believes that economic flashpoints around the working day and 
the wages system spontaneously tend to become political conflicts, not 
least because of the need to struggle against unjust laws designed to 
support the capitalist interest. The restriction of unlimited exploitation 
through union organization, culminating in legislation on the eight 
hour day, for instance, was the result of '(a protracted and more or less 
concealed civil war between the capitalist class and the working class" 
(Cl: 412-13). From this perspective, Marx regards the modern nation 
state as an instrument of the capitalist class for the legal enforcement 
of the endogenous "laws of motion'' of capital accumulation, and for 
the armed defence of the institution of private property in the means 
of production. The executive arm of the state, Marx and Engels write, 
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is an expression of the collective exploitation of the working class by 
the capitalist class, a "committee for managing the common affairs of 
the whole bourgeoisie" (MESW: 37), whose centre of gravity is "armed 
bodies of men" expressly intended for the suppression of proletarian 
revolt against the capitalist class. The state is an instrument of class 
domination because "political power, properly so called, is merely the 
organised power of one class for oppressing another" (ibid.: 53), and, 
indeed, it is possession of a state apparatus that converts an economi-
cally dominant class into a ruling class properly speaking. According 
to Marx and Engels, then, politics is mainly a reflection of econom-
ics - specifically, politics is the result of the generalization of the eco-
nomic interests of the exploiting class and the institutionalization of 
these interests in a special body of men and women whose detachment 
from particular interests enables them to represent the interests of that 
class as a whole (ibid.: 577). 
Nonetheless, especially in his historical writings, Marx also acknowl-
edges that the state apparatus, while based on economic interests, has 
relative autonomy of action not only from particular fractions of the 
ruling class, but indeed from that class as a whole. Marx waxes elo-
quent about this consequence of exploitation as an "enormous bureau-
cratic and military organisation, with its extensive and artificial state 
machinery [an] appalling parasitic body" (ibid.: 169), which has the 
capacity under exceptional circumstances to act as a neutral arbiter 
between contending classes. Even in 1852, the "state machinery" had 
at its disposal ''an army of half a million officials" besides its military 
forces. This institutional apparatus makes possible the phenomenon of 
"Bonapartism", military dictatorship led by charismatic figures, where 
the state maintains the stability of the social order by preventing class 
conflict. Although this implies that the relatively autonomous state 
apparatus has the subordinate function of regulating the unity of the 
social formation, it has to be noted that, for Marx, the Bonapartist state, 
by preventing class conflict, effectively preserves private property. For 
this reason, Marx insists that the modern nation state, irrespective of 
its form of government, is a "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie': because 
the distinction between democracy and authoritarianism, although 
it makes a tactical political difference, does not alter the state's class 
foundation. 
A lot of the subsequent debates in Marxism - beginning with 
Engels ~ about the "relative autonomy" of the state from capital and 
the ability of politics to "react back upon" its economic foundation are 
attempts to capture analytically these descriptive positions. Alongside 
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an instrumental position that the state is a machine for maintaining class 
domination and economic exploitation (e.g. ibid.: 37, 169) there is what 
has been called, because of its logical primacy rather than frequency of 
occurrence in Marx's work, ''Marx's general theory of the state" (Draper 
1977: 584). The general claim is that although the state might sometimes 
be directly manipulated by the ruling class, fundamentally its class char-
acter is determined by the dominant property relations (e.g. MESW: 
181-2). Parliamentary democracies sometimes enact reforms against 
the interests of the capitalist class, but these remain capitalist states by 
virtue of their legal defence of private property and their economic 
investment in national infrastructure, which are both beneficial to the 
capitalist class (e.g. Cl: 229, 461). 
For Marx, the bourgeois state apparatus is a ((parasitic excrescence)' 
(MESW: 288 ), not something that the proletarian party captures and 
deploys in the interests of the transformation of capitalism into social-
ism. Marx is adamant that "the first step in the revolution by the 
working class must be to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling 
class" (ibid.: 52), and that the second step is to dismantle the bour-
geois state apparatus (ibid.: 288-90). The proletarian state is a ((social 
republic)) (ibid.: 287) based on participatory democracy by the armed 
population, which abolishes the "social slavery)) of the working class 
through the nationalization of property (ibid.: 290-91). (Mass par-
ticipatory bodies with direct election and open debate have arisen 
in most revolutions since 1871, and have subsequently been called 
''soviets': "workers' councils'', "shoras)' and so forth.) The replacement 
of the nation state and private property with a participatory demo-
cratic social republic based on socialized property provides the key to 
the meaning of Marx's notorious expression '(the dictatorship of the 
proletariat" (ibid.: 259). 
For Marx, every state is inherently a class dictatorship, because it is 
the political expression of the economic relations that form the anatomy 
of society, so that all states defend - with the coercive force that neces-
sarily supports legal relations - the material interests of their ruling 
class. The term ''dictatorship': then, is not used in opposition to "democ-
racy" (for Marx, both parliamentary democracies and authoritarian 
regimes are dictatorships insofar as they express the interests of the 
dominant class) but in opposition to the ''withering away of the state" 
(ibid.: 327-8). For Marx, the "social republic" organizes the elimina-
tion of capitalist property, the global federation of socialist republics 
abolishes remaining inequalities and the stateless communist world is 
a condition of abundance (ibid.: 319-20). 
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The «anarchist" element in Marx must not be forgotten. Marx 
remained all his life an advocate of democracy - initially of parliamen-
tary democracy and then of participatory democracy - and a sometimes 
nostalgic enthusiasm for the democratic ancient Athenian polis. But 
Marx is not a democrat, if what that means is an advocate of democ-
racy as the best regime for a good community and thus the final end 
of political strategy. To be exact, Marx is an instrumental democrat, 
an advocate of democracy as the best means for the self-emancipation 
of the oppressed and the only way to cooperatively organize the "rule 
of the associated producers" during the transition to communism. In 
terms of political strategy, of the ends or goal of social mobilization, 
Marx is actually anti-political, something that follows directly from 
the notion that the state is the expression of exploitation. For Marx, 
politics is the confrontation of class against class at the level of state 
power, and a society without exploitation would have no classes, and 
thus need no state. 
Bourgeois ideology 
According to Marx, the major limitation on the political action of the 
working class is not really the capitalist state, but bourgeois ideology, 
wherein ('men and their relations appear upside down, as in a camera 
obscura" (MECWS: 36). The implication of this celebrated claim is 
that the working class has material interests in social revolution but is 
imbued with false consciousness regarding these material interests. For 
instance, Marx comments that "instead of the conservative motto 'a fair 
day's wages for a fair day's work: [the proletariat] ought to inscribe on 
its banner the revolutionary watchword 'abolition of the wages system'" 
(MESW: 226). As with the materialist inversion of Hegel, the reversal 
of perspective involved in going from bourgeois ideology to proletar-
ian consciousness is said to entail a shift from ideological to scientific 
cognition. 
In Marx's writings, the term "ideology" is used critically to mean a 
distorted representation of social relations centred on material produc-
tion, which by concealing social contradictions serves the interests of 
the ruling class (Larrain 1979). Ideology refers only to that subset of 
ideas that have the social function of justifying class rule: it does not 
mean a class "worldview" (instead, it means specific elements within 
a worldview) and it definitely does not mean ideas in general. Marx's 
contention that "in every epoch, the ruling ideas are the ideas of the 
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ruling class" is a claim about how the most prevalent social ideas are 
likely to be those that have beneficial consequences for the reigning set 
of material interests (a functionalist claim), rather than the notion that 
ideology is a conspiracy. 
The most important way in which sets of ideas function to justify 
class rule is not through directly legitimating domination, but rather 
through rendering it invisible, by naturalizing exploitation and repre-
senting alternatives as impossible or unthinkable. This is a consequence 
of the indirect form of exploitation under capitalism, which presents 
relations of domination as relations of freedom, together with the ten-
dency of the "ruling ideas" to represent society ahistorically. Marx lam-
poons the apologists for capitalism for their uncritical representation of 
capitalism as natural and inevitable, rather than social and historical, 
but he also recognizes that these ideological depictions accurately rep-
resent the way capitalist social relations superficially appear. The realm 
of market exchange really is characterized by formal "equality and free-
dom", Marx notes, but this merely conceals the way that "this apparent 
individual equality and liberty disappear" in the depths of production 
relations, where exploitation means they "prove to be inequality and 
unfreedom" (Marx 1973: 247-48). 
Ideologies are not a deception but rather a structural limitation. 
Ideologies ((do not [intellectually] go beyond the limits which [their 
class] do not go beyond in life", and these limits are fundamentally 
the relations of production (ibid.: 117). Marx maintains that the sur-
face appearances of bourgeois economics (equal exchange) conceal 
the exploitative essence of the wage labour relation, and that classi-
cal political economy is ideological because it merely records these 
surface appearances (C3: 797). In an oft-cited passage, Marx proposes 
that the process of "real abstraction", the rule of equivalence based on 
abstract labour, means that the commodity is "a very queer thing indeed, 
abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties": 
A commodity is ... a mysterious thing, simply because in it the 
social character of men's labour [the exchange value of abstract 
labour] appears to them as an objective character stamped 
upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the 
producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to 
them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but 
between the products of their labour ... it is a definite social 
relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic 
form of a relation between things. (Cl: 45) 
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Commodity production, Marx therefore maintains, generates an 
inverted world of representations that he describes as "commodity fet-
ishism", where the commodity appears to take on the social properties 
of the agent and the worker seems merely a natural object ruled by the 
"general laws of motion) of the economy. This is an "enchanted, per-
verted, topsy-turvy world, in which Monsieur Le Capital and Madame 
La Terre do their ghost-walking as social characters and at the same 
time as mere things,, (C3: 809). 
Marx subtitled his major works "critiques", but he did not imagine 
that intellectual criticism alone would disperse ideological representa-
tions, for he held that because of their naturalization oflimitations, ide-
ologies represented a sort of necessary illusion vital to the perpetuation 
of production relations. The distinction between a class "in itself" (as a 
set of persons positioned in contradictory relations) and "for itself" (as 
a set of persons mobilized within a social antagonism under the banner 
of their material interests) expresses this difficulty. For the proletariat to 
overcome ideology, the organization of"the most advanced and resolute 
section of the working class" into a political party is necessary. For the 
mature Marx, emphatically, this is not a question of the intellectuals 
directing the proletariat, for "the emancipation of the working classes 
must be conquered by the working classes themselves" (Marx & Engels 
1953: 395). 
In the "1859 Preface': Marx claims that the relations of production 
in a social formation are the foundation not only for politics and the 
state, but also for ideological forms of social consciousness. A particular 
focus for criticism is "bourgeois morality): which is arraigned with being 
a non -scientific set of ideas that maintain a supposedly disinterested 
perspective) while in reality naturalizing the standpoint of the isolated 
individual. Political liberalism, with its negative conception of liberty 
as formal rights providing freedom from unwarranted interference by 
others, is likewise taxed with reflecting the same conception of formal 
equality that supports the wage contract (MESW: 97-8). For the mature 
Marx, the communist perspective is based on a scientific analysis of the 
material interests of the proletariat. 
Communist freedom 
The basic tension in Marx's thinking) between the normative critique 
of capitalist alienation and a scientific theory of material interests, 
becomes most evident in the question of post-capitalist society. I would 
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like to broadly follow Habermas's analysis of this problem in what fol-
lows (Habermas 1972: 25-63, 1979a: 130-77). On the one hand, the 
"young Marx" has a normative theory of capitalist alienation, which 
proposes that capitalism involves moral wrong and that individualistic 
definitions of liberty violate higher ideals of political freedom. On the 
other hand, the '(mature Marx" has a descriptive-explanatory theory 
of capitalist exploitation, which proposes that the laws of motion of 
capitalist economics are internally contradictory, so that humanity will 
soon confront a choice between social stagnation and revolutionary 
progress. Although the two are potentially compatible - the descrip-
tive account might clarify the historical conditions of possibility for the 
realistic achievement of the goals of the normative account - in Marx's 
treatment, they tend to be in conflict. 
For Marx, communist politics were distinctively anti-utopian 
because, instead of imposing ((fantastic pictures of a future society" on 
the actual world, historical materialism meant a dialectical analysis of 
the potentials for a social alternative already latent in existing arrange-
ments (MESW: 60). "We call communism the real movement which 
abolishes the present state of things': Marx and Engels wrote in The 
German Ideology (MECWS: 42). In the Communist Manifesto, they 
added that the "theoretical conclusions of the communists are in no 
way based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered, 
by this or that would-be universal reformer [but] merely express, in 
general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle" 
(MESW: 46). This position, held consistently throughout his lifetime, 
made Marx constitutionally allergic to theoretical speculations on post-
capitalist social arrangements. 
Nonetheless, in his Critique of the Gotha Program, Marx did outline 
some basic ideas on the transition from capitalism to socialism under 
the social republic, and then the transition from socialist states to com -
munist society (ibid.: 319-21). Socialism, Marx proposed, involved: 
a communist society, not as it has developed on its own foun-
dations, but, on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist 
society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally 
and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old 
society from whose womb it emerges. Accordingly, the indi-
vidual producer receives back from society ... exactly what he 
gives to it. ... [E]qual right here is still in principle bourgeois 
right, although principle and practice are no longer at logger-
heads. (Ibid.: 319) 
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Exploitation no longer happens, because payment is regulated by a con-
tribution principle rather than the wage contract, but natural inequali-
ties persist, together with social inequalities remaining from capitalism. 
Marx comments that justice in the form of rights "can never be higher 
than the economic structure of society and its cultural development 
conditioned thereby" (ibid.: 320). 
The realm of communist freedom begins with the transcendence 
of naturally imposed necessity, through the generation of material 
abundance, whereupon the communist distributive maxim "from each 
according to his ability, to each according to his needs" replaces formal 
equality (ibid.: 321). Marx held that communism would abolish the 
enslavement of the individual to the division of labour and promote 
the all-round development of human beings (ibid.: 320). Despite com-
ments by the young Marx that suggest the elimination of the division 
of labour entirely, the vision of the mature Marx appears to be one of 
individuals' socially unrestricted participation in material life, rather 
than the demand that each be capable of all, or that natural abilities 
would be irrelevant to individual fulfilment. 
Although Marx advocates principles of distributive justice, it is not 
clear what their normative foundation actually consists in. According 
to Marx, "the communists do not preach morality at alr' (MECWS: 72). 
Principles of distributive justice appear to be natural results of advances 
in the productive forces, not consequences of reasoning about the social 
conditions of moral autonomy and the forms of self-realization that 
constitute human flourishing. In Capital, Marx states unequivocally: 
The justice of the transactions between agents of production 
rests on the fact that these arise as natural consequences out 
of the production relationships. The juristic forms in which 
these economic transactions appear as wilful acts of the par-
ties concerned, as expressions of their common will and as 
contracts that may be enforced by law against some individual 
party, cannot, being mere forms, determine this content. They 
merely express it. This content is just whenever it corresponds, 
is appropriate, to the mode of production. It is unjust whenever 
it contradicts that mode. (C3: 333) 
The mature Marx therefore has a non-moral critique of capitalism as a 
fetter on development, which entails a historical relativization of moral-
ity. The base-and-superstructure model of the mature Marx's social 
theory claims that normative principles are themselves historically 
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variable functions of economic developments. This is the idea that moral 
values and standards of justice are relative to the level of social evolution 
of a historical society, and that means, for Marx, relative to the mode 
of production. It follows that bourgeois morality and capitalist justice 
are valid for capitalist society, but not for future societies; conversely, 
however, there is no trans-historical perspective from which bourgeois 
justice will have been a form of social injustice. Such a relativization 
of normative principles leads Marx to frequently declare that commu-
nism has no place for morality and that freedom reduces to historical 
necessity. 
Marx recognizes the importance of human freedom, in the form of 
political agency, in the socialist revolution, but he does not think that 
this involves a moral imperative. The practical activity of socialist revo-
lution presupposes a relation between human freedom and historical 
necessity: "historical necessity" describes the material preconditions 
for a successful action; political strategy consists in the performance 
of successful actions once these preconditions are satisfied. There is, 
accordingly, no contradiction between Marx's insistence on economic 
developments as historically necessary, his claim that "freedom is the 
recognition of necessity" and the practical activism of Marx's politics. 
But there is also no connection to moral principles (Reiman 1991: 
149-50). 
It is not the case that there is a communist justice which represents a 
higher principle of justice beyond capitalism - for instance, substantive 
equality as opposed to formal equality. Marx does not appear to think 
that at all. Instead, he believed that justice involved conflicting claims 
under conditions of scarcity, from which it follows that communism 
is beyond justice. Norman Geras perhaps sums up the problem best: 
"Marx did think that capitalism was unjust, but he did not think he 
thought so" (Geras 1985: 70). 
From the perspective of the addressees of the theory, however, it 
is crucial that an emancipatory social theory have rational normative 
foundations. Denunciations of "exploitation'' and "oppression" appear 
to invoke the language of moral values and political ideals, and it is 
reasonable to ask what the moral wrongs and losses of freedom are that 
any individual proletarian is supposed to resist. Likewise, even when it 
is clear that no historical process is automatic, the projected "liberation" 
and "emancipation" must seem arbitrary if they arise merely from a 
descriptive account of social evolution, because it is not at all clear that 
consciously accelerating historical tendencies is the same as deliberate 
action towards desirable ends. 
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In principle, a normative clarification of the real stakes in the 
debate, despite what appears to be a set of evolutionary claims about 
normative validity, remains possible. Sometimes Marx does appear to 
be proposing that moral autonomy is a trans-historical principle and 
that historical societies constrain (or do not constrain, in the case of 
communism) its realization. Alternatively, from the perspective of a 
teleological conception of the goal of history in communist society, it 
might be possible to argue that stages of normative development also 
ascend in sequence. In that case, historical values are valid as approxi-
mations to an ideal of human flourishing that will only be realized in 
a final stage of history. 
But the fact is that in Marx's conception, con1munism is a society 
without ideals. Communism is therefore beyond moral autonomy and 
any teleological ideal, despite the fact that it is said to provide the con -
ditions for human flourishing. Why, then, did Marx deny that his was 
a normatively rich critique of capitalism? The answer must be that his 
theory of ideology led him to maintain that moral terminology repre-
sented bourgeois ideology with a merely "tactical" value. Marx appears 
to have thought that normative arguments were centred on the rational 
individual and therefore historically limited by the realities of capital-
ist society. The mature Marx therefore deprived himself of the clear 
normative perspective of the young Marx, whose critique of alienation 
brings together criticism of the social conditions that limit the exercise 
of moral autonomy with a teleological ideal of human flourishing in a 
truly social existence. From the young Marx's perspective, exploitation 
would be a clear moral wrong, because a fundamental principle of moral 
autonomy is the injunction to treat other human beings as free individu-
als with moral dignity, rather than instrumentally manipulating them 
for personal gain. But the mature Marx thought that exploitation was 
not an injustice, and therefore also not a moral wrong. 
The problem is that a resolution of this confusion remained unlikely, 
insofar as Marx thought that there was no point in producing a blueprint 
for communism, especially not a moral one, or in discussing norms of 
justice when the state was going to wither away anyway. The result is a 
paradox, when not a tragedy: perhaps the most successful philosophy of 
politics in the history of Western thought lacked clear normative foun-
dations for its social theory and a political philosophy for its strategic 
programme. Tensions within the thought of the mature Marx, between a 
theory of society with links to the natural sciences and an emancipatory 
philosophy in the heritage of the Enlightenment, exploded into open 
differences among the Marxists. This pulled at the synthesis of praxis, 
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structure and history, teasing apart its elements as social conditions and 
historical experiences confronted mid-nineteenth century theory with 
mid-twentieth century problems. Marxism is the century of effort to 
confront this situation and resolve these problems. 
Summary of key points 
The f'young Marx" 
• Dialectical theory involves progress through contradiction and 
conflict. It emphasizes the unity of conceptual and social oppo-
sites, the way in which antagonism grows out of the limitations 
of a historical form of social life, and the tendency for inherent 
contradictions to transform a phenomenon into its opposite. 
• Marx rejects Hegel's idealism for a materialist position based in 
a philosophical anthropology whose core is the idea of human 
labour as creative praxis, as the transformation of nature, and the 
self-transformation of humanity. 
• Marx's critique of capitalism depends on the category of aliena-
tion - a condition of estrangement from nature, the products of 
labour, other persons and oneself, which is the consequence of 
the division of labour and private property. 
The "mature Marx" 
• Turns from a normative theory of alienation to a descriptive 
theory of exploitation, based on a critical appropriation of the 
labour theory of value, according to which commodities exchange 
for the socially necessary labour time embodied in them. 
• Exploitation happens because of the difference between the value 
of the commodities a worker produces and the value of the work-
er's commodified labour power (the ability to work for a specified 
time in return for wages), which means that the hidden source of 
capitalist profit is unpaid labour time. 
• The accumulation of capital and the exploitation oflabour are the 
same thing, but Marx detects a long-term tendency to stagnation 
(the tendency of the falling rate of profit) in the very mechanism 
of capitalist dynamism, the way that capitalism promotes techno-
logical innovation. 
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Fundamentals of Marxism 
• The bourgeoisie are the owners of the means of production, held 
to exploit the proletariat, the class of persons compelled by lack of 
ownership of the means of production to sell their labour power 
for a wage. These classes are fundamental to capitalism, but many 
other classes exist, including an extensive «middle strata'' whose 
precise boundaries are disputed. 
• Marx is an advocate of womens liberation, holding that although 
the oppression of women predates capitalism, both men and 
women of the working class have a common interest in the abo-
lition of exploitation. 
• Marx holds that the state exercises its monopoly of violence in 
the interests of a defence of the property relations that form its 
foundations, and that the main function of the state is to act as a 
committee of management for the capitalist class. 
• Ideology is "false consciousness", which means a representation 
that is a motivated distortion of the material interests of a social 
group: "motivated" because in the interests of the ruling class; 
"distortion" because a representation of historical social relations 
as natural, just and inevitable. 
• Communism is a hypothetical condition of a worldwide society, 
characterized by the achievement of material abundance, within 
which production would happen according to the abilities of each 
individual, and distribution would happen in line with the needs 
of every person. 
• Socialism is a hypothetical condition of a post-capitalist society 
preliminary to communism, characterized by a world federation 
of socialist states, which would result from anti -capitalist revolu-
tions led by proletarian, communist parties. 
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two 
Classical Marxism 
Karl Marx described his own social and political theory as "histori-
cal materialism", not as ((Marxism': Indeed, upon learning of one early 
version of the consolidation of his ideas into a political doctrine, he 
famously announced that "I am not a Marxist!" (MESW: 679). The 
implication of Marx's statement is that there is a significant difference 
between the complex and provisional nature of a theoretical research 
programme, on the one hand, and the sort of practical simplification 
involved in a political doctrine capable of serving as the foundation for 
a party - and a state - on the other hand. 
Marx was well aware that mass movements are not built around 
abstract research programmes, and he did not oppose turning the main 
conclusions of historical materialism into a political doctrine, formu-
lating a party programme and putting the ideas into practice. Indeed, 
historical materialism calls for its own practical application as the defini-
tive test of theory, for this lends the theory its historical falsifiability, 
differentiating it in an important way from traditional philosophy. Yet, 
as Marx's comments in his "Critique of the Gotha Program" (1875) 
indicate, doctrinal simplification can easily generate vulgarization and, 
ultimately, an oracular statement of "eternal truths" - an ideology. 
Marx, then, did not espouse Marxism. Nonetheless, it was as Marx-
ists, and not as "historical materialists': that the masses marched and the 
leaders acted during the convulsions of the twentieth century. In fact, the 
key figure in the emergence of one of the major political and intellectual 
forces of twentieth-century history is Engels. It was Engels who sorted 
"Marxism" out from a host of contradictory and open-ended research 
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questions in the final work of the mature Marx, and then popularized 
and disseminated it as a political doctrine. The codification, systemati-
zation and simplification of Marx's positions that Engels performed in 
his major works centres on the reduction of dialectical philosophy to 
the method of the natural sciences. 
Engels's transformation of historical materialism into Marxist poli-
tics under the title of "scientific socialism" inaugurates the period of 
"classical Marxism': Following Engels, the leaders of the socialist move-
ment, such as Karl Kautsky (1854-1938), Georgi Plekhanov (1856-
1918), Vladimir Ilych Lenin (1870-1924), Joseph Stalin (1878-1953), 
Leon Trotsky (1878-1940) and Mao Tse-Tung (1893-1976), modified 
specific predictions and strategies in light of historical developments 
and political successes. But from Engels onwards, during the century of 
historical Communism (1883-1989), the Marxism of the Second, Third 
and Fourth Internationals remained substantially the same. Marxism 
was a scientific politics that revolutionized history just as Darwin had 
radicalized nature. It formulated general laws of history that demon-
strated a unilinear process of social evolution, which ascended through 
a historically necessary sequence of modes of production, culminating 
in communist society. 
The result is a relation between practice, history and structure based 
on the adaptation of human society to the natural environment. Practice 
is accordingly defined through the level of technological development 
of the productive forces, which is held to be the motor of historical 
dynamics. Historical evolution is seen as passing through the emer-
gence, maturation and then stagnation of a society's characteristic pro-
ductive forces, as these are promoted and then retarded by its typical 
social relations of production. Because social structure depends upon 
the reflection of economic arrangements in politics, law and ideology 
(and the reaction back upon economics of these factors), mutations in 
the economic foundation of society catalyse wider changes. 
The change in the meaning of the term "praxis" indicates the shift 
involved in this vision. Where for the young Marx praxis meant that 
creative human labour in which humanity transformed the natural 
environment while modifying itself, for classical Marxism, following 
Engels) "practice" referred to instrumental manipulation of the external 
world. Praxis, meanwhile, came to signify the unity of scientific theory 
with revolutionary practice. Social revolutions, in other words, were 
the laboratory experiments of the new science of history, the events 
where the hypotheses of Marxism were refined and demonstrated. 
Classical Marxism is therefore first and foremost scientific socialism, 
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a science of history that explains past social evolution and links this to 
the material interests of present class agents involved in major structural 
transformations. 
But classical Marxism is also, at the same time, an effort to protect 
this interpretation of historical materialism from revision, in the face 
of challenges emanating from within the socialist movement. Classical 
Marxism was, then, from the very beginning a "restoration' of the cor-
rect line against '(revisionism': that is the recovery of an original doctrine 
from its subsequent distortion through neglect or revision. 
The challenges around which orthodoxy and revisionism took shape 
in classical Marxism can be reduced to two basic sets of factors: intel-
lectual and political. On the one hand, classical Marxism had to deal 
with a whole raft of historical developments and research discoveries 
that falsified specific predictions made by Marx. Although Marxism 
as a research programme in history provided an immense stimulus to 
the investigation of past societies, many of the findings disconfirmed 
fundamental elements of the classical position. And capitalism in the 
twentieth century proved far more complex than Marx and Engels had 
anticipated, catalysing major new theories and serious disputes within 
classical Marxism. 
On the other hand, as might be expected from a perspective that 
regarded political success as the ultimate vindication of theoretical 
positions, revolutionary experience dominated the debate. For what 
changed between Engels's intervention and subsequent, bitter debates 
in the communist movement was the emergence of actual socialist revo-
lutions. But these revolutions happened where Marx and Engels never 
imagined they would: in Russia and China- backwards, peasant-based 
economies, utterly different from the industrialized nations of today. 
From October 1917 in Russia onwards, the connection between histori-
cal experiences of revolution and the theoretical works of the leaders 
determined the arguments about the "authentic Marx': Yet these argu-
ments, about parliamentary reform versus revolutionary insurrection 
and questions of socialist strategy, happened in a world unlike that 
predicted by the founders. 
Engels's systematization of Marxism 
Engels's codification of historical materialism as ('scientific socialism" 
was greatly influenced by the prestige of the natural sciences, and 
especially by Engels's admiration for Charles Darwin. The result is a 
classical marx1sm 49 
systematization of Marx's research into a theoretical doctrine that claims 
to rest upon the "general laws of motion of matter" undergoing "ceaseless 
flux" (Engels 1950a: 60, 65). Scientific materialism is supposed to pro-
vide a general social and historical theory of the economic infrastruc-
ture of society, together with the "ultimate explanation" of the whole 
superstructure (Engels 1950d: 124). The dialectical method, shorn of 
its normative dimension, systematically connects natural evolution and 
the historical process (Engels 1950c: 349), thus supplementing Darwin 
with Marx (MESW: 429). By virtue of this method, Marxism suppos-
edly discovers "the general laws of motion ... in the history of human 
society" (Engels 1950c: 353). Although Engels's evolutionary vision of 
the Marxist worldview is characterized by revolutionary advances and 
social antagonisms - unlike the gradualism of the natural sciences -
there is no doubt that he regards Marxism as the application of scientific 
method to human history. 
Engels's presentation of Marxism as an evolutionary theory, sup-
ported by the dialectical method as a general science of everything, 
is centred on the monumental 542 pages of the Marxist primer Anti-
Duhring (1878). Indeed, after Marx's death in 1883, Engels's output 
increased phenomenally. As Norman Levine summarizes: 
The height of Engels' career corresponded with the termina-
tion of Marx's life. It is, therefore, entirely consistent that five of 
Engels' rnajor works were published in the years closely preced-
ing Marx's death, or after the termination of Marx's life. Anti-
Duhring appeared in 1878; Socialism: Utopian and Scientific in 
1882; The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State in 
1884; and Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German 
Philosophy in 1888. The Dialectic of Nature was first published 
in 1927 by Riazanov, although the manuscript itself appears to 
have been completed by 1882. (Levine 1975: 233) 
Although Marx certainly read the Anti-Dilhring- from which Socialism 
Utopian and Scientific and Ludwig Feuerbach are taken, along with core 
ideas for The Dialectic of Nature -we should not conclude that his posi-
tions coincided with those of Engels. Getting the demarcation right, 
however, is a complex question. For Terrell Carver and Norman Levine, 
there is a clear opposition between the humanist Marx and the positivist 
Engels (Carver 1983: 156; Levine 1975: 174). Subsequent scholarship, 
in retrieving Engels from simplistic condemnation, has tended to stress 
the warrant in the mature Marx for Engels's interpretations (Hunley 
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1991). Nonetheless, defenders of Engels cannot press this to the point of 
total agreement, for Marx is on record rejecting supposed general laws 
of history (Marx & Engels 1953: 294), whereas Engels dearly proposes 
just such supra-historical laws (Engels 1950c: 353). But the underlying 
difference between Marx's historically specific materialism and Engels's 
highly general scientific socialism was probably masked by the inter-
vention of Marx's death between their main publications (Carver 1983: 
151-2; Levine 1975: 233-4). 
Engels's appellation "scientific" was probably also intended to trail 
connotations of cultural certainty and political authority in the prac-
tical context of organizational struggles. Even before Marx's death, 
theoretical challenges began to arise within the socialist movement, in 
the form of a current demanding a philosophical rethink of socialist 
strategy. In this context, the subtitle of Engels's work against Professor 
Diihring's moderate views is meant ironically. Herr Eugen Duhring's 
Revolution in Science mocks the professor's overturning of Marxism's 
scientific findings with the abstract tools of philosophy. In place of the 
hopeless speculations of the red professor, Engels substitutes a total 
theory of human history framed in evolutionary terms and redolent of 
the natural sciences. 
Inside the final decade of his life, Engels engaged in a monumental 
work of popularization, writing about a hundred publications between 
1890 and 1895 (Carver 1983: 181; Levine 1975: 234). In Engels's treat-
ment, Marxism's method of scientific analysis, although based on the 
dialectical theory of Hegel, has been "corrected" by splitting the revolu-
tionary method from the conservative system by means of abstracting 
three core methodological principles from Hegel's work (Engels 1950c: 
330). Basically, what this means is that the natural environment, together 
with the social and historical totality, is to be grasped as an antagonistic 
whole in a constant process of development through contradictions. 
This notion of antagonistic interconnections is science, Engels affirms, 
whereas philosophy is Hegel's conservative system, which boils down to 
his historical teleology. Thus the dynamic process grasped by Marxist 
science does not have an ideal goal outside of history that masquerades 
as "absolute truth'' (ibid.: 329). Instead, it proposes laws of motion, for-
mulated as historical tendencies (and counter-tendencies) that can be 
consciously catalysed, accelerated or retarded, with the assistance of 
scientific knowledge (ibid.: 354). 
Furthermore, the dialectical method is said to generate a scientific 
politics totally unlike the utopian imposition of well-intentioned ideals 
onto society. Where natural science incorporates a process of theoretical 
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correction through experimental testing, scientific socialism constantly 
corrects its social theory through analysing the results of revolution-
ary politics. In other words, the experimental laboratory of the new 
science of history is nothing less than social revolution and its applied 
technology is the transformation of society. The implication is that the 
relation between the theorist and the masses is the same as that between 
the chemist and her materials, because "the conflicts of innumerable 
individual wills and individual actions in the domain of history produce 
a state of affairs entirely analogous to that prevailing in the realm of 
unconscious nature'' (ibid.: 354). 
Scientific socialism 
Although the idea that Marxism makes scientific claims cannot be 
wholeheartedly endorsed, it cannot be completely dismissed either. As 
we saw in the first chapter, the mature Marx suppressed the normative 
foundations of historical materialism. Sometimes he maintained that 
historical materialism was solely an explanatory theory of particular 
societies, grounded in a materialist reconstruction of classical political 
economy and supported by descriptive statements; at other times he 
provided textual authority for Engels to push historical materialism 
in the direction of a factually based set of explanatory generalizations 
capable of trans-historical application. The leaders of the Marxist parties 
followed Engels in arguing that) effectively, the evolution of humanity's 
productive forces should be regarded as that part of natural history 
which ultimately determines the economic foundation of society. 
This has rightly been described as "productive force determinism" 
(Rigby 1998: 5-91), and before examining its specific claims, it is worth 
pausing to assess its scientific status. In principle, an argument that 
locates the dynamics of human history in a natural tendency of the 
human animal to innovate and relates this to social evolution is a sci-
entifically testable theory. Furthermore, insofar as classical Marxism 
involves explanatory generalizations about historical causes, and locates 
these causes in the regularities of economic behaviour, it is a plausible 
candidate for being considered a properly scientific sociology. 
Yet, despite its origins in a positivist conception of scientific method, 
the classical Marxist conception of scientific socialism has not satis-
fied positivist philosophers of science such as Karl Popper. For Popper, 
science does not advance through improved generalizations about the 
world. Instead) science progresses by knocking out false pretenders to 
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scientific status. Scientists advocate bold conjectures about the natural 
world in a form that involves some specific (testable) predictions. 
Experimental testing involves efforts to falsify the claims of a theory, 
so that a real scientist will say of current orthodoxy that it has not yet 
been disproven, not that it is true. And Popper finds this combination 
of boldness and humility completely absent from Marxism. 
Specifically, Popper accuses Marxism of being a pseudo-science on 
two grounds. First, he thinks that it does not contain any falsifiable 
propositions, because its hypotheses do not lead to a set of verifiable 
predictions. This is basically an attack on the dialectical method, which 
Popper regards as mere logical confusion: «the dialectician need never 
be afraid of refutation by forthcoming experiences" (Popper 1940: 424). 
More damagingly, Popper alleges that Marxism depends on confusion 
between trends and laws. Trends involve general conditional statements 
(if condition then event, where the event is something that holds, empiri-
cally, in a statistically significant way). By contrast, laws are logically 
universal and "assert the impossibility of something or other" (Popper 
1964: 115). Marxism, he maintains, asserts that the accumulation of 
means of production, that is the relentless advance of the productive 
forces, is a universal historical law (ibid.: 129). But Marx himself admits 
the existence of counter-examples. Therefore the hypothesis is false. 
Where does this leave us with respect to the scientific status of classical 
Marxism? Its defenders can either deny the validity of Popper's model of 
science or argue that Popper has misunderstood the Marxist argument. 
On the one hand, Popper's own student, Imre Lakatos, soon corrected 
Popper's hard-line position by acknowledging that scientific theories are 
not in general directly falsifiable (Lakatos 1978: 25). Instead, scientific 
hypotheses are located in theoretical networks and operate through 
holistic frameworks, or research programmes, so that the distinction 
between scientific and non-scientific theories concerns the fallibility 
versus non-fallibility of entire bodies of knowledge. Non-scientific 
research programmes degenerate: faced with problems for specific theo-
ries, they try to "save the hypothesis" by adjusting the theory to fit with 
observations, rather than by advancing radical new explanations (ibid.: 
25). Scientific research programmes risk failure - that is, they are fallible 
- because they promote radical new explanations when confronted with 
anomalies and falsifications, which often means abandonment of the 
original programme. From this perspective, classical Marxism without 
question began as a scientific research programme - indeed, as a radical 
new explanation within the programme of classical political economy 
that generated a new holistic framework in its wake (Kadvany 2011). The 
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big question today would be whether classical Marxism is progressively 
continuing to produce radical hypotheses, or whether it has degenerated 
and become a non-scientific dogma. 
On the other hand, defenders of classical Marxism could argue that 
Popper mistakenly interprets its hypotheses as general laws, when what 
is in fact claimed is the existence of general tendencies. Popper admits 
the validity of statements of tendency in the physical and social sci-
ences, although he rightly points out that such claims are existential 
and conditional, not universal and determining (Popper 1964: 129). 
The problem with this line of defence is that it retrieves the scientific 
status of historical materialism by exploding the fundamental tenet 
of classical Marxism. A statement of tendency maintains that under 
specific conditions a certain result is (descriptively or exactly) likely 
to happen, thereby explaining the existence of a definite trend in the 
empirical data. The difficulty is that although this interpretation of his-
torical materialism finds plentiful warrant in Marx's mature work, it 
is incompatible with the claims of productive force determinism. The 
classical dilemma is as follows. If Marxism provides statements of ten-
dency, then it is grounded in an examination of the specific conditions 
of historical societies. In that case, it yields social scientific knowledge of 
social formations, but it must acknowledge that no general law connects 
their transformations. The consequence is that socialism is, like other 
revolutionary events in human history, a contingency, that is some-
thing that might or might not happen. Lacking a normative framework, 
such a set of claims cannot cross the threshold from "might occur" to 
«should happen'>. But if, by contrast, Marxism is a set of determining 
laws of trans-historical generality, then socialism becomes a question 
of causally determined social evolution, that is, a (non-moral) historical 
necessity. The political benefits of such an argument are obvious. In that 
case, however, classical Marxism is committed to producing a falsifiable 
set of predictions flowing from a deterministic interpretation of the role 
of the productive forces in social evolution. It is to the difficulties of this 
final strategy that we now turn. 
Productive force determinism 
According to S. H. Rigby, "the essence of productive force determinism 
is that the level of development of a society's productive forces explains 
the nature of its relations of production, so that as the productive forces 
develop, so society is obliged to change" (Rigby 1998: 28). Not only is 
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it certain that the mature Marx advocated this position explicitly and 
repeatedly (ibid.: 27, 52), but there can also be no doubt that the classical 
Marxists subscribed to this view. Following Engels's lead, the leaders of 
the Second International, Plekhanov and Kautsky, ((asserted [productive 
force determinism] as the basis of Marxist history and social theory" 
(ibid.: 60). The theoreticians of the Third International, Bukharin and 
Lenin, continued to advocate this reading of Marx despite major politi-
cal differences with the Second International (ibid.: 66-8). Stalin and 
Trotsky, mutual political hostility notwithstanding, also both proposed 
productive force determinist interpretations of Marx (ibid.: 68-9). As 
Rigby summarizes: 
A productive force determinist reading of Marx was not only 
legitimate in terms of Marx's explicit statements. It was also well 
suited to the political practice of the Second International .... 
Yet although the political practice of the [Third International] 
implied a very different conception of Marxism from that of 
[the Second International], this change was not accompa-
nied by any innovation in the realm of historical theory. ... 
Plekhanov and Kautsky rejected the Bolshevik revolution led 
by Lenin; Bukharin, Stalin and Trotsky disagreed on the way 
forward for the revolution in an age of international isolation, 
yet all were united by a conception of historical materialism as 
a form of productive force determinism. (Ibid.: 61-2) 
G. A. Cohen's KarlMarxs Theory of History (1978) represents the most 
cogent statement of the classical Marxist argument yet provided. He 
begins from a distinction between the social form of labour (the mode 
of production or economic foundation of society) and the material 
labour process (the development of the productive forces as the way in 
which human beings adapt to the natural environment). Cohen's aim 
is to locate the productive forces in natural history, in order to ground 
scientific socialism in a set of causally determined natural regulari-
ties. He expresses this commonplace of classical Marxism somewhat 
surprisingly by claiming that "the productive forces occur below the 
economic foundation" (ibid.: 30). For Cohen, the productive forces are 
c'the foundation of the economy, but they do not belong to the economic 
foundation" (ibid.: 30). 
The implication is that the advance of the productive forces is part 
of natural history. They are the "matter" that is "formed" by histori-
cal social formations (ibid.: 98). As Cohen puts it, ccthere are traces in 
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Marx of a Darwinian mechanism" in which adaptation to the natural 
environment by a labouring animal generates material and intellectual 
conditions that communal group dynamics must then respond to, by a 
filtering process based on social hierarchies (ibid.: 291). The aim is to 
use this argument to defend the perspective that "history is the history 
of human industry, which undergoes growth in productive power, the 
stimulus and vehicle of which is an economic structure which perishes 
when it has stimulated more growth than it can contain" (ibid.: 26). 
This is the exciting, if contentious, claim that founds classical Marx-
ism. It rests on the idea that it is human nature to develop and deploy 
technological means in the labour process. This is because it is human 
nature to exercise an instrumental form of rationality in calculations of 
efficiency, when it comes to the important question of satisfying desires 
by means of human effort. We are, in other words, rather lazy, but also 
rather desirous, creatures. This strong contradiction in our nature gen-
erates both progress and the utopian expectation of what progress is 
towards. For Cohen: 
( 1) Men are, in a respect to be specified, somewhat rational. 
(2) The historical situation is one of scarcity. (3) Men pos-
sess intelligence of a kind and degree which enables them to 
improve their situation. [Thus] rational beings who know how 
to satisfy compelling wants that they have will be disposed to 
seize and employ the means of satisfaction of those wants. 
(Ibid.: 152) 
The salient respect in which human beings are rational is that they 
innovate in the technological means by which they satisfy their wants, 
in order to decrease the effort and increase the yield involved in labour. 
Historical materialism is therefore an explanatory system that seeks 
to clarify how societies respond to the adaptive behaviour of human 
beings, in light of the "fact, which needs to be explained, that societies 
rarely replace a given set of productive forces by an inferior one" (ibid.: 
153). On this basis, Cohen proposes two theses designed to justify the 
determinist perspective: 
(Development Thesis) The productive forces tend to develop 
throughout history. (Primacy Thesis) The nature of the produc-
tion relations of a society is explained by the level of develop-
ment of its productive forces. (Ibid.: 134) 
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'Jhe Development Thesis explains the state of the productive forces, 
and predicts their tendential advance on a natural-historical basis by 
virtue of "somewhat rational,, human innovation. But notice how Cohen 
shifts from an argument for a determining law to the idea of conditional 
trends, while continuing to maintain the language of ((determination': 
Logically speaking, Cohen should now state the condition under which 
the upwards trend in the productive forces happens, and it is clear that 
this condition is that the relations of production "fit,, to the productive 
forces. 
But the Primacy Thesis states that advances in the productive forces 
cause alterations in the relations of production, by virtue of a functional 
relationship between them (ibid.: 160). This is surely circular reasoning, 
because now the conditions under which a trend happens are described 
as effects of the trend that was to be explained. 
Cohen appears to be unaware of this sort of objection, which is about 
the logical connection between two theses. But he is aware that objec-
tions to a proposed circular connection between two things (produc-
tive forces and relations of production) might arise. His rejoinder is 
that the relation between productive forces and productive relations, 
as well as between economics and the superstructures, is functional. 
Causation here involves functional explanation, which is quite different 
to mechanical cause-and-effect sorts of explanation. 
Functional arguments involve consequence explanations, in which 
the occurrence of the event (a mutation in productive relations, for 
instance a change in property law) happens because its consequences 
are beneficial to the cause (the advance of the productive forces, for 
instance a technological innovation; ibid.: 263). For instance, classi-
cal Marxism maintains that the advent of capitalist relations happened 
because these relations were beneficial to the advance of the productive 
forces released by the modern scientific revolution. Generally speaking, 
for a functional explanation to be intellectually credible, a mechanism 
of selection has to be demonstrated, which clarifies how changes in Y 
that are beneficial for X are preferentially retained. 
Let us assume that the relevant mechanism can be specified. Then 
functional explanations of the connection between productive forces 
and relations of production are perfectly acceptable. But this is not really 
a rejoinder to the objection of circular reasoning, which concerns the 
relation between the Development and the Primacy theses. Cohen never 
confronts this possibility, because he states the Development Thesis 
in the form of a determining law (i.e. unconditionally), but with the 
content of a statement of tendency (i.e. conditional). 
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Where that leaves us is with the asserted ('fact ... that societies rarely 
replace a given set of productive forces by an inferior one': In other 
words, the most significant test case for the productive force determin .. 
ism of classical Marxism is the existence of an ascending sequence of 
modes of production. 
Modes of production 
In line with the Development Thesis, classical Marxists expect that 
human history should show evidence of a tendential ascent of the 
productive forces, from scarcity towards abundance. These should be 
accompanied by a series of distinct forms of productive relations, cor. 
responding to each stage of advance of the productive forces. Further, 
these stages in economic history should lead to a defined sequence of 
forms of the state together with characteristic official ideologies, espe. 
cially religions. History, in other words, should exhibit a stepwise pro. 
gression within what is, overall, a unilinear evolutionary curve upwards, 
as shown in Figure 2. 
Marx's quip that "the hand mill gives you society with the feudal 
lord; the steam mill society with the industrial capitalist)) (MESW: 200) 
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Figure 2 The classical sequence of modes of production. 
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of production. But, despite appearances, it must not be imagined that 
classical Marxists are technological determinists, because the concept 
of a mode of production relates technology to social forms rather than 
reducing social forms to technological inventions. Specifically, a mode 
of production designates the connection between a characteristic set 
of productive forces and the social relations of production that pro-
vide beneficial consequences for them. Although the productive forces 
include instruments of production and raw materials, the most impor-
tant productive force is labour power, that is the class of direct produc-
ers. Likewise, although the social relations of production are comprized 
by property relations, the crucial thing is how effective possession of the 
means of production leads to control of the distribution arrangements 
regarding the product oflabour. Therefore (and following Balibar's post-
classical clarification of the logical relations involved in these concepts; 
Althusser & Balibar 1970: 212-16): 
• "Work relations" designates the connection between labour power 
and the means of production, which reduces to the question of the 
extent to which the direct producers are separate, that is whether 
or not the direct producers are regarded as part of the instru -
ments or means of production. Under so-called primitive modes, 
there is minimal separation between the collective, shared imple-
ments and the common land. In slavery, ancient law regarded the 
producer as an instrument, a "talking tool': In rent-based modes 
(feudalism and the so-called Asiatic mode of production), the serf 
(i.e. unfree peasant farmer) is tied to the land, that is to the means 
of production. Under capitalism, and in a hypothetical socialist 
society, the producers are free, that is regarded as separate from 
the instruments and means of production. In exploitative modes 
of production, classical Marxists often speak of the distinction 
in work relations between "economic compulsion" (wages) and 
"extra-economic coercion' (slavery, rent). 
• "Property relations" refers to effective possession of the means 
of production by the property-owning class, which is generally 
a class of non -producers but sometimes the direct producers 
themselves. Ultimately, what is meant by effective possession is 
the ability to appropriate the social surplus product. This is the 
sum total of social production left over once those necessities 
required for the maintenance of the labour power of the direct 
producers have been deducted. In so-called primitive societies, 
the direct producers are the property owners and the (minimal) 
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social surplus product is distributed in an egalitarian way, or ht 
ways that reflect forms of political and cultural authority. Under 
slavery, the slave-owners appropriate the entire product and make 
deductions, often at less than subsistence levels, to feed, clothe 
and house the slaves. In rent-based societies, the serfs provide for 
their own subsistence but are compelled to perform several days a 
week of surplus labour for the landlord, which is appropriated by 
this propertied class. Under capitalism, Marx's labour theory of 
value holds that the social surplus product is appropriated through 
the difference between wages and profits. Finally, in a hypothett .. 
cal future society, the propertied class and the direct producers 
coincide, so that the social surplus product is distributed equally 
(socialism) or as needed by each (communism). 
Modes of production, then, are in the final analysis all about exploita-
tion, that is the way that the combination of work relations and property 
relations determines the form through which the social surplus product 
is appropriated. For reasons of space, I will just discuss two of these 
forms, slavery and rent, as we examined Marx's theory of the wage-based 
society in the last chapter. How well do these general descriptions of 
historical societies perform when confronted by the historical evidence? 
Do the transitions between them correspond to the predictions made 
by productive force determinism? 
Ancient slavery 
For classical Marxism, the ancient civilizations of the Mediterranean, 
especially Greece and Rome, are paradigmatic examples of the slave-
based mode of production. Slaves are people who have become items 
of property, and who therefore cannot direct and control their own 
labour power, but are instead able to be bought and sold. In the ancient 
world, the slave was - as Marx reminds us - instrumentum vocale, a 
"talking tool", whose enslavement was the result of accumulated debts, 
military conquest, sale of children or an inherited condition. The form 
of appropriation of surplus labour in slavery was through the most 
brutal forms of extra-economic coercion, ranging from the murderous 
regime of the galleys, mines and plantations, through to the application 
of severe corporal punishments in the cases of manufacturing, domestic 
and body slaves. Slaves receive, at their masters' discretion, a portion of 
the product oflabour sufficient to reproduce their labour power, and the 
constant threat of coercion is applied to maintain productivity. 
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1he hypothesis that ancient Greece and Rome were slave societies has 
been tested by classical Marxist research, but the results are somewhat 
inconclusive. G. E. M. de Ste Croix's monumental The Class Struggle in the 
Ancient World sets forth from classical premisses, but then concedes that 
the majority of the population in Greece and Rome were in fact free peas-
ants and independent artisans (de Ste Croix 1981: 52-4). Additionally, 
although slave revolts were common in the ancient world, in celebrated 
instances managing to liberate whole provinces and entire cities, the 
political struggles of the ancient world mainly happened between the 
wealthy patricians and the impoverished plebeians. Perhaps in an effort 
to salvage the hypothesis, de Ste Croix then claims that although the 
bulk of the social surplus product was not in general derived from slav-
ery, the ancient ruling class specifically "derived their surpluses ... from 
unfree labour'' (ibid.: 53 ). Indeed, he points out that the surplus product 
generated on the vast plantations and in state-held mines, together with 
the constant influx of cheap slaves following military conquests, was 
the most important civil weapon at the disposal of the patrician class. 
De Ste Croix analytically conflates the unfree peasantry (serfs) with 
agricultural slaves, under the title of «unfree laboue: while accepting 
that ('it is serfdom which provides the propertied class with much of its 
surplus" (ibid.: 173 ). Nonetheless, this is a reasonable way to modify the 
classical position in light of empirical evidence. In effect, it claims that 
the societies of the ancient world were based on a combination of pro-
duction modes, where slavery and serfdom are not legally differentiated. 
Much more troublesome for the classical account is the transition 
from antiquity to feudalism in Europe. Marx and Engels were well aware 
that the collapse of the Roman Empire after 450 CE led to economic 
regression. Now in general, the classical expectation is that the pro-
ductive forces display an inherent tendency to increase, which leads 
the productive relations to become fetters on development. Once this 
occurs, the increase of the productive forces is temporarily blocked, 
generating stagnation, crisis and then either collapse or revolution. But 
that is not what historical research indicates happened. "This was not 
a case", writes Ellen Wood, '(where dynamic forces taxed the limits of 
restrictive relations .... But rather ... the prevailing relations ... encour-
aged the extension of extra-economic surplus extraction instead of the 
improvement oflabour productivity" (Wood 1995: 130). The economic 
problems of Rome depended on the conflict between efforts to broaden 
the base of exploitation (not to increase its depth) by enserfing the free 
peasantry (the colonii) and the staggering expenditures of the expanding 
state (Anderson 1974b: 18-28). 
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Engels constructed an argument to circumvent this problem: the 
enserfment of the colonii represented the nucleus of an increase in 
labour productivity through technological innovation. Late Roman 
development was on its way to feudalism when contingent events (last. 
ing fully 500 years!) interrupted the historically necessary sequence with 
a sort of barbarian intermission. Subsequent classical Marxist histori. 
ans have followed suit, arguing that feudalism represented a significant 
productivity advance on antiquity and that the Roman peasantry were 
proto-feudal. In other words, feudalism represents the resumption of 
a unilinear historical sequence determined by economic productive 
forces. This argumentative strategy preserves the series of modes of 
production, but it sacrifices the explanatory account of the transitions 
between them. 
Rent-based modes 
Medieval eastern and western Europe is regarded by classical Marxists as 
the paradigmatic instance of feudal society, but Mughal India and Han 
Dynasty China are also examples (Rigby 1998: 222). Alongside feudal-
ism, classical Marxism also debated the existence of another rent-based 
mode of production, the ''Asiatic': which I will discuss in a moment. The 
rent-based modes are characterized by agricultural production under 
conditions where money rent is highly restricted in favour of rent-in-
kind, and markets for agricultural goods are limited. Two common 
characteristics define these rent-based modes: the supreme landlord is 
the monarch, who theoretically possesses the entire country on behalf 
of the ethnic collectivity; the labourers are legally bonded to the soil and 
this legal restraint facilitates extra-economic coercion of surplus labour 
through royal taxes and customary obligations. 
Under European feudalism, a serf (sometimes called a peasant) is an 
agricultural labourer who is legally tied to a particular landholding as 
glebae adscripti, bondsman or bondswoman, which juridically prevents 
their movement. Work relations were therefore characterized by lack of 
control over materials (plus lack of access to major instruments, such 
as mills, irrigation and oxen teams), creating a relation of dependence 
on the landlord for the serf's means of subsistence. The appropriation 
of the surplus social product through property relations happens by 
means of a division of the serf's week into days spent on their private 
plot (reproduction oflabour power) and days served on the lord's fields 
(production of surplus). As Perry Anderson writes: 
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agrarian property was privately controlled by a class of feudal 
lords, who extracted a surplus from the peasants by politico-
legal relations of compulsion. This extra-economic coercion, 
taking the form oflabour services, rents in kind or customary 
dues owed to the individual lord by the peasant, was exercized 
both on the manorial demesne attached directly to the person 
of the lord and on the strip tenancies or virgates cultivated by 
the peasant. (Anderson 1974b: 147) 
Meanwhile, although landownership is technically invested in the 
monarch, in practice the sovereign parcelled out estates through a 
descending hierarchy of feudal nobles, in a chain of dependent ten -
ures that contracted military services for the opportunity to exploit a 
landholding and its serfs. The partitioning of sovereignty into manors, 
baronies, earldoms and so forth prevented the unification of the feudal 
state, with two historically significant consequences. First, the church 
played an extraordinarily important role in the suppression of dissent, 
supplementing the political weakness of the aristocratic centre with 
ideological control of the popular periphery. And second, feudal ruling 
classes could not establish control over the free towns, which eventually 
provided the seat for the rise of the bourgeoisie. 
The controversy in classical Marxism regarding the so-called Asiatic 
mode of production concerns whether the entire historical world of 
Asia can reasonably be regarded under a single description. Addition-
ally, Marx's own description of this mode in terms of state-based 
irrigation works, prolonged by Karl Wittfogel into a massive survey 
of ''oriental despotism" that embraced everything from the Incas to 
Imperial China, is highly misleading (Wittfogel 1957). Although some 
Marxists dismiss the entire category, there is a distinction to be made 
between the generic form of a rent-based mode characterized by sov-
ereign ownership of land and its deviant form in European feudalism, 
characterized by the parcellization of sovereignty. In ancient Egypt and 
the Mesopotamian civilizations, for instance, land tenure was organ-
ized through the state and rent collected as tax (in money, goods and 
services), and this would in fact appear to be typical of pre-modern 
agrarian economies (Rigby 1998: 222-4). But these rent-based societies 
were notoriously conservative in terms of technological innovation 
and economic development. In the case of Europe, by contrast, the 
rent-based mode represents a significant productive improvement on 
the ancient mode: 
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[Although] there was no simple, terminal halt to technique 
in the classical world ... no major cluster of inventions ever 
occurred to propel the ancient economy forward to qualita-
tively new forces of production. Nothing is more striking, in 
any comparative retrospect, than the overall technological 
stagnation of antiquity. It is enough to contrast the record of its 
eight centuries of existence, from the rise of Athens to the fall of 
Rome, with the equivalent span of the feudal mode of produc-
tion which succeeded it, to perceive the difference between a 
relatively static and a relatively dynamic economy. 
(Anderson 1974b: 26) 
Indeed the entire narrative of the maturation and stagnation of feu-
dalism, with the long crisis of feudalism in the fourteenth century as 
a placemarker for its incipient collapse, seems better evidenced than 
the equivalent account of the transition from antiquity to feudalism. 
Capitalism, on the classical account, matures in the womb of feudalism 
until it is reflected throughout late feudal society in the development of 
absolutism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Absolutism is 
already bourgeois in content, although feudal in form, and it nurtures 
the productivity advances that the free towns and the scientific revolu-
tion make possible. Once the late eighteenth century has generated bour-
geois revolutions, the productive forces of capitalism are liberated from 
feudal restraints, producing the Industrial Revolution as a spectacular 
proof of the superior dynamism of capitalism compared with feudalism. 
In other words, as was perhaps expected, the classical Marxist account 
of historical transitions fits well with the western European case of the 
shift from feudalism to capitalism. Elsewhere, in terms of the test of 
historical evidence in the ancient world, and the comparison between 
European and non-European rent-based societies, classical Marxism 
fares badly. This suggests what we might already have suspected, that 
the theory represents a premature generalization from a special case. 
Challenges in the twentieth century 
The theoretical limitations of classical Marxism, however, did not pre-
vent productive force determinism from having a significant political 
effect. Indeed in the demonstration of the value of classical Marxism, 
revolutionary success tended to be substituted for research findings, 
and this is hardly surprising. The Marxist parties were mass formations, 
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not intellectual seminars, and they recruited members on the basis of 
taking political action around the legitimate grievances of the oppressed. 
Under these circumstances, Marxists' political effectiveness in revolu-
tionary situations appeared to corroborate the basic correctness of the 
central idea of productive force determinism, which was that the march 
of history pointed necessarily towards socialism. 
The thesis of the advance of productive forces implied that by the 
end of the nineteenth century, mature capitalism would begin to decay 
into stagnant forms. This would generate a series of economic crises that 
would be reflected in political authoritarianism and ideological reaction. 
Classical Marxists from Kautsky and Plekhanov through to Stalin and 
Trotsky argued that the breakdown of capitalism was on the horizon 
after the First World War (1914-18), and with it the disintegration of 
liberal ideology and the abandonment of parliamentary democracy. The 
economic turbulence and political convulsions of the interwar decades 
(1920-40), such as the Great Depression of the 1930s and the rise of 
German and Italian fascism, together with successful socialist revolu-
tions in Russia (1917) and then China (1949), certainly appeared to 
confirm the basic theses of classical Marxism. 
Yet throughout this period, because of a paradoxical combination of 
political successes and failed predictions, classical Marxism was itself in 
crisis. In 1918, the Second International, founded around the authority 
of Marx and Engels in the 1880s, split, with its radical wing, the pro-
Leninist Third (or Communist) International, breaking from the social 
democratic majority. Then, in 1938, the radical, Trotskyist minority 
of the Communist International, already long since expelled from the 
pro-Stalin national parties that composed the movement, formed the 
Fourth International. 
Two basic sets of questions were at work in these splits. The first 
concerned how complex new social phenomena were to be interpreted 
by classical Marxism in ways consistent with productive force deter-
minism. These phenomena included developments such as the massive 
expansion of the middle strata, the strikingly uneven development of 
the former colonies, the unprecedented economic boom of the post-war 
era, the spread of social rights and civil liberties in the industrialized 
world, and the failure of the socialist countries to economically compete 
with the capitalist world. Although the stagnation of the productive 
forces that should, theoretically, have been produced by the fetter of 
capitalist social relations did appear to be confirmed before the Second 
World War, post-war capitalism seemed to have returned to a progres-
sive dynamic, with economic boom, political progress and a historical 
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advantage relative to the socialist bloc. The basic discursive strategy 
of classical Marxism was to interpret these phenomena as misleading 
appearances concealing the global and historical essence of a mode 
of production in decline. One way to do this is to argue a theory of 
imperialism, proposing that material prosperity and expanding rights 
in the industrialized centres, or "metropolitan countries': is the direct 
consequence of impoverishment and authoritarianism in the industrial-
izing periphery, or "semi-colonial countries': There is plenty of evidence 
of unequal exchange, dependent development and political distortion 
that supports this sort of contention, but it is not really a defence of 
the classical hypothesis unless it is also shown that this results in over-
all stagnation in the global level of productive forces. Perhaps because 
this is rather difficult to demonstrate, the other strategy is to remove 
the requirement that the productive forces be involved in a zero-sum 
game. This involves building up a contemporary classical picture of the 
determining role of the economy in relation to politics and ideology on 
a world scale. The most impressive classical Marxist synthesis of this 
sort is Ernst Mandel's Late Capitalism, which, together with his inter-
pretation of twentieth-century history (Mandel 1978b, 1986), provides 
a productive forces determinist reading of multinational capitalism 
(Mandel 1978a). Probably the most striking element of this account is 
Manders shift from a theory of the emergence, maturation and stagna-
tion of capitalist productive forces to a theory oflong waves of capitalist 
development (Mandel 1995). According to Manders classical determin-
ism, the up-and-down historical rhythm of expansion and contraction 
is built into capitalism, rather than signifying the breakdown of the 
mode of production. 
The second set of questions concerned the opposition between politi-
cal voluntarism and evolutionary gradualism. These were ultimately 
arguments about the relation between the economic base and the 
ideologico-political superstructure. Engels had insisted in the 1890s 
that the Marxist understanding of history and society did not imply the 
passive reflection, in politics, of economic trends. In a famous letter to 
Joseph Bloch, Engels maintains that: 
According to the materialist conception of history, the ulti-
mately determining element in history is the production and 
reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I 
have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying 
that the economic element is the only determining one, he 
transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, 
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senseless phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the 
various elements of the superstructure - ... political, juristic, 
philosophical . . . religious . . . - also exercise their influence 
upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases 
preponderate in determining their form. There is an interac-
tion of all these elements in which, amid all the endless host 
of accidents, ... the economic movement finally asserts itself 
as necessary. (Engels l 950b: 443) 
The notion of "economic determination in the final instance" is here 
related to the class content of political history. Meanwhile, an example 
of the superstructural determination of the political form of a social 
struggle arising on the basis of economic interests is provided by Engels's 
analysis of the relation between emergent capitalism and the Protestant 
Reformation. For both Marx and Engels, the doctrines of Luther and 
Calvin were ideological representations of the class interests of the 
fledgling bourgeoisie, "the true religious disguise of the interests of the 
bourgeoisie» (Engels 1950c: 362). 
In terms of social structure, the classical position is that economic 
determination is ultimately decisive, but politics and ideology none-
theless "react back', on the economic foundation to limit or enable 
development (Engels 1950b: 444). In the dynamic terms of historical 
events, Engels speaks of a "parallelogram of forces,: whose "resultant" 
is the direction of historical change. This implies that although politics 
and ideology might point away from class forces, their total effect is 
best analysed in class terms, because historical agents are ultimately 
economically constituted class agents. The whole question of the action 
of the superstructural institutions on the class infrastructure, and the 
historical effectiveness of the ideology and politics of popular move-
ments in transforming economics, becomes particularly pointed when 
it comes to revolutionary states. The Leninist Third International ulti-
mately split from the social democratic Second International on just 
this issue. Could a Marxist party, based in a tiny industrial proletariat, 
successfully set up a socialist state in a country whose economic foun-
dations were mainly pre-capitalist? 
Lenin's politics and the Leninist party 
For the leading theoreticians of the Second International, such as 
Kautsky and Plekhanov, Marxism predicts the need for a prolonged 
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period of capitalist development before socialist revolution becomes a 
possibility. By contrast, in his celebrated Imperialism, the Highest Stage 
of Capitalism (1916), Lenin argues that capitalism has completed its 
historical mission in the creation of a world economy regulated by 
nation states, and has now entered into its epoch of decay (Lenin 1977c: 
728). The big corporations and the most powerful states try to stave 
off economic stagnation by exploiting cheap labour and raw materials 
in the colonies, but this only leads to world wars between the impe-
rialist powers. The implication is that there would be no ((prolonged 
period of capitalist development" in Russia, because capitalism as a 
global system has ceased to secure well-rounded, as opposed to uneven, 
development. The stark alternatives are socialist revolution or chronic 
under-development. 
Lenin's explanation for imperialism is based on economic factors 
(ibid.: 700-08). The emergence of monopolistic firms that have inte-
grated with banking concerns generates what Lenin calls "finance 
capital': the merger of industry and banking in international corpo-
rations. These firms generate "monopoly super-profits" because their 
international scope means that they can ''export capital" through foreign 
investment, taking advantage of cheap labour, abundant raw materials, 
high rates of profit and pliant colonial governments. The implication 
is that the nature of capitalism has changed: where once the capitalists 
had sought to liberate humanity from feudalism, they now seek global 
domination; where once capitalism had aspired to cosmopolitan peace 
and international unification, it now represents a force for nationalist 
aggression and imperialist rivalries. To prevent rebellion in the colo-
nies and revolution at home, the imperialist powers enlist sections of 
the working class as a "labour aristocracy)) in support of their policies, 
through special conditions, and try to manage crises through the inte-
gration of the state with capital in a semi-planned economy. The super-
exploitation of the colonial peoples and the devastation of the natural 
resources of the developing world are not accompanied by well-rounded 
industrial development or the improvement ofliving standards. Instead, 
Lenin argues, the imperialist powers use their military superiority to 
impoverish and dominate their colonial empires. But since colonialism 
in the nineteenth century has already partitioned the globe, the only 
solution for rising imperialist powers such as Japan and Germany is to 
militarily force a re-division of the world (ibid.: 708-26). 
Hastily returning to Russia upon the outbreak of democratic revolu-
tion in February 1917, Lenin drew the final conclusion from this analysis. 
Amidst the chaos of imperialist wars, economic crises and revolutionary 
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uprisings, an extremely centralized party can seize the opportunity and 
lead a socialist insurrection. This is despite the developmental back-
wardness of these "weak links" and the fact that the proletariat is a tiny 
minority of the population in the semi-colonies. If the central commit-
tee is prepared to exercise military discipline among its small number 
of highly trained militants, the party can expand rapidly among the 
radicalizing population and win support by combining democratic 
and socialist slogans with land reforms aimed at the vast peasantry. 
And it so happened that such a party was on hand in April 1917, 
because Lenin had been arguing for just such a formation since What 
Is To Be Done? (1902) had split the Russian Social Democratic Party. In 
State and Revolution ( 1917), written in the heat of the action, Lenin insists 
that the authentic Marxist doctrine on the state maintains that every 
state has a fundamental class character. The class character of the state 
is decided by the property relations enshrined in its legal system, while 
the unity of the state resides at the level of executive power. A weapon 
for the oppression of one class by another class, the state is an instru-
ment of violence that basically consists of "armed bodies of men" (Lenin 
1977b: 243). The bourgeois state is a national state dedicated to private 
property, especially in the means of production, Lenin concludes, some-
thing that has become reactionary in an era of the world economy and 
the possibility of socialism. Against the bourgeois state, Lenin proposes 
a workers' council republic modelled on the Paris Commune, pointing 
out that although Marx foresaw the necessity of a socialist state, the ulti-
mate aim is to smash the state altogether (ibid.: 269-74). Accordingly, 
Lenin distinguishes between a workers' state (a revolutionary repub-
lic within a recently nationalized capitalist economy in transition to 
socialism), a world federation of socialist states (a global arrangement 
of states defending collective property within economic arrangements 
based on worldwide planning) and communism (a world arrange-
ment of planned production without states or property; ibid.: 303-13 ). 
In opposition, then, to capital and the nation state, Lenin places the 
working class and its participatory-democratic workers' councils. Yet 
Lenin also argues that the link between class and councils is the revo-
lutionary party, arguing that the task of the party is organization of 
the armed insurrection followed by political representation within the 
workers' council republic. From the very beginning, Lenin's framing of 
the class/party relationship attracted the criticism that it was "substitu-
tionist'', that is that Lenin was preparing to substitute a minority party 
for the working class as a whole. Lenin's conception of the role and 
organization of the party did nothing to reassure the critics within the 
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Russian, French and German social democratic parties on this score, for 
Lenin insists on a party of the militant minority controlled by the cen-
tral committee through ''democratic centralism" (Lenin 1977c: 186-7). 
Lenin claimed that although the party represents the historical inter-
ests of the whole class, the party cannot be a broad formation or reflect 
anything other than the majority view in the party i~self, because it 
must consist only of the "highest consciousness': He therefore gladly 
took the name '(Bolshevik,, ("majority>') when the Russian Social Demo-
cratic Party split on these questions. It must be said that the party's 
consciousness-raising activities certainly included a militant defence 
of human rights, for Lenin insists that "working-class consciousness 
cannot be genuine political consciousness unless the workers are trained 
to respond to all cases of tyranny, oppression, violence and abuse, no 
matter what class is affected" (ibid.: 145). Nonetheless, although Lenin 
insists that the highly disciplined and well-educated party members -
or "cadres" - act as a transmission belt in both directions between class 
and central committee, in practice the central committee determined 
policy from exile, using the party newspaper as a propaganda organ. 
That many socialists were suspicious of Lenin's conception of political 
organization was the result of one of his most controversial positions, 
on the relation between workers' experience and class consciousness. 
In a notorious passage, Lenin writes that: 
there could not have been Social-Democratic consciousness 
among the workers. It would have to be brought to them from 
without. The history of all countries shows that the working 
class, exclusively and by its own efforts, is able to develop only 
trade union consciousness .... The theory of socialism, how-
ever, grew out of the philosophical, historical and economic 
theories elaborated by educated representatives of the proper-
tied classes, by intellectuals. (Ibid.: 114) 
The entailment of this position is that working class spontaneity is to be 
distrusted as merely "reformist': by contrast with the correct, revolution -
ary line of the party militants. It also means that when workers learn 
about politics from experience, their conclusions are always wrong, as 
opposed to the right interpretation of historical events by the central 
committee. In fairness to Lenin, these were never conclusions that he 
explicitly drew. But the implications are disturbing:. especially when 
this is placed next to Lenin's views on the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat. Although Lenin maintains that this expression means popular 
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participatory democracy, he also insisted that the proletarian dictator-
ship was above the law and beyond "bourgeois'' morality. 
By October 1917, Lenin's Bolshevik Party had won a majority in 
the urban centres on the demands of "land, bread and peace': and 
Lenin felt ready to start the insurrection. The Russian Revolution 
completely transformed world politics and led to the breakaway of the 
1hird (Communist) International (or "Comintern") from the Second 
(Socialist) International. Lenin, probably the most unorthodox of the 
orthodox Marxists in the period 1902-17, overnight redefined what 
orthodoxy meant. Meanwhile Kautsky, yesterday's "pope" of orthodox 
Marxism, suddenly became not just a "revisionist", but a veritable "ren-
egade" (Lenin 1977a: 17-97). 
Actually existing socialism 
The Russian Revolution provided the template for insurrectionary poli-
tics and socialist construction in the twentieth century. These states have 
been described as "historical Communism' or "actually existing social-
ism: designations that are imprecise but widely used. The questions 
surrounding the destinies of the revolutions made by the communist 
parties that grew from the Third International are complex. Nonetheless, 
there are some historical facts that frame the entire experience, which 
must be taken into consideration in any account of the implementation 
of classical Marxism. As Howard Chodos summarizes: 
First, the fact that the vision that inspired the creation of his-
torical communism did not survive the twentieth century 
intact. The main states that were built in the name of Marxism 
either collapsed, as in the case of the former Soviet Union and 
its allied People's Democracies, or have been so thoroughly 
transformed as to result in a series of economic reforms, as 
in the case of China, as to be completely unrecognisable. . .. 
Second, the fact that serious violations of human rights, not to 
say outright criminal behaviour, have repeatedly occurred in 
states purporting to implement the [classical] Marxist vision, 
under a sufficiently wide array of circumstances to constitute 
a prima facie case that there was something amiss at the heart 
of the twentieth-century socialist project. And finally, the fact 
that historical communist regimes were never able to live up to 
the standard that they themselves established as the criterion by 
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which they should ultimately be judged, that is they never did 
surpass capitalist liberal democracies either in terms of their 
ability to sustain economic growth, or in terms of meeting the 
material needs of their citizens. ( Chodos 2007: 177) 
For most people today, the future society envisaged by Marxism as a 
whole, and not just its classical variant, is fatally compromized by the 
experiences of Russia and China. The designation "actually existing 
socialism': which originates from its defenders, is apologetic, because 
it implicitly contrasts what was imagined before any of this happened 
with what became possible under historical circumstances. Indeed even 
the most resolute advocates of the political arrangements modelled on 
the Soviet Union acknowledged that the results were hardly ideal (Stalin 
1943: 656-7). Following internal political struggles against the left oppo-
sition of Bukharin and Trotsky, Stalin's control of the central committee 
of the Bolshevik Party made it possible to instigate a particular version 
of the classical programme. Under conditions of imperialist encircle-
ment, invasion by a militarily superior fascist power and then Cold 
War stand-off against the technologically advanced West, the Soviet 
Union engaged in a form of the national construction of socialism that 
had four elements. These were forced agricultural collectivization and 
modernization, the socialization of industry and rapid industrializa-
tion, centralized economic planning using a five-year timeframe, and 
political centralization of a dictatorial, one-party state with an extensive 
secret police. 
Where Stalin pioneered a particular vision of socialist construction 
that was extensively implemented following revolutions in the devel-
oping world, it was really Mao who worked out how to apply classical 
Marxism to political strategy in peasant societies, that is to actually 
make revolutions happen. Following Stalin's interpretation of Lenin's 
theory of imperialism and its application in Russia, Mao foresaw a 
two-stage process. In the first stage, the Communist Party leads (on 
behalf of the absent proletariat) an alliance of peasants and the national 
bourgeoisie against the alliance of imperialist forces, local fascists and 
the pro-imperialist bourgeoisie. The resulting People's Democracy 
then manages a peaceful transition to socialism in one country, as the 
Communist Party within the provisional government of national unity 
rapidly consolidates power. 
Confronted with the problem of socialist strategy in a peasant society, 
Mao concluded that the Communist Party must create revolutionary 
zones within the countryside and only arrive at the end of the revolution 
72 understanding marx1sm 
at the gates of the cities. In essence, the revolution sets up a proto-state 
iJl one part of the country and then extends this outwards by infiltra-
tion into the popular masses and guerrilla actions against the army and 
police (Tse-Tung 1967-69: 113-94 Vol II, 147-54 Vol IV). Furthermore, 
given the arms imbalance between pro-imperialist forces and the 
communist movement, the revolution must reckon with a "prolonged 
popular war', involving serious casualties, where revolutionary policy, 
democratic centralism and military discipline collapse into the same 
thing. Once the Communist Party holds a majority in the organs of state 
and the national assembl~ it moves to alter the constitution to reflect 
a socialist state by collectivizing property, revolutionizing agriculture, 
forcing industrialization and expropriating foreign corporations. After 
the socialist revolution, the proletariat becomes a majority of the popu-
lation, although, happily, it is not a proletariat by this stage but just "the 
people" of a classless republic. 
Because classical Marxism regarded practice as the test of theory, 
Marx's vision of socialism has been held to stand or fall with the suc-
cess or failure of historical Communism. Most evaluations of actually 
existing socialism have sought to balance the difficult historical circum -
stances of its birth against the social achievements of these regimes. 
Their strategy for socialist construction centred on the breakneck 
advance of technological productive forces at the expense of the politi-
cal rights and economic control of the labour force. These were traded 
against an expectation of material prosperity in the future. Nonetheless, 
defenders of the regimes can point to some real achievements. Successful 
revolutions demonstrated that capitalism could be overthrown, while 
the initial phases of agricultural reform and industrialization generated 
significantly higher growth rates than Western alternatives. Socialist 
construction - however flawed - resulted in better material conditions 
for the population compared to the pre-revolutionary regimes, where 
vast wealth gaps were replaced by relatively egalitarian distribution 
arrangements and massively improved access to social services. The 
socialist bloc supported national liberation from colonial domination 
and imperialist military interventions worldwide, and the existence of 
an alternative to capitalism influenced the setting up of the welfare state 
in the West (Chodos 2007: 185). 
Critics of these regimes have powerful arguments at their disposal, 
however, beginning with the way that the terminus of these regimes in 
atrocity or stagnation has almost completely discredited social alterna-
tives to capitalism. Despite some social and economic advances, popular 
support for actual socialism has proven absent in the moment of political 
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truth, possibly because of persistent material shortages, bureaucratic 
manipulation of distribution arrangements, the suppression of dissent 
and debate, and failure to actually surpass the West technologically. 
To protect a system of political clientalisrn, the governing bureaucracy 
engaged in ferocious repression of any popular movements, including 
massive criminal acts, on the scale of the atrocities that fascism perpe-
trated (ibid.: 185). 
The official declarations of the leaders of these states ring in chilling 
counterpoint to the factual record of their regimes. "All of the exploit-
ing classes have been eliminated", Stalin wrote triumphantly in 1936; 
"the exploitation of man by man has been abolished, eliminated, while 
... in the sphere of the national economy of the USSR, we now have a 
new, Socialist economy [advancing] along the road to Communism" 
(Stalin 1943: 566). It is reliably estimated that the construction of this 
((new, classless, Socialist societi' (ibid.: 567) cost at least 10 million lives 
between 1929and1953 (Davies 1995: 72-3). Mao's efforts to implement 
the Stalinist blueprint from the 1930s under Chinese circumstances of 
the 1950s also had catastrophic consequences for the popular masses. 
The policies of agricultural collectivization and forced industrialization 
were continued in the Great Leap Forward (1958-62), which resulted 
in famine and 38 million deaths (Chang & Halliday 2005: 456-7). In 
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, party cadres consisting of 
layers of workers and students were mobilized against intellectuals and 
bureaucrats, not in order to create a participatory democracy, but in 
order to cleanse the state of ((cultivation", by removing these layers from 
power and sending intellectuals to forced ('re-education,, camps (Shu-
Tse 1980: 380-415). Nonetheless, Mao's strategy of guerrilla warfare 
and socialist construction led by the Communist Party was successfully 
prosecuted by Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam (a relatively benevolent regime) 
and by Pol Pot in Cambodia (an extremely malevolent regime). 
Explanations of actually existing socialism and accounts of these 
societies have ranged from right-wing arguments that they demonstrate 
that Marxism as a whole is inherently totalitarian, through to apologies 
for their political and economic defects as the result of imperialist encir-
clement, rather than some problem with the classical vision (Chodos 
2007: 182). These societies have been described as immature forms of 
socialism, workers' states that have degenerated into bureaucratic des-
potisms, forms of state capitalism and even new types of bureaucratic 
class society. Adjudication of these claims would require a separate 
volume, but in relation to classical Marxism, two things can be said. 
The first is that the combination of a vision of historically necessary 
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social evolution with a conception of socialism as a morally neutral 
scientific politics most certainly played a part in the disaster of his-
torical Communism. The second is that this by no means incriminates 
classical Marxism as a whole, because it was certainly possible to be a 
classical Marxist and yet directly oppose the regimes of actually exist-
ing socialism. 
The classical critique of Stalin's Russia 
Trotsky's is far from the only classical critique of Stalinism. Nonetheless, 
because of his historical significance, this analysis of the Soviet Union 
cannot be overlooked in any evaluation of productive force determinism 
and its political consequences. Although the Fourth International failed 
to lead a mass mobilization (Frank 1979: 3-4), it provides evidence that 
the politics of Stalin are not the whole story about scientific socialism. 
Trotsky's claim that the Soviet Union was a "degenerate workers' state" 
that had resulted from a political counter-revolution by the Stalinist 
bureaucracy, and his alternative to national liberation in «permanent 
revolution", remain controversial and contentious. The point here, how -
ever, is not to reach a final judgment on the object of Trotsky's analyses, 
but to illustrate the classical approach by looking at an historical figure's 
response to Stalin's national model of socialist construction. 
According to Trotsky's mature theory, although capitalism as a world 
system of combined and uneven development is as a whole a fetter 
on the productive forces - making socialist revolution in the develop-
ing world possible - it is absurd to suggest that a backward economy 
could on its own advance to socialism (Trotsky 1970). In The Revolution 
Betrayed ( 1936), Trotsky argues that, from the classical perspective, the 
Stalin regime can only be regarded as a counter-revolutionary force 
within what Trotsky calls a "degenerate workers' state': 
This is fundamentally an argument from the historical condition 
of the global sum of productive forces to the negative consequences 
of isolated national development, exacerbated by imperialist block-
ade. Additionally, Trotsky denounces the suppression of participatory 
democracy in the workers' soviets and ridicules Stalin's declaration of 
the achievement of socialism as a farce, given the industrial backward-
ness of the Russian economy. «By the lowest stage of communism [i.e. 
socialism]", Trotsky writes, "Marx meant, at any rate, a society which 
from the very beginning stands higher in its economic development 
than the most advanced capitalism:' He continues: 
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[T] he present Soviet Union does not stand above the level of 
world economy, but is only trying to catch up to the capitalist 
countries. Marx called that society, formed upon the basis of 
a socialization of the productive forces of the most advanced 
capitalism of its epoch, the lowest stage of communism. This 
designation obviously does not apply to the Soviet Union .... 
[T]he present Soviet regime, in all its contradictoriness, [is] not 
a socialist regime, but a preparatory regime transitional from 
capitalism to socialism. (Trotsky 1972: 47) 
In his analysis of the class character of the Soviet state, Trotsky begins 
from the economic base and then argues that the contradictions of 
the political superstructure are determined in the last instance by an 
economic antagonism. This is between socialist property relations in 
production and capitalist monetary relations in distribution. Because 
it is compelled by material scarcity to use monetary wages to distribute 
the social product, Trotsky proposes: 
The state assumes directly and from the very beginning a dual 
character: socialistic, insofar as it defends social property in the 
means of production; bourgeois, insofar as the distribution of 
life's goods is carried out with a capitalistic measure of value 
and all the consequences ensuing therefrom. (Ibid.: 54) 
In other words, the institutional structure of the state reflects the funda-
mental laws of motion of the economy, so that political struggles must 
respond - according to the specific factors at work in the political arena 
- to economic antagonisms of a class character. Accordingly, the admin-
istration is being run by a class layer that is distinctly non-proletarian, 
at the same time that the government in the soviets has excluded pro-
letarian participation. The Stalin regime, Trotsky concludes, represents 
a political counter-revolution. Although Trotsky does consider the pos-
sibility that the Soviet Union is a form of state capitalism, he remains 
unconvinced, because he believes that that would have to involve the 
reversal of socialist property relations: 
The means of production belong to the state. But the state, so to 
speak, "belongs" to the bureaucracy. If these as yet wholly new 
relations should solidify, become the norm and be legalized, 
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whether with or without resistance from the workers, they 
would, in the long run, lead to a complete liquidation of the 
social conquests of the proletarian revolution. But to speak of 
that now is at least premature. The proletariat has not yet said 
its last word. The bureaucracy has not yet created social sup-
ports for its dominion in the form of special types of property. 
It is compelled to defend state property as the source of its 
power and its income. (Ibid.: 249) 
The class characterization of the Soviet state remained an important 
question in the post-war era. Some Trotskyists adapted a "state capital-
isf' position, while others described the post-Stalin regime as a "degen-
erate workers' state': But they agreed on the practical tasks involved in 
Russia. These included launching new soviets against the post-Stalinist 
bureaucracy, the democratization of the economy and the complete dis-
mantling of what Trotsky had called ({a totalitarian-bureaucratic state" 
(ibid.: 108). 
In the event, that did not happen. Instead, historical Communism 
collapsed through economic stagnation and lack of political legitimacy. 
Many Marxists had long recognized that these states were not viable 
and had rejected the official orthodoxies that went with them. From 
the 1970s onwards, many classical Marxists, drawn by both Trotskyist 
and Maoist critiques of the Soviet Union, began to move away from 
productive force determinism. A new focus on the relations of produc-
tion was accompanied by recognition of multiple paths of historical 
evolution and the importance of political contingency in social devel-
opment. This might well be called post-classical by thinkers such as 
Perry Anderson and Ellen Wood, for instance, although they affirm 
a base-and-superstructure perspective, emphasizing the centrality of 
the political superstructure in class dynamics (Wood 1986, 1995) and 
the multiplicity of possible trajectories confronting historical societies 
(Anderson 1974a, b). Others affirm the centrality of the concept of 
imperialism but locate this in a world-system perspective that con-
centrates on economic and political relations (Wallerstein 1990, 2002). 
Either way, the unfolding of historical necessity through a sequence 
of modes of production, and the politics of national infrastructural 
development that accompanied it, no longer represent the mainstream 
of Marxist thinking. 
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Summary of key points 
The codification of historical materialism 
• In the context of debates in the socialist movement, Engels for-
malized "Marxism" as the science of human history that comple-
mented Darwin's science of natural evolution. 
• From this perspective, social revolutions are the laboratory experi-
ments of Marxist science, whose major hypothesis is that social 
evolution follows development of the productive forces. 
Lenin's politics 
• Lenin's rediscovery of Hegel was a return to historical teleology, 
in the form of the thesis that imperialism is the "epoch of capital-
ist decay': an era of wars and revolutions which implies that the 
communist party must have a quasi-military discipline. 
• Imperialism is caused by five economic factors (monopoly cor-
porations, finance capital, the export of capital, world economy 
and colonial re-division of the globe), but the resulting uneven 
development creates revolutionary opportunities in the "weak 
links" in the «imperialist chain': 
• Lenin argues that the capitalist state is a machine for the defence 
of private property and must be smashed in a proletarian insurrec-
tion, replaced by a workers' council republic led by the victorious 
communist party. 
• Lenin proposes that the vanguard role of the party springs not only 
from the imperialism it opposes, but also from the inability of the 
proletariat to spontaneously transcend trade union consciousness. 
Trotsky and Stalin on socialism 
• Stalin declared it possible to achieve socialism in an isolated and 
backward country by virtue of state property, industrialization 
campaigns, collectivized agriculture and the suppression of dis-
sent, announcing in 1936 that the Soviet Union, despite its state 
apparatus, had arrived at communism. 
• On Trotsky's analysis, the Soviet Union was a degenerated work-
ers' state characterized by contradictions between socialized 
production and bourgeois distribution, and by a totalitarian 
political regime whose interests are contrary to the interests of 
the proletariat. 
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three 
Hegelian Marxism 
The Hegelian Marxism of the Hungarian philosopher Gyorgy Lukacs 
and Italian Communist Party (PCI) leader Antonio Gramsci heralded 
the renaissance in Marxism that followed the Russian Revolution. 
Alongside many other Marxist thinkers at the time, Lukacs and Gramsci 
returned to the Hegelian roots of Marx's theory in order to rethink 
its conclusions. Dissatisfaction with orthodox Marxism's combination 
of evolutionary gradualism and scientific socialism was widespread. 
Speaking for many, Gramsci described the Bolshevik insurrection as 
a ''revolution against [Marx's] Capitat (rather than capital!). This for-
mulation meant, for Gramsci, the rejection of politically fatalistic deter-
minism and vulgar economic reductionism. A theoretical renaissance 
involves taking the fundamental principles of a research programme and 
systematically varying one of them. In the case of Hegelian Marxism, 
that meant retaining praxis and history while varying structure. For 
both Lukacs and Gramsci, Marxist theory was meaningless outside 
political activism in the class struggle, so instead of a scientific theory 
of social structure, Marxism was a philosophy of praxis. 
Arising from a materialist radicalization of Hegelian dialectics, 
Marxism as a philosophy of praxis locates the source of the impasses 
of philosophy in the contradictions of social life. The consequence 
is that the transcendence of philosophical limitations can take place 
only through the practical resolution of these real contradictions. In 
proposing this, Lukacs and Gramsci certainly considered themselves 
to be Leninists, although they insisted that the problems confronting 
the western European revolutionary movement could not be solved by 
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the mechanical application of Lenin's positions. Indeed, most of the 
other Hegelian Marxists, such as Karl Korsch (Marxism and Philosophy, 
1923) and Jose-Carlos Mariategui (Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian 
Reality, 1928), also regarded themselves as Leninists. But the truth was 
that Hegelian Marxism had broken with Lenin's militant version of the 
base-and-superstructure model. The result is two extraordinarily influ-
ential new Marxist conceptions of the structure of capitalist society, 
in terms of "reification" (Lukacs) and "hegemony" (Gramsci). In the 
context of the failure of the western European revolutions in the 1920s 
and the rise of fascism in the 1930s, these ideas provided powerful 
new explanations of the "lag in consciousness" that had undone the 
Italian and German workers, despite objectively revolutionary condi-
tions. With Hegelian Marxism, the Marxists in the West began a long 
"cultural turn: seeking to understand how supposedly "superstructural" 
factors had decisively influenced history. 
History and class consciousness 
Gyorgy Lukacs (1885-1971) was already a significant cultural intellec-
tual when the crisis of the First World War and Russian Revolution burst 
upon Hungary in 1919. His philosophically inclined literary criticism, 
The Soul and Forms (1910) and Theory of the Novel ([1916] 1971b), had 
made a considerable impression on western European intellectual cir-
cles, with their post-Hegelian existential treatment of cultural fragmen-
tation. In both works, Lukacs diagnosed a yearning for psychological 
wholeness and communal unity. Describing this as a longing for totality 
that was everywhere denied by bourgeois conditions, Lukacs regarded 
it as primarily a cultural problem until he radicalized at the end of 
the war. During the short-lived socialist uprising, Lukacs served as a 
revolutionary commissar, as well as being a member of the Communist 
Party (Arato & Breines 1979: 91). 
From exile in Vienna in the 1920s, Lukacs wrote his enormously 
influential History and Class Consciousness ([1923] 1971a), which, 
although it electrified the radical intellectual milieu in western Europe, 
was greeted by the Leninist leadership of the Communist International 
as a dangerous deviation. Its central claim is that the orthodox Marxism 
of the Second International represents a complete falsification of the 
dialectical philosophy that animated Marx's theory. Once the histori-
cal dialectic is returned to the forefront of materialist social theory, 
Lukacs proposes, two major breakthroughs become possible. The :first is 
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recognition that Marxism advocates the idea of totality as both a theo-
retical lens for revealing the systematic interconnection of all aspects of 
social life and a normative ideal upon which to reconstruct a truly social 
existence. The second is that from the totalizing perspective of Marxist 
theory, capitalist dehumanization and cultural fragmentation turn out 
to be deeply related processes and, indeed, represent the main barriers 
to revolutionary class consciousness. Clearly influenced by sustained 
reading of Hegel and the dialectics of alienation, as well as detailed 
knowledge of Marx's published works, History and Class Consciousness 
anticipated the release of Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 
of 1844 at the end of the 1920s (Feenberg 1981). 
The significance of History and Class Consciousness is twofold. As 
already mentioned, it is emblematic of the "cultural turn'' of the Western 
Marxists, a process that orthodox Marxists have represented as a turn 
away from class struggle to the forms of cultural critique beloved of 
intellectuals (Anderson 1979). Certainly that book's disregard for the 
structural analysis of capitalist society and the concept oflaws of motion 
of the economic foundation meant that it was instantly distrusted by 
the Comintern's leadership. And there is no doubt that with the reces-
sion of the tide of proletarian political mobilization in the 1920s, the 
Marxist intellectuals to some extent lost contact with mass movements. 
But the central problem for newly converted Leninists in the Western 
revolutions of 1918-23 was that the majority of the working class con-
tinued to follow the moderate social democrats. Most workers displayed 
highly conservative cultural attitudes that prevented their entry into the 
ferment of radicalization happening among a minority of the popula-
tion. The cultural turn was a turn to central problems of revolutionary 
strategy, not a turn away from Marxist theory. 
At the same time, History and Class Consciousness was a philosophi-
cal treatment of problems of revolutionary strategy that highlighted 
the normative dimension of Marxism. Lukacs's work advocated moral 
universality and human flourishing in ways that had been suppressed 
by the reception of historical materialism as social science. Its central 
essay, "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat': centres on 
the section critiquing "The Antinomies of Bourgeois Thought", where 
Lukacs confronts Kantian philosophy. Lukacs criticizes Kant for his 
notorious divisions between value and fact, freedom and determin-
ism, practice and theory, and subject and object, maintaining that these 
reflect the conditions of existence of the bourgeois individual (Lukacs 
197la). Adapting Hegel's critique of Kant in the Phenomenology of Spirit 
(Hegel 1977: 355-74), Lukacs proposes that the social conditions of 
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bourgeois society generate an individualistic understanding of freedom 
and a contemplative attitude towards the world. These prevent bourgeois 
consciousness from acknowledging that the realization of freedom, the 
revolutionization of the social world and the transformation of the natu. 
ral environment in labour practice are all the same thing. 
The concept of reification 
Marx linked his analysis of political economy with his critique of ideol-
ogy through the concept of commodity fetishism, the ideological illu-
sion that structured the interactions of individuals in a market society. 
"A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing': Marx wrote: 
simply because in it the social character of men's labour appears 
to them as an objective character stamped upon the product 
of that labour . . . It is only a definite social relation between 
men that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation 
between things. (CI: 72) 
What Marx describes here Lukacs calls the ccreification' ( Verdinglichung 
- petrifaction) of social relations under capitalism, where reification 
colloquially refers to treating persons as things. More technically, it 
names the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, the mistake of treating an 
abstraction as a material thing, and attributing causal powers to it. This 
is Lukacs' point of departure for his analysis of the commodity as the 
((universal category of society as a whole", a "central structural problem' 
whose ((consequences are able to influence the total ... life of society)) 
(Lukacs 197la: 86, 84). The commodity form becomes a universal struc-
turing principle of both society and the psyche, because the principle of 
equivalence - the exchange of commodities in proportion to abstract 
labour - is both a psychological requirement, as a necessary illusion, and 
sociological compulsion, as a "real abstraction': The real abstractions of 
capitalist society create a world that is highly rationalized, yet utterly 
irrational. Although the "principle of rationalisation is based on what 
can be calculated", these calculations represent society as governed by 
anonymous economic laws that have the appearance of laws of nature. 
The anarchy of the market means that the operation of social processes 
happens behind the backs of agents, to whom the world appears as a 
"second nature" ruled by a capricious fate. Everyday life, meanwhile, 
becomes dominated by quantitative calculations of efficient means, not 
82 understanding marx1sm 
qualitative c~n~~d~r~tions of human ends, so that "time is everything; 
man is nothing (ibid.: 88-9). 
In light of the phenomenon of reification, Lukacs radicalizes the soci-
ology of Max Weber on social and cultural rationalization. For Weber) 
the modern world of capitalism and bureaucracy are formed through a 
new type of"formal rationality': the application of the principle of calcu-
lation to reason itsel£ Mainly, individuals exercise "purposive rational-
ity': calculations of the most efficient means to (potentially irrational) 
goals; reflection on the goals of action happens in "value rationality': 
submission of reason's ends to procedures which reduce to tests oflogi-
cal consistency. What is lost from everyday life under formal rationality 
is not only traditional, religious worldviews, but also other aspects of 
"substantive rationality", considerations of human flourishing and the 
good life. As Lukacs notes, "quality no longer matters", for "quantity 
alone decides everything", so the modern person becomes a "human 
being without qualities" (ibid.: 89-90). The individual under capitalism 
is a socially atomized, anonymous functionary who suppresses their 
unique individuality and regards the sum of their personality in terms 
of their quantitative performance, considering themselves a calcula-
ble object located in an anonymous chain of causes and effects (ibid.: 
89-90). 
The development of vast bureaucracies in state and corporate admin-
istration is one consequence of the "dehumanising function of the com-
modity relation" (ibid.: 92). Another is the submission of every element 
of human life (law, culture, ethics, politics) to the procedures of the 
natural sciences, in the interests of a "disinterested" effective manipu -
lation of social routines. Lukacs maintains that the objectification and 
rationalization of social relations means that the major aspects of social 
life break apart into reified "things): departments of activity such as law, 
politics, culture and economics, which appear to relate to one another 
externally, through mechanical cause-and-effect relations. 
Reification «leads to the destruction of every image of the whole': that 
is to a condition of cultural fragmentation (ibid.: 103). The formalism 
of modern bourgeois philosophy reflects this reality, especially in its 
characteristic antinomies. An '<antinomi' is a set of mutually exclu-
sive and logically contradictory conclusions arrived at from identical 
premisses, such as Kant's simultaneous claims that the empirical indi-
vidual is entirely determined, yet the "transcendental egd' is completely 
free. Bourgeois philosophy cannot resolve its own antinomies, Lukacs 
argues, because its characteristic standpoint is that of the isolated indi-
vidual contemplating nature from the perspective of judging between 
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competing scientific theories. This perspective leads Kant to propose 
that the substratum of the natural and social worlds is unknowable in 
principle. For all its rationalism and elevation of the mathematical as the 
paradigm of thinking, bourgeois philosophy is fundamentally irrational. 
Thus, Lukacs concludes: 
the attempt to universalise rationalism necessarily issues in 
the demand for a system but, at the same time, as soon as one 
reflects upon the conditions in which a universal system is pos-
sible, i.e. as soon as the question of the system is consciously 
posed, it is seen that such a demand is incapable of fulfilment. 
(Ibid.: 117) 
To solve the problem of the antinomies of bourgeois thought, Lukacs 
shifts from the epistemological focus on "theoretical reason" of Kantian 
philosophy. He rejects the standpoint of the contemplative subject inves-
tigating an object domain in society using formal procedures reminis-
cent of the natural sciences. Instead, he advocates the activist focus of 
Fichte)s idealism of "practical reason': with its free subject transforming 
the object domain through rationally willed action. Lukacs states that: 
What is relevant to our problem here is the statement that the 
subject of knowledge, the ego-principle, is known as to its con-
tent and, hence, can be taken as a starting-point and as a guide 
to method. In the most general terms, we see here the origin of 
the philosophical tendency to press forward to a conception of 
the subject which can be thought of as the creator of the totality 
of content. (Ibid.: 122) 
It was Fichte who radicalized Kant's formalistic ideas about practical 
reason into a philosophy that placed "the practical, action and activity 
in the centre of his unifying philosophical system,) (ibid.: 123). But it 
was Hegel who fully understood the revolutionary implications of the 
subject as creator of totality, an insight that Hegel expresses as the idea 
of the active subject who consciously creates the world and at the same 
time transforms themselves (ibid.: 128). 
The category of totality 
Lukacs, materialist interpretation of Hegel as a sort of bourgeois Marx 
was later to extend to a demonstration that Hegel's economic research 
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had substantially anticipated Marx. In History and Class Consciousness, 
Lukacs restricts himself to the claim that "economic determination in 
the last instance' is actually not the centrepiece of Marxism: 
It is not the primacy of economic motives in historical explana-
tion that constitutes the decisive difference between Marxism 
and bourgeois thought, but the point of view of totality. The cat-
egory of totality, the all-pervasive supremacy of the whole over 
the parts, is the essence of the method which Marx took over 
from Hegel and brilliantly transformed into the foundations 
of a wholly new science ... Proletarian science is revolutionary 
not just by virtue of its revolutionary ideas which it opposes 
to bourgeois society, but above all because of its method. The 
primacy of the category of the totality is the bearer of the principle 
of revolution in science. (Ibid.: 27) 
Instead of a bourgeois ''purely formal" ethics "lacking in content': 
Lukacs proposes that "the essence of praxis consists in annulling that 
indifference of form towards content" of bourgeois philosophy. This 
happens by recognizing that the material object (nature and society) is 
something generated by the active subject (human labour; ibid.: 126-8). 
In other words, from the perspective of praxis, the antinomies of bour-
geois philosophy and the cultural fragmentation of the bourgeois world 
are resolved by means of a methodological totality that anticipates and 
guides the totalizing praxis of socialist revolution. 
Now, this reasoning requires some questionable premisses to carry 
the argument. As Lukacs acknowledged in his 1967 self-critique, the 
main one is the claim that "nature is a social category" (ibid.: 130). This 
certainly makes possible the idea that theory and practice, and subject 
and object, are a unity. But it is a regression to idealism, potentially at its 
most absurd. Technically, in order to make subject and object and theory 
and practice a complete unity, the ontological difference between subject 
and object has to be annulled, along with any distinction between sci-
entific knowledge of the natural environment and normative agreement 
within the social world. The problem with this position, as he later con-
ceded, is that performs an idealist conflation of the material properties 
of the natural environment with the theoretical discoveries that scien -
tifically model these. Then it reduces the question of scientific valid-
ity, idealistically conceived, to a political question of the correct line. 
Moreover, if "nature is a social category': then society is basically an 
artwork. It is an intelligible and transformable totality, which can be 
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entirely known because it is exhaustively the product of human actiont 
Since the material substrate of human labour and the social totality 
has been rendered transparent, there are no opaque social relations 
that need to be grasped through scientific procedures, because the 
connection between material scarcity and productive forces has van .. 
ished. Not surprisingly, Lukacs maintains that bourgeois aesthetics is a 
perfect exemplification of the category of totality in operation: 
[Art's] principle is the creation of a concrete totality that 
springs from a conception of form orientated towards the 
concrete content of its material substratum. In this view, form 
is therefore able to demolish the "contingent" relation of the 
parts to the whole and to resolve the merely apparent opposi-
tion between chance and necessity. (Ibid.: 137) 
Bourgeois aesthetics grasps "the principle whereby man having been 
socially destroyed, fragmented and divided between different partial 
systems is to be made whole again': but it does this only in ideas, not 
through actions (ibid.: 139). Instead, art's aesthetic redemption of the 
world remains a compensation for the loss of substantive meaning-
fulness and the reality of the mutilation of human flourishing, one 
restricted to a specialized compartment of social life characterized 
by its uselessness. With the dialectical method, Lukacs argues, Hegel 
applies the aesthetic principle to thinking in response to an "impulse 
to overcome the reified disintegration of the subject and the - likewise 
reified - rigidity and impenetrability of its objects" (ibid.: 141). 
Reality can be understood as the product of human action, so that 
the rationality of the material substratum and the concrete individuality 
of the contents of thought are the same problem. Its solution, Lukacs 
flourishes, is the identification of a "subject of the genesis" of the totality 
of forms, a ((methodologically indispensible subject-object" (ibid.: 146). 
Hegel identified this subject with humanity as a whole, idealistically 
reified into the "world spirit': But Lukacs argues that Marx's discov-
ery of the proletariat demonstrates that Hegel's subject is a premature 
designation: 
Only when a historical situation has arisen in which a class 
must understand society if it is to assert itself; only when the 
fact that a class understands itself means that it understands 
society as a whole and when, in consequence, the class becomes 
both the subject and object of knowledge; in short, only when 
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these conditions are all satisfied will the unity of theory and 
practice, the precondition of the revolutionary function of 
theory, become possible. Such a situation has in fact arisen 
with the entry of the proletariat into history. (Ibid.: 2-3) 
1he proletariat, Lukacs unequivocally states, is the "identical subject-
object of history" (ibid.: 206). 
The proletarian revolution 
Lukacs eventually conceded that "the proletariat seen as the identical 
subject-object of the real history of mankind is no materialist consum-
mation that overcomes the constructions of idealism [but] rather an 
attempt to out-Hegel Heger' (Lukacs 197la: xxiii). That was not, how-
ever, until 1967, almost half a century afterwards. In the meantime, 
Lukacs' defense of History and Class Consciousness found him announc-
ing that, in effect, Marx was a continuation of Hegel. "Like the classical 
German philosophers, particularly Hegel;' Lukacs writes, "Marx per-
ceived world history as a homogeneous process, as an uninterrupted, 
revolutionary process of liberation" (Lukacs 1972: 24-5). 
The accent in Lukacs's version of Hegelian Marxism falls solidly on 
praxis as the key to both structure and history. This is not only because 
the proletarian subject "expresses,, itself in the socio-historical totality. 
It is also because the theory itself reduces to an expression of political 
practice: 
Historical materialism is the theory of the proletarian revolu -
tion. It is so because it is in essence an intellectual synthesis of 
the social existence which produces and fundamentally deter-
mines the proletariat; and because the proletariat struggling for 
liberation finds its clear self-consciousness in it. 
(Lukacs 1970b: 9) 
Along the way, scientific experimentation and the objectivity of knowl-
edge are denounced as "contemplation at its purest" (Lukacs 197la: 132). 
This sort of critique of orthodox Marxism was badly received in the 
increasingly Stalinist Comintern, as Stalin drove Marxism back in the 
direction of "proletarian science': Lukacs was forced to recant publicly 
and he only just escaped being purged. 
During the period between about 1927and1967, Lukacs's participa-
tion in cultural debates and philosophical interventions was intensively 
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regulated by the government. In Lukacs's aesthetics of the realist novei 
however, the category of totality and the notion of an identical subject-
object made a lot more sense. This is because the world of the novel, being, 
after all, entirely composed oflinguistically mediated idealizations, has 
none of the stubborn resistance of the material world that renders such 
notions so dubious in relation to social structure and world history. 
According to Lukacs, the realist novel is politically progressive irre-
spective of authorial intentions, because literary realism depends upon 
the construction of psychologically plausible and socially typical indi-
viduals, acting and being acted upon within a created ("diegetic») world 
that must strike the reader as believable. The requirements of literary 
diegesis mean that the author must construct a social world composed 
of realistic social relations, within which the characters interact in ways 
consistent with their worldly position and psychological characteriza-
tion. What this means, in effect, is that the realist work reconstructs 
the reified totality of surface appearances of a historical society as in 
actuality the effects generated by the sum total of human actions under-
taken by socialized agents. The realist work totalizes, both historically 
and socially, revealing society to be the work of socially and historically 
determined human agency. 
By contrast with the literary realism of authors such as Walter Scott, 
Charles Dickens, Honore de Balzac and Thomas Mann, Lukacs argued, 
stood two degenerate tendencies that reflected reification. On the side 
of the object was '(naturalism", the realistic depiction of the objective 
world, including the accurate representation of empirical individuals, 
but lacking the synthetic connection between historical background, 
social context and typical character of literary realism. Naturalism 
'(describes" but does not "narrate': because it represents the reified total-
ity but does not reconstruct it as a social process, and it is populated by 
individuals but not characters, because it reproduces idiosyncrasies but 
cannot achieve typification. On the side of the subject was modernism, 
a sort of psychological naturalism that accurately reported the subjec-
tive experience of reification, in terms of cultural fragmentation and 
personal disintegration. Modernism, for Lukacs, was utterly hostile to 
progressive culture, because its protest against reification was conducted 
in terms that rendered the real causes of the problem in historical social 
relations completely invisible, substituting instead a politically reaction-
ary naturalization of subjective distortion (Lukacs 2007: 34-9). 
The totalizing perspective of the realist work overcomes the reified 
fragmentation of the reader's immediate experiences, because it repre-
sents the antagonism between the particular and the general as a social 
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rocess. But this totalizing perspective awakens a dormant dimension ~f those experiences and this may lead to a moment of acknowledgment 
(recognition) of the truth of the artwork and a desire for liberation. 
"1he [realist] work': Lukacs says, {(by its very nature, offers a truer, more 
complete, more vivid and more dynamic reflection of reality than the 
recipient otherwise possesses" (Lukacs 1970a: 36). Art therefore pre-
serves and expresses the yearning for the realization of human creative 
potential and the desire for human agency of everyday individuals. The 
collision between the rounded development of literary characters and 
their social agency, and the reified perspective of everyday life, results 
in a cathartic shock with the potential to catalyse ethical regeneration 
in the audience (Lukacs 1963: 767, 786). 
Indeed, with fascism on the rise, Lukacs detected a strong current 
of philosophical modernism in the works of bourgeois philosophy 
since Hegel, with a turn to subjectivity amounting, Lukacs argued, to 
an embrace of irrationality. In somewhat shrill tones, Lukacs docu-
mented the hypothesis that in the age of imperialism, bourgeois thought 
passively reflected the fettering of the productive forces, in the form 
of a gradual renunciation of reason. The deepest valleys in this dark 
landscape were labelled Kierkegaard, Bergson, Nietzsche and Heidegger 
- philosophers who might indeed be accused of irrationalism - but 
Luka cs's monochrome treatment of major thinkers meant that neo-Kan -
tianism and Husserl's phenomenology were also included in the general-
ized retreat from reason. That everyone else had abandoned the heights 
achieved by Marx and Hegel perhaps provided psychological compen-
sation, however, for Lukacs's own failure to complete his major late 
projects, on social ontology and philosophical aesthetics, satisfactorily. 
The philosophy of praxis 
The second concept to be explored in this chapter is the category of 
"hegemony>: or leadership based on a combination of domination and 
direction, developed by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1891-
1937). With the category of hegemony, Gramsci arrived at a conceptu-
alization of social structure, based on the typically Hegelian-Marxist 
emphasis on praxis and history, which profoundly modified the base-and-
superstructure topography of orthodox Marxism. Orthodoxy's static, 
external relation between economic foundation and ideologico-political 
superstructure regards the state as an instrument of domination only. 
But Gramsci proposes that "the supremacy of a social group manifests 
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itself in two ways, as 'domination' and as 'intellectual and moral leader-
ship,,, (Gramsci 1971: 57). Hegemony, which Gramsci defines in terms 
of a mobile equilibrium of consent and coercion operating in both state 
and civil society (ibid.: 245), introduces a dynamic, dialectical relation
1 
in which politics and ideology play an interventionist role in economics. 
A small and highly intellectual man, who suffered from a spinal 
deformation that left him with a permanently hunched back as a result 
of a childhood accident, Gramsci is one of Marxism's heroic figures, 
alongside Luxemburg, Trotsky and Che Guevara. For despite constant 
ill health, Gramsci became a founding member of the powerful Italian 
Communist Party (PCI) and a leader of the anti-fascist resistance against 
Mussolini in the 1920s and 1930s, right up until his death in a fascist 
gaol just before the beginning of the Second World War. His vision-
ary imagination and role as one of western Europe's most important 
socialist humanists meant that Gramsci incorporated successive his-
torical developments - the workers' councils of 1918-23, the Bolshevik 
Revolution and formation of the Third International, the emergence of 
mass popular movements against fascism - into his theoretical writings 
in ways that reach beyond the dark days of the 1930s. 
Hegemony is a category that Gramsci uses in several - possibly con-
flicting - senses. It therefore hovers uncertainly between a theoretical 
concept and a descriptive metaphor. This is not Gramsci's fault. It was 
imposed on him by the conditions under which he wrote, in a series of 
33 notebooks that he wrote in prison in the late 1920s and the 1930s 
(Boggs 1976: 11-20; Gramsci 1971: xvii-xcvi). The 2,848 pages of the 
Prison Notebooks use numerous euphemisms designed to evade the cen-
sorship of Mussolini's political police - Marxism is "the philosophy of 
praxis': the PCI is "the Modern Prince': socialism is an "integral civiliza-
tion'' - but they also systematically aim at double-meanings. This unsys-
tematic system of metaphors and disguises has aptly been described as 
a "labyrinth'' for the interpreter (Anderson 1976: 72). Alongside Perry 
Anderson's superb analysis of "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci" 
(Anderson 1976) and Carl Boggs's scholarly and objective reconstruction 
of Gramsci's Marxism (Boggs 1976), I have also drawn on Martin Jay's 
analysis of Gramsci's concept of totality (Jay 1984: 150-73). Probably 
the best way to grasp what is meant by hegemony is to explore its con-
ceptual genesis in Gramsci's developing ideas, before locating it in the 
broader problems of political strategy that it was supposed to resolve. 
Gramsci's theory reflects the impact of pragmatist philosophies 
of language (ibid.: 160-63). A semantic approach to language is an 
approach that seeks to understand how correctly constructed sentences 
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refer to the world, that is to a material reality that is assumed to be 
external to the words and ideas contained in utterances. By contrast, 
pragmatism overturns the traditional, correspondence theory of truth 
(a true sentence is one that accurately describes the external world) and 
replaces it with the idea of truth as warranted assertion (a true sentence 
is one that we all agree will allow us to get things done). Cooperative 
action in the world (because it is mediated by language) is the same 
thing as understanding the world. 
"Philosophy", Gramsci maintains: 
is not to be conceived as the individual elaboration of system-
atically coherent concepts, but as a cultural battle to transform 
the popular mentality and diffuse ... philosophical innova-
tions, which will demonstrate themselves to be 'historically 
true' to the extent that they become concretely- i.e. historically 
and socially- universal. (Gramsci 1971: 348) 
Gramsci's "philosophy of praxis" is therefore a reading of Marx in 
pragmatist terms, and specifically an interpretation of the concept of 
praxis - the "dialectic of theory and practice" - as the idea that action 
and culture are a unity. "The fundamental concept [of the] philosophy 
of praxis [is that it] is 'sufficient unto itself"', Gramsci writes: 
It contains in itself all the fundamental elements needed to 
construct a total and integral conception of the world, a total 
philosophy and theory of natural science, and not only that, 
but everything that is needed to give life to an integral practical 
organization of society, that is to become a total integral civili-
zation .... [T]he philosophy of praxis is a completely autono-
mous and independent structure of thought in antagonism 
to all traditional philosophies and religions . . . that is begin-
ning to exercise its own hegemony over traditional culture. 
(Ibid.: 462) 
Beyond language pragmatics, Gramsci's views are shaped by the neo-
Hegelianism of Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce. Gramsci explic-
itly concedes that his critique of the base-and-superstructure model is 
inspired by Croce (ibid.: 458-61). He also adopts the Crocean term for 
Hegelianism, "absolute historicism': and uses it to describe Marxism: 
It has been forgotten that in the case of [historical material-
ism] one should put the accent on the first term - ((historical" 
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- and not on the second, which is of metaphysical origin. The 
philosophy of praxis [i.e. Gramsci's Marxism - GB] is abso-
lute "historicism", the absolute secularisation and earthliness 
of thought, an absolute humanism of history. (Ibid.: 465) 
The "philosophy of praxis': then, is a pragmatist version of Marxism, 
one that turns away from orthodox Marxism to the Hegelian roots of 
historical materialism in order to understand the wider implications of 
its own pragmatic theory of action. History is the succession of strug-
gles for universality, in which the nature of universality is extended and 
deepened until, finally, with socialism, a form of universality arrives that 
derives from the majority and not from the minority of the population. 
''.Absolute historicism': then, means not just that universality is histori-
cal, but that it is relative - every contending social group has its OWn 
universal, or definition of universality. The connection, then, between 
praxis and history is, according to Gramsci, not a question - as it is for 
Lukacs - of the teleological unfolding through the historical process of 
the goal of a de-reified society. Instead, it is a radically open-ended proc-
ess of social struggle in which political mobilization and party organi-
zation must bring together the fragmented germs of that new culture 
already present in workers' consciousness, systematize and extend this, 
and expand this integral vision to the entire society. 
Historical bloc and national unification 
Against this conceptual background, the problem that Gramsci's theory 
of hegemony is intended to solve has two aspects. First, it copes with 
the incomplete nature of the bourgeois revolution in Italy and the way 
in which, because of this, tasks of socialist construction overlap with 
the completion of democratic development. And second, it deals with 
the way that, despite this uneven development in Italian capitalism, the 
revolutionary upsurge of the 1920s failed because of a lack of cultural 
and political preparation among the oppressed classes of Italian society. 
Both of these problems involve «hegemony", but in different ways. The 
first complex of problems brings Gramsci into proximity with classical 
theories of uneven development. The second set of problems compli-
cates the first in ways that go beyond classical Marxism, because it raises 
the question of the existing integration of workers, peasants, intellectu-
als and the middle classes into capitalism. In Italy between 1918 and 
1922, historical conditions meant that the moment that the radical wing 
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of the socialist party began to form workers' councils, a broad popular 
alliance formed in support of Mussolini's fascist "march on Rome" and 
its effort to save the monarchy. 
Gramsci understood that this had historical roots going all the way 
back to the incomplete Italian democratic revolution of 1848 and the 
Mazzini (and Garibaldi) movement of the 1860s. Not only did the revo-
lutionary movement of the 1840s fail to dislodge the northern monar-
chy, but the Mazzini-Garibaldi movement of the 1860s had failed to 
enlist the peasantry against the feudal southern landlords. Instead, the 
northern liberals were quickly satisfied with a constitutional monarchy 
that encouraged market relations, while the southern landlords basically 
traded their renunciation of a claim on political power for military sup-
port from the north to suppress Garibaldi's radical movement ( Gramsci 
1971: 74-5, 95-6). While the north industrialized rapidly, the south stag-
nated, thanks to a lack of agricultural reforms, which blocked market 
relations and subordinated the south to the north (ibid.: 98-9). Rather 
than releasing peasants from the land in an agricultural revolution that 
could fuel an industrial revolution with wage labourers, capitalist devel-
opment in the south inched forward through corruption, inefficiency 
and indiscipline. By the beginning of the twentieth century, northern 
and southern Italy were like two historical eras - capitalist and feudal 
- soldered together by a political compromise of historical proportions 
(ibid.: 101-3). Under the dominance of the moderate northern liberals, 
and without disrupting the interests of southern landlords, Italy in the 
nineteenth century underwent a "passive revolution", in which national 
unification and bourgeois consolidation crept forwards without seri-
ously destabilizing this system of political compromises (ibid.: 106-14). 
Gramsci conceptualized this situation as a "historical bloe' of north 
and south, liberal capitalists and reactionary landlords, that had man-
aged to recruit important elements of the white-collar workers and mid-
dle-class professionals in the north, and small traders and prosperous 
peasants in the south, to this major social alliance (ibid.: 102-6). The 
social alliance functioned by satisfying the historical interests - that 
is to say, the fundamental material interests, such as ownership of the 
means of production and the legal relations that accompany this - of 
the major parties. At the same time, the major players in the social 
alliance provided significant material concessions - financial rewards, 
political power, cultural prestige - for the minor alliance partners. Thus 
the liberal parties of the north were run by middle-class professionals 
with a conservative outlook on behalf of the liberal capitalists, with a 
union movement whose leadership was staffed by similarly conservative 
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white-collar employees. Meanwhile, the parties of the south drew their 
strength from small businesspersons and wealthy farmers, whose abi}., 
ity to command a popular following was used to block land reform oa 
behalf of the feudal landlords (ibid.: 92-6). Although this historic bloc 
maintained its power through coercive force - for instance the military 
suppression of Garibaldi - its real stability was due to the pervasi\re 
consent to this arrangement throughout Italian society. In the absence 
of real alternatives, "subaltern groups': such as workers and peasants, 
radical intellectuals, and junior employees, regarded their best chances 
for advancement as springing from cutting a deal with the power bro .. 
kers. And besides, nowhere did a clear conception of an alternative to 
this system ofliberal conservatism and historical compromise exist. AU 
of the major ideas about reform, such as those presented by Croce's lib. 
eralism, had already capitulated to the status quo by declaring that fun-
damentals were off limits when it came to social change (ibid.: 114-18). 
Especially against the background of the disaster of failed proletarian 
insurrection in the north, followed by mass popular backlash and fascist 
takeover, Gramsci understood that the key to socialist strategy in Italy 
was the building of a social counter-alliance. Encompassing all of the 
oppressed, such an alliance would need to address their most fundamen-
tal interests in order to cement these groups together in a historically 
binding way. The key to this was an analysis of the connection between 
the interests of the southern peasantry and the tasks of capitalist mod-
ernization. The creation of a unified national economy, the provision 
of national infrastructure, a single legal code enforced by a professional 
(i.e. non-familial) state, a national system of political representation 
based on democratic principles - all of these things could benefit the 
poor peasantry, but only on one proviso. This was that land reform 
must dispossess the landlords and redistribute the land, thereby replac-
ing feudal relations with an agricultural market. In essence, that meant 
the transformation of peasants into farmers, that is into small agrarian 
businesspeople, a dream that Gramsci believed (on good evidence) was 
close to the heart of every struggling peasant. On Gramsci's analysis, 
this was not in contradiction to the initial tasks of socialist construction, 
which must rest upon raising the level of the productive forces in Italy 
and expanding the ranks of the proletariat, mainly through the comple-
tion of the bourgeois revolution. And such a liberal socialism would be 
able to offer significant concessions to middle-class professionals and 
white-collar employees, because it would involve a dramatic expansion 
in state industry and administration, together with new opportunities 
for political representation and cultural recognition (ibid.: 272-6). 
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The category of hegemony 
Although Gramsci's category of hegemony represents a profound 
modification of the base-and-superstructure model, this is not always 
expressed with clarity in the Prison Notebooks. «Structures and super-
structures form a 'historical bloc;" Gramsci maintains: "that is to say, the 
complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures 
is the reflection of the ensemble of the relations of production'' ( Gramsci 
1971: 366). That sounds like the base-and-superstructure model; but, 
in actuality, it explicates a different idea: "though hegemony is ethical-
political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the 
decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus 
of economic activity" (ibid.: 166). Gramsci's position is inconsistent with 
the idea that class subjects are formed in production and must then use 
the state solely as an instrument for domination, while concealing their 
interests through ideological falsifications. Instead classes - such as the 
Italian bourgeoisie - form in the economic foundation, but they only 
become historical subjects in social alliances, through "intellectual and 
moral leadership" or "ethical-political hegemony", as in the historical 
bloc of northern capitalists with southern landlords just discussed. 
In the theory of hegemony, then, the collective subject is the his-
torical bloc, not the economic class, and hegemony is how the subject 
maintains its position of social dominance in opposition to contending 
subjects. Hegemony, then, means leadership by a historically cemented 
social alliance through its control of the state and its ability to secure 
consent in civil society. Gramsci describes this in terms of a mobile equi-
librium of coercion and consent, because it reflects a dynamic condition, 
where a threatened ideological consensus can always be protected using 
force. Although Gramsci is not entirely consistent in how he thinks 
about the relationship between the terms "consent and coercion'' and 
"political state and civil society': probably the most plausible position 
that the Prison Notebooks formulate, in line with Anderson's discussion, 
is as follows (Anderson 1976). The state holds a monopoly over coercion 
in bourgeois society, through its executive and juridical components. 
But it is also an agent promoting consent, through its legislative arm 
and its educational apparatus. Bourgeois civil society- that is, economic 
institutions together with civil organizations such as unions, parties, 
churches and associations - does not normally directly involve coercion, 
because it rests upon individual liberty (rather than forced labour). 
Instead, civil society is the major locus of the formation of consent, 
through public debate, protest movements, the spread of ideas and the 
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transmission of the cultural forms of everyday life. That is not to say 
that there is no state coercion regularly applied to civil society organi. 
zations - such as union-busting legislation backed by police powers, 
or police lines to defend strike breakers. But the point is that this is 
legally sanctioned state force. Coercion, then, happens through the state, 
while consent is generated by the state and within civil society. It is not 
correct, therefore, to speak of "political force and cultural hegemony~ 
Hegemony describes that combination of political force and political 
and cultural consent that makes authority different to domination. 
The hegemonic position of the dominant historical bloc over all 
subaltern groups, then, is not just the result of a lack of «lawyers, guns 
and money", but also the consequence of the subaltern groups consent-
ing to the dominant position of the groups composing the historical 
bloc. Subaltern groups see their interests in terms of the interests of the 
dominant alliance partners, because the dominant particular interests 
are framed as universal ideals, that is as human rights and national 
interests. Thus, for instance, Italian workers framed their wage claims in 
terms of the national interest and in terms of claims for rights. Subaltern 
groups also regard the world through the values of the dominant alli-
ance, sharing ideals of patriotic nationalism and individual liberty with 
the groups who in fact benefit most from these ideas. Gramsci's rec-
ognition of this situation is the key to his explanation of the failure of 
the western European revolutions, by contrast with the success of the 
eastern European revolutions: 
In Russia, the State was everything, civil society was primor-
dial and gelatinous; in the West there was a proper relation 
between State and civil society, and when the State trembled, a 
sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State 
was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful 
system of fortresses and earthworks. (Gramsci 1971: 238) 
This contrast, between western capitalist hegemony and eastern abso-
lutist domination, leads to Gramsci's celebrated opposition between 
western trench warfare, or the "war of position': and eastern break-
throughs, or the "war of manoeuvre': Where the Bolsheviks could 
achieve a sudden breakthrough by virtue of the Eastern reduction of 
hegemony to domination, the Italians must engage in a protracted proc-
ess of building up counter-hegemony in civil society before the seizure 
of state power. With the conquest of state power, proletarian and peasant 
hegemony would be directed through the instrument of a new sort of 
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.mass, participatory state apparatus, but would nonetheless continue to 
involve a mobile equilibrium of consent and coercion (ibid.: 228-76). 
Gramsci's interest in Machiavelli is best understood in this context. 
for Gramsci, Machiavelli is a Renaissance thinker trying to work out 
for the nascent capitalist class what Gramsci is theorizing for the rising 
proletarian class, namely a theory of hegemony. Machiavelli's notion 
of the state as a centaur - half beast (i.e. coercion) and half human 
(i.e. consent) - together with his insistence that the state is an educa-
tor that creates a new type of civilization (ibid.: 246-52) are indices of 
this. Machiavelli's notorious separation of politics from ethics, then, 
expresses only the distinction between coercion and consent, and his 
awareness that the state must engage in both. Equally, Gramsci's notions 
of "ethical-political hegemony", and an "ethical state': must be framed 
by the "Machiavellian" idea that although the state promotes an intel-
lectual and moral culture among the population) it also reserves to itself 
the right to deploy force when persuasion fails (ibid.: 263). But, prob-
ably most importantly for Gramsci, Machiavelli provides a reflection 
on intellectuals and the moral and cultural elements of hegemony that 
is particularly fertile for the communist thinker. Gramsci was, after all, 
trying to work out how party intellectuals, such as himself, could pre-
pare a counter~ hegemony that would, by means of a process of political 
education and cultural reform, disintegrate bourgeois hegemony and 
replace it with a national-popular alliance. In this process, Gramsci jet-
tisons the negative and critical implications of the term ideology (i.e. a 
distorted representation of material interests) for the positive version 
of ideology as a worldview. 
The modern prince 
Although hegemony cannot be reduced to culture, cultural questions 
are clearly central to the category. Cultural forms provide the medium 
for the formation of consent and therefore the ideological cement for 
social cohesion, together with the universal ideals within which indi-
viduals and classes formulate their material interests. For Gramsci, the 
intellectuals are therefore crucial to the formation of hegemony (and 
counter-hegemony), because it is the intellectuals who elaborate cultural 
forms. But Gramsci insists that the articulation of hegemony is a popular 
process, because "all men are intellectuals': although he concedes that 
"not all men have in society the function of intellectuals" ( Gramsci 
1971: 9). 
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To understand what Gramsci means here it is important to situate 
his position in relation to two central Marxist questions - the nature 
of class consciousness and the implications of the division between 
mental and manual labour. While he refuses the conception of ide .. 
ology as false consciousness, Gramsci does not quite think that the 
proletariat spontaneously develops a representation of its historical 
interests. On the one hand, the material interests of subaltern groups 
such as the proletariat are typically represented within the hegemonic 
ideology. On the other hand, where representations of interests do 
break with the hegemonic ideology, they remain fragmentary until 
systematized into a new culture and new morality. The task of intel-
lectuals is therefore the systematization of popular ideas rather than 
the fabrication of an entirely alien doctrine that is to be imposed on 
the masses by the party (ibid.: 330-36). Exactly who these intellectuals 
are, in light of Gramsci's assertion that all persons are intellectuals, is a 
question of historical contingency. The intellectuals are those who the 
division of labour have allocated to that function; but, under social-
ism, this distinction will wither away. Moreover, the party is a "collec-
tive intellectual" (the conceptual direction perhaps of the proletariat 
as a {'collective worker,,) which adverts to its educational function in 
not just raising class consciousness, but also providing a forum for 
the development of individuals' own intellectual capacities (ibid.: 16). 
According to Gramsci, "the philosophy of praxis does not tend to leave 
the 'simple' in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather 
to lead them to a higher conception of life" (ibid.: 332). Intellectuals 
should combine their theoretical knowledge with the practical wisdom 
of the masses, forming an «intellectual/moral bloc" with the "cultural 
movement as a whole" (ibid.: 333-4). 
This analysis is complicated by Gramsci's claim that the intellectu-
als within the division of labour fall into two main groups: traditional 
intellectuals (those who belong to the professions as a consequence 
of mental labour) and organic intellectuals (those who, although they 
perform manual labour, are the thinkers of their groups). The traditional 
intellectuals, historically speaking, were once organic intellectuals of 
the bourgeois class, at an earlier stage of the division oflabour. Gramsci 
hoped that the proletariat would generate its own organic intellectuals 
from among all strata of the labouring population and that these would 
assemble beneath the banner of the communist movement. But he did 
acknowledge that renegade traditional intellectuals - such as Marx and 
Engels - had played a crucial role in the formation of the socialist move-
ment, and so were not to be rejected from Italian communism. 
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The communist party, then, as a "collective intellectual': is the modern 
equivalent of Machiavelli's Renaissance prince: the political agency with-
out which the organic intellectuals of the rising class could not hope to 
articulate a new hegemony (ibid.: 249). Although Gramsci's conception 
of socialist strategy certainly involves what has been described as a "long 
march through the institutions" of civil society, that is a protracted strug-
gle by progressive intellectuals to transform popular and high culture in 
line with a new morality and new vision of society, it is not restricted 
to this. At some stage, and despite an extended preparatory phase of 
political education and cultural struggle, politics means conflict for and 
through the state, which in turn means the necessity for an organiza-
tion capable of seizing power and directing society through the state 
apparatus. The "modern prince': the communist party, like Machiavelli's 
Renaissance prince, must be capable of applying coercive force, including 
armed insurrection and the repression of the formerly hegemonic group. 
Gramsci's aim is to connect mass enthusiasm for progressive change 
with Machiavellian republicanism, connecting the Leninist conception 
of politics with the national-popular unification of Italy (Boggs 1976: 
114). At this juncture, as Jay has noted, there is a tension in Gramsci 
between ethical humanism and an instrumental vision of politics (Jay 
1984: 169). Unfortunately, Gramsci's theory of hegemony does not pro-
vide definitive clues to resolving this ambivalence in one direction or the 
other, because its central feature is the idea that normative universal-
ity arises through instrumentally successful action, and functions as a 
means to represent material interests. Gramsci clearly believes that the 
proletariat is a universal class with universal interests, whose liberation 
is also emancipatory for the entire society. The problem is that his theory 
does not and cannot justify this belief, because, in fact, it leads to the 
opposite conclusion, namely that antagonistic interests result in differ-
ent worldviews. Gramsci's "historicism", that is moral and epistemologi-
cal relativism, threatens to revenge itself upon the claims of universality 
that the theory needs in order to ground its understanding of political 
struggle in something other than the arbitrary assertion of group inter-
ests. In the end, politics for Gramsci was less about moral universality 
than about the formation of collective subjects through the struggle 
to educate and discipline the masses for republican self-government, 
reflecting his embrace of political, rather than ethical, values. The idea 
that hegemony is a process of the formation of a new collective will, a 
national-popular identity that consolidates a social alliance into an his-
toric bloc through cultural and political, as well as economic, struggles, 
has been immensely influential in subsequent Marxist political thought. 
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Summary of key points 
The primacy of practice 
• For Lukacs, Marxism is the dialectical method, the revolution-
ary outlook of the insurgent proletariat and the political strategy 
of socialist revolution all at once, because it is an activist unity 
of theory and practice, a conceptual totality that creates a new 
world. 
• For Gramsci, Marxism is a "philosophy of praxis", a worldview 
based on creative labour that is capable of generating a new, inte-
gral civilization, and which must struggle to assert its universal 
vision. 
The structure of capitalism and ideology 
• Lukacs's concept of reification combines Marx's alienation with 
Weber's rationalization: commodity fetishism structures society 
and rationality, resulting in the reduction of quality to quantity, 
and the appearance that society is governed by pseudo-natural 
laws of economic development. 
• Bourgeois philosophy is characterized by antinomies, because it 
reflects the limitations of capitalism as a form oflife that is affected 
by reification, especially the opposition between a free subject and 
society as governed by the laws of motion of capital. 
• The category of the totality represents the revolutionary principle 
in thought, because it reconstructs the social structure as a whole 
with a historical genesis through human action, which exposes 
how capitalism is not natural, but historical. 
• For Gramsci, society is structured through historical blocs, social 
alliances based on fundamental classes, which fuse economic 
foundation and ideologico-political superstructure into a unity. 
• Historical blocs exercise ideological and political power through 
hegemony, a mobile equilibrium of consent and coercion funda-
mentally based on the representation of the particular interests 
of the social alliance as the general interest. 
Historical change and class politics 
• For Lukacs, the proletariat is the author of social reality, the 
identical subject-object of history, who, led by the proletariat, 
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will expressively generate a new totality following the socialist 
revolution. 
• For Grarnsci, the proletarian party is key, because it must con -
struct a progressive class alliance capable of bringing a counter-
hegemonic force to power and creating a new historical bloc of 
the oppressed. 
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four 
The Frankfurt School 
Although strongly influenced by Lukacs's critique of commodity rei-
fication and advocacy of the principle of totality, and highly sympa-
thetic to the rediscovery of the radical humanism of the young Marx, 
the historical materialism of the "Frankfurt School" developed along 
entirely different lines to Hegelian Marxism. The research programme 
led by figures such as Max Horkheimer (1895-1973), Theodor Adorno 
( 1903-69), Herbert Marc use ( 18 98-1979) and Erich Fromm ( 1900-80) 
is called the Frankfurt School because it originated at the Institute for 
Social Research at Frankfurt University in the 1920s and 1930s. The 
first Marxist research institute to be attached to a university department 
outside the Soviet Union, the Institute for Social Research was eventu-
ally relocated to New York in 1934 because of the Nazi dictatorship. 
Its leading members understood Lukacs's breakthrough to mandate an 
interdisciplinary research programme that employed a materialist ver-
sion of the dialectical method. Their aim was to integrate specialized 
inquiry into political economy, culture and ideology, psychology, and 
philosophy into an open-ended and ongoing intellectual totalization, 
in order to update historical materialism. Sharply critical, however, 
of Lukacs's proletarian ((identical subject-object of history" and his 
reduction of materialist knowledge to an action programme for revo-
lutionary politics, the major thinkers of the Frankfurt School sought 
to pose fundamental questions about revolutionary experiences and 
contemporary capitalism without making historical materialism into 
a left-wing Hegelianism. At the same time, they were deeply critical 
of the orthodox Marxism of the Stalinist parties, regarding historical 
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the foundation for the other levels. The intention here was to concep. 
tualize the relative autonomy of politics and ideology from econom. 
ics, thereby avoiding vulgar Marxist economic reductionism. Seeking 
an alternative terminology to the base-and-superstructure metaphor, 
Althusser and co-thinkers described these as "structural instances» 
, 
or "regional structures", rather than levels, and Althusser pointedly 
described the Marxian concept of the social formation as a "totality of 
[structural] instances articulated on the basis of a mode of production,, 
(Althusser & Balibar 1970: 207 note 205). Accordingly, the research 
programme developed a concept of social formations as complex struc. 
tured wholes and called for the development of regional theories of the 
economic, political and ideological "instances" for all of Marx's modes 
of production. Alongside Althusser, Etienne Balibar, Roger Establet 
and Jacques Ranciere worked on the central categories of this structural 
rethinking of historical materialism, while, elsewhere, Nicos Poulantzas, 
Christine Buci-Glucksmann and Ernesto Laclau considered politics, 
Goran Therborn and Michele Barrett investigated ideology, and Pierre 
Macherey and Terry Eagleton researched aesthetics. Always somewhat 
coy about their relation to the then-fashionable structuralism of figures 
such as Claude Levi-Strauss, the Structural Marxists are best considered 
to be not structuralists, but structural-functionalists, operating with a 
novel form of functionalist methodology. Most recently, Robert Resch 
has produced a superb reconstruction of the entire programme that 
influences my presentation of Structural Marxism, and developed an 
innovative conception of agency from the Structural Marxist perspec-
tive (Resch 1992). 
Unjustly, Althusser and co-thinkers have been accused of obscurant-
ism and Stalinism. In truth, their insistence on the scientific status of 
Marxism mandated constant theoretical revision, with the consequence 
that they were anti-dogmatic. Their political stance within the powerful 
European communist parties was in opposition to the Stalinist leader-
ship, for theoretical anti-humanism must not be confused with practical 
anti-humanitarianism (Elliott 1987). In fact, making a clear distinc-
tion between social science and political consciousness, Althusser and 
co-thinkers consistently advocated socialist humanism as the ideology 
of the communist movement (Althusser 1969: 221-47), at a moment 
when the political prospects for European socialism briefly flowered. It 
must not be forgotten that this was not an intellectual game, but a very 
serious political project with potentially dangerous consequences for 
theoretical mistakes. The conjuncture of the 1970s, reminiscent of the 
1930s, was utterly different to today's situation of widespread apathy and 
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bipartisan consensus on neoliberal governance. From the worldwide 
student revolts of 1968 onwards, a wave of mass mobilizations spread 
across Latin America and Asia, in the context of the Vietnam War. 
As military dictatorships supported by America and its NATO allies 
mushroomed in these areas to prevent the spread of left-wing govern-
ments, popular sentiment in Europe itself shifted to the Left. Before long 
there were massive protests against existing military regimes in Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, and support for the alliance of socialist and com-
munist parties in France and Italy climbed sharply. The communist par-
ties in western Europe decisively distanced themselves from the brutal 
repression happening in eastern Europe, especially in Czechoslovakia, 
and announced the advent of "Eurocommunism': a non-reformist sort 
ofliberal socialism that intended to win power through parliamentary 
democracy. As centrally involved with the left wing of Eurocommunism, 
many of the Structural Marxists made an important contribution to this 
political strategy. 
Theoretical practice and complex structures 
For Althusser and co-thinkers, the break with Hegel's teleological con-
ception of history involves a critique of economic reductionism. As we 
have seen, the classical interpretation of Marx's "1859 Preface" regards 
the superstructures as a space of ideological and political contingency, 
as opposed to the historical necessity acting through the economic 
foundation. Superstructural transformations only happen as a delayed 
result of infrastructural evolution, and politics and ideology are merely 
the forms in which historical agents become conscious and contest 
(accelerate or retard) this process. Accordingly, the teleology of classical 
Marxism fundamentally depends upon the idea that the historically 
necessary evolution of the economy is reflected in society as a whole 
((in the last instance". Althusser ridicules this simplification of society 
and history: 
The economic dialectic is never active in the pure state; in 
History, these instances, the superstructures, etc. are never seen 
to step respectfully aside when their work is done or, when 
the Time comes, as his pure phenomena, to scatter before His 
Majesty the Economy as he strides along the royal road of the 
Dialectic. From the first moment to the last, the lonely hour of 
the "last instance" never comes. (Althusser 1969: 113) 
structural marx1sm 133 
The economy never acts on its own, outside the global structure of 
social relations in which it is embedded, and to think otherwise is to 
think metaphysically, that is ideologically. Economics, politics, law and 
ideology always reciprocally influence one another, and Marxism, for 
Althusser, is the science of the totality of these structured interactions. 
In order to think through his complex alternative, Althusser freely 
appropriates structuralist theory, in particular the history of science 
produced by Gaston Bachelard and the structural anthropology of 
Claude Levi-Strauss. 
Bachelard supplies the idea that sciences emerge from non-scientific 
ideologies (e.g. Marxism from Hegel) through radical intellectual rup-
tures involving the formalization of concepts (Lecourt 1975). Sciences 
then develop through a series of further ((epistemological breaks" that 
are reminiscent of the notion of paradigm shifts advocated by Thomas 
Kuhn. What Althusser calls "theoretical practice" involves the produc-
tion of conceptual generalizations: the ideological raw materials which 
are the data of experience (Generalities I) are transformed through logi-
cal formalization and conceptual testing (Generalities II) to produce rig-
orous models of a theoretical object-domain (Generalities Ill; Althusser 
& Balibar 1970: 11-70). Althusser proposes that there is just such an 
epistemological break between the Hegelianism of the young Marx and 
the scientific socialism of the mature Marx. Accordingly, the signifi-
cance of the shift from alienation to exploitation is that it marks the tran-
sition from ideological simplification to a theory of social complexity. 
Levi-Strauss provides a model for how a theoretical anti-humanism 
can yield startling insights into society. Where theoretical humanism 
concentrates on agents' interpretations of social practices, for instance 
asking Caduveo Indians about the meaning of their facial tattoos (they 
symbolize sub-group membership), theoretical anti-humanism locates 
social practices in the total functional context of the network of social 
relations. From this perspective, the Caduveo Indians' facial tattoos per-
form the ideological function of providing a medium for sub-group dif-
ferentiation in a way that preserves the unity of the lineage structure (i.e. 
"tribar' unity; Levi-Strauss 1968: 245-68). Structuralism breaks with the 
ideological image of the social formation as an organic totality ("soci-
ety") that can be grasped by its individual members, and Althusser's 
central claim is that Marx arrived at just such a conception of society 
long before structuralism. 
Althusser and co-thinkers therefore maintain that the fulcrum 
of "Marx's immense theoretical revolutiod' is not the base-and-
superstructure model, but the structure of the social formation as a 
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complex whole (Althusser & Balibar 1970: 182-93). Behind the some-
times baroque terminology of Structural Marxism is an idea of singular 
brilliance. With the notion of extra-economic coercion in past societies, 
Marx had implied that the social relations determining exploitation in 
non-capitalist modes of production did not necessarily reside in the 
economic "base" of the social formation. Lapidary expressions, such as 
the quip that "the Middle Ages could not live on Catholicism, nor the 
ancient world on politics'' (Cl: 82), actually suggest that ideology and 
politics, respectively, are dominant regions of social life in feudalism 
and antiquity. Indeed, it appears that the key to the difference between 
ancient, feudal and capitalist modes of production actually reduces to 
the question of whether the economic, the political or the ideological 
dominates in the social formation. In the terminology of Structural 
Marxism, the social formation consists of (at least) three "structural 
instances': or "regional structures" - the economic, the political and 
the ideological. By "structure" is meant a functionally defined ensemble 
of many institutions and practices, and the complex structure of the 
social formation is the set of relations between these regional structures. 
The key to this is the question of which one of them is the dominant 
structure in the social formation, or "structure-in-dominance", because 
it is where the social relations are housed that make the exploitation of 
labour possible. This can be depicted abstractly by representing eco-
nomics, politics and ideology with a letter ( e, p, i) and rendering the 
structure-in-dominance in bold type: 
Capitalism: e, p, i 
Antiquity: e, p, i 
Feudalism: e, p, i 
But what is it that assigns to economics, politics or ideology the role 
of a structure-in-dominance? For Althusser, the intellectual epicentre 
of Marx's theoretical discovery is that the crucial connection that per-
forms this "articulation" of economics, politics and ideology itself resides 
in the economy, in the set of relations governing the labour process. 
Unsurprisingly, this connection is the one between the productive forces 
and the relations of production, which Structural Marxism describes 
(with some terminological complications that are unimportant here) 
as a connection between the division of labour and property relations 
(Althusser & Balibar 1970: 212-14). 
According to Althusser and Balibar, then, "the economy is determi-
nant [only] in that it determines which of the instances of the social 
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structure occupies the dominant place" (ibid.: 98-9, 224). The struc. 
ture-in-dominance «distorts" the relational social field by imposing a 
hierarchy of effectiveness on the other structural instances, making 
some weak and others strong. It also transforms logically autonomous 
regional structures into relatively autonomous regions (Althusser 1969: 
201-2). Certainly, the economic is dominant in capitalism, but this is 
a historical peculiarity. For Althusser, it is a characteristic of economic 
reductionism to believe in the eternal "primacy of the economy': based 
on the mistaken notion of the permanence of the structural dominance 
of the economic region (ibid.: 213). 
Consequently, Marx is proposing "economic determination in the 
final instance", but this does not mean that the economic instance is 
the dominant instance in all social formations. That only looks like a 
paradox or a provocation because of the enormous intellectual hold that 
Marx's architectural metaphor has exercised on the radical imagination. 
According to Poulantzas's summary: 
By mode of production, we shall designate not what is generally 
marked out as the economic (i.e. relations of production in 
the strict sense), but a specific combination of various struc-
tures and practices, which, in combination, appear as so many 
instances or levels, i.e. as so many regional structures of this 
mode .... Furthermore, the fact that the structure as a whole 
is determined in the last instance by the economic does not 
mean that the economic always holds the dominant role in the 
structure. The unity constituted by the structure-in-dominance 
implies that every mode of production has a dominant level or 
instance, but the economic is in fact determinant only insofar 
as it attributes the dominant role to one instance or another . 
. . . Therefore, what distinguishes one mode of production from 
another and consequently specifies a mode of production is 
the particular form of articulation maintained by its levels: this 
articulation is henceforth referred to by the term matrix of a 
mode of production. (Poulantzas 1973: 13-15) 
Instead of the image of economic base and politico-ideological super-
structure, then, the relation between mode of production and social 
formation is that of a structural matrix that determines the asymmetrical 
relation between structural levels of the social formation, by assigning 
to one instance the role of structure-in-dominance (Althusser & Balibar 
1970: 319). 
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Mode of production and social formation 
Structural Marxism's position is impossible to grasp if we insist on 
retaining the classical Marxist model of base-and-superstructure. 
Rather, the Structural Marxist concept of the mode of production and 
social formation yields the topology depicted in Figure 3. 
Tue Althusserian problematic involves the effort to "rethink the idea 
of historical causality in terms of the matrix effect of a structured whole 
on its elements" (Resch 1992: 79). It does this primarily by conceptu-
alizing causality not as something happening between entities, but as 
the consistency of a field of relations (Callinicos 1976: 52). This is pos-
sible because of Althusser's interpretation of ('determination in the last 
instance" not as a historical thesis, but as a structural thesis in abstrac-
tion from historical development (Benton 1984: 17 -18). The structural 
matrix of the mode of production is a principle of articulation connect-
ing economics, politics, law (suppressed for clarity in the diagram) and 
ideology. There are several consequences of this position. 
First, Structural Marxism focuses on social reproduction from a 
structural-functionalist perspective, which means that it concentrates 
on the structural mechanisms that maintain the basic functions of every 
social formation. These functions are the production of material life 
(economic structures), the maintenance of the unity of the social forma-
tion (political structures) and the provision of socialized individuals, 
or social subjects (ideological structures). These structures are inte-
grated into a "complex whole" (Althusser & Balibar 1970: 188), because 
subordinate regional structures provide the material requirements, or 
"conditions of existence", for the structure-in-dominance. For instance, 
the capitalist mode of production is defined by the articulated combina-
tion of the wage relation (capitalist relations of production, namely the 
extraction of surplus value) and mechanized production (capitalist pro-
ductive forces). The absence of extra-economic coercion means that the 
Social formation: complex unity of a structure-in-dominance 
Mode of production: 
principle of articulation 
of the structures 
The 1deolog1cal 
The political 
Relations of production 
The economic < 
Forces of production 
Figure 3 The structure of the complex whole (based on Jameson 1981: 36). 
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economic instance is the structure-in-dominance. But the accumulation 
of capital depends upon the reproduction of certain conditions of exist-
ence in the political (the institutional separation of politics and econom-
ics through the nation state), the juridical (contractual legal relations) 
and the ideological instances (the ideology of possessive individualism 
and the "isolation effect" of an ideological split between citizenship and 
class). Accordingly, in capitalism core regions of the political, juridical 
and ideological instances function as "conditions of existence" for the 
dominant, economic instance. 
Second, the operation of this system of functionally defined and 
differentially related structures is what Structural Marxism describes 
as "structural causality': The best way to grasp structural causality is 
through Althusser and co-thinkers' polemic against the idea that the 
mode of production is the same as the economic structure. On the 
one hand, in a way, the mode of production is nothing more than a 
shorthand description of which regional structure is the structure-in-
dominance. Accordingly, Althusser insists that the mode of production 
is the "absent cause" of the social formation, "present only in its effects': 
This is a striking, polemical formulation designed to combat the idea 
that the mode of production is something that can be localized in the 
social formation (e.g. His Majesty, the Economy). The mode of produc-
tion is "immanent in its effects" within the social formation rather than 
located somewhere else. This means that "the whole existence of the 
structure consists of its effects, in short, it is merely a specific combina-
tion of its peculiar elements [and] is nothing outside its effects" (ibid.: 
188). On the other hand, the mode of production performs an explana-
tory role, insofar as it is a specific combination of the division oflabour 
and property relations that determines which regional structure is the 
structure-in-dominance. That is what is meant by saying that the mode 
of production acts as a matrix of constraints, or a structural "skeleton", 
by assigning a location and function to the structural instances, and 
defining their limits of variation consistent with the social reproduction 
of the complex whole (Hindess & Hirst 1975: 14-15). 
Third, Structural Marxism focuses on the relative autonomy of the 
regional structures in the social formation. The relation between regional 
structures, their provision of conditions of existence for the structure-
in-dominance, means that none of them can be sealed compartments. 
Instead, the general tendencies of economic development are influenced 
by developments in the political, juridical and ideological instances, 
and conversely, the developmental dynamics of the political, juridical 
and ideological instances are distorted by economic tendencies. On the 
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Structural Marxist conception, over time, the inter-relation of relatively 
autonomous regional structures is not automatic, so there is always poten-
tial for dysfunctionality between structures, and therefore socio-political 
crisis. Therefore, we pass from the deterministic universe of high struc-
turalism and enter a probabilistic universe, where the exertion of struc-
tural constraints sets the probability of smooth social reproduction, on 
the lines of the concept of"structuralselectivity" (Resch 1992: 309-14). 
The complexity of the materialist dialectic 
The relative autonomy of the regional structures means that a general 
theory of the social formation demands (at least) specific knowledge of 
economics, politics, law and ideology. Knowledge of society cannot be 
simplistically deduced from economic laws, as economic reductionism 
attempts to do. Indeed, Structural Marxism maintains that the distinct 
tendencies of the relatively autonomous regional structures results in 
uneven development in the social formation. ''Unevenness is internal to 
the social formation: Althusser claims, «because [of] the structuration in 
dominance of the complex whole" (Althusser 1969: 213 ), and this results 
in different rates of historical change in the various structural instances. 
For Althusser, the social formation is uneven and heterogeneous, 
consisting of the distinct evolutionary rate of different structural ele-
ments, which therefore have "differential histories''. This concept of 
the "complex whole" is set up against the ((homogeneous temporal-
ity" of both Hegelian dialectics and classical Marxism (Althusser & 
Balibar 1970: 99-100, 104-5). Ideological structures, for instance, are 
notorious for their glacial rate of development in relation to economic 
changes, producing the politically problematic «time lag" between eco-
nomic crisis and class consciousness that we have already remarked 
upon several times in previous chapters. The differential rhythms of 
the discrete structural instances imply that the synchronic field of the 
social formation (the unity of a conjuncture) includes several distinct 
temporalities, destroying the unified present of the expressive "Zeitgeist'~ 
It is therefore necessary to theorize the specific historical temporality 
of every structural instance and its distinct social contradictions and 
rate of development (ibid.: 100). Instead of the homogeneous develop-
ment of the entire social formation in a unified temporality, Althusser 
affirms that in a complex whole "it is no longer possible to think the 
process of development of the different levels of the whole in the same 
historical time" (ibid.: 99). 
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The notion of differential temporalities connects to another innova. 
tion of Structural Marxism, which is to think about the social forma. 
tion as including many subordinate structures from other modes of 
production. Obviously, this is particularly important when considering 
semi-colonial countries, but it has wider application, for the metropoli. 
tan countries also include many structural remainders of vanquished 
modes. Because the concept of structural articulation extends "all the 
way down" into the regional structures of economics, law, politics and 
ideology (and others, such as aesthetics), the structural instances are 
potentially extraordinarily complex. They consist of internally complex, 
regional structures that form the organizing matrices for ensembles of 
institutional apparatuses, where the relative unity of a structural instance 
is determined by regionally dominant "substructures" (Poulantzas 1973: 
115). If you like, this is the Structural Marxist equivalent to Trotsky's 
concept of"combined and uneven development", but it also includes the 
possibility that regional structures include substructures that anticipate a 
post-capitalist mode of production. The limit to the "higgledy-piggledy» 
nature of the regional structures in a complex social formation is the core 
areas of these, which provide the conditions of the existence for the struc-
ture-in-dominance - these must function smoothly, or risk social crisis. 
Concepts of structural causality, relative autonomy and differential 
temporalities mean that, for Structural Marxism, historical development 
is a contingent sequence of disjunctive modes of production and not a 
logical series (a conceptual ascent) or the realization of a teleological 
principle. The best way to consider this idea of the unevenness and com-
plexity of historical change is to regard the regional structures as com-
posed of different sorts of practices, thus bringing together structure 
and practice with the rejection of historical teleology. Althusser specifies 
that "all the levels of social existence are the sites of distinct practices" 
(Althusser & Balibar 1970: 58); as Resch explains, "social structures are 
realized, reproduced and transformed through rule-bound yet open-
ended practices" whose model is transformations effected by the labour 
process (Resch 1992: 36). Social practices are - as Resch explains -
"rule-governed but open-ended» practices whose effect on the structure 
is potentially transformative (ibid.: 216-21, 309-18). In capitalist social 
formations: 
All practices are viewed by Structural Marxists as unevenly 
developed or ('contradictory» [and] it is reasonable to gener-
alise the contradictions in the various instances as follows. ( 1) 
In economic practice, contradictions exist between relations 
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of cooperation and exploitation within the labour process (the 
forces of production) and economic ownership (the social rela-
tions of production) ... and these contradictions are mani-
fest in the antagonistic class interests of the labourers and the 
exploiters oflabour power, and take the form of struggles over 
control of the means of production (economic class struggles, 
the politics of production). (2) In political practices, contradic-
tions exist between relations of representation and relations of 
hegemony, expressed in the antagonism between the "power 
bloc" - those classes and class-fractions that effectively con-
trol the institutions of collective social organisation - and the 
«masses" - other classes and class-fractions within the social 
formation lacking this institutional control. (3) In ideologi-
cal practices, contradictions exist between relations of quali-
fication (relations of empowerment that enable individuals to 
become effective social subjects) and relations of subjectifica-
tion (relations restricting individuals to certain roles and spe-
cific capacities). (Ibid.: 37) 
The social formation is conceptualized in terms of different sorts of 
local struggles happening, on the basis of contradictory practices, as it 
were, "all over the place". Althusser's concept of "over-determination" 
is intended to unify these otherwise discrete struggles, lending them 
the significance of class struggles. Now, over-determination is a term 
of art from Lacanian psychoanalysis that describes the way in which 
something happening at one level can be the effect of an intersect-
ing multiplicity of causes originating at several other, different levels. 
Althusser insists that this is not just the pluralist idea that everything 
has multiple causes, because "the structure articulated in dominance 
that constitutes the unity of the complex whole [is reflected] within 
each contradiction'' (Althusser 1969: 206). Frankly, that explanation is 
as clear as mud. Poulantzas's sometimes difficult idea of ((social class" 
is an effort to specify exactly why the totality of economic, political 
and ideological practices represents class practice and class struggle. It 
therefore clarifies what is actually meant by over-determination. 
Social classes and class practices 
There is an essential preliminary step, though, for Structural Marxisms 
radical reconceptualization of the mode of production has implications 
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for the very concept of class. In classical Marxism, classes are entities 
formed in production relations, that is economic classes, which have 
political interests and ideological representations of their social identity. 
But Poulantzas thinks of classes as effects of the structural whole, rather 
than positions in economic production alone, so that classes are the 
result of a "triple determination" by economic, political and ideological 
structures (Poulantzas 1973: 64). Although "the economic place of the 
social agents has a principal role in determining social classes': politics 
and ideology are part of the "objective determination" of class loca-
tion (Poulantzas 1975: 14). He rejects the classical approach as a mere 
sociological aggregate of occupational positions and dismisses equation 
of class with class-consciousness, that is a social identity conditioned 
by ideological unity, as the idea that individuals are somehow assigned 
class "number plates" (Poulantzas 1973: 202). Although the economic 
determination of waged, productive labour is primary, political deter-
minations of supervisory role and ideological determinations of edu-
cational qualification participate in the definition of the proletariat and 
other strata. The basic effect of this argument is to acknowledge that 
the proletariat, defined as unskilled manual, non-supervisory workers 
who produce surplus-value directly, is a tiny minority of the popula-
tion. It is surrounded by a vast ensemble of "social categories" (e.g. 
the intelligentsia) and {(social strata'' (e.g. the labour aristocracy), who 
make up the new middle strata, the vast majority of the population 
in the industrialized democracies. The capitalist class, meanwhile, is 
likewise fragmented into numerous "autonomous fractions", so that no 
fundamental class of production in modern society can possibly become 
hegemonic except through a social alliance. 
What Poulantzas calls social class is not a different set of persons 
alongside his economically, politically and ideologically defined classes 
and strata. Rather, it is an effort to describe the class significance of the 
antagonistic field of social practices and local struggles at any moment 
in a social formation. This is potentially confusing, and best imagined as 
a mobile ('superstructure" of antagonistic relations arising on the "foun-
dation" of the objective determination of class location by the complex 
whole. If the regional structures of the social formation are driven by 
practical antagonisms - labour versus ownership, masses versus power 
bloc, empowerment versus subjectification - then at any time there is 
a global relation of forces across the complex whole, resulting from the 
social struggles happening at a vast multiplicity of points. Social class 
describes the overall opposition resulting from this situation. But how 
does this work? 
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According to Poulantzas, the field of conflicts over practices - a field 
traversed by the political conflicts of social classes - is distinct from the 
complex structure of the social formation. Indeed, it seems that the field 
of practical struggles, the arena of the "lived experience" of structural 
conditions which he confusingly describes as "social relations': rises up 
as a superstructure on the infrastructural basis of the social formation. 
"Social classes do not present themselves as the effect of one particular 
structural level ... i.e., as the effect of the economic structure on the 
political or ideological': Instead, they "manifest themselves ... entirely 
as the global effect of the structures in the field of social relations which, 
in class societies, themselves involve the distribution of agents/supports 
to social classes" (Poulantzas 1973: 64). For Engels, historical events 
happen as the result of a "parallelogram' of forces, representing the sum 
of many individual actions in a conjuncture. The historical event is the 
"resultant': irreducible either to the intentions of agents or the contex-
tual determinants forming the terrain on which the event happens. It is 
in this context that Engels speaks of economic determination in the last 
instance. But we have seen that Structural Marxism interprets this as 
a structural thesis and not as an historical explanation. The concept of 
social class as the effect of the totality of social practices is the Structural 
Marxist replacement for Engels's idea, designed to preserve the claim 
that class struggle is the motor of history, without relapsing into the 
economic reductionist version of this hypothesis. To use a metaphor 
that Poulantzas employs, the complex whole of the social formation 
provides the terrain on which social agents, whose action is limited but 
not automatic, move, and in their movement, these agents transform 
or maintain that terrain: 
Social class is a concept which shows the effect of the ensemble 
of structures, of the matrix of a mode of production ... on the 
agents which constitute its supports: this concept reveals the 
effects of the global structure in the field of social relations . 
. . . Social classes do not cover structural instances but social 
relations: these social relations consist of class practices, which 
means that social classes are conceivable only in terms of class 
practices. [These] relations consist of class practices in which 
social classes are placed in oppositions: social classes can be 
conceived only as class practices, these practices existing only 
in oppositions which in their unity constitute the field of the class 
struggle. (Poulantzas 1973: 67, 86) 
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That is rather convoluted, to say the least. I am going to clarify it with 
another metaphor. The terrain of a structural region creates many poten-
tial sites of conflict. But some of these conflict sites are critical to the 
survival of the structure-in-dominance, because they are locations that 
provide its conditions of existence. The terrain of a structural region 
therefore sets up a game of "capture the flag)) (that is preserve or alter the 
social practices that reproduce the conditions of existence of the struc-
ture-in-dominance), which players in various conflicts are involved in 
whether they know it or not. The presence of the "flag" polarizes social 
conflict happening on the terrain of a regional structure. The sum total 
of the balance of forces in struggles for the economic, political, juridical 
and ideological (and other) "flags" has a class significance, because social 
reproduction and therefore the preservation of a mode of production is 
in question. Accordingly, there is a strategic-relational tension across 
the practical struggles on the terrains of the social formation, and the 
distribution of forces to either side of this antagonistic "game" is what 
social classes are. Social class, as an effect of the structured multiplicity 
of contradictory practices, is therefore inseparable from class struggle, 
although what this means is very different from the classical picture. 
Not only do the shifting fortunes of the struggle over social practices 
(the class struggle) alter the boundaries of social classes, but despite 
the effect of structural determinations in fixing the horizon of the class 
struggle, social class interests cannot be mechanically deduced from 
the structure. Instead, Poulantzas conceptualizes social class interests 
as formed within the "horizon of action'' of possible structural trans-
formations and therefore fundamentally determined by the material 
possibilities for new articulations in the political conjuncture (ibid.: 64). 
Social class is therefore not fundamentally a new, broader definition 
of class as a set of structural locations that define material interests, as in 
the classical picture. Rather, it is a (terminologically confusing) descrip-
tion of how historical change is really the effect of class struggle, that is 
an effort to explain what over-determination actually means. The idea 
of social class mandates a political summary of the balance of forces 
involved in social struggles across the social formation at any moment, 
that is a summary of the conjuncture, in terms of the forces for structural 
transformation versus the forces for social reproduction. In this context, 
Poulantzas speaks of the capacity to introduce new structural elements 
in a strategic-relational field of contestation. Ultimately, the strategic 
stake here is the introduction of elements of a post-capitalist mode of 
production into the complex whole, with the effect of breaking up the 
unity of the capitalist social formation. This provides a new definition of 
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socialist strategy that does not rely on social classes as "subjects of his-
tory': and which therefore seeks to defend the idea of class struggle as the 
dynamic of history without reintroducing historical teleology. Historical 
change happens as a result of a myriad of interventions in localized con-
texts on the basis of "lived experience", that is as social practices in the 
habitus, or social space, of individuated subjects (Resch 1992: 322-5). 
The specificity of the political 
Social class, it has to be said, never really caught on as a contribution 
to social theory. Instead, acknowledgement of the need for social alli-
ances in contemporary capitalism went hand-in-hand with the recog-
nition that the structural location of individual agents was potentially 
very complex indeed. Classes were not just economically, politically 
and ideologically fragmented. They were also impacted by a variety of 
other structural determinations, such as race and gender. Perhaps for 
this reason, Structural Marxism increasingly confronted the question of 
socialist strategy on the terrain of politics and ideology, in the context 
of institutional struggles and popular alliances. Structural Marxists such 
as Christine Bud-Glucksman of Italy (Buci-Glucksmann 1980) and 
Ernesto Laclau of Argentina (Laclau 1977) were ideally placed to rethink 
the Marxist conceptualization of the capitalist state as an internally com-
plex regional structure, with its own historical development and practi-
cal contradictions. But it is Poulantzas's Political Power and Social Class 
(1973) that determines their approach, and his State, Power, Socialism 
(1978) that best defines the strategic consequences flowing from this. 
According to Poulantzas, the state is central to "the sense of the cohe-
sion of the ensemble of the levels of a complex unity, and is the regu-
lating factor of its global equilibrium as a system" (Poulantzas 1973: 
45). In other words, the social function of the regional structure of the 
political, within the general theory of historical materialism, is to secure 
the unity of the social formation (ibid. 3 7-56). Although politics, func-
tionally defined, is everywhere, a dimension of every social practice, 
the political structural instance - the state - is the key to maintaining 
social reproduction. Political struggles therefore tend to condense on 
the terrain of the political instance, which in the capitalist mode of pro-
duction takes the institutional form of the nation state, and is defined 
by the regional contradiction between relations of representation and 
relations of domination (Resch 1992: 37, 308-64). The maintenance of 
the structural integrity of the social formation means protection of the 
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structure-in-dominance. Therefore, every state is a class state insofar 
as maintenance of the social formation means protection of its definl 
ing property relations (Poulantzas 1973: 54).Turning to specificalfy 
capitalist social formations, Poulantzas investigates the peculiarity of 
the capitalist state, namely its institutional separation from econom .. 
ics. Within the particular theory of the capitalist mode of production, 
the relative autonomy of the political instance from the economic is 
a consequence of the absence of extra-economic coercion in capital-
ist production (ibid.: 123-41). To develop this regional theory of the 
relative autonomy of the state, Poulantzas requires an analysis of the 
effects of the state in unifying the power bloc and isolating economic 
from political struggles (ibid.: 190-94). The "isolation effect" requires 
that the capitalist state is not the instrument of the dominant class, but 
instead, as a national-popular state, appears as the neutral-universal 
instance where hegemonic leadership is exercised. Consequently, both 
the state form and its regime of government incorporate concessions 
to a vast network of popular struggles and accommodate the shifting 
balance of forces within the hegemonic alliance itself. Finally, Poulantzas 
shifts to the conjunctural analysis of specific class political practices 
within the institutional apparatuses of the state (ibid.: 229-53). This 
movement - from abstract functions to concrete structural analysis -
introduces economic and ideological determinants of the state into the 
regional theory (ibid.: 130-41) and investigates the practices of social 
classes (defined as complexes of economic, political and ideological 
determinants in a relation of forces) on the strategic terrain of the state 
institutions (ibid.: 195-224). 
Poulantzas argues that state power is, in the final analysis, class power 
(ibid.: 99-121), and that - as he later expresses it - the state appara-
tus represents the material condensation of a balance of social forces 
(Poulantzas 1978: 123-62). This seeks to combine a strategic-relational 
concept of political power, as the capacity to act in opposition to a social 
antagonist (to make a difference, that is to introduce a new structural 
element), with the Marxist concept of the social whole (Jessop 1985: 
115-47). Because of its functional role in maintaining the unity of the 
social formation, the state condenses power. The state constitutes the 
"strategic point where the various contradictions fuse" (Poulantzas 1973: 
43). One consequence of this thesis is that the multiplicity of social 
struggles are in the final analysis class struggles, because the function of 
the institutional apparatuses of the capitalist state is to unify and con-
dense social protest into specifically political oppositions. The specificity 
of the political therefore refers to two things: a non-instrumental theory 
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of the state and the idea that politics is site of social transformations. 
poulantzas concludes that: 
it is from this relation between the state as the cohesive factor 
of a formation's unity and the state as the place in which the 
various contradictions of the instances are condensed that we 
can decipher the problem of the relation between politics and 
history. This relation designates the political struggle as the 
''motive power of history': (Ibid.: 45) 
Against this intellectual background, State, Power, Socialism argues for 
non-reformist structural transformations within a strategic-relational, 
that is social class, perspective on politics. The state is grasped as an 
institutional ensemble (including executive, legislative, juridical and 
ideological arms) that can be broken apart by popular mobilizations 
and strategic transformations. Accordingly, the state is not "smashed", 
but simultaneously dismantled and rearranged, through a combina-
tion of parliamentary legislation, sweeping democratization of the state 
bureaucracy, popular organs of political participation, and radical trans-
formations of the army and police that would include the replacement 
of elite specialized bodies with the populace under arms. 
Ideological interpellation 
Probably the most influential innovation within Structural Marxism is 
Althusser's reconceptualization of ideology. Althusser rejects the criti-
cal conception of ideology as false consciousness and proposes that, 
instead, "ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals 
to their real conditions of existence" (Althusser 1971: 162). Maintaining 
that no society, including communism, can dispense with an ideologi-
cal instance, he describes ideology as a "system of representations" or 
"world outlook'' (Althusser 1969: 231-2). Ideologies can be true or false, 
he claims, but in all cases they are the opposite of science, because of 
their subject-centred character, designed to recruit agents to a world-
view rather than to explain the world scientifically as a "process without 
a subject or a goal': A prime example of a true ideology in this sense is 
in fact the left-wing Hegelianism of the young Marx, with its proletarian 
subject of world history and historical teleology (ibid.: 51-86). 
But in actuality, this is a more complex idea than it appears, for 
"Imaginary" is a term of art from Lacanian psychoanalysis that is 
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roughly coextensive with the Freudian concept of the ego. For Freud, 
a lot of the ego is in fact unconscious, and the implication is th 
· d 1 · "f 1 · ,, b t · at 1 eo ogy 1s not a se consc10usness , u an unconsc10us naturaliza. 
tion of the individual's learnt perception of the world. Indeed, in his 
initial formulation of the theory of ideology in For Marx, Althusser 
immediately qualifies his description of ideology as a system of rep. 
resentations by saying that these representations are ''profoundly 
unconscious" (ibid.: 233). In reality, ideology is lived experience, that 
is the way in which the socialized ego makes elementary sense of 
the phenomenal world through commonsense ideas and habituated 
perceptions. In particular, in the lived experience of everyday rou-
tines, individuals "recognize" one another as, say, free persons with 
basic rights, or God's creatures cast in the image of their Creator, and 
this set of perceptions seems to them as natural as their own egos 
seem unified. Psychoanalysis argues that these assumptions are the 
result of socialization, fundamentally dependent on the internaliza-
tion of an image of authority into the self, in the form of the superego, 
which becomes the voice of conscience, policing the ego's conformity 
to social norms. When Althusser says, then, that ideology generates 
social subjects and fits them to functional roles, this means that ide-
ology operates at the most basic levels of personality formation, long 
before it is explicitly codified as a philosophical statement, or "world 
outlook'~ This perhaps clarifies what is at stake when Althusser claims 
that "what is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of real 
relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary 
relation of those individuals to the real conditions in which they live» 
(Althusser 1971: 165). 
Initially, Althusser had proposed that ideology, as the commonsense 
construction oflived experience, was the "cement" that maintains social 
reproduction, and it seemed to emanate from everywhere and nowhere. 
This position effectively theorises social subjects as mindless drones of 
the reigning social order and prevents the emergence of social agents 
capable of initiating revolutionary transformations of the structure 
(Benton 1984: 96-107; Hirst 1976: 385-411). The events of May 1968, 
when student protests triggered a general strike in France that brought 
the government down, catalysed Althusser's abandonment of this bias 
towards the automatic reproduction of the social formation. 
In his celebrated essay on "ideological state apparatuses" (or ISAs) 
in Lenin and Philosophy, Althusser (1971: 127-86) reconsiders the 
problem. He investigates the formation of socialized individuals 
through their recruitment (or "interpellation') by ideologies, which are 
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propagated through institutions. Althusser's ISAs essay proposes that 
ideology inserts biological individuals into forms of social subjectivity 
with different types of political agency. He contends that "ideology has 
the function (which defines it) of 'constituting' concrete individuals as 
subjects" (ibid.: 171; emphasis added). Althusser claims: 
Every human cannot be the agent of a practice unless he takes 
the form of a subject. The "subject form" is in fact the form 
that the historical existence of every individual, every agent 
of social practice, takes: for the relations of production and 
reproduction necessarily involve ... ideological social relations 
which, in order to function, impose on every individual agent 
the form of a subject. (Althusser 1976: 95) 
A human person (a biological individual) is not an agent without an 
imaginary relation to the real conditions of existence, which is to say, 
without a socialized ego. Social practice requires a socialized subject 
and this socializsation takes the form of ideological "interpellatiod~ 
"Concrete subjects only exist insofar as they are supported by a con-
crete individual [and] ideology ... transforms the individuals into sub-
jects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation ... called 
interpellation" (Althusser 1971: 174). Althusser likens this process to 
the hailing of a person by the police ("hey, you!"): as the person spins 
around and "recognizes" himself or herself as hailed, they at once 
become an individual citizen and subject themselves to the discipline 
of the state. 
For Althusser, despite the advent of modernity, religion remains 
the exemplary instance of ideological interpellation. The discourse of 
religion creates social subjects by positioning them within a body of 
representations whose major doctrine is that ''humanity is made in the 
image of God" (Althusser 1971: 178). With the rise of modernity, what 
Althusser calls the "School-Family couplet" replaced the church as the 
major locus of subject formation and so social subjects "recognize" one 
another in the image of the liberal distinction between public citizen 
and private person. This alters the content of ideological representations, 
but not their form, which remains paradigmatically religious. As Alex 
Callinicos explains, "ideology is the way in which men and women are 
formed in order to participate in a process of which they are not the 
makers, and ideology performs this function by giving them the illusion 
that history was made for them" (Callinicos 1976: 70). In this context, 
Althusser defines ideology as both recognition (it is "obvious" that we 
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are subjects and recognize one another on this basis) and misrecognition 
(of the structural conditions of the public/ private distinction; Althusser 
1971: 172, 183). 
The ambition of this reconceptualization is to explore the political 
implications of ideological struggle: at a stroke, social reproduction 
becomes something politically contested (Benton 1984: 96-107; Resch 
1992: 208-13). In effect, Althusser tries to accommodate the existence 
of bourgeois and proletarian ideologies, transforming the conception of 
a dominant ideology into the thesis of a hegemonic ideology. Although 
Althusser only discusses the dominant ideology and the state appara-
tuses, the implication is that this theory is a contribution to the forma-
tion of an anti-capitalist social alliance. The idea is that in opposition 
to possessive individualism, communist militants will promulgate a 
socialist humanist ideology through such institutions as schools and 
universities, trades unions and social movements, thereby recruiting 
to the revolutionary movement. 
Ideological state apparatuses 
The idea of a hegemonic ideology confronted by counter-hegemonic 
ideologies connects, in Althusser's treatment, with a determined effort 
to break with the conception of the "ruling ideas" as a free-floating 
body of representations lacking an institutional location. Althusser pro-
poses in the second major thesis of the ISAs essay that "ideology has a 
material existence" (Althusser 1971: 165). Breaking with the distinction 
between ideas and action, Althusser proposes to "talk of actions inserted 
into practices ... governed by the rituals in which these practices are 
inscribed, within the material existence of an ideological apparatus'' 
(ibid.: 168). Because religion is the paradigm of ideology, Althusser 
turns to the cynical discussion of religion by French philosopher Blaise 
Pascal, for whom religious beliefs are the result of indoctrination, rather 
than conversion. Pascafs formula, "kneel down and you will believe" -
in other words, participate in the institutional ritual and religious faith 
will follow - indicates, as far as Althusser is concerned, the real nature 
of ideological convictions. He argues that ideology is the result of a 
process of conformity to institutional routines and habituated practices. 
Ideologies are forms of social subjectivity that belong to the agency 
required to perform socially normal functions, rather than being prima -
rily doctrinal abstractions or grand ideals. Accordingly, Althusser pro-
poses that ideas themselves are ((material actions inserted into material 
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ractices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by ~e material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of the 
subject" (ibid.: 169). The talismanic repetition of({material" is designed 
to banish ''ideas" and replace them with institutionalized practices of 
subject formation (ibid.: 169), for "there is no practice except in and 
by an ideology [and] there is no ideology except by the subject and for 
subjects" (ibid.: 170). 
Despite the centrality of the educational system to ideological 
inculcation, what Althusser calls ideological state apparatuses are 
not restricted to the sphere of the state and its semi-governmental 
organizations. To the contrary: the major illustrations of the concept 
of the ISAs offered by Althusser, aside from universities and schools, 
are drawn from the "private'' sphere of civil society. These include the 
church, trade unions, the family, the mass media, political parties and 
cultural practices. Following Gramsci, Althusser contends that the 
political hegemony of the ruling class can be functionally diff eren -
tiated into the RSAs ("repressive state apparatuses", which function 
predominantly by the exercise of coercion, namely police, army and the 
apparatus of punishment) and the ISAs, where the dominant ideology 
is institutionalized in a multiplicity of state and non-state locations. 
Althusser specifies that: 
( 1) all state apparatuses employ both ideology and repres-
sion, but the distinction between ISAs and RSAs relates to the 
relative proportions present in the different apparatuses; (2) 
the ISAs have a relative autonomy and a dispersed multiplic-
ity as opposed to the unified consistency of the RSAs; (3) the 
sole unity of the ISAs is secured by the dominant ideology. 
(Ibid.: 149) 
Althusser's conception of ideological state apparatuses tends to sug-
gest that despite the diversity of ideological practices and institutional 
sites, ranging from the education system to the church and family, the 
"ideological state apparatuses" are unified by means of the dominant 
ideology. The reason why these are said to be "state" apparatuses, how-
ever, is not particularly clear. Althusser appears to be collapsing civil 
society into the nation state in a way that is not really very helpful. 
What is clear, however, is that the intent of this discussion is to support 
the Eurocommunist "long march through the institutions'' (Anderson 
1976: 33-7). It advocates the capture of the various ((state" apparatuses 
of an ideological kind and their re-functioning, from forums for the 
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dominant ideology into vehicles for counter-hegemony. Nonethele 
ideology and politics tend in the ISXs essay to collapse into one anotb ss 
ideology becomes an appendage of the state while the hegemonic cl: 
acquires a monolithic aura (Resch 1992: 36). ss 
By contrast, Goran Therborn drops the confusing ascription of 
ideology to the state, introducing a new opposition between «ideologt 
cal apparatuses" and ((ideological counter-apparatuses". He maintains 
that contradictions within the process of subject-formation spring 
from the requirement that ideology must generate a correspondence 
between two processes. Individuals are "subjected" to a social arrange-
ment through the inhibition of drives and the formation of capacities. 
They are also "qualified" to perform certain roles in social life that can 
include critical reflection and transformative action. When subjection 
and qualification fail to correspond, Therborn argues, "the effects ofa 
contradiction between subjection and qualification are opposition and 
revolt, or under-performance and withdrawal" (Therborn 1980: 17). 
The ensemble of structural determinations, exerted by economic and 
political relations, over-determines the contradictions of the inter-
pellation process, so that the contradiction between subjection and 
qualification is not isolated from contradictions of domination and 
exploitation (ibid.: 45-6). The concept of material contradictions in 
the ideological apparatuses, and the existence of socio-political antag-
onisms between ideological apparatuses and counter-apparatuses, 
lends theoretical substance to the claim that the material existence 
of ideology enables conceptualization of ideological class struggle 
(ibid.: 86). Second, and perhaps more interesting, Therborn recasts 
the characterization of ideology so that it goes beyond a description 
of how subjects are fitted to functional roles. In a chapter entitled 
"The Ideological Universe: Dimensions of Human Subjectivity", he 
proposes that ideology has both historical-social and existential-
personal aspects. Where the former category is well understood in 
Marxism, under the heading of «class ideologies", the latter, which 
are essential for subjects' experience of the world as a meaningful 
space for personal development and social action, have yet to be 
fully grasped by historical materialism. Religion is the key example 
of an existential ideology providing an explanation of "the meaning 
of life, death, suffering, the cosmos and the natural order" (ibid.: 23). 
Gender is another, and although Therborn has been highly active in 
the investigation of this field, we now turn to the striking contribution 
of Michele Barrett for an example of how Structural Marxism handles 
women's liberation. 
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women1s oppression and structural articulation 
'Jhe advantages of Structural Marxism are on display in Barrett's 
Womens Oppression Today (1980). Her fundamental claim is that the 
nuclear family represents a survival from pre-capitalist modes of pro-
duction that is both ideological and economic in character. What Barrett 
describes as the ideological-economic unit of the "family-household" 
is structurally articulated to capitalist regional structures, in a clas-
sic instance of the Structural Marxist interpretation of combined and 
uneven development. But she insists that this articulation is historically 
contingent, shaped by social struggles in the nineteenth century, and 
that the insertion of the pre-capitalist family-household into capitalist 
relations has modified its structure and functioning at both economic 
and ideological levels. 
Barrett arrives at this position on the basis of an exhaustive review of 
two major debates in socialism and feminism. The first is the "domestic 
labour debate': concerned with the question of why a gender-segregated 
division of labour, which assigns women to domestic labour and to a 
relatively unskilled and underpaid segment of the labour market, exists 
in capitalism (Barrett 1980: 152-86). In general (at least in the 1970s 
and 1980s), female domestic labour and the socialization of children 
is unproductive (i.e. non-value producing) work that reproduces the 
labour power of the male breadwinner. Women entering the labour 
force must often continue to perform these tasks even as they work for 
a wage or salary, and female wages continue to be only about 66 per cent 
of the male wage in a similar industry. But the conclusion that Barrett 
draws from this debate is that it cannot be definitively demonstrated 
that privatized reproduction of labour power through the family unit 
is a necessary consequence of the combination of private property and 
wage labour. Capitalism could equally well be organized on the basis 
of the commercialization of domestic labour and child-rearing serv-
ices, with women in full employment and without a gender-segmented 
labour market. She therefore argues that the current situation is the 
consequence of historical factors, and specifically of the way in which 
the pre-capitalist family-household was integrated into capitalism. 
Up until the eighteenth century, the family-household was a unit 
of economic production as well as essential to the reproduction of the 
labour force. Capitalism reorganized economic production on the basis 
of private property, creating public, waged labour, and split this off from 
the residual private, domestic labour in the reproduction of the work-
force, which continued to be done in the family-household unit. This 
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had contradictory effects. On the one hand, it reduced the available 
supply of wage workers, by excluding half of the potential labour pool, 
and this resulted in the ability of mainly male trade unions to sue~ 
cessfully struggle in the nineteenth century for wage rises. From the 
perspective of an individual entrepreneur, then, the persistence of the 
privatized reproduction of labour power through the family-household 
structure is irrational, because relatively expensive. On the other hand> 
though, this gender segregation divided the working class, with the 
trade unions often vigorously campaigning to keep women in the home 
on the basis that female workers undercut the male breadwinner. Many 
socialists reinforced this politically regressive line, not least through the 
invisibility of domestic labour as a theoretical category of importance 
in the analysis of the division of labour. From the perspective of the 
capitalist class as a whole, then, the persistence of the family-household 
structure has extraordinarily beneficial political effects in dividing and 
disorganizing united resistance to capitalism. 
The second debate concerns the question of "capitalist patriarchy': 
the hypothesized existence of a dual structure in contemporary societies 
that combines capitalist economic exploitation with masculine domi-
nation organized culturally. Barrett does not for a moment doubt that 
male dominance exists or that it involves not just material privileges 
for men, and the assumed universality and neutrality of masculinity as 
the paradigm of what is human, but also a series of extremely negative 
ideological stereotypes. These extend all the way down, from the cultural 
denigration of femininity as inferior and the disgraceful exploitation of 
women in the cultural industries, to the internalization of negative asso-
ciations around feminine sexuality in the socialization of boys and girls. 
But she argues that a dualist framework naturalizes the division between 
male-public and female-domestic labour. It also fails to explain the 
interconnections between capitalist exploitation and masculine domina-
tion. Radical as it might sound, "capitalist patriarchy" continues to frame 
the question of the division oflabour in male-centred terms and neglects 
the functional integration of the nuclear family into capitalist societies. 
Barrett's alternative takes advantage of Althusser's reconceptualiza-
tion of ideology as institutionalized rituals that have the effect of gener-
ating forms of social subjectivity. The family, she proposes, is foremost 
an institutionally organized set of social practices whose effect is gender, 
the culturally defined roles of and hierarchical distinction between mas-
culine and feminine. By allocating these culturally determined charac-
teristics to individuals who are sexually male or female, familial ideology 
reproduces the gender segmentation of the division of labour and the 
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cultural privileges of masculinity. It also naturalizes these by making it 
appear that they are automatic consequences of reproductive biology. 
Barrett takes up Althusser's suggestion that under capitalism, the central 
ideological structure is the "School-Family" apparatus. She contends 
that "the oppression of women, although not a functional prerequisite of 
capitalism, has acquired a material basis in the relations of production 
and reproduction of capitalism today" (Barrett 1980: 249). 
Furthermore, Barrett maintains, following Althusser, the ideological 
naturalization of cultural gender roles is deeply unconscious. Although 
sharply critical of Althusser's limited technical understanding of psy-
choanalysis (Barrett 1993), she agrees with his underlying approach. 
"Gender identity and the ideology of the family': Barrett proposes, in 
line with psychoanalytic conceptions of the self, "are embedded in our 
very subjectivity and our desires at a far more profound level than <false 
consciousness,,, (Barrett 1980: 226). Gender ideology has a sufficiently 
deep hold on individuals' sense of themselves to manage to perpetu -
ate deep divisions, despite the relatively "sex-blind" operations of the 
market. Barrett concludes that: 
These divisions are systematically embedded in the structure 
and texture of capitalist social relations in Britain and they play 
an important part in the political and ideological stability of 
this society. They are constitutive of our subjectivity as well as, 
in part, of capitalist political and cultural hegemony. They are 
interwoven into a fundamental relationship between the wage-
labour system and the organization of domestic life, and it is 
impossible to imagine that they could be extracted from the 
relations of production and reproduction of capitalism without 
a massive transformation of those relations taking place. Hence, 
the slogan ((No women's liberation without socialism; no social-
ism without women's liberation'' is more than a pious hope. 
(Ibid.: 254-5) 
Structural Marxism and Eurocommunism 
What has been described as the Eurocommunist «long march through 
the institutions" involved the effort to capture positions in the state, 
universities and media, as well as labour parties, trades unions, social 
movements and church groups, in order to transform these institu-
tions. Most of the leading thinkers of Structural Marxism in the 1970s 
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were members of the mass-based communist parties of France, Italy; 
Spain and Greece, and many of them supported the shift in these par~ 
ties from Stalinist politics to the politics of Eurocommunism. The 
Eurocommunist movement represented an effort to rethink socialist 
strategy as a prolonged, democratic struggle for "structural reform~ 
, 
rather than an insurrectionary surge. The "historic compromise'' With 
parliamentary democracy that this reflected involved the acknowledge. 
ment that liberal conceptions ofliberty, equality and rights represented 
not just mass ("false") consciousness, but historic gains for the popular 
masses, not lightly to be thrown away. The Leninist strategy of popular 
insurrection against the bourgeois state was replaced by a policy of 
protracted democratic contestation for electoral hegemony (Antonian 
1987: 117-35). Socialist transition was reconceptualized as an entire 
historical stage of "advanced democracy'>, characterized by the shifting 
equilibrium between social forces struggling around a new social order 
(Claudin 1978: 122-65). 
The Eurocommunist idea of socialism was that of a "revolution 
in liberty': that is an extension and deepening of democratic proc-
esses through the democratization of society, and a revolution that 
would preserve negative liberty even as it strove for positive freedom. 
Substantively, Eurocommunism involved three major elements: 
1. The transformation of the vanguard party into a mass formation 
capable of participating in alliance politics with equal partners in 
a democratic front. 
2. The democratization and decentralization of the state, through 
the extension of parliamentary control over the state-apparatus, 
linked to the abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat for 
liberal socialism. 
3. Abandonment of the command economy for market socialism, 
conceptualized as a democratically planned mixed economy 
including workers' self-management (Boggs 1982; Carrillo 1978; 
Claudin 1978). 
The strategy of Eurocommunism during the 1970s embraced the full 
implications of democratic politics including the negotiated formulation 
of joint programmes representing political compromises and therefore 
rejected the popular front led by the proletarian party. Instead, it advo-
cated the norm of regular alternation of governing parties involved 
in political competition as part of a multi-class transitional strategy 
(Napolitano 1977). 
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Within the Eurocommunist movement, the left-wing opposition -
including theoreticians such as Althusser, Balibar, Buci-Glucksmann 
{Buci-Glucksmann 1980) and Poulantzas (Poulantzas 1978) - pro-
moted the strategy of combining democratic politics with mass mobi-
lizations (Antonian 1987). For many of the Structural Marxists, the 
communist parties had not developed a democratic political practice 
that might recognize the legitimacy of representative democracy while 
avoiding the trap of piecemeal parliamentary reformism. But radicals 
were not able to develop forms of participatory democracy supported 
by a mass movement that might counter-balance the potentially con-
servatizing effects of participation in liberal-democratic governments 
(Poulantzas 1978; Weber 1978). Although the left Eurocommunists 
(especially Fernando Claudin, Pietro Ingrao, Lucio Magri, Rossanna 
Rossanda, Ni cos Poulantzas and Etienne Balibar) struggled for their 
theoretical alternative and political strategy within the Eurocommunist 
movement, the right retained a solid majority throughout (Antonian 
1987: 87-102). 
By the mid-1980s, Eurocommunism had conclusively failed to realize 
its potential. Structural Marxism, meanwhile, was in deep difficulties. 
Leading members experienced insanity or committed suicide ( Althusser, 
Poulantzas), and many drifted away intellectually under the impact of 
the post-structuralist critique of the concept of structure as a whole. 
Tue Structural Marxists never resolved the central problem with the 
entire programme, its persistent normative deficit perfectly expressed 
through the contradictory call for theoretical anti-humanism and prac-
tical humanism. The problems with transforming moral and political 
values into reflexes of the social structure hardly need restatement. In 
effect, this is likely to result in a cynically manipulative relation to prac-
tical struggles, or, at best, a wretched consequentialism of the "greatest 
good for the greatest number': Not surprisingly, Structural Marxism 
only had a very weak response to the rise of the New Philosophy in the 
1980s, a right-wing movement in thought promoting the idea that eve-
rything beyond a militant defence of human rights leads automatically 
to the Stalinist Gulag. The collapse of historical Communism and the 
disintegration of the communist parties lay on the horizon, alongside 
the transformation of most politicians in the world into miniaturized 
versions of Margaret Thatcher. Marxism as a whole was about to become 
something that you provided a good alibi for, rather than something 
you contributed fresh ideas to. 
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Summary of key points 
Theoretical revolutions 
• Theoretical anti-humanism involves the structural-functionalist 
perspective on individuals as "bearers" of social roles, in a complex. 
functional differentiation of institutions whose effect is to ensure 
social reproduction, that is the maintenance of the social whole. 
• From this perspective, "history is a process without a subject or a 
goal": historical change happens because of structural mutations 
I 
which occur as a result of dysfunctionality creeping into the rela-
tions between institutions as a consequence of the complexity of 
the social formation. 
• The centrality of the Marxist concept of social practice mod-
elled on the labour process is retained, in the context of a radical 
rethinking of social structure designed to highlight the "relative 
autonomy" of Marx's economic, political and ideological "levels" 
of society. 
Social complexity and differential histories 
• Instead of the base-and-superstructure model, the social for-
mation is conceptualized as a totality of structural instances, or 
regional structures linking a multiplicity of functionally related 
institutions, articulated by the mode of production. 
• The mode of production assigns to one of the structural instances 
(the economic, the political, the ideological) the role of structure-
in-dominance, while other instances provide its conditions of 
existence. 
• Although the structural instances are inter-related by the effects 
of the structure-in-dominance, they each have their own defining 
practices and determinate contradictions, and they evolve accord-
ing to different internal dynamics with a distinctive "temporality': 
or rate of development. 
Class politics and class struggle 
• The relation between an internal rate of development within a 
structural instance and the interfering effects of the structure-in-
dominance and other structures on this particular evolutionary 
path is thought of descriptively in terms of "over-determination', 
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which under capitalism means the displacement into ideology or 
the condensation into politics of economic antagonisms . 
• "Social classes" (with shifting boundaries) are the result of a bal-
ance of forces that can be summed up across the entire social 
formation, based on the state of play around contested prac-
tices in each of the structural instances, in a global antagonism 
between struggles for social reproduction versus struggles for 
social transformation. 
• "Social classes" are not to be confused with the idea of classes of 
production, defined as structural locations in the social forma-
tion, which are said to have economic, political and ideological 
determinants of identity. 
State politics, ideological hegemony and revolutionary strategy 
, The political instance is defined as the ensemble of institutions 
dedicated to the maintenance of the unity of the social formation, 
centred on the state as the apparatus where power is concentrated 
and legitimized. Nonetheless, the nation state under capitalism is 
not theorized as a monolithic unity, but rather as itself an ensem-
ble of institutions (executive, legislative, juridical and ideological) 
susceptible to fracturing under popular pressure. 
• Ideology is radically redefined through the description of lived 
experience as an "imaginary relation" to social structures. Ideology 
depends on the internalization of institutional rituals during an 
individual's socialization, transformation of the "ideological state 
apparatuses'' the key to ideological hegemony. 
• Ideology as an unconscious relation to social structures is illus-
trated by the gender division between men and women, produced 
by the family structure, a legacy of pre-capitalist modes of produc-
tion that has been articulated into capitalism at the levels of eco-
nomics (through domestic labour) and ideology (through gender 
roles). 
• Socialist strategy is reconceptualized as a protracted struggle for 
"advanced democracy" in capitalist social formations, during 
which progressive forces strive to transform existing structures 
into post-capitalist institutional arrangements. 
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materialism as a means to re-open ancient questions about the good 
life and meaningful existence, rather than as a positivist social science. 
Members of the Frankfurt School prudently described their research 
programme as "Critical Theory" partly as a euphemism for historical 
materialism that they hoped would deflect hostile attention, and partly 
to signify their distance from orthodox forms of Marxism. 
The key element in the Frankfurt School's Marxism is their cri-
tique of the labour model of praxis, combined with a return to con-
ceptions of structure and history close to those of the young Marx. 
Max Horkheimer's initial outline of Critical Theory in the 1930s, as an 
interdisciplinary, materialist research programme, set the scene for the 
development of a fairly systematic theory of monopoly capitalism, the 
bureaucratic state, the modern individual and consumer society. At 
the same time, scepticism towards Hegelian Marxism's activist reduc-
tion of historical materialism - its conflation of proletarian experience 
with radical theory - combined with the integration of psychoanalytic 
positions into Marxist theory, led to a questioning of the relationship 
between the labour process and an objectifying attitude. In the 1940s, 
leading members of the Frankfurt School significantly radicalized the 
critique of commodity reification in the context of an anthropologi-
cal inquiry into the roots of social domination. They concluded that 
"instrumental reason", the formal rationality of reified calculations, 
arose long before capitalism, from the effort to master nature through 
technological progress. 
After the Second World War, the paths of the key members of the 
group began to diverge, with what has become the major statement 
of the first generation of Critical Theory, Adorno and Horkheirner's 
Dialectic of Enlightenment ([1947] 2002), in fact representing only one 
intellectual possibility. Adorno's subsequent work on negative dialectics 
and dissonant modernism in the post-war era was mainly an effort to 
clarify and extend the theses of this breakthrough work. A significant 
alternative, however, was Marcuse's synthesis of psychoanalysis and 
Marxism, in works that directly inspired the student movements of the 
1960s and 1970s. Marcuse and Adorno, in different ways, opened up 
questions around individuality and the family, bureaucracy and author-
ity, consumption and culture, and dialectical methodology, which con-
ventional approaches in historical materialism have rarely broached, 
before or after the Frankfurt School. This chapter, then, explores the 
development and diversification of Frankfurt School Marxism among 
its key, first-generation members, up until the 1950s. The second genera-
tion of the Frankfurt School, many of whom were students radicalized 
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in the 1960s around the positions of their professors, are examined later, 
in the chapter on Critical Theory. 
The Institute for Social Research and the "cultural turn" 
1he Frankfurt School's critique of labour and its interest in art have 
been widely misunderstood. Leninists in particular have strongly 
criticized the Frankfurt School for its insistence on the importance of 
culture and its members' political quietism (Marcuse excepted). For 
Gyorgy Lukacs, the Frankfurt School had installed itself at the "Grand 
Hotel Abyss': a contemplative and pessimistic intellectual space from 
which to justify their lack of political engagement with speculations on 
difficult art and high theory (Lukacs 197lb: xv). For Perry Anderson, 
the Frankfurt School's "cultural turn" is a reflection of political defeat 
in the 1920s and 1930s that, together with the consequent isolation 
of radical intellectuals from mass movements, results in a theory that 
has lost contact with revolutionary practice (Anderson 1979: 32). Phil 
Slater proposes that, because the Frankfurt School is not an "agitational 
weapon': it fails to "achieve the relation to praxis which is central to the 
Marxist project" (Slater 1977: xiv). Zoltan Tar maintains that, lacking 
a scientific socialism, the critique of labour practice makes Critical 
Theory "in the last analysis [just] another existentialist philosophy" 
(Tar 1977: 205). The notion of "praxis" as the unity of Marxist theory, 
articulated by the Len1nist party, with revolutionary practice by the 
proletarian movement, in which theory exists to guide strategy, and 
according to which truth is determined by political success, looms 
large in these criticisms. 
The problem here is that some sorts of Marxism have reduced Marx's 
thought to a dour blue-collar workerism, for which ''praxis" has no 
more meaning than experimental verification of scientific hypotheses 
in the "laboratory" of class politics. For the Frankfurt School, Leninist 
objections instrumentalized theory and made the central commit-
tee into the arbiter of philosophical truth, something whose negative 
intellectual consequences were reflected in Lukacs' own fate (Adorno 
2007c: 151-76). More damagingly, such objections also strategically 
"forgof' that for Marx, praxis meant human flourishing through crea-
tive labour (MECWS: 47), rather than theoretically guided political 
success. Generally speaking, the Frankfurt School's combination, of 
radical humanism under conditions of proletarian demobilization 
with social theory arising from a critique of the labour model of praxis, 
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is understood by critics as leading to hopeless despair. There is a gap 
between ideals and reality that refuses to close, because - unlike for 
Marx in 1847 - no revolutionary upsurge seems to loom on the horizon. 
But perhaps it would be simpler to express surprise that, given a 
grim assessment of revolutionary chances in the 1920s to 1940s, what 
the members of the Frankfurt School did was not to adapt to politi-
cal conditions by moderating their stances, but to radicalize further. 
The specific form that this radicalization took was a deepening of the 
philosophical implications of Marxism by means of its fertilization with 
Weberian sociology, in the context of an encounter with Freudian psy-
choanalysis. Possibly the best way to think about the Frankfurt School is 
as a unique research programme that unites the Marxist question - what 
are the roots of the modern loss of freedom? - with the Weberian ques-
tion - what is the ground of the modern loss of meaningfulness? - in 
a critical theory with an emancipatory practical intention (Bernstein 
1995: 12). It was the intertwining of the problem of domination with 
the problem of nihilism, together with the integration of Freudian psy-
choanalysis into historical materialism, which defined the Marxism of 
the Frankfurt School. 
Although the members of the Frankfurt School initially accepted 
Marx's idea that creative labour represented the model of practice, this 
eventually came under critical scrutiny. Freud had linked labour dis-
cipline to what he called «the renunciation of instinctual satisfactions" 
through delayed gratification, and had pointed to the increasing ten-
dency under capitalism for this delay to become permanent (Freud 
200lc: 57-146). But if the mastery of external nature through labour 
practice actually involved a problematic domination of internal nature, 
and if this problematic domination of internal nature threatened to 
lead to social irrationality and the mistreatment of others, then labour 
practice no longer looked like the key to liberation. Revision of the idea 
of labour practice as central to the utopian hopes of the socialist move-
ment resulted in the distinctive and controversial character of Frankfurt 
School Marxism, because this triggered a search for alternative sorts of 
action on which to base emancipatory possibilities. 
Additionally, members of the Frankfurt School radicalized in a con-
text of a disastrous Leninist voluntarism, whose fatal neglect of cultural 
factors led to the failed Western revolutions of 1918-23. Further, the 
apparently irresistible rise of European fascism was the result not only 
of the political paralysis of radical forces, but also of the fascists' abil-
ity to appeal to the mentality of major sectors of the population. Like 
Grarnsci, members of the Frankfurt School understood that during this 
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period, although the capitalist state was completely vulnerable, what 
had been revealed was that the mentality of the working class lagged far 
behind political developments. An exhaustive empirical survey of psy-
chological attitudes among German workers, conducted by the Institute 
in the 1920s, revealed that most had personality structures that were 
highly conservative and resistant to socio-cultural changes (Jay 1973: 
124-35). These personality structures, Institute members discovered, 
were the result of childhood socialization, forming the templates by 
which individuals responded to economic and cultural transformations, 
so that there was a generational lag in the adaptation of individuals to 
society. Moreover, German fascism exhibited violent irrationality in a 
form widely described on the German Left as "mass hysteria: Turning to 
psychoanalysis to understand the unconscious roots of political unrea-
son made sound sense. The "cultural turn" was entirely connected to 
the urgent political questions of the inter-war years. 
Critical Theory versus Traditional Theory 
Frankfurt School Marxism only took on its distinctive form once Max 
Horkheimer became the Director of the Institute in 1930. Nonetheless, 
under the direction of Carl Grunberg in the 1920s the Institute had 
published Karl Korsch's Marxism and Philosophy (1923) and discussed 
Lukacs's History and Class Consciousness ([1923] 197la). Against this 
intellectual and historical background, Horkheimer presented the dif-
ferences between the ideas of Frankfurt School Marxism and rival 
socialist and bourgeois approaches in a series of articles for the Institutes 
journal that culminated in "Traditional and Critical Theory" in 1937 
(Horkheimer 1982: 188-243). Influenced by Lukacs, Horkheimer argued 
that the difference between social philosophy and traditional sociology 
consisted in the historical and materialist dialectical methodology that 
the former used to integrate the fragmented knowledge provided by 
the latter into an ongoing totalization. From this perspective, Marxism 
is a materialist prolongation of Hegel's use of "determinate negation': 
This refers to the process of specifying the social connections between 
isolated abstractions, so as to locate them in their contextual deter-
minants. The method constructs a ''concrete totality" of "many deter-
minations and relations" that represents the dialectical <<unity of the 
diverse" (Marx 1973: 100-101). Long before the publication of Marx's 
Grundrisse, Horkheimer had reconstructed the dialectical method from 
his knowledge of Hegel, but he had also realized that, although this 
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resulted in a concrete totality, a truly historical materialism precluded 
finished systems (Horkheimer 1982: 226-8, 242-3). 
The dialectical methodology of Critical Theory aims at an interdisci-
plinary materialism as the Frankfurt School's interpretation ofLukacs's 
"category of the totality as the [intellectual] bearer of the principle of rev-
olution': Implicitly drawing upon the critique of reification, Horkheimer 
argued that capitalist society appears to bourgeois consciousness as a 
"sum total of facts" submitted to "the classificatory thinking of each 
individual" in the interests of effective adaptation to social reality (ibid.: 
199). The resulting disciplinary silos of traditional sociology and bour-
geois philosophy therefore compartmentalize social reality in line with 
the prevalent cultural fragmentation caused by reification, even as they 
eliminate substantive questions through a formalistic method whose 
paradigm is the closed system of mathematical demonstrations (ibid.: 
199-205). 
Unlike the isolated silos of the bourgeois academic disciplines, dia-
lectical theory relates the latest research findings in distinct areas to one 
another by grasping the material interconnections between economic 
science, sociology, political science, cultural criticism, psychology and 
philosophy. At the same time, Critical Theory inquires into the historical 
genesis of the object of inquiry, insisting that the economy, society, the 
state, culture, the psyche and thinking all change because of their mutual 
interrelation. Thus in order to construct an interdisciplinary material-
ism, members of the Frankfurt School had to reconstruct bourgeois 
disciplines within the historical genesis of their social context, while 
rejecting ideological limitations such as reified "laws of motion'' and an 
unhistorical "human nature': A classic instance of this is the Frankfurt 
School's appropriative critique of Freudian psychoanalysis, in which it 
is argued that Freud had ideologically assumed that the nuclear family 
was an unchanging reality and so transformed his valuable dissection 
of the bourgeois individual into an unchanging model of the psyche 
(Adorno 1967). 
Frankfurt School Marxism represents self-reflexive sociology, that 
is a sociology that reflects on its own social location in the division of 
labour and on its own historical conditions of possibility (Horkheimer 
1982: 213). Because of his stress on the historical genesis of the object 
of analysis and the social connections between domains of human 
knowledge, Horkheimer regards the theorist as a participant in the 
socio-historical processes under diagnosis. Consequently, the synthe-
sis of knowledge of society gained through integrating different disci-
plines using materialist dialectics is not a final truth, but the provisional 
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result of an ongoing effort to grasp the totality in thought. There is a 
Hegelian distinction here that it is crucial to grasp. For Hegel, Kantian 
formalism was merely the classificatory '(Understanding" operating on 
a fragmented and unhistorical ''factual" world. By contrast, self-reflexive 
dialectical "Reason'~ grasping the totality as generated by antagonisms, 
knows that the totality can only be conceptualized by thinking in con-
tradictions. Horkheimer's Marxist version of this idea is to propose 
that reality be grasped as a historically developing, concrete totality of 
social contradictions. 
By contrast with Lukacs, the members of the Frankfurt School sought 
to reopen a set of ancient questions about the good life as questions, 
turning to the doctrine of hedonism in particular for the roots of a 
materialist understanding of human existence. They also engaged exten-
sively with what they described as the "dark writers of the bourgeoisie", 
reactionary philosophers such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, in a 
bid to fully comprehend the limits of the bourgeois Enlightenment. 
Like Lukacs, they were attracted to a synthesis of Marx and Weber, and 
strongly influenced by Hegel's critique of Kant, but they also investi-
gated Freud, existentialism (Heidegger and Kierkegaard), Bergson and 
Husserl (Held 1980: 29-39, 175-99; Jay 1973: 41-85). 
As Horkheimer notes, if the social theorist commited to human free-
dom is a participant in antagonistic contradictions, then this implies an 
emancipatory sociology with the practical intent to change the world 
(Horkheimer 1982: 208-11). But the members of the Frankfurt School 
rejected Lukacs' idea that the proletariat is the privileged historical sub-
ject whose revolutionary praxis entails absolute knowledge and which is 
capable of expressively generating the social totality from its conscious 
transformation of the natural environment (Jay 1984: 207). Not only 
does this reduce philosophical truth to the instrumental success of a 
political strategy, it also denies the resistance of matter to human con-
sciousness, and it proclaims the idealist unity of subject and object in 
a way that can only lead to a closed system of finished truths. Instead, 
the addressee of the Frankfurt School's Marxism increasingly becomes 
humanity as a whole, understood as historical individuals rather than 
a collective subject (Held 1980: 24-6). 
Administered society 
The research of the Institute involved an informal division of labour 
(Held 1980: 14). Members were to investigate society (Henryk Grossmann, 
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Friedrich Pollock and Arkadij Gurland - political economy; Franz 
Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer - law and the state), culture (Leo 
Lowenthal, Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin - art; Herbert 
Marcuse and Max Horkheimer - philosophy) and personality (Erich 
Fromm - depth psychology, including Freudian psychoanalysis). 
The independent results were to be integrated into a social theory by 
means of the dialectical methods of historical materialism, mainly by 
Horkheimer, but in such a way as to place back on the agenda ancient 
philosophical questions about human happiness and the good life. 
Before long, Adorno was playing a role alongside Horkheimer in sum-
marizing the research findings and synthesizing them into a global 
theory, based on the idea that the equivalence principle of commodity 
exchange dominated society. The equivalence principle refers to Marx,s 
notion of ((real abstraction: where unlike use values, embodying quali-
tatively different concrete labour, exchange for like exchange values, 
embodying the same amount of abstract labour. The equivalence princi-
ple became Horkheimer and Adorno's version of commodity reification. 
Although the positions of the Frankfurt School were never formu-
lated as a new orthodoxy, there was general agreement in the 1930s 
and 1940s that the historical materialist analysis of capitalism must 
begin from the economic structure of society (Kellner 1989: 51-82; 
Held 1980: 41-2). It was clear to the political economists, Neumann, 
Kirscheimer, Pollock, Gurland and Grossmann, that nineteenth-cen-
tury liberal capitalism, with its reliance on market mechanisms and 
the minimal state, was finished. The new phenomena to be explained 
included fascist dictatorships, economic depression and the emergence 
of consumer society, the economic developments of monopoly capital-
ism, and the bureaucratic state. The capitalism described by Marx had 
been replaced by a new fusion of monopoly corporations, international 
banking and the interventionist state, which sought to manage crisis 
tendencies through rational planning. This was disturbing, because a 
central demand of the socialist movement from Engels onward was for 
the rational planning of the economy as a replacement for the anarchy 
of the market. For the members of the Frankfurt School, experiencing 
firsthand the stabilization of the Great Depression through authori-
tarian politics, this was being realized before their eyes - in the form 
of National Socialism. Moreover, the Russian experiment, which the 
Frankfurt School initially enthusiastically endorsed and then critically 
supported, had begun to suspiciously resemble Nazi Germany. 
Although the members of the Frankfurt School agreed that liberal 
capitalism was finished, disagreements arose around the characterization 
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of the form of capitalism that had replaced it. Despite some differences, 
Neumann, Gurland and Kirscheimer held that post-liberal capitalism 
was a crisis-prone form of authoritarian society that they described as 
"totalitarian monopoly capitalism" (Kellner 1989: 61-76; Held 1980: 
53-8). On their analysis, the formation of monopoly corporations and 
their fusion with the banking sector distorts the operation of the law of 
value but cannot suppress it. The consequence is that the rate of profit 
must necessarily fall. Monopoly capitalism, in other words, has an inher-
ent tendency towards stagnation - even breakdown - offset by political 
intervention by state authorities seeking to prevent collapse. «Rational 
planning'' in this context means a reactive posture of constant crisis 
management, linked to an authoritarian approach to labour and a bel-
ligerent stance towards competing nations. Such a fundamental social 
arrangement, typified by German capitalism under the Nazi regime, 
must be accompanied by a totalitarian political system, because the state 
cannot afford to satisfy the material demands of the population or to risk 
the delays of democratic processes. Accordingly, Neumann argues in 
his classic work Behemoth ( 1942) that "in a monopolistic system, prof-
its cannot be made and retained without totalitarian political power" 
(Neumann 1942: 354). The implication is that totalitarian government is 
to monopoly capitalism as parliamentary democracy is to liberal capital-
ism: the natural regime for that social formation. 
By contrast, the approach taken by Pollock (and supported by 
Horkheimer, Adorno and Marc use) was to describe post-liberal capital-
ism as a rationally managed form of "state capitalism", with democratic 
and totalitarian variants (Kellner 1989: 52-60, 74-6; Held 1980: 58-63). 
Despite the potentially misleading terminology, Pollock certainly did 
not mean by "state capitalism" the amalgamation of all capitals with the 
state in a single giant enterprise-cum-bureaucracy. Instead, his analysis 
indicates that the monopoly corporations and the major banks rely 
on state intervention to provide the conditions for the formation and 
realization of value. They do this through state support for strategic 
industries, control over labour regulations and distortion of market laws 
in the interests of preventing economic crises. Constant state interven-
tion in the economy and regulation of labour markets, together with 
aggressive programmes of imperialist expansion and the creation of vast 
military industries, means that the crisis potentials of capitalism have 
been suppressed, although not totally eliminated (Adorno 1987: 33-56). 
The analysis of state capitalism begins from a critique of the Soviet 
Union that rejects its socialist claims entirely (Jay 1973: 152). Pollock's 
argument that rational planning has successfully dampened down crisis 
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potentials means that he can acknowledge the existence of state capital. 
ism in the United States and Great Britain, for instance, without having 
to propose that these democracies would inevitably turn fascist. Instead, 
Pollock adopts a critical attitude towards the democratic variant of state 
capitalism by examining the ways in which the advertising industry and 
consumer goods belong to the rational management of the new capital. 
ism. At the same time, however, Pollock's analysis tends to overstate the 
ability of state capitalism to control mass mobilizations and to prevent 
economic crises, leading to an analysis that risks concluding that there is 
no significant difference between parliamentary democracy and fascist 
totalitarianism (Picone 1978: ix-xxi). 
The Pollock-Adorno-Horkheimer line, which leads key members of 
the Frankfurt School to describe both parliamentary democracy and 
authoritarian statism as the <'administered society" (Habermas 1989: 
296), has many advantages and some disadvantages. It clarifies mem. 
hers' opposition to both Stalinism and Hitlerism without forcing the 
Frankfurt School into the characteristic position of Cold War liberalism, 
which was to proclaim the relative superiority of the Western democra-
cies (Held 1980: 70-76). It locates the basis for political apathy in the 
1950s and 1960s not in some defect of the masses, but in the disem-
powering implications of consumerism and bureaucracy. And it leads 
other members of the Frankfurt School, such as Wolfgang Haug, to 
penetrating analyses of the advertising industry and post-war consum-
erism, which regard "commodity aesthetics" in terms of pseudo-sexual 
substitute gratifications with strong links to aggressive competitiveness 
(Haug 1986). This is a powerful analysis of how and why "sex sells», 
of status-driven consumption, and of the ways in which advertising 
generates consumer desire. On the negative side, however, the notion 
of an "administered society" tends to generate a model of society as 
monolithic, where the stress falls on the tendential elimination of crisis 
potentials. 
Marx and Freud 
The mainstream of Marxism has generally criticized Freud's theory as 
a pessimistic anthropology that is really an ideological naturalization 
of capitalist individualism. By contrast, for the Frankfurt School, from 
the beginning of Horkheimer's directorship of the Institute in 1930 
onwards, psychoanalysis was regarded as a crucial part of any analysis of 
society. Individual psychology provided a conceptual corridor between 
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ideological formations and social structure (Held 1980: 110-47; Jay 
1973: 86-112). Extensive contact with progressive psychoanalytic think-
ers through the Frankfurt Psychoanalytic Institute, led by Otto Fenichel 
and directly attached to the Institute for Social Research, convinced 
Institute members of the radicalism of Freud's theory (Jacoby 1986). 
'}hey were persuaded that Freud's focus on socialization through the 
family and his materialist analysis of the personality represented a cri-
tique of the basic unhappiness of existing society, not an endorsement 
of current arrangements. Nonetheless, under the leadership of Fromm 
initially, and later at the hands of Adorno and Marcuse, the Frankfurt 
School attempted something other than merely adding psychoanalysis 
as a finished doctrine to the Marxist theory of society. Unlike orthodox 
Freudians, the members of the Frankfurt School insisted on a histori-
cization of psychoanalysis through a philosophical critique of instinct 
theory and a sociological reconstruction of the relationship between 
changing forms of the family and historically variable structures of 
personality. 
Based on the anthropological position in Marx's Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, it was clear to Fromm that Marx 
did not in fact believe that the human being, as a natural animal, was 
an infinitely plastic expression of social relations. Marx held that the 
human animal had some basic natural drives (hunger, sexuality, etc.) 
whose expression was shaped (or distorted) by a historically specific 
array of (socially generated) human needs. Accordingly, Marx criticized 
the suffering caused by capitalist alienation as the result of an unnatural 
condition (Fromm 1966). For Fromm, then, what Freud could supply 
to Marxism was a theoretical description of the interaction between 
natural instincts, socialized needs and personality structures, one capa-
ble of explaining the psychological bases of hope as well as the mecha-
nisms behind destructiveness and conformity. In The Development of 
the Dogma of Christ (1931), for instance, Fromm connects important 
shifts in religious doctrine to social shifts, on the one side, and changes 
in personality structure, on the other side, in a significant early integra -
tion of Marx and Freud (Burston 1991: 98-133). For Fromm, Freud's 
theory implies the formation of socially typical class "character", because 
common conditions of socialization, and therefore characteristic renun-
ciations demanded of individuals, obtain across classes at any historical 
moment. The application of psychoanalysis to sociology is accompanied 
by the historicization of the categories of Freudian theory, especially the 
illegitimate universalization of the Oedipus Complex, which Fromm 
regards as specific to the liberal capitalist era. The destructiveness 
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implied by the notion of a death drive, Fromm proposes, naturalized the 
aggression of possessive individualism and the market society. A better 
explanation, Fromm argues, is that from the Reformation onwards , 
European culture has displayed a strong preference for "anar (i.e. ascetic 
and acquisitive) personality structures, something that the development 
of capitalism actively fosters. For such persons, conscious revulsion 
from sexuality as "unclean" has as its flipside an unconscious sexua} 
excitement at the punishment of ''deviants': which Fromm does not 
hesitate to describe as a sado-masochistic psychological identification 
with authoritarian figures. Eventually, however, Fromm rejected Freud,s 
libido theory and eliminated the erotic dimensions of his explanations 
of fascism and capitalism (respectively) altogether. 
Other members of the Frankfurt School regarded Fromm's rejection 
of the concept of libido as evidence for his adaptation to the post-war 
de-radicalization happening around the "neo-Freudian revisionism'' 
of American ego psychology (Burston 1991: 207-29; Rickert 1986: 
351-400). For Adorno and Marcuse, Freud's conception of the instincts 
is the ballast that prevents psychoanalysis from thinking that the ego 
might successfully adapt to social reality (Adorno 1967: 86-8; Marcuse 
1966: 238-74). According to Freud's libido theory, the human animal 
adapts to its natural and social environment through the formation 
of a psychic structure - the ego - that reflects a ''precipitate of aban-
doned object-cathexes" (Freud 200lb: 29). Freud proposes that for each 
individual, an instinctually derived psychic energy, or libido, resident 
in the unconscious and operating according to the pleasure principle, 
is attached, or cathected, onto representations of objects, once these 
objects have provided pleasurable satisfaction to that human animal. 
The theory states that the reality principle disciplines the expression of 
the pleasure principle by forcing it, by means of the apparatus of the ego, 
to accept delayed gratification in accordance with the dictates of external 
reality. In effect that means that the socialization of the infant involves 
the renunciation of satisfying objects, especially sexual objects, and the 
"precipitation" of these sacrifices in the structure of the personality. 
Freud proposes that a portion of libido is permanently invested in 
the ego as "desexualized narcissistic libido" around each conquest of 
repression, and he eventually described this precipitated structure as 
the superego, the psychic representation of social ideals. Only gradually 
does the infantile ego learn to partially replace early object-images with 
adult substitute satisfactions, and Freud in this connection speaks of the 
"vicissitudes,, of the sexual inclinations as they mature through oral, 
anal and then genital forms of expression. These stages of development, 
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Freud holds, are deposited in the ego as personality structures that 
reflect fundamental attitudes of the ego toward the libidinal strivings 
of the rest of the psyche (Freud 200la: 141-58, b: 1-66). 
Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse connect these ideas with the late 
Freud of the anthropological theory of Civilization and its Discontents 
( [ 1930] 200 I c). As already mentioned, in that extraordinary work, Freud 
proposes that the advance of civilization is necessarily accompanied by 
the increasing "renunciation of instinctual satisfactions", that is histori-
cally developing social reality demands the delay of gratification on an 
ever-expanding scale (Freud 200lc: 57-146). This condition, which 
Freud with dark irony calls "secular progress in repression)), means that 
industrial capitalism has become a sickness-inducing society filled with 
potentially neurotic individuals, whose resentment of the demands of 
constant increases in productivity is likely to erupt in outbreaks of vol-
canic irrationality. 
Culture industry 
For Adorno and Horkheimer, the potentials of Freudian psychoanal-
ysis go further than just a clarification of the appeal of fascism and 
Stalinism to the "authoritarian personality" (Adorno et al. 1964). The 
advent of an administered society, they argue, is accompanied by state 
intervention in family structures, with the consequence that the famil-
ial conflict dynamics that form the autonomous ego are institutionally 
circumvented, replaced by submission to social authority. Adorno in 
particular is concerned that the autonomous individual ofliberal capi-
talism is becoming historically superseded by a morally heteronomous, 
or externally directed, "organizational individual': one with distinctly 
narcissistic traits (Kellner 1989: 83-120; Held 1980: 130-34; Jay 1973: 
104-5). Accordingly, changes in the historical form of individuality 
are expressed in a significant superstructural modification that some 
members of the Frankfurt School describe as the "culture industry': 
the cultural complement to the administered society. In focused stud-
ies of the corporatization of culture happening in the entertainment 
industries, in radio, film, television and sport, Adorno, Horkheimer, 
Lowenthal and Marcuse reveal a significant shift in the nature of ide-
ology. Bourgeois ideology had spoken of negative liberty and liberal 
justice, and its artworks expressed these aspirations in their highly indi-
viduated forms and idealistic contents. What this meant was that radical 
criticism could pointedly contrast the idealistic representations with 
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social reality in ways that made potent contact with mass aspirations. 
By contrast, American democracy, Soviet totalitarianism and fascist 
propaganda all provide evidence of direct manipulation of individuals' 
consciousness by means of techniques that entirely bypassed poten. 
tially incriminating reference to ideals. Adaptation to existing society 
is presented as a desirable goal for the exhausted individual, for whom 
light entertainment provides some relief from that life of boredom and 
fatigue which the culture industries represent as entirely natural. 
It is sometimes imagined that the Frankfurt School's idea of the cul. 
ture industries pits commodified mass culture against non-commercial 
high art. But a Marxist sociology of culture that proposed that art had 
only recently become commodified would be at right-angles to reality, 
and this is emphatically not the Frankfurt School's position (Adorno & 
Horkheimer 2002: 107-9). Rather, their position is the dialectical one 
that, as Marcuse states in his key essay '1\ffirmative Culture': bourgeois 
art was emancipated from liturgical functions precisely because of a 
shift from religious tutelage to art markets (Marcuse 1968: 95-115). In 
the revolutionary era of the bourgeoisie, its autonomous art performed 
a radical role in undermining late feudal society and the absolute state, 
not because of any particular political content, but because its artistic 
form expressed an explosive desire for individuation. 
Bourgeois art, Marcuse holds, has two special properties that make 
it historically unique: its "purposeful purposivelessness': a Kantian 
mouthful expressing the idea of deliberate uselessness, and its concep-
tion of aesthetic beauty as the harmonious proportionality of an organic 
whole. Deliberate uselessness means that art is an end in itself. Just 
like the free particular that is the human being enjoying individual 
liberty, the artwork "self-legislates" through its form and realizes ends 
inherent to itself, rather than those imposed from without. This results 
in a harmonious balance between parts and the whole, such that the 
whole is greater than the sum of its parts without at any moment arbi-
trarily subjugating any part to the total conception. This relationship 
is called "beauty>' and it releases a pleasure unrelated to instrumental 
satisfaction of instinctual needs. Marcuse argued that this meant that 
bourgeois art contained a "promise of happiness" in its implicit vision 
of the well-rounded individual achieving non-instrumental well-being 
under conditions of individual liberty (ibid.: 115): 
By affirmative culture is meant that culture of the bourgeois 
epoch, which led in the course of its own development to the 
segregation from civilization of the mental and spiritual world 
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as an independent realm of value that is also considered supe-
rior to civilization. Its decisive characteristic is the assertion 
of a universal, obligatory, eternally better and more valuable 
world, that must be unconditionally affirmed: a world essen-
tially different from the factual world of the daily struggle for 
existence, yet realizable in every individual "from within': with-
out any transformation of the state of fact. (Ibid.: 95) 
Although this was revolutionary in relation to the ancient regime, with 
the shift of the bourgeoisie to the side of reaction after 1848, bourgeois 
art ceases to play an unequivocally progressive historical role. Its prom-
ise of happiness begins to promote not a radical challenge to the existing 
arrangements, but the ideological illusion that the social conditions for 
individual self-fulfilment have already arrived. In losing its critical nega-
tivity in relation to society, the mainstream of bourgeois art becomes 
merely "affirmative culture': degenerating in the next hundred years into 
a set of generic repetitions of established conventions. 
Accordingly, the Frankfurt School's most radical theses, explored in 
Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment, propose that this 
brings about the entry of the logic of the commodity into the structure 
of the artwork (Adorno & Horkheimer 2002: 114-15). The theses on 
the culture industry, therefore, are not primarily about the commer-
cialization of art, but about the standardization of its forms and the 
consequent trivialization of its contents (Kellner 1989: 120-45). Art 
as light entertainment, produced only as a commodity for the purpose 
of diversion from the dissatisfactions of everyday life and the grind 
of work, is art characterized by generic cliches, stereotypical contents 
and repetitious forms, designed to elicit routine responses (Adorno & 
Horkheimer 2002: 107-12). The uniqueness of the bourgeois artwork, 
its unfolding according to a law of form that it evolves from the heart 
of its own concerns, is replaced by pseudo-individuation, the marginal 
distinctiveness of brand differentiation through the star system, in a 
marketplace that tolerates no real diversity (ibid.: 102-18). The promise 
of deep happiness is replaced by superficial instant gratification, based 
on infantile regression through representations of successful aggression 
and quasi-sexual pleasure through adaptation to power (ibid.: 120-25). 
The products of the culture industry avoid the really new like the plague, 
for this would challenge conventional tastes with fresh perceptions, new 
feelings and alternative values, implying a demanding experience that 
includes the risk of artistic failure as the flipside to real experimentation 
(ibid.: 125-8). ''.As the demand for the marketability of art becomes total, 
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a shift in the inner economic composition of cultural commodities is 
becoming apparent': they conclude. "In adapting itself entirely to need, 
the [standardized] work of art defrauds human beings in advance of 
liberation from the principle of utility" (ibid.: 128). 
Whereas artworks are generated through what Freud called "sublima. 
tion': a non-repressive detour of instinctual energies into cultural goals, 
the products of the culture industries represent a repressive channelling 
of sexual drives into conformist ideals. In Adorno's memorable phrase, 
"works of art are ascetic and shameless; the culture industry is porno-
graphic and prudish'' (ibid.: 111). Adorno's highly influential Philosophy 
of Modern Music ([1947] 2007b) represents a defence of autonomous 
art as a potentially liberating social practice in a reifi.ed society. This is 
conducted along the lines of his later assertion that ((this is not a time 
for political art, but politics has migrated into autonomous art, and 
nowhere more so than where art appears to be politically dead" (Adorno 
2007a: 194). The radical musical forms of Schonberg and Stravinsky 
break with the organic totality of the classical bourgeois artwork pre-
cisely in order to assert their independence from kitsch radio hits and 
the museum classics of the national symphony orchestra. Nonetheless, 
the dialectics of instrumental reason penetrate even the most hermetic 
and dissonant of modernist artworks, filling them with unresolved con-
tradictions. Where Schonberg rationalizes and systematizes music, he 
liberates it from classical tonality only to make atonality into a formal 
prison (Adorno 2007b: 87); Stravinsky, meanwhile, uses avant-garde 
forms with folkloric contents to present a regressive modernism with 
affinities to fascism (ibid.: 115). Only Adorno's beloved ((free atonality" 
preserves the liberating dynamics of dissonant modernism - but that 
is so rare that he has difficulty in specifying examples (Adorno 1998: 
269-322, esp. 272, 293). 
By contrast with Adorno and Horkheimer's view of the culture indus-
try, unorthodox member of the Frankfurt School Walter Benjamin 
(1892-1940) holds that the production techniques of popular culture, 
especially cinema, have demystified art. By stripping the work's "aura: or 
quasi-magical mystique, popular cinema completes the secularization of 
bourgeois art and makes possible an engaged and participatory viewing 
experience. ((Mechanical reproduction of art changes the reaction of the 
masses toward art': he writes: 
The reactionary attitude toward a Picasso painting changes 
into the progressive reaction toward a Chaplin movie. The 
progressive reaction is characterized by the direct, intimate 
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fusion of visual and emotional enjoyment with the orientation 
of the expert. Such fusion is of great social significance. The 
greater the decrease in the social significance of an art form, 
the sharper the distinction between criticism and enjoyment 
by the public. The conventional is uncritically enjoyed, and the 
truly new is criticized with aversion. With regard to the screen, 
the critical and the receptive attitudes of the public coincide. 
The decisive reason for this is that individual reactions are pre-
determined by the mass audience response they are about to 
produce and this is nowhere more pronounced than in the film. 
(Benjamin 1973: 236) 
Whether Benjamin would have been able to sustain this optimistic 
position in the post-war era is a matter of speculation, for he suicided 
in 1940 when, fleeing from the Nazis, fascist Spain refused him entry 
from France. 
Instrumental reason 
The idea that Marxism involves liberation from utility, an emancipa-
tion from what Adorno and Horkheimer describe as the "functional 
context of self-preservation" (Adorno & Horkheimer 2002: 22), is a 
strikingly unconventional way of expressing Marx's notion that the 
society of abundance is a release from material scarcity. But Dialectic 
of Enlightenment is an enigmatic book, written between Stalingrad and 
Normandy, "to explain why humanity, instead of entering a truly human 
state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism" (ibid.: xiv). As rival sci-
entifically enlightened state capitalisms slugged it out by means of high-
tech war machines and rationally administered death camps, Adorno 
and Horkheimer expressed a deep dismay at the results of the universal 
rule of the equivalence principle of bourgeois society. ('Enlightenment': 
they write, "aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing 
them as masters [of nature]. Yet the wholly enlightened earth is radiant 
with triumphant calamity" (ibid.: 1). Adorno was to write soon after-
wards that the prospects of socialism are extremely bleak: the best that 
can be done is to keep alive hope for the good society by reflecting on 
the "damaged life" of the administered world (Adorno 2005: 39). 
Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of instrumental reason extends 
the concept of commodity reification in several directions, most nota-
bly by combining reification and rationalization with repression. By 
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repression is meant both social domination and psychic repression of 
instinctual satisfactions. Thus the basic idea of instrumental reason is 
that of a calculating manipulation of human beings and the natural 
environment that reduces persons and things to raw materials for the 
production of use values, in order to assist socialized individuals in 
their goal of self-preservation. At the same time, growing technological 
control of the world by instrumental reason involves increasing instinc. 
tual renunciations on the part of socialized individuals, who as a result 
become potentially irrational in direct proportion to the accomplished 
rationalization of their world. The combination of rationalization and 
repression results in the transformation of society into a reified object, 
a total system that can be calculated mathematically) which becomes 
a second nature for the modern individual, ruling over them like a 
capricious fate. Under the signs of ideas of "progress" and "commu. 
nity': the administered society turns its vision of complete control and 
its nostalgia for lost solidarity into a potent ideology that functions as 
the modern myth, under various designations ("the socialist mother-
land", "the German Fatherland") "the American Dream''). But via Freud 
' Adorno and Horkheimer also reconstruct the anthropological genesis of 
instrumental reason, pushing the origins of this process back to before 
capitalism, in human pre-history. Hence their book has a title that 
alludes to the social process of rationalization, the tragedy of enlight· 
enment, rather than a critique of capitalism alone. 
Unfortunately, in line with the idea that this is a message in a bottle 
rather than a manifesto for action, Adorno and Horkheimer express this 
through a series of cryptic aphorisms about the mutual entanglement of 
myth and enlightenment, rational control and instinctual renunciation 
(Adorno & Horkheimer 2002: 8, 14). Although they do not explicitly 
clarify it, the underlying idea is that enlightenment is a historical process 
before it is a distinct historical moment (the Enlightenment). Finally, 
they are rather unclear about their alternatives to instrumental reason, 
which turn out to be a combination of dialectical thinking in the mode 
of negative dialectics and mimetic expression in line with avant-garde 
art - a combination that would be praxis and not labour, they insist. 
It is therefore helpful to break the idea down into the relation to 
Lukacs and the relation to Freud and treat them sequentially. It is also 
helpful to interpret Dialectic of Enlightenment by means ofHorkheimer's 
more accessible co-text Eclipse of Reason ([1947] 1974). 
As with Lukacs, Adorno and Horkheimer synthesize Weber with 
Marx, suggesting that quantitative calculation and formal rationality 
are linked together in systems of thinking that have as their model 
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mathematical formalizations, and which have a real material basis 
in social domination. The classificatory intellect dominates its object 
because it subordinates substantive particularity to universal forms and 
general regularities. When the social world is regarded as consisting 
of uniform regularities that can be described using the mathematical 
calculations of scientific sociology and economic laws, this is evidence 
that human beings have been socially reduced to mere objects. Unlike 
Lukacs, however, rather than regarding capitalist culture as hopelessly 
fragmented into particulars and lacking the concrete universality of 
the category of totality, they link instrumental reason to the process 
of "determining judgement': This is the general intellectual process of 
subsuming a particular instance under a universal rule, which Adorno 
and Horkheimer propose is grounded in the equivalence principle. 
Accordingly, instrumental reason involves the domination of the par-
ticular by the universal along the lines of a process of intellectual classifi-
cation that reflects economic calculations and bureaucratic procedures. 
Intellectual resistance to instrumental reason must accordingly take the 
form of a dialectical history in "philosophical fragments': rather than 
conceptual totality. 
Instrumental reason involves a substitution of calculated means for 
rational ends, leading to the loss of substantive ideals of human flourish-
ing, so that finally capitalism liquidates its own universal liberal ideals 
as "scientifically unverifiable" (Horkheimer 1974: 22-3). The concept 
of negative liberty central to liberal political philosophy was based on 
the assumption that self-preservation represented the ultimate goal 
of human existence. This is the philosophical meaning of the social 
contract, whereby self-preserving individuals unite around a state that 
defends universal principles, in order to protect themselves from lethal 
instrumentalization by aggressive others. This prolongs and socializes 
self-preservation, rather than transforming it into a higher principle, 
enshrining instrumental reason as the basic social mechanism of a 
technological society based on the equivalence principle. The instru-
mentalization of others and the self implicit in instrumental reason 
involves the generalization of utilitarianism, the idea that an ethic can 
be derived from calculations of utility applied to social relations. In 
liberal utilitarian Jeremy Bentham's notorious "felicific calculus': for 
instance, the individual is supposed to perform actions only when these 
maximize "the greatest happiness for the greatest number': a position 
that fairly obviously licenses the sacrifice of individuals and the imposi-
tion of totalitarian restraints on minorities. According to Adorno and 
Horkheimer, all that the Marquis de Sade's sadistic perversions do is 
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to render explicit the underlying human irrationality of this system 
which is why they claim that "enlightenment is totalitarian'' (Adorn~ 
& Horkheimer 2002: 4). Liberalism contains within it the seeds of its 
totalitarian opposite. "In Sade)), Adorno and Horkheimer conclude in 
disgust, ((private vices are the anticipatory historiography of public Vir-
tues in the totalitarian era'' (ibid.: 92). 
Dialectic of enlightenment 
Accordingly, Adorno and Horkheimer introduce Freud into the analy-
sis of reification, linking formal rationality's suppression of qualitative 
distinctions and substantive goals to the repression of inner nature. The 
fundamental point that they are making is that in order to discipline 
themselves to a world organized on the lines of a mathematical for-
mula, individuals must subject their internal natur~ to fierce controls. 
<'Humanity had to inflict terrible injuries on itself': they write, "before 
the self, the identical, purpose-directed, masculine character of human 
beings, was created, and something of this process is repeated in every 
childhood)) (Adorno & Horkheimer 2002: 26). Drawing on psycho-
analysis, they propose that the corollary to this is a tendency to regard 
the unknown as the uncontrolled, and to respond with pre-emptive 
aggression to the potential threat. The "return of the repressed)), then, 
involves the mechanism of projection, where unmastered aggression 
from the self is projected outwards as aggression from the other, and 
the self reacts with pre-emptive violence, together with irrational jus-
tifications about the ''threat" posed by unassimilated aliens. Not for 
nothing does Dialectic of Enlightenment conclude with a long analysis 
of anti-Semitism. 
Adorno and Horkheimer argue that instrumental reason develops 
through four stages, implicitly corresponding to Marx's sequence of 
modes of production. But they trace its anthropological origins to 
instinctual self-preservation in the natural environment. The basic 
aim of "enlightenment", in line with its underlying instinctual thrust, is 
the mastery of a threateningly unknown and potentially deadly nature. 
It achieves this through increasing detachment from nature, that is 
demystification and domination of the natural environment, includ-
ing the mastery of human nature. This implies a thesis of staggering 
generality: technological advance in the productive forces, the histori-
cal movement of relations of social domination, scientific progress in 
the disenchantment of nature, the rationalization of cultural forms and 
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religious worldviews, secular progress in the renunciation of instinctual 
satisfactions, the historical genesis of personality structures centred on 
an increasingly narcissistic ego, and the growth of calculating forms of 
rational conduct are all the same process. 
What that means is that instrumental reason gradually generates 
formalist ((enlightenment" and the personality structures belonging 
to it, beginning with the Greek Enlightenment of ancient Athens and 
culminating in the European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. 
'Jhis process of "enlightenment" does not emerge at a stroke, but instead 
develops dialectically from within pre-scientific modes of thought, in 
that combination of objectification and repression that we have already 
explored. Accordingly, Adorno and Horkheimer announce that: 
mimetic, mythical and metaphysical forms of behaviour were 
successively regarded as stages of world history which had 
been left behind, and the idea of reverting to them held the 
terror that the self would be changed back into the mere nature 
from which it had extricated itself with unspeakable exertions, 
and which for that reason filled it with unspeakable dread. 
(Ibid.: 24) 
Not only does the social self progressively detach itself from (external 
and internal) nature, it also increasingly treats others as things to be 
manipulated, so that social domination keeps pace with objectifica-
tion, in what is recognizably a Freudian recasting of Marx's theses on 
alienation. 
Although the whole book sometimes looks like a tragedy of"enlight-
enment" along the pessimistic lines of Weber's "iron cage of rationality': 
where the inexorable advance of formal rationality leads inescapably to 
the incremental reduction of freedom, in fact it follows a divergent vari-
ant on the standard dialectical schema. For Marx and Hegel, the master 
narrative of historical progress follows a convergent dialectic, where the 
minuet between domination and liberation flows in the direction of 
increasing freedom: the potential for emancipation and the actualiza-
tion of freedom eventually converge on the goal of history. Throwing 
Freud into the mix makes the potential for emancipation and the actu-
alization of freedom diverge, because the actualization of (apparent) 
freedom involves growing (psychic) repression, resulting in an ego that 
is increasingly cold and calculating, together with growing potential 
for irrational resentment against society's demands. Tue autonomous 
individual is therefore decoded as the lonely neurotic, the manipulative 
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personality springing from a set of ego defences that tend to proje¢t 
unmastered internal aggression onto imagined external threats. 
Liberalism is unmasked as the doctrine that self-preservation is the 
only value, a situation whose truth is the atomization of social solidanty 
into market relations, the construction of a state whose paramount task 
is to preserve life, and the elimination of moral restraints on human 
conduct. Thus liberalism morphs into totalitarianism, and democt 
racy meekly submits to dictatorship. Instrumental reason advances 
in stages characterized by increasing potential for emancipation and 
human welfare combined with decreasing actualization of freedom and 
meaningfulness. Speaking very carefully in the context of post-war anti. 
communist hysteria, they write: 
The enslavement to nature of people today cannot be separated 
from social progress. The increase in economic productivity 
which creates the conditions for a more just world also affords 
the technical apparatus and the social groups controlling it a 
disproportionate advantage over the rest of the population. 
The individual is entirely nullified in the face of the economic 
powers. These powers are taking society's domination over 
nature to unimagined heights. While individuals as such are 
vanishing before the apparatus they serve, they are provided for 
by that apparatus better than ever before. In the unjust state of 
society, the pliability and powerlessness of the masses increase 
with [this] materially considerable but socially paltry rise in the 
living standard of the [working] classes. (Ibid.: xvii) 
Because Adorno and Horkheimer are interested in a dialectical reading 
of the "dark writers of the bourgeoisie", the reactionary critics of the 
European Enlightenment (e.g. Nietzsche), their thesis is sometimes bru-
tally misinterpreted as just a neo-Romantic (i.e. irrationalist) rejection of 
enlightenment. That is false. What Adorno and Horkheimer are up to in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment is an anthropological variant of Lukacs's essay 
"Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat'' (Lukacs 1971a: 
83-222), that is a dialectical critique of formal rationality. But their 
dialectic is not just divergent: domination has a master narrative; lib-
eration exists in fragments. Instrumental reason, the mastery of nature 
springing from self-preservation, is exemplified by the labour process. 
In opposition to domination is the utopian hope for a post-capitalist 
reconciliation between human beings and the natural environment, best 
expressed through creative praxis. Dialectical thinking corresponds to 
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the onlY form of social praxis that refuses calculation and utility, the 
e1ess labour of modernist artworks, which contains the last glimpse 
~the potential for a utopian reconciliation in the administered world 
~·b;d.: 23). Nonetheless, '(in light of the catastrophes that have happened, 
~d in view of the catastrophes to come", Adorno writes, "no universal 
history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading 
from the slingshot to the megaton bomb,, (Adorno 1973: 320). Adornds 
Negative Dialectics represents a sustained effort to develop this divergent 
dialectic as the method of a critique of the capitalist totality presented 
through a series of fragments, each of which reflects a potential for 
emancipation in the midst of the universal history of social domination. 
Creative praxis and erotic liberation 
1he downbeat note struck by Adorno and Horkheimer in the post-war 
era is entirely alien to Marcuse's explicitly utopian connection between 
Freud and Marx in his major work, Eros and Civilization ([1955] 1966). 
Despite major engagement with psychoanalysis, dialectics of labour 
remain central to Marcuse, even though he distrusts the version of 
Marxism that proceeds from the cumulative advance of the productive 
forces. Although he had been a soldiers' deputy in the Berlin workers' 
councils of 1919, he too eventually became convinced that the prole-
tariat in the industrialized world had become integrated into capitalist 
society to the extent that its revolutionary potential was questionable. 
Although the work of Adorno and Horkheimer radicalized some stu-
dents, it was ('Marcuse alone among the [founding members of the 
Frankfurt School] who identified with and defended the radical move-
ments" of the 1960s (Kellner 1989: 210). 
In keeping with the broad approach of Frankfurt School Marxism, 
Marcuse's introduction to Eros and Civilization strikes a familiar note, 
declaring that "intensified progress seems to be bound up with intensi-
fied unfreedom" (Marcuse 1966: 4). In this context, ''utopian" means 
both apparently impossible and actually desirable, and it is the combi-
nation of a critique of alienation profoundly influenced by the young 
Marx with a politics of desire that sides decisively with the pleasure 
principle against social reality which characterizes Marcuse. In his clas-
sic exposition of the Hegelian roots of Marxian social theory, Reason 
and Revolution (1941), Marcuse represents Marxism as a whole as a 
prolongation of the dialectical philosophy by historical materialist 
means (Marcuse 1999: 273-322). Drawing on his work in the 1930s 
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on Hegel's ontology and Heidegger's philosophy, however, he empha, 
sized the reconciliation of humanity and nature in his reconstruction 
of socialist politics. Until the 1940s, Marcuse held that the proletariat 
is the transformative class of capitalist society and that the anti-fascist 
struggle is a prelude to socialist revolution. Emphasizing the young 
Marx's claims of normative universality on behalf of the working class, 
Marcuse maintains that "the proletariat is distinguished by the fact that, 
as a class, it signifies the negation of all classes" (ibid.: 291). At the 
same time, Marcuse's interest in a balanced relation between humanity 
and nature led him to be highly suspicious towards capitalist technol-
ogy (Feenberg 2005) and in One-Dimensional Man (1964), Marcuse 
describes instrumental reason as "technological rationality" (Marcuse 
1964: 115). The significance of this is that in the post-war era, Marcuse 
increasingly believed that the proletariat had become materially inte-
grated into capitalist society by means of the technological manufac-
ture of pseudo-needs, linked to the substitute gratifications provided by 
the culture industries. In the second edition of Reason and Revolution 
([1958] 1999), Marcuse added that: 
Technological progress multiplied the needs and satisfactions 
[in consumer society], while its utilization made the needs as 
well as their satisfactions repressive: they themselves sustain 
submission and domination. (Marcuse 1999: 437) 
Marcuse believes that human needs that potentially transcend the capi-
talist system have been mainly replaced by false needs generated by 
the culture industries. The next question is, of course, how to liberate 
radical, system-transcending human needs from the gilded cage of the 
consumer paradise. Despite a certain estrangement from other mem-
bers in the post-war era, Marcuse remains consistent with the rest of 
the Frankfurt School in rejecting labour as the source of this liberation. 
Like Adorno, he turns instead to art, grasped dialectically as at once a 
potentially liberating anticipation of creative praxis and a component of 
the social division oflabour with the potential to generate escapist com-
pensations for actual unfreedom. Artworks are the key to re-awakening 
the longing for the release of creative human potentials that instant 
gratification dulls, for the humanist perspective of authentic art pro-
vides a contrast with everyday life. Moreover, art, as a form of creative 
play, operates under the pleasure principle, where the repressed desire 
for a realization of individuals' full humanity can be openly expressed 
(Marcuse 1966: 140). Accordingly "the revolution involves a radical 
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transformation of the needs and aspirations themselves, cultural as well 
as material" (Marcuse 1972: 33). To do this requires the overthrow of 
the connection between social domination and the reality principle in 
late capitalism, which Marcuse describes as the "performance principle': 
consequently, a key task of socialist construction is the replacement 
of the performance principle, the reality principle adapted to capitalist 
discipline, with a "non-repressive reality principle'' (Marcuse 1966: 129). 
'Ihe connection between creative praxis and sexual liberation out-
lined in Eros and Civilization was fundamental to the positive reception 
ofMarcuse's work among 1960s radicals, for it spoke of an erotic revolt 
against instrumental reason. Marcuse acknowledges that material scar-
city imposes restraints on individuals' ability to gratify their instincts 
and that disciplined labour is the necessary foundation for social pros-
perity (Marcuse 1966: 21-77). But the ((dialectics of civilization" have 
now made possible the elimination of those restraints that have to do 
with maintaining an unequal distribution of material wealth (ibid.: 
78-126). With the society of abundance on the horizon, the instinctual 
renunciations necessary to drag humanity into the modern world can 
be progressively relaxed. In a key section, misleadingly entitled "Beyond 
the Reality Principle", Marcuse argues that repression is unnecessary 
under socialism and that his proposed non-repressive reality principle 
would involve the release into society of the pleasures hitherto dammed 
up within authentic artworks (ibid.: 172-96). In terms that echo how 
Adorno's understands art, but with a distinct preference for realism 
over modernism, Marcuse suggests that the sublimations reflected in 
humanist artworks can now be de-sublimated, through their application 
to reality. The revolution is both a political and a psychological libera-
tion, whose major effect on the individual will be the freeing of erotic 
impulses from the narrow scope of sexual expression alone. Arduous 
work will become pleasurable play. 
Subsequent developments and arguments led Marcuse to clarify and 
correct the hypotheses presented in Eros and Civilization. In An Essay 
on Liberation (1969) and Counter-revolution and Revolt (1972), Marcuse 
accepts that some repression is necessary to any form of civilization 
whatsoever (i.e. the repression of impulses to incest and murder) and 
that the real problem is what he calls "surplus repression': the repres-
sion needed to sustain the performance principle (Marcuse 1969: 33). 
Furthermore, a danger has emerged of the cooptation of radical culture 
by the capitalist system through "repressive de-sublimation': the explicit 
sexualization of cultural forms combined with the aggressive destruc-
tion of classical bourgeois art (Marcuse 1972: 103). Although the youth 
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movement's radical cultural politics retain a progressive potential, the 
strategic aim of socialist revolution must not be derailed by a culture of 
instant gratification. Where Marcuse had championed Narcissus against 
Oedipus in Eros and Civilization (Marcuse 1966: 159-71), he now 
argued that this would result in a consumer-driven hedonism which 
would foster narcissistic personalities, not autonomous individuals. As 
Douglas Kellner points out, Marcuse's potential today lies in the unre-
solved tension between his Romantic anti-capitalism and a materialist 
research programme that is yet to be concluded (Kellner 1984: 372-5). 
These latter lie, as Morton Schoolman proposes, in Marcuse's philo-
sophical anthropology of the hidden radical potentials in the disposi-
tions of modern individuals (Schoolman 1980: 351, 356). 
Summary of key points 
Critical Theory 
• Frankfurt School Marxism endorses the opposition between 
reification and totality, but refuses the idea of the proletariat as 
identical subject-object of history. Instead, it aims at an interdis-
ciplinary materialist research programme that is reflexively aware 
of its own social position in class society and is committed to 
practical emancipation. 
• Frankfurt School Marxism involves a dialogue with non-Marxist 
theoretical and philosophical sources, such as Weber and Husserl, 
as well as anti-Enlightenment conservatives such as Nietzsche and 
Schopenhauer. Probably the most important non-Marxist influ-
ence is Freudian psychoanalysis, which sets up the Frankfurt 
School's suspicions towards labour practice as a model of human 
activity. 
Social-theoretical positions 
• In general, Frankfurt School Marxism holds that twentieth-
century society has become a form of state capitalism, character-
ized by economic planning, bureaucratic management, cultural 
industries and conformist personalities, within which the individ-
ual is increasingly constrained to adapt to an administered society. 
• Alongside considerable potential for authoritarian personality 
structures, the administered society promotes forms of individuality 
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that are dependent on authority, particularly through its industrial 
standardization of culture. Art has become a question of light 
entertainment rather than a representation of human possibili-
ties, and with the exception of dissonant modernism, has lost its 
critical edge. 
Philosophical implications 
• Modernity depends upon a reification of reason itself, known as 
instrumental rationality. The principle of universal equivalence 
operating in commodity exchange (the reduction of material 
qualities to abstract quantities due to the monetarization of social 
relations) expresses itself through reason as an operation of clas-
sification, systematization and formalization, with the ultimate 
aim of the reduction of life to something calculable. 
• Alternatives to instrumental reason may exist in unconscious 
instinctual forces linked to the life drive (Eros) or the most anti -
commercial forms of modernist art, which express the final inabil -
ity of the natural human being to completely adapt to a repressive 
society, and are therefore the reservoir of hope in an otherwise 
grim situation. 
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• SIX 
Analytical Marxism 
The reconstruction of Marxism essayed by a loose collective of thinkers 
in the US and the UK since the 1970s is best described as "analytical 
Marxism': This is a designation that captures members' allegiance to an 
"analytically sophisticated Marxism': based on "wholesale embrace of 
conventional scientific and philosophical norms" (Wright et al. 1992: 5). 
Possible alternative nomenclatures include the movemenfs colloquial 
name, NBSMG - the "Non-Bullshit Marxism Group" - and "Rational 
Choice Marxism", a label based on the adherence of a majority of these 
thinkers to particular techniques of social scientific modelling (Roberts 
1996: 3). The idea of no-nonsense Marxism gives a sense of the impa-
tience of these thinkers with bewildering talk about dialectical contra-
dictions and relational-strategic class oppositions, but it perhaps lacks a 
bit of specificity. Rational Choice Marxism, meanwhile, designates with 
all the specificity one could desire a set of methodological strictures 
based in the research strategies of analytical philosophy, the search for 
sociological microfoundations based on methodological individual-
ism, the modelling techniques of game theory and the mathematical 
approach of neo-classical economics. But it rules out too much, for it 
excludes important analytical contributions that are methodologically 
holistic, albeit based on a "wholesale embrace of conventional scien-
tific and philosophical norms': It also overlooks those who modify the 
central postulate of Rational Choice approaches, that people are basi-
cally "rational, self-interested optimizers'', in the direction of descriptive 
realism. 
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Analytical Marxism, then, is a movement that seeks to reconstruct 
Marxism by re-examining ideas about labour practice, social structure 
and the historical process, using a series of methods that define the 
cutting edge in non-Marxist social and economic science in the English-
speaking world. Analytical Marxism is "the view that Marxism should, 
without embarrassment, subject itself to the conventional standards of 
social science and analytical philosophy': This "implies a rejection of the 
thesis that Marxism as a social theory deploys a distinctive methodology 
that differentiates it radically from 'bourgeois social science"' (Wright et 
al. 1992: 108). Instead of the sorts of positions that defined the Marxist 
Renaissance, which advocated a specific method as the core of histori-
cal materialism, even as they redefined the relations between its terms, 
"Marxism should be distinguished from other social thought not by its 
tools, but by the questions it raises" (Roemer 1988: 176). Gerald Cohen, 
Jon Elster, Adam Przeworski, John Roemer, Elliott Sober, Erik Olin 
Wright, Andrew Levine, Allan Buchanan, Alex Callinicos and Philippe 
van Parijs are among the contributors to this strand of Marxist thought, 
whose political positions range from "revolutionary democratic social-
ism" through to "left-wing libertarianism" (Roberts 1996: 3). 
Restricted historical materialism 
In his introduction to Marx, which is in fact an introduction to the 
analytical reconstruction of historical materialism, Jon Elster takes aim 
at three methodological fallacies: 
The first is methodological holism, the view that in social life 
there exist wholes or collectivities, statements about which 
cannot be reduced to statements about the member individu-
als. The second is functional explanation, the attempt to explain 
social phenomena in terms of their beneficial consequences 
for someone or something, when no intention to bring about 
these consequences has been demonstrated. The third is dia-
lectical deduction, a mode of thinking that is derived from 
Hegel's Logic and that does not lend itself to brief summary. 
(Elster 1986: 21) 
It is ironic, then, that analytical Marxism was launched by G. A. Cohen's 
remarkable Karl Marx's Theory of History (1978), already discussed in 
relation to classical Marxism. This is a work that aggressively locates its 
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reconstruction of Marx in the space of holistic functional explanation, 
although it rejects the Hegelian vision of history in the young Marx. 
Instead, Cohen bases himself on the mature Marx's "1859 Preface" in 
order to derive and defend a frankly determinist theory of historical 
progress. Cohen's determinism is holistic because it argues from the 
class locations specified by economic structures to the behaviour of 
individuals. It also engages in functional explanations, explicitly propos-
ing the functional relationship between productive forces and relations 
of production as the explanatory ground for historical change (Cohen 
1978: 36 note 31, 160). 
That Cohen's position catalysed the formation of a current that 
some have described as Rational Choice Marxism, then, might seem 
extremely strange. But it can be explained by two features of Cohen's 
argument. The first is extraordinary methodological clarity combined 
with frank preparedness to state exactly what he means, freely and 
fearlessly accepting the risk of falsification and rebuttal. "Overnight", 
writes Elster, Cohen's work "changed the standards of rigor and clarity 
that were required to write on Marx and Marxism" (Elster 1985: xiv). 
The second is that Cohen's holisrn and functional explanation are not 
grounded in the standard way, through broad descriptive claims about 
social reproduction. Instead they depend upon a set of daringly precise 
hypotheses about human nature, which are expressed as claims about 
rational behaviour. For the analytical Marxists, what was impressive 
about Cohen's position was this approach, reasoning about historical 
cases from clearly stated first principles. But the Augean Stables of his-
torical materialism had been cleansed of dialectical mystification, they 
felt, only to have the accumulated muck replaced with functionalist 
obfuscations and an implausible determinism. Cohen had hit upon the 
wrong set of first principles in his attempt to reconstruct the broad 
insights and emancipatory intentions of Marx. But that was something 
that the right method would soon correct. 
Analytical Marxists have broadly taken two paths towards meth-
odological rigour. The first is to scale down the pretensions of classical 
Marxism by defending a "restricted historical materialism" supported 
by a "weak technological determinism" (Wright et al. 1992: 94). The 
second is to drastically shrink the scope of economic determination 
of political and ideological processes down to a handful of key areas. 
Nonetheless, this explanatory programme still has traction, if and only if 
a set of mechanisms can be identified connecting the economic founda-
tion to the specific areas of the political and ideological superstructures. 
For Wright, Sober and Levine, the problem is not the basic intuition of 
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classical Marxism concerning historical development and social struc-
ture, but its deterministic and totalizing scope. Their criticism of Cohen's 
classical determinism - the "Development Thesis" - is to advance logical 
and anthropological objections to the idea that there is a trans-historical 
human interest in the reduction of effort through technological innova-
tion. Furthermore, they contest the classical conflation of explanation 
with determination. 
From their perspective, the productive forces cannot be defined out-
side their social application, with the consequence that they cannot be 
held separate from legal forms of property. This means commitment 
to a relational definition of the productive relations and productive 
forces, which ruins efforts to locate the productive forces in natural his-
tory. Moreover, Levine and co-thinkers point out, technological inno. 
vation means productivity improvements, and it is not obvious that 
every human being will have an interest in this under all circumstances. 
Specifically, although exploiting classes should have a strong interest in 
innovation, exploited classes might not benefit in terms of a reduction 
of effort at all. What is stake for the direct producers is not the produc-
tion of a fixed quantity of things, but their labour time and therefore 
the expenditure of human effort. They reason that the exploited have no 
significant interest in regression, but no particular interest in advance 
either. The consequence of this analysis is that the productive forces do 
not so much advance, as mainly fail to regress: technological develop· 
ment is "sticky downwards" (Wright et al. 1992: 78-9). In the final analy-
sis, this episodic tendency of the productive forces to ratchet upwards 
depends on the balance of class forces, and centrally it depends on the 
advent of periods of instability in which rising classes have an interest 
in revolutionary solutions to the problems of stagnation. 
The dear implication is that the path of development for any soci-
ety is historically contingent, rather than determined necessarily by 
a tendency operating in - or below - the base. To this end, Levine 
and co-thinkers propose the analysis of variant "historical trajectories" 
(ibid.: 61-88), disclosing "multiple routes into the future" (ibid.: 90). 
Furthermore, they argue, the notion that functional explanation of the 
relation between the economy and the superstructure leads to a plausi-
ble "determination in the last instance" by the foundation is not credible. 
Classical Marxism conflated definition of the effects of one region of 
social life in restricting the set of possible actions in another region of 
social life, with a cosmological vision of society as a set of empirically 
modulated appearances of a class essence. To be credible, Marxism must 
define the restricted areas of the ideologico-political superstructure that 
164 understanding marx1sm 
are functionally dependent on the economy. It must do this through 
identifying a set of mechanisms of structural selectivity that connect 
the economy to small regions of politics and ideology. The economic 
foundation, then, to use an architectural metaphor, has some pylons 
emerging from it into the actual building - nothing more. Marxism 
should not try to claim that the entire edifice of society is somehow 
determined by its material foundation, but restrict itself to the plau-
sible claim to explain how and where that building is connected to its 
economic substructure. 
Alex Callinicos would certainly not accept Levine and co-thinkers' 
divorce of radical politics from the Marxist theory of history. But he 
does accept something rather like weak directionality and restricted 
causation. He is wary of functional explanations, however, and argues 
that Marxism lacks a fully satisfactory account of historical agency, of 
"making history': As Przeworski has explained, the problem with his-
torical materialism is that "Marxism was a theory of history without any 
theory about the actions of people who made this history>: Specifically: 
Marx was the last thinker who simultaneously viewed behav-
iour as rational, strategic conduct, and sought to explain how 
people acquire their historically specific rationality, including 
preferences. (Przeworski 1985: 95) 
Marxism describes all action twice, once as a set of routine perform -
ances with unintended consequences and once as a set of strategic delib-
erations based on material interests. What Callinicos seeks to do is to 
close the gap between structure and agency without recourse to func-
tional explanation. His position seeks to explain how agents' historically 
specific rational calculations of their own material interests generate 
a set of unintended effects. The connection is the theory of ideology 
(Callinicos 1988: 134-77), which explains the formation of collective 
agents. A common identity forms around a representation of shared 
interests (ibid.: 134). Describing his methodological collectivism as 
((classical historical materialism" rather than analytical Marxism (ibid.: 
90), he maintains that this explains the influence on structure on agency. 
But he commits what for proponents of methodological individualism 
is a central fallacy, the ascription to aggregations of individuals of a 
collective subjectivity. History on his account is made by what another 
tradition would call "class subjects': whereas, the rejoinder would prob-
ably run, in reality it is made through recurring patterns of individual 
action without these persons necessarily having a single identity. 
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Rational choice and methodological individualism 
For Elster, Przeworski and Roemer in particular, then, methodologi-
cal individualism is the remedy for dilemmas of agency and structure. 
It is a radical cure, however, because it involves dropping even weak 
directionality and restricted forms of functional explanation. From the 
perspective of rational choice Marxism, there is a bad synergy between 
methodological collectivism, historical teleology and functional 
explanation. As far as Elster is concerned, methodological collectiv-
ism involves the postulation of meta-subjects, that is the ascription to 
groups (e.g. classes and nations) of the properties of individuals. These 
are supposed to act on and in society, as if they possessed the desires 
and beliefs that motivate action, together with the conscious ability 
to reason about the most efficient means to the ends shaped by these 
desires and beliefs. The threshold between the postulation of collective 
subjects and the invocation of historical teleology is porous indeed. As 
soon as the collective subject is treated as if it were an actually exist-
ing, ontologically primary entity (and not an aggregation of individu-
als), its "intentions" begin to shape a discussion of its "actions': For 
instance, "Humanity was for Marx what Spirit or Reason was for Hegel 
- the supra-individual entity whose full development is the goal of his-
tory, even though it is not endowed with the qualities of an intentional 
agent who could bring about that goal" (Elster 1985: 116). Such talk is 
merely disguised, rather than eliminated, in functional explanation, 
where actions are explained with reference to the actual benefits for such 
collective subjects. Functional explanation appears to avoid recourse 
to intentionality. But Elster argues that either the supposed functional 
"goal" of the action is a disembodied "intention" of the collective subject, 
or the claim is internally contradictory, proposing to explain intentional 
action by social agents with reference to unintended effects (ibid.: 28). 
The sorts of things that functional relations and collective agents 
seek to clarify - namely why groups of individuals acting intention-
ally realize consequences that are not in their interests - can only be 
scientifically investigated by proposing an explanatory mechanism for 
patterns of behaviour. Since what is to be explained is a gap between 
motivations and consequences, the only intellectually rigorous mech-
anism that can be proposed must involve the intentional actions of 
individuals, especially when they act in similar ways in the absence of a 
coordinating framework. Methodological individualism, Elster insists, 
is not the exclusive property of neo-classical economic theory and neo-
liberal political philosophy (ibid.: xiii), but can be used to investigate the 
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"specifically Marxist contribution" to social science, the explanation of 
"aggregate phenomena in terms of the individual actions that go into 
them' (ibid.: 4). 
Elster insists that there is nothing right-wing about this. Method-
ological individualism is methodological, not ontological. Its individu-
als are not the isolated bourgeois of classical economics or the selfish 
individualists of neo-classical economics (ibid.: 6). The sort of individual 
involved depends on the assumptions made by the theory, and Elster's 
assumptions would appear to be that individuals are historically and 
socially formed. Such individuals get involved in what he calls a "fal-
lacy of composition" (the cognitive mistake of transposing what is true 
for a part onto claims about what is true for the whole) when they act 
without a mechanism of coordination. For instance, for every individual 
capitalist, cutting wages raises profits. But for the capitalist economy, 
generalized reductions in wages produce crises of under-consumption. 
A similar argument applies to the tendency of the falling rate of profit as 
the effect of individual reasoning about technological innovation. Elster 
thinks that these sorts of "aggregate phenomena" are best explained 
using methodological individualism. 
The use of game-theoretical modelling can further clarify the sorts 
of "aggregate phenomena" that rational choice Marxists are thinking 
about, and how they think about them. Game theories involve the 
postulates of rational choice theorems about individual action. These 
reduce to the idea that individuals act strategically and reason instru-
mentally: individuals possess beliefs and desires, which lead them to 
formulate preferences; individuals rationally maximize the satisfaction 
of their preferences; individuals do so based on the selection of the best 
means to these ends, from a set of feasible alternatives. A <'game,, is 
then a situation involving complex strategic interdependencies among 
rational optimizers, and the "prisoners' dilemma" is its elementary 
cell form. Analytical Marxists typically use examples such as the situ-
ation where two employees believe that their firm is about to down -
size by making one of them redundant, but have no opportunity to 
communicate effectively with one another to plan joint action. Each 
knows that if they both take strike action, the employer will fold, and 
staffing levels will be maintained. But if only one of them strikes, she 
will probably be the one sacked, while the other will most likely retain 
her job, with some probability that the employer will then demand 
higher productivity. If both do nothing, a redundancy is highly likely. 
Although it is in both their interests to strike, neither will in fact take 
that action under these circumstances. Uncertain about the decision 
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of the other, each of them reasons that it is rational for the individual 
to let the other person take all the risks. The free-riding individual Will 
reap possible benefits without incurring negative consequences. Thus 
they both do nothing, and the consequence of their rational, strategic 
action is an unintended, suboptimal outcome for each. The functional-
ist would maintain that dividing the working class (through competi-
tive socialization, possessive individualism, and ideologies of race and 
gender) benefits the capitalist class. The methodological individualist 
would reply that she has actually demonstrated a micro-foundational 
mechanism that explains the phenomenon, without reference to func-
tional teleology. Roemer believes that this approach can explain labour 
market behaviour, Przeworski thinks that it can clarify party-political 
strategies and Elster believes that collective action can be explained 
through game theories. 
Exploitation and inequality 
The application of methodological individualism's analytical techniques 
to classical Marxism leads to a fairly thorough demolition of Marx's 
positions, beginning with the rejection of the labour theory of value 
and terminating in a dismissive critique of the tendency of the falling 
rate of profit. As Marcus Roberts points out, this is beautifully illus-
trated by Elstees index entry for "labour theory of value" in Making 
Sense of Marx: 
labour theory of value, 127-41; ill-defined because of the het-
erogeneity oflabour, 130-1; plays no role in the determination 
of equilibrium prices an rate of profit, 133-8; cannot explain 
the possibility of exchange and profit, 138-41; does not pro-
vide a criterion for the socially desirable choice of technique, 
149-51; does not explain the actual choice of technique under 
capitalism, 144-6; ill-suited to the analysis of balanced eco-
nomic growth, 143; inconsistent with the Marxist theory of 
class, 325 n 3; constitutes a weakness in the theory of exploita-
tion, 167, 202-3; vitiates the theory of fetishism, 98-9; vitiates 
the critique of vulgar economy, 503; rests on obscure Hegelian 
foundations, 125-6. (Elster 1985: 554; Roberts 1996: 155) 
Even an unmarked grave would be more dignified. Elster notes that 
Capital appeared just before the end of classical economics and argues 
that Marxist economic theory never came to grips with the neo-classical 
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revolution of the 1870s. Noting that there are, despite this, advanced 
contemporary variants of Marxian economics, he quips that "it is pos-
sible to be obscurantist in a mathematically sophisticated way, if the 
techniques are applied to spurious problems" (Elster 1986: 60). These 
pseudo-problems are basically coextensive with Marx's central concepts. 
Elster's assumption is that "like most classical economists, Marx tried 
to explain price formation by a labour theory of value" (ibid.: 64). On 
this basis, the labour theory of value is faulted for failure to consider 
the heterogeneity of labour and inability to convert values into prices, 
among other cardinal sins. The first problem has to do with natural 
talent: Marx considers skilled labour as unskilled labour plus education 
and training (i.e. human capital), but allegedly cannot deal with forms 
of skill that are not produced as commodities; the latter has to do with 
the notorious difficulties caused by the fluctuation of prices around 
values (Elster 1985: 130, 135). Given that "later Marxists have offered a 
deduction of prices from values that is formally correct': the real killer is 
the heterogeneity oflabour, because this "prevents the labour theory of 
value from even getting off the ground" (ibid.: 131). It does so because 
it is said to affect the determination of the value oflabour power. Mind 
you, this conclusion is enigmatic, because Marx's theory deals not with 
concrete labour, but with abstract labour; the point being that natural 
skill differentials go unrewarded in a mode of production that systemati-
cally reduces qualitative distinctions to quantitative differences. 
At any rate, in complete agreement with the idea that the funda-
mentals of Marxian economics are up the spout, Roemer produces a 
"general theory of exploitation" that uses game-theoretical models to 
generat~ some interesting results. He argues that exploitation means 
having to work longer than is socially necessary when others work less 
than is socially necessary, and qualifies this by linking it to the existence 
of realistic alternative possibilities. 
I propose that a group be conceived of as exploited if it has 
some conditionally feasible alternative under which its mem-
bers would be better off .... Formally, this amounts to specify-
ing a game played by coalitions of agents in the economy. A 
coalition can either participate in or withdraw from the econ-
omy. To define the game, I specify what any particular coalition 
can achieve on its own if it withdraws from the economy. Given 
these specifications, if a coalition can do better for its members 
by ((withdrawing", then it is exploited. 
(Roemer 1982b: 276) 
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Exploitation means being economically or politically compelled to work 
longer than necessary when other work options exist (historically 
speaking). Presumably, "withdrawal" means not strike action, but the 
construction of (for instance) a market socialist economy, or perhaps 
subsistence production. The effect is to locate exploitation in histori-
cally possible alternative sets of economic relations. Operating with this 
definition, Roemer demonstrates that, beginning from unequal mate-
rial positions, privileged commodity-producing agents can manage to 
exploit underprivileged agents in the absence of wage contracts and 
labour markets. On the other hand, allowing wage contracts but dis-
tributing starting resources equally produces non-exploitative labour 
markets. Finally, he shows that by allowing wage contracts and labour 
markets, and allocating differential endowments to rational agents, the 
model generates classes and exploitation. The labour theory of value is 
redundant and "the heresy is complete: not only does exploitation emerge 
logically prior to accumulation and institutions for labour exchange, 
but so does the articulation of exploitation into classes'' (ibid.: 265). 
What's more, the implication of this position is that class formation 
is historically contingent. That means that class locations cannot be 
derived from property relations alone, but also depend on variables such 
as skill and organization. Based on the work of Wright, statistical cor-
relations between class, income and consciousness appear to be empiri-
cally robust: "agents choose their own class positions - not willingly, but 
under constraint, as a consequence of optimizing, given their initial 
endowments'' (Roemer 1988: 80). Consistent with the postulates of 
Rational Choice theory, Roemer thinks that class is the unintended col-
lective result of individualistic reasoning given differential endowments 
of capital stock. As Roberts comments, "Roemer's principal objection to 
capitalism appears to be not so much that unequally endowed individu-
als would choose capitalism, but that, being unequally endowed, they 
would have no choice but capitalism" (Roberts 1996: 169). According 
to Roemer's modelling, then, exploitation emerges as a consequence 
of the unequal distribution of capital assets in the original position of 
rational agents, which implies that inequality, rather than wage con-
tracts, is the real problem that socialists should tackle. Domination 
in the workplace, for instance, might be a moral or legal abuse, but 
it is irrelevant to the question of an historical alternative to capitalist 
exploitation in socialism: 
Domination at the point of production, so often a concern 
of Marxism, is only distantly related to the concern with 
170 understanding marx1sm 
exploitation. The essential injustice of capitalism is located ... in 
the property relations that determine class, income and welfare. 
(Roemer 1988: 107) 
It is therefore crucial not to confuse socialist society with industrial 
democracy. According to Roemer's analysis, the catastrophe of historical 
Communism arose from three factors: state ownership of firms, central 
allocation of goods rather than market mechanisms, and political dic-
tatorship (Roemer 1993: 89). His alternative is to combine democratic 
politics and market allocation with a system defined in terms of "institu-
tional guarantees that aggregate profit are distributed ... equally" (ibid.: 
89). His argument is that before Marx, public ownership was regarded as 
an instrument for securing egalitarianism, and that equality rather than 
nationalization is the core of socialist politics. The principal problem 
with historical Communism was motivational, and it lay in the false 
assumption that after a reform of human nature, individuals would serve 
the public good rather than private interests (ibid.: 93). 
Roemer poses the central task for conceptions of socialism in terms 
of "a system of property rights and an economic mechanism which 
perform significantly better than modern capitalism'', but which pre-
serves both efficiency and equity (ibid.: 93). He suggests that market 
socialism must not plan the basket of consumer goods or allocate these 
centrally, although labour and consumption markets would require 
regulation. The real innovation in his conception of market socialism 
is that it would be a "coupon economy': where although "citizens would 
be allowed to trade their stock in mutual funds for stock in other mutual 
funds, they would not be free to liquidate their portfolios" (ibid.: 96). 
In A Future for Socialism (1994), Roemer further develops this 
model of market socialism, designed to. preserve the efficiencies that 
capital markets make possible, but eliminate exploitation, through the 
equitable distribution of productive assets. The idea is elegant: two 
ideal economic models are set up, with identical principles of operation 
and identical starting points. Both are equipped with parliamentary 
democracies that the rich can influence politically, but one of them 
has a regulated economy in a sense to be discussed. In both> there are 
rich and poor, represented by the distribution among the population 
of "units of the good" (e.g. money). In the capitalist system, individu-
als trade units of the good and invest in productive assets, as usual. 
The socialist system is the same as the capitalist "except that'', under 
socialism, "prices of stock are now denominated in [government-issued 
and legally regulated] coupons, not in units of the good,, (Roemer 
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1994: 65). Citizens can freely trade units of the good, but not govern-
ment coupons; coupons can only be used for investment purposes, 
leading to dividends paid in units of the good; a regulation prevents 
any individual from owning productive assets in excess of their initial 
allocation of coupons, which is 1,000 coupons to every individual. 
Result: the capitalist system generates exploitation through concen-
tration of productive assets; the socialist system prevents exploitation 
emerging; and "the poor (who in this specification constitute 95% of 
the population) are better off in the market-socialist equilibrium than 
in the capitalist equilibrium, regardless of the degree of influence the 
rich have in the elections" (ibid.: 73). 
Politics and ideology 
Some critics engage in sarcastic dismissal of Roemer - "fascinating, 
professor" - which is unhelpful. Marx and Engels's vision of socialism 
was, after all, just as abstract, and a good deal less practical. There are, 
however, pointed, substantive criticisms ofRoemer's basic approach that 
can be made, about the sorts of individuals involved in these models, 
the relation of the models to historical situations, and the connection 
between exchange and production (Wood 1990). The deepest problem 
would appear to be that Roemer's innovative approach to socialist poli-
tics depends upon a quite novel definition of exploitation. This makes 
politics a question of the rational evaluation of historical alternatives 
rather than a response to perceptions of injury or something based 
around legitimate moral grievances. 
The rational choice approach acknowledges that there is a distinc-
tion between agents calculating rational alternatives based on playing 
the game according to the rules, as opposed to global judgements on 
the fairness of the current rules of the game. Thinking about exploita-
tion and inequality involves the contemplation of "conditionally feasible 
alternatives': that is counter-factuals. Clearly, the jump from the agent's 
perspective to the global decision to withdraw from the current game 
is the analytical equivalent to the problem of class membership and 
class consciousness. The attainment of class consciousness is mainly 
presupposed by Roemer, in order to treat political economy as a zero 
sum game, where any rational agent can grasp the stark historical choice 
between capitalism and socialism. Indeed, for Roemer, "historical mate-
rialism ... claims that history progresses by the successive elimin~tion 
of forms of exploitatioh which are socially unnecessary in the dynamic 
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sense" (Roemer 1982a: 271). In other words, Roemer believes that a 
definition of exploitation based on consideration of "conditionally fea-
sible alternatives" can intersect with historical materialist explanations 
of epochal shifts between modes of production. But who are the agents 
of these transformations and how do they manage to operationalize 
their rational calculations of feasible alternatives? And what happens 
when they reasonably believe that, rather than there being no imagina-
ble alternative to exploitation, there is no viable way out, and settle for 
improving their lot under current arrangements? 
1he first question first. Wright, as we saw in Chapter 1, initially 
adopted an approach to the definition of class boundaries based on the 
idea of contradictory class locations, defined in terms of a hierarchy of 
determinations (exploitation relation, supervision functions, independ-
ence in work process). In light of some difficulties with this position, 
in Classes, Wright embraces Roemer's theory of exploitation, with the 
consequence that classes are now straightforwardly defined in terms 
of effective control of productive assets (Wright 1985: chapter 3). He 
proposes that the advantage of this position is its explanatory purchase 
on phenomena of income differentials and social attitudes, and much 
of Classes is devoted to empirical corroboration of the link between 
these things and exploitation-defined classes. Significantly, however, 
Wright's efforts to refute Elster's declaration that ('the centrality of class 
in social conflict cannot be upheld" (Elster 1985: 394) reduce to the 
assertion that property relations are central to material existence, and 
so must play a determining role (Wright 1985: 97-8). Recognition that 
the link might be indirect, from the existence of classes to the formation 
of characteristic beliefs, which then determine the sorts of grievances 
that motivate social conflict, is ruled out, at least for Wright, Roemer and 
Elster, because of their rejection of all variants of the theory of ideology. 
Analytical Marxism's sharp criticism of the concept of ideology is a 
consequence of its focus on rational calculation as the basic explanation 
of social action. The most economical formulation of the objection is 
Roemer's: "one cannot use exploitation as an explanation of class strug-
gle unless it is perceived by the workers as an injustice that they wish to 
erase [but that is impossible to do] if one simultaneously wishes to claim 
that capitalist relations obscure relations of exploitation" (Roemer 1988: 
85). Class consciousness, then, is a question not of removing ideologi-
cal false consciousness, but of accurately weighing historical alterna-
tives under conditions of systematically imposed fallacious reasoning. 
Elster, hie,1' ly critical of Marx's theory of ideology, presents this in terms 
of "cold': structural mechanisms whereby, in a decentred economy, 
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fallacies of composition regularly arise. Marx's major methodological 
contribution turns out to be an insight into the social conditions behind 
the common but mistaken belief that "causal relations valid locally ... 
retain their validity when generalised to a wider context" (Elster 1985: 
19, 487). In more colloquial terms, "ideology" reduces to the prob-
lem that rational agents, rather than seeing that conditionally feasible 
alternatives are historically imaginable, decide that the most reasonable 
thing for them to do as individuals is to free-ride on collective action 
while attempting to join the exploiting class. Class consciousness can 
then be reframed: "Elster's proposal is to understand class solidarity as 
a transformation of the preference orderings characteristic of the free-
rider problem (the prisoners' dilemma payoff matrix) into an assur-
ance game" (Wright et al. 1992: 123). An assurance game is defined by 
agents' conditional altruism (a preference for altruism conditional upon 
an assurance that others will not free-ride), which depends on shared 
information, and therefore political organization. 
Now the second question. Przeworski in effect argues against the poet 
John Milton's great rebel, that rational beings will not declare it "better 
to reign in Hell, than to serve in Heaven': The assurance game of social 
solidarity might generate collective action, but nothing can guaran-
tee revolutionary success. Indeed, a moment's reflection is sufficient to 
convince a rationally self-interested optimizer that the construction of 
a socialist society must involve a protracted transition period, during 
which some experiments with new political and economic arrange-
ments might well fail. Better to play a different style of game than to opt 
out; and given that Analytical Marxism regards Marx's crisis theory as 
completely false, there is no reason to suppose that the standard rules 
will change suddenly. The most effective strategy under those conditions 
is to strike a reasonable balance between excessive industrial militancy 
(which leads to retaliation) and utter compliance (which leaves workers 
"f 1 ") ree to ose : 
Unless the capacity to institute socialism is organized economi-
cally, politically and ideologically with the capitalist society, 
wage-earners are better off avoiding crises and cooperating in 
the reproduction of capitalist accumulation. 
(Przeworski 1985: 165) 
On Przeworski's analysis, the reform strategies of social democratic par-
ties are rationally determined responses to the economic and political 
constraints of capitalism. Capitalism and Social Democracy has, perhaps 
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inadvertently, a classically tragic structure: its protagonist, social democ-
racy, confronts a perfect dilemma. Given that "universalism is the ide-
ology of the bourgeoisie': and that the common interest is necessarily 
defined in terms of the continuation of capitalism, social democracy has 
no prospect of generating democratic socialism (ibid.: 21). On the one 
hand, the working class is too small to form an electoral majority alone; 
on the other hand, building electoral coalitions with middle-class voters 
necessarily involves dilution of class politics into non-class populism. 
1here is a certain tragic dignity to this presentation of the social demo-
cratic parties rending themselves, setting up and then tearing down the 
welfare state. Certainly, it would be a callow Marxism indeed that would 
refuse to acknowledge the contribution of social democracy to working-
class politics, or denigrate the historic achievement that social rights 
represent. But it is an unusual Marxism that with satisfaction declares 
of this no-win, no-exit situation that things have turned out about as 
well as could have been hoped for, under the circumstances (ibid.: 239). 
Marxism and justice 
Recent efforts of Analytical Marxism have focused on the normative 
foundations of market socialism. As Cohen says, if domination depends 
on the distribution of property, not exploitation at the point of produc-
tion, then "the question of exploitation resolves itself into the question of 
the moral status of capitalist private property" (Sitton 1996: 85, Cohen 
cited). Valuably, the analytical approach has inspired some important 
reconstructions of Marx's underlying normative convictions and their 
retrieval from his confusions on the question of justice. Rodney Peffer, 
for instance, reconstructs Marx's moral theory as: 
recommending the promotion of one or more types on non-
moral good - freedom, human community and self-realization 
- [where] the criterion of right action is not simply the maximi-
zation of the non-moral good. This type of moral theory holds 
that there are other right-making characteristics of actions, 
rules for actions and/ or social policies and actions, for example 
treating people as ends in themselves ... or respecting others 
people's rights. (Peffer 1990: 80-81) 
According to this interpretation, Marx is a mixed-mode deontologist, 
that is someone who thinks that the basis of freedom is moral autonomy, 
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but who denies the pertinence of the fact/value distinction and holds 
that autonomy makes possible a perfectionist account of political justice. 
The other way to go is to suppose that Marx holds a teleological ethics 
based in an ideal of human flourishing. From Elster's perspective, Marx,s 
most enduring contribution is the idea of "self-realization through crea-
tive work': amounting to an ethical individualism (Elster 1985: 521, 
527). This is a valid ideal, but one that should be implemented with 
caution, specifically in relation to a viable distributive principle (ibid.: 
522). Elster thinks that Marx held an ill-defined distributive theory 
of justice based on a contribution principle (proportional receipts for 
individuals' social contribution through the labour process), but rejects 
it as a serious normative position (ibid.: 516-17). The "needs principle" 
outlined in the "Critique of the Gotha Programme" is better, but in the 
absence of the requisite social arrangements, Rawls' "difference princi-
ple" would at least provide for social equality (ibid.: 230). It is interesting 
and significant that Elster and Peffer converge, from different perspec-
tives, on the claim that a modified Rawlsian position on justice, based 
in the value of equality, is the most defensible Marxist theory of justice 
today (see Peffer 1990: 364-5). 
According to Rawls's signature work, A Theory of Justice, "justice 
as fairness" will result from a social contract, struck between rational 
agents who determine distributive principles for society based on a 
hypothetical agreement. Individuals situated behind a "veil of igno-
rance" regarding what sorts of things they will possess and what sorts 
of values they will hold in the future society, he argues, will agree on 
two basic principles. The Equality Principle states that "each person is to 
have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar scheme ofliberty for others" (Rawls 2003: 53). 
The Difference Principle provides that "social and economic inequalities 
are to be so arranged that they are reasonably expected to be to every-
one's advantage': while its other part, the equal opportunity principle, 
stipulates that these inequalities be ((attached to positions and offices 
open to all" (ibid.: 53). As Allen Buchanan demonstrates, the only way 
to fully grasp socially concerned political liberalism is to recognize that 
''Rawls' work incorporates basic Marxian themes" (Buchanan 1982: 161) 
within a defence of the welfare state, based on universal principles of 
distributive justice. Many standard Marxian objections to this position 
fail, because, once we consider the requirements of the social context, 
or circumstances of justice needed to support such principles, it is fun-
damentally not a defence of actually existing capitalism, but instead an 
argument for a mixed economy combined with sweeping social reforms. 
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Rawls is closer to social democracy than to the parties that claim to be 
liberal today; but then, social democracy is a form of political liberalism 
inflected through social concerns derived from Marxism. 
Now, there are three basic ways that Marxists can respond to the 
challenge of this highly progressive form ofliberalism: 
1. Refuse to elaborate an alternative conception of justice on grounds 
that the whole problem only arises under conditions of scarcity, 
which means that Marxism is a critique of justice. Marxists who 
adopt this line have to be extremely confident about the elimi-
nation of scarcity in the society of abundance, which is difficult 
once classical Marxist economics and the classical conception of 
communism are abandoned. Its proponents also fairly quickly 
discover that not only does justice remain rather pressing during 
any envisaged transition period, but also that distributive justice 
remains necessary after the transition to communism, because it 
concerns reconciliation between individuals who hold differing 
conceptions of the good life. Rawls's distributive principle does not 
reduce to the distribution of things; it also concerns the problems 
that arise in a value-pluralist environment. To cope with these 
difficulties, Marxists who adopt the "critique of justice" line tend 
to be consequentialists, that is they believe that ethics consists of 
maximizing some good for the greatest number of individuals. 
Peter Singer's utilitarian interpretation of Marx is an excellent 
example. Consequentialism can be a difficult position to sustain 
intellectually, however, because of its tendency to license conclu-
sions that offend basic moral intuitions (it tends to support ideas 
about the sacrifice of individuals for the greater good), and it has 
had disturbing applications in the history of "actually existing 
socialism''. 
2. A second option is to promote Marx's own ethical individualism 
as something that gets us ('beyond justice'~ According to Roemer, 
his approach does not ((locate the historical materialist imperative 
in considerations of justice': because it is founded on the distinc-
tively Marxist conception of self-actualization (Roemer 1982a: 
275). This would appear to mean the following. Where theories 
of justice - and especially that of Rawls - concern equality in 
distribution, a self-actualization theory assumes material abun-
dance, and therefore the supersession even of egalitarian arrange-
ments, and investigates the forms of human flourishing. Again, 
this reasoning misunderstands what is meant by (Histribution': 
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reducing it to the allocation of things, and neglects the ways that 
a theory of distributive justice also concerns conflicts between 
individuals who hold different conceptions of self-actualization 
Unless it is held that everybody will rationally agree on a singl~ 
conception of human flourishing, the need for distributive justice 
does not vanish just because the moral foundation for the theory 
shifts from deontological to teleological grounds, and the resulting 
normative political philosophy is framed in perfectionist terms. 
3. The third option is to argue an alternative model to Rawlsian 
"justice as fairness': One way to go is to claim that deontologi-
cally based liberal conceptions of right contain internal potentials 
for their own self-transcendence in the direction of substantive 
equality, especially once the social undermining of autonomy that 
capitalism involves is eliminated. This broadly Hegelian strategy 
is the one adopted by Critical Theory (see next chapter). Another 
way to go is to propose that the central problem with Rawlsian 
liberalism is that the Equality and Difference principles provide 
for, respectively, equality and inequality. This is the route taken 
by G. A. Cohen in his late work. For Cohen, radicalization of the 
Equality Principle leads to the rejection of the Difference Principle 
(Cohen 2008: 7); serious investigation of the moral principles and 
considerations of justice behind the Equality Principle mandates 
the conclusion that substantive, and not merely formal, equality is 
the desired outcome. Cohen's central task is "rescuing the concept 
of justice" from the social facts of capitalism, by arguing that Rawls 
is wrong to exclude the ethos of society from his definition of the 
basic structure of society that considerations of justice are said to 
be capable of reforming (ibid.: 229-73, especially 261). The ethos 
of a just society, one characterized by substantive equality, would 
be egalitarian, and this is what socialism means today. 
According to Roemer, in light of the sorts of arguments that both he and 
Cohen marshal, the value of equality criticizes as unjust the capitalist 
distribution of productive assets and supports public ownership, which 
means that "the goal of socialism is best thought of as a kind of egali-
tarianism" (Roemer 1994: 125). The egalitarian programme developed 
by thinkers such as Cohen is based on a perception of "the greatness of 
Rawls" (Cohen 2008: 11). Political liberalism is without question one 
of the great achievements of the modern world, and Rawls is its current 
summit: facile dismissals by Marxists of"liberal-democratic capitalism'' 
are a real sign of political immaturity. The task of socialism is not to 
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smash the noses off the classical statues, but to arrive at a higher set 
of social arrangements. Nonetheless, as Alex Callinicos notes, because 
egalitarianism bases itself at least on market socialism in opposition 
to the Difference Principle, there is a real and substantive distinction 
between it and liberalism (Callinicos 2000: 52). 
From the perspective of Analytical Marxism, an extremely serious 
effort has been made not only to reconstruct the emancipatory impulse 
of Marxism and basic insights of Marx, but also to move this programme 
decisively into the mainstream of political philosophy, where it can no 
longer be ignored. But the thing is that Marx failed to hold up his end 
of the arrangement, providing what proved to be an extremely fallible 
set of claims: "Marx was almost never right; his facts were defective 
by the standards of modern scholarship, his generalizations reckless 
and sweeping" (Elster 1986: 3). Under these conditions, the meaning 
of socialism changes, but the orientation to egalitarian social arrange-
ments does not. To the contrary, it has received a more precise direction. 
Nonetheless, there remains something bloodless about this sort of 
socialism. The methodological assumption of the rational utility-maxi-
mizer might generate interesting economic models, but it does not have 
sufficient descriptive depth to capture the human condition. Marx con-
sidered human beings as creative, social animals and developed a rich 
theory of the flourishing of historical societies, which is why he cites the 
poets alongside the political economists. The basic difference between 
Marxism and liberalism, when it comes to the conception of justice, 
is that Marxism rejects as a mutilation of the human condition the 
reduction of human beings to socially isolated, rationally maximizing 
consumers of utilities. Human nature is creative and sociaL character-
ized by historically generated material needs and deeply situated psy-
chological desires for free self-expression and full personal realization, 
Marx asserts. Moral autonomy and the social contract, with everything 
that follows from them, such as human rights, political liberty and social 
equality, represent invaluable historical and intellectual contributions to 
a just society. But the atomizing effects and vested material interests that 
flow from capitalist political economy directly undermine the politi-
cal participation, social solidarity and affective reciprocity necessary to 
make them effective realities. In political liberalism, precisely because of 
its failure to truly confront these issues, moral autonomy and the social 
contract become the fronts for massive inequality; the virtue of equal-
ity becomes an empty sham - equality before the law under conditions 
of the naturalization of inequality - and the political community is 
depopulated of virtuous citizens, even by realistic, modern standards. 
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Faced with the insufficiency of Marx's conceptual apparatus today, the 
alternative theoretical decision could of course have been to reconstruct 
the richness of historical materialism using valid contemporary philo-
sophical methods, rather than to expose its impoverishment using the 
methodological tools of its fiercest critics. But that would require a very 
different set of philosophical and political convictions, to which we turn 
in the next two chapters. 
Summary of key points 
The analytical approach 
• Cohen's defence of functional explanation and technological 
determinism set new standards of argumentative rigour, but 
subsequent Analytical Marxists have adopted methodological 
individualism and rational choice theories. 
• Rational choice methodology involves the assumption that the 
individual is a rational maximizer of utilities, and applies this to 
modelling social situations through game theories developed from 
the prisoner's dilemma. 
• The central concern of Marxism shifts from the labour theory of 
value to new concepts of exploitation and ultimately to a concern 
with inequality in the distribution of productive assets. 
Praxis, structure and history 
• Practice is reconceptualized as making rational choices among 
feasible alternatives based on a set of preferences that flow from 
the assumptions governing the game in question. 
• Weak historical materialism involves only those political and 
intellectual conditions directly connected to the economic model 
in question; historical explanation involves regarding epochal 
changes as decisions between sets of alternative economic models. 
• The state remains central to coercion and distribution, but a social 
democratic approach to parliamentary participation is often 
adopted, alongside models of market socialism based on public 
ownership of productive assets. 
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The question of justice 
• Socialism becomes a question of normative arguments in support 
of historically feasible alternative arrangements, which means that 
justice becomes a central concern. 
• Engagement with Rawlsian liberalism leads many Analytical 
Marxists to define themselves as egalitarians, who support sub-
stantive equality and public ownership and criticize liberal ideas 
that defend inequality as beneficial to society. 
analytrcal marxrsm 181 
seven 
Critical Theory 
Although Critical Theory represents a reconstruction of historical mate-
rialism in general, it is particularly focused on reactivating the legacy of 
Frankfurt School Marxism, albeit under dramatically altered historical 
and intellectual circumstances. This situation has mandated a thorough 
critique of their predecessors, so that despite sometimes being described 
as the "second generation of the Frankfurt School': influential thinkers 
such as Jurgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, Albrecht Wellmer, Claus Offe 
and Seyla Benhabib are best thought of as embodying a distinctive new 
approach. 
• The historical circumstances concern preserving the emancipa -
tory impulse of Western Marxism in the context of, initially, the 
post-war reconstruction ofliberal capitalism, and now, neoliberal 
forms of globalization with illiberal implications. The experience 
of the fascist dictatorships in Europe had made abundantly clear 
just how limited the left-wing dismissal of human rights and par-
liamentary democracy, as the superficial, ideological fac;:ade of 
the bourgeois state, really was. The new Critical Theorists in the 
1960s, beginning with Habermas's groundbreaking analysis of the 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere ([ 1962] 1991 b), ini-
tiated a retrieval of democratic theory for progressive ends, with 
a strong normative component. Critical of the social-democratic 
welfare state for its bureaucratization and commodification of 
social relationships, they have tended to advocate a civic repub-
licanism based on political participation through "deliberative 
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democracy': This approach, which stresses public debate and 
democratic will-formation, positions contemporary Critical 
Theory as a vigorous critic of imperialist aggression, authoritar-
ian governance and social exclusion. But it is founded on a set of 
historical experiences which suggest that acceptance of the false 
idea of an inevitable transformation of liberal democracy into 
fascist totalitarianism is profoundly disabling. 
• The intellectual conditions relate to philosophical engagement 
with a critique of the intellectual roots of fascist ideology, in irra-
tionalist and authoritarian currents in German thought. Critical 
Theory sought to decisively shift the centre of gravity of central 
European philosophy in a progressive direction, especially through 
participation in the "linguistic turn" towards a social conception 
of reason. For the Critical Theorists, the core of a principled and 
consistent rejection of Romantic, anti-Enlightenment strains in 
both left-wing and right-wing German philosophy resides in a 
philosophical understanding of the emancipatory potential of 
modernity. The key to this is recognition that modern rationality 
is internally complex rather than monolithically simple, together 
with a critique of the Enlightenment's limited understanding of 
its own implications. They demonstrate that the dominant, epis-
temological problematic of Enlightenment thinking, grounded 
in the subject-object relation, is only a part of the wider field of 
rational subject-subject agreements, or "intersubjectivity': Critical 
Theory thereby critiques the catastrophic perspective of a "trag-
edy of enlightenment", with its implicit hostility to modernity, 
together with Adorno and Horkheimer's paradoxical total critique 
of reason by means of reason, as a limited response to the prob-
lems of Enlightenment philosophy. 
Yet the questions posed by the Frankfurt School are regarded as the right 
ones. It is for this reason that the leading thinker of Critical Theory, 
Jurgen Habermas, has been moved to maintain that he is ''the last 
Marxist': someone "fiercely determined to defend [historical material-
ism] as a still-meaningful enterprise" (Habermas 1992: 464, 469). An 
interdisciplinary, materialist research programme, one that aims at an 
emancipatory critical theory with a practical intent, must seek to unite 
the critique of domination with the question of a meaningful existence, 
in the context of a focus on human suffering. To this end, Habermas 
in particular has reconstructed the relations between practice, struc-
ture and history in historical materialism, in the context of a thorough 
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critique of classical Marxism. Practice is recast in terms of two distinct 
forms of activity, corresponding to the subject-subject and subject-
object distinction, as communicative interaction and instrumental 
action in the labour process. This dualism then informs a distinction 
between the society as a space of communicative participation, or cclife-
world", and the society as a functionally differentiated social system 
grounded in the division of labour. As outlined by John Sitton and 
David Ingram in studies that inform this chapter, Habermas accepts 
that the notion of social complexity alters contemporary theory's rela-
tion to the radical tradition (Sitton 2003), but holds that a proceduralist 
concept of reason can preserve the emancipatory thrust of the ideal of a 
rational society (Ingram 1987). In particular, Habermas advocates the 
idea that the evolution of society, involving a ramifying differentiation 
of functional subsystems, such as economics, administration, juridical, 
media and so forth, is conceptually independent from the evolution of 
normative structures in cultural processes. Multiple evolutions within 
a dynamic environment take the place of teleological development, and 
the lack of a "centre" to society means the abandonment of revolutionary 
utopias involving transformations based on the state. 
Differences with the Frankfurt School 
The subtitle of Habermas's highly influential The Structural Trans-
formation of the Public Sphere (199lb), "an inquiry into a category 
of bourgeois society': indicates that it implicitly operates against the 
background of the Marxist theory of history. Specifically, it works in 
tension with the theory of instrumental reason developed by Adorno 
and Horkheimer, whose tragic dialectic of enlightenment suggests 
that liberal democracy inevitably succumbed to manipulative forms 
of technocratic political management. For Adorno and Horkheimer, 
Enlightenment rationality necessarily mutated into neo-positivism, the 
theory that an isolated individual seeking to adapt to external real-
ity must formulate falsifiable hypotheses on the basis of the totality of 
inert facts. This position translates in the social sciences into the idea 
of a value-neutral scientific sociology that bases itself on evidentially 
grounded explanatory and descriptive theories, which can then be used 
to managerially control social processes. In the "positivism dispute" 
in Germany in the 1950s and 1960s, Habermas, who was Adorno's 
research assistant, takes the side of the Frankfurt School's founders in 
critiquing this sort of "technocratic ideology': Although he supports the 
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idea of an evidence-based social theory, Haberrnas attacks the absence 
of social and historical contextualization in neo-positivism, and its 
idea of value-neutrality when speaking of intersubjective agreements 
(Wiggershaus 1994: 567-8, 584). He believes that technocratic ideol-
ogy, as evident in neoliberal politics, neo-classical economics and func-
tional system~ theory, is now t~~ mo~t imp?rtant form of contemporary 
ideology, having replaced political hberahsm (McCarthy 1996: 1-16}. 
But Habermas refuses Adorno and Horkheimer's identification oflogi-
cal reasoning and propositional argumentation with neo-positivism, 
together with their reduction of Enlightenment reason to means-ends 
rationality. In particular, Habermas does not think that the modern 
idea of democratically steering society on the basis of reasoned public 
debate is mere false consciousness, a socially necessary illusion masking 
a quasi-totalitarian administered society. 
Accordingly, in Structural Transformation, Habermas argues that 
rational debate about the general interest, through open discussion 
of public concerns, secretes an egalitarian ideal. The process that he 
calls "democratic will-formation" took shape during the eighteenth 
century in a network of forums, or ''sphere,, of public debate, based 
around (in-principle) open arenas including the media and parlia-
ment. Civil liberties, political rights, the free press, together with coffee 
houses, literary journals, parliamentary parties and the like, were the 
institutional locus for the articulation of ideals ofliberty, equality and 
solidarity. Although the "public sphere" thus constituted was under-
mined by the contingent reality of class inequality, the practices of 
open dialogue and democratic will-formation have an emancipatory 
potential. The idea that the social contract is based on rational con-
sent grounded in open dialogue and that it invests individuals as the 
authors of the laws that they must obey is the foundation of modern 
notions of liberation. The public sphere mediates the social existence 
of individuals, linking their private interests and domestic lives to 
their public participation in the political community as citizens, and 
it provides a mechanism by which collective agreements can direct the 
administrative apparatus, or "public authority" (Habermas 1991b: 30). 
According to the ideal of inclusiveness, transparency and rationality 
that founds the public sphere, elaborated in the political philosophy 
of the Enlightenment's thinkers, no individual should in principle be 
excluded from public deliberations in the political community. In 
practice, however, the ideal of the public sphere clashed immediately 
with the realities of bourgeois society, not only in the exclusion of 
persons on grounds of class, race and gender, but also in that the 
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institutions supporting democratic will-formation were quickly com-
mercialized and bureaucratized. 
Having outlined the egalitarian ideal of the public sphere, Habermas 
in the second half of Structural Transformation turns to the corporatiza-
tion of the media, and to the entrenching of the special interests of the 
powerful groups in class society through the professionalization of poli-
tics and its mutation into a form of public relations exercise. Together 
with the highly conservative implications of technocratic ideology, 
which seeks to maintain the status quo by efficiently directing society in 
the interests of system imperatives belonging to the capitalist economy 
and state bureaucracy, these changes have inverted the function of the 
public sphere. He speaks in this connection of a "re-feudalization" of 
the public sphere, where the corporate media and parliamentary parties 
join with technocratic experts and wealthy interest lobbies to transform 
rational will-formation into a sort of courtly performance among the 
powerful, aimed at manipulating democratic legitimacy (Habermas 
I99lb: 231-2). At the same time, the transformation of citizens into 
consumers in late capitalism drives individuals back into "civic pri-
vatism" and undermines their democratic citizenship (ibid.: 141-80). 
Meanwhile, the role of the bureaucratic administration in steering com -
plex economic and social processes (discussed below) means that the 
state can less and less afford the "luxury" of democratic deliberation 
(ibid.: 181-235). 
Habermas's endorsement of the ideal of democratic will-formation 
and his location of the public sphere in a complicated historical dialectic 
governed by complexity and contingency, together with his implicit 
claim that there is a contradiction between parliamentary democracy 
and capitalist society, suggest a major disagreement with Adorno and 
Horkheimer. Indeed, this sets the scene for some signature differences 
between Critical Theory and what I have called Frankfurt School 
Marxism. Against the sometimes sweeping generalizations of the first-
generation thinkers and their implicit reliance on an inverted version 
of Hegel's historical teleology, second-generation Critical Theorists are 
concerned with the empirical texture of social processes in open-ended 
developments, and are almost allergic to the «philosophy of history" as a 
totalizing gesture. Deeply involved in dialogue with philosophical meth-
ods and social theories that do not originate in Marxism, the Critical 
Theorists tend to interpret a multidisciplinary research programme 
in terms of interventions into other debates, rather than recruitment 
of various research findings into a potentially monolithic vision of an 
administered society. Habermas proposes that the wellspring of the 
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difference lies in Adorno and Horkheimer's acceptance - despite their 
forceful criticisms - of the model of rationality based on the isolated 
subject contemplating its object of knowledge. The identification of 
reason as a whole with supposedly baleful "instrumental rationality» 
springs from this source. In their search for an alternative to corn~ 
modity reification and instrumental reason, the first generation of the 
Frankfurt School was led by this definition of rationality to valorize 
non-propositional (and sometimes irrational) modes of thinking as 
the alternative to the Enlightenment. Instead of the dead-end of that 
approach, which ultimately terminates in a Romantic anti-capitalism, 
Habermas refuses to accept that instrumental manipulation of objects, 
guided by the criterion of successful efficiency, exhausts the concept of 
reason. He proposes instead to consider the internal differentiation of 
modern thought, within which instrumental rationality would be only 
one component of reason, legitimate in its sphere of competence but 
problematic when applied globally (Habermas 1984: 339-99). 
Critique of historical materialism 
In a series of articles in the 1960s and 1970s, Habermas generates a 
reconstructive critique of historical materialism premised on a firm 
rejection of the natural-scientific version of Marxist orthodoxy repre-
sented by Engels and then Stalin. There is a core reason why Habermas's 
specific objections to a raft of positions - the theory of instrumental 
reason, the administered society and what he calls Adorno's defen-
sive cultural and political "strategy of hibernation'' (Habermas l 979b: 
43) - must lead back to a general critique of Marx. This concerns the 
normative foundations of emancipatory social theory, because Marx's 
evolutionary schema for historical progress through the advance of the 
productive forces fatally compromises the practically oriented criticism 
of capitalism in light of universal moral claims. Adorno's "instrumental 
reason" tacitly accepts this framework, even if it inverts its position on 
labour. The historical materialist theory of social evolution transforms 
the standpoint of normative critique into a superstructural "reflection" 
of developments in production. According to Habermas, the dialectic 
of forces and relations of production must be reformulated and the 
reductive relation between base and superstructure completely aban-
doned (Habermas 1970: 113-14, 1973: 168-9). "The development of 
the productive forces': he writes, "triggers but does not bring about the 
overthrow of relations of production and evolutionary renewal of the 
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rnode of production': But, he instantly adds, "even in this formulation 
the theorem can hardly be defended" (Habermas 1979a: 146). 
According to Habermas, Marx employed two different sorts of argu-
ments in his critique of capitalist political economy (ibid.: 130-77). 
On the one hand, advancing productive forces generate a sequence 
of modes of production, characterized by specific class struggles that 
provide the dynamic for the internally motivated transformation from 
tower to higher stages of society. The decline of a mode is accompa-
nied by social disintegration, that is "the common ruin of the con-
tending classes" (MESW: 36), together with historically created but 
socially unsatisfied human needs, which point the material interests 
of the exploited classes in the direction of a struggle that transcends 
that socio-historical stage. What this means is that the foundation for 
emancipatory critique rests upon an evolutionary logic, which renders 
specific propositions in historical materialism unfalsifiable at the cost of 
making the whole theory invalid after the first failed revolution. On the 
other hand, Marx criticizes capitalism for its failure to realize equality, 
liberty and solidarity, pointing out that these values are the ones actually 
held by the majority of the population. In his concrete historical analyses 
of specific political struggles, Marx acknowledges the importance and 
independence of cultural and intellectual factors. What this suggests 
is that the independent development of normative standards, in the 
form of moral consciousness, is only linked to social evolution, rather 
than a dependent variable appended to it. Consequently, in Knowledge 
and Human Interests (1968) and Communication and the Evolution of 
Society (1971), Habermas sets out to theorize the distinct processes of 
social evolution and normative development, and to clarify the possible 
connections between them. 
Habermas argues that the two sorts of approach employed by Marx 
- social evolution and normative critique - were conflated, because of a 
collapse of reason into instrumental manipulation modelled on labour 
practice. Actually, this problem is the signature of the "philosophy of 
the subject" that, from the Enlightenment onwards in Western thought, 
had based its reflections on the model of the isolated subject seeking 
knowledge about conceptual and material objects. Rene Descartes and 
Immanuel Kant are the most important placemarkers for the predomi-
nance of the subject-object problematic in the ((philosophical discourse 
of modernity': and Habermas is well aware that Hegel and Marx;s work 
represents a critique of the philosophical and social implications of their 
approaches. But Hegel and Marx's critique miscarried, because Hegel's 
collective subject, supposed to expressively generate the historical and 
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social totality through alienation and then rediscover itself as the result 
of a long series of struggles, merely transposes the subject-object rela-
tion onto the relation between the world spirit and the ethical life of a 
socio-historical totality (Habermas 1972: 7-24). Marx decoded Hegel's 
world spirit and ethical life as the economically exploited classes and 
the politico-cultural superstructures, without challenging the terms of 
the basic model (ibid.: 25-42). For a vanishing moment, the young 
Hegel glimpsed the possibility of conceptualizing the collective subject 
in terms of a set of agreements arrived at through open debate between 
subjects who, instead of instrumentalizing one another as manipula-
ble objects, regard the other as another subject worthy of historically 
defined forms of moral respect (Habermas 1973: 142-69). But this 
became quickly subordinated to the young Hegel's equally important 
insight - anticipating Marx - that the totality of subject-object relations 
creating the historical world for the collective subject was founded on 
labour. 
Marx and Hegel, in other words, missed an opportunity to conceptu-
alize a distinction between the subject-object rationality oflabour prac-
tice, oriented to instrumental success and guided by efficiency criteria, 
and the subject-subject rationality of«interaction': oriented to reaching 
mutual understanding and guided by agreement based on the force of 
the better argument. Marx, accordingly, presupposes but does not the-
matize the communicative dimension of interaction, as in, for instance, 
his insistence that labour is social labour mediated by language. This 
remains an insight which never crosses the conceptual threshold into 
a theory of normative development - that is, pre-eminently, the devel-
opment of universalistic forms of moral consciousness - that would 
run alongside Marx's theory of social evolution through technological 
progress. There are two important consequences of Habermas's argu-
ment about a significant gap in Marx's position (ibid.: 1-40, 195-252). 
The first is that the theory-practice relation in Marxism is generally 
grasped in instrumental terms, reducing social theory to political strat-
egy and severing the connection between social theoretical claims and 
intersubjectively recognized forms of truth. The ((test" of Marxist social 
theory becomes historical practice, which means success in revolution-
ary strategy. Therefore, Marxist social research has languished in an 
empirically under-developed backwater, insufficiently attuned to the 
complexity of society and dogmatically oriented to an "all-or-nothing" 
form of falsification which militates against the refinement of hypoth-
eses. The second consequence is that historical materialism lacks the 
dimension of self-reflexive critique. Instead of reflection on the status 
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of its own truth claims, and especially its own normative foundations, 
classical Marxism tends to reduce these to effects of social evolution. 
Legitimation crises in late capitalism 
'Jhe reconstruction of historical materialism around the distinction 
between labour and interaction, together with a reconceptualization 
of social structure and historical evolution through dialogue with 
mainstream sociology, does not mean abandonment of the traditional 
Marxist focus on linking crisis potentials of the capitalist system to 
the normative convictions of social agents. For both Habermas and 
associated thinker Claus Offe, the twentieth-century rise of the inter-
ventionist state in the context of monopoly capitalism is an irrevoca-
ble development, but it is not one that fundamentally solves the basic 
crisis dynamics of the system. Although they reject the labour theory 
of value and the falling rate of profit, Offe and Habermas support a 
conventional definition of the working class as waged labour and the 
state as an administrative institution separate from the economy, which 
is characterized by a monopoly of violence and a foundation in consti-
tutional law based on property forms. In Contradictions of the Welfare 
State (1984) and Disorganized Capitalism (1985), Offe deals with the 
financial and political burdens on capitalism of post-war social welfare 
and economic planning. Offe holds that capitalism is characterized by 
a basic contradiction between economic anarchy and the socialization 
of production that happens through state intervention and economic 
planning (Offe 1984: 15, 48). Under conditions of the decline ofliberal 
ideology as a justification for the system, especially the disintegration 
of the "achievement principle" of just rewards for hard work linked to 
possessive individualism, and the management of class conflict by arbi-
tration commissions, a political sea change happens. The technocratic 
ideology of successful growth and material prosperity re-politicizes the 
"private sector", making capitalist disorganization a social concern, at 
the same time that there is a shift "from conflict over group interest 
to conflict over general rules, and from the definition of claims to the 
definition of legitimate claimants" (Offe 1985: 231). Politics becomes 
a question of the rationality of the administrative sub-system, that is 
class conflict becomes latent, manifest only through issues of the effec-
tive steering of the economy. In Legitimation Crisis, Habermas accepts 
the broad thrust of this sort of argument, despite endorsing the labour 
theory of value and the falling rate of profit: 
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Economic growth takes place through periodically recurring 
crises because the class structure, transplanted into the eco-
nomic steering system, has transformed the contradiction of 
class interests into a contradiction of system imperatives. 
(Habermas 1975: 26) 
That Habermas subsequently drops the categories of classical Marxist 
economics for an analysis substantively identical to Off e's therefore has 
no impact on his general position. 
Habermas's innovation is to identify two additional forms of crisis 
tendency, beyond economic crises and their displacement into ration-
ality crises of the administrative sub-system, that are invisible in the 
classical analysis. These crisis types are "legitimation crises': affecting 
society's consensus agreement on the just exercise of political authority, 
or legitimacy of the administration, and "motivation crises", affecting 
individuals' dispositions to engage in work performances, cooperate 
socially and support prevalent cultural values. Legitimation and motiva-
tion crises arise within the socio-cultural sub-system, which operates 
according to a different logic from that of the economic and political 
sub-systems (Figure 4). 
Habermas's position is best grasped as a left-wing reply to Daniel 
Bell's neoconservative thesis on the "cultural contradictions oflate capi-
talism': According to Bell, there is a contradiction between late capitalist 
Economic subsystem 
• Function: social adaption to 
the natural environment 
• Steered by: money 
Management of economic 
crises generates rationality 
crisis in administration 
Administrative subsystem 
• Function: maintenance of 
social reproduction through 
generalized direction of 
society 
• Steered by: power 
Monetarization of socio-cultural 
interaction generates motivation 
crises among individuals 
Bureaucratic management 
of socio-cultural interaction 
generates legitimation crisis 
for the administration 
Socio-cultural subsystem 
• Function: transmission 
of cultural knowledge, 
maintenance of value consensus 
and socialization of individuals 
• Maintained by: communicative 
interactions 
Figure 4 Rationality, legitimation and motivation crises in late capitalism 
(based on Habermas 1973: 49). 
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multinational corporatism and bureaucratic administration, arising in 
economics and politics, and the forms of governance and types of per-
sonality needed to make the system work. Western societies face a crisis 
of governance because of an excess of democratic expectations that is 
incompatible with system imperatives of economics and administra-
tion. Furthermore, consumer hedonism and modernist culture have 
undermined the work ethic, generating a motivational crisis affect-
ing labour performances and sparking an anti-authoritarian counter-
culture. For Bell, the solution is to depoliticize the administration in 
order to unload democratic expectations, through radical economic 
deregulation, and to combine this with a return to religion in order to 
generate conformist personalities that have been re-oriented to the work 
ethic. For Habermas, by contrast, emerging legitimation and motivation 
crises point to the need for a radical democratization of administration 
and economy, together with an expansion and deepening of modernist 
culture. The emancipatory potentials of modernity have been choked, 
because the economy and the administration, with their anonymous 
and amoral imperatives, have colonized the socio-cultural system and 
the public sphere. Consumer hedonism is certainly a problem, but a 
modernist anti-authoritarian culture and a set of highly democratic 
expectations are part of the solution. 
More theoretically, Habermas's fundamental point is that "distur-
bances of system integration endanger [the] continued existence [of a 
social formation] only to the extent that social integration is at stake, 
that is when the consensual foundations of normative structures are 
impaired so that society becomes anomic" (Habermas 1975: 3). Social 
integration through interaction is different to system integration 
through the anonymous media of money and (bureaucratic) power. 
The consensual coordination of action among social agents, or social 
integration, cannot be accomplished via the interventions of money 
and power. These areas of social life depend on communicative inter-
action rather than success-oriented efficient action and they cannot be 
made more effective through functional differentiation. Accordingly, 
the socio-cultural sub-system simply does not behave in the same way 
that the economy and administration do, which is why the monetary 
manipulation of consensus formation and the bureaucratic production 
of values and motivations always deepens the crisis rather than resolving 
it. The notion of crisis tendencies concerning the normative justifica -
tions for legitimate orders and personal motivations corrects the bleak 
perspectives of the "total system,, advanced by Adorno and Horkheimer 
(Habermas 1987a: 130). 
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Communicative action versus strategic action 
In the first of the two massive volumes of 1he Theory of Communicative 
Action Habermas deepens and extends the perspective developed in 
Legitimation Crisis, together with his reconstructive critique of histori-
cal materialism. His fundamental strategy is to develop the distinction 
between labour and interaction, which implicitly underscores the oppo-
sition between crises of system integration (economic crises: economics; 
rationality crisis: administration) and crises of social integration (motiva-
tion crises: culture; legitimation crises: society), into a distinction between 
strategic action and communicative action. Accordingly, Habermas 
defines strategic action and communicative action as the two different 
modalities of the social coordination of action regulating the economic 
and political sub-systems and the socio-cultural system respectively: 
• Strategic action involves the instrumentalization of social cooper-
ation: strategic action is coordination of action by means of "influ-
ence': where influence means the employment of inducements 
other than reasons - such as money, force or status - to gain the 
required pseudo-consensus for action (Habermas 1984: 332-3). 
Strategic action operates legitimately in sub-systems steered by 
generalized media (money- economics; power - administration). 
It is illegitimate when it enters areas of value consensus, personal-
ity formation and cultural knowledge, either as direct manipu-
lation through money and power or as indirect manipulation 
through distorted communication, such as appeals to prejudice 
or false representations of material interests. 
• Communicative action involves the coordination of action 
through "consent': based on the linguistic process of reaching 
understanding in dialogue, operating in the socio-cultural sub-
system {Habermas 1984: 94-6). Consent means understanding 
of the justifications for action, and it presupposes the rationality 
of participants and their unforced agreement. Communicative 
action therefore means not just the existence of dialogue, but the 
process of rational justification and reasoned argument, which 
in turn entails the legitimacy of dissent and therefore reciprocity 
between participants. 
From this perspective, ideology means ((systematically distorted com-
munication'', that is forms of self-deception in which norms and values 
are protected from rational scrutiny by their acceptance as common 
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convictions "beyond question': This happens because they have taken 
on the function of legitimating forms of strategic action, and debate 
is selectively controlled by power interests in the public sphere and 
bureaucratic administration (Habermas 1987b: 346). Note that this is 
different from forms of pseudo-consensus resulting from the strategic 
manipulation of debate through influence or concealment of real inter-
ests, because it refers to the effect of system pressures on individuals' 
conception of their own values and interests. 
Habermas then reconstructs the pragmatics of speech involved in 
communicative action, in order to clarify how universal normative 
standards, which can be agreed upon by all rational persons, represent 
a critical perspective on the crisis tendencies of late capitalism. To set 
this up, Habermas turns to Weber. Instead of interpreting of rationaliza -
tion as reification (e.g. Adorno), Habermas interprets reification as an 
effect of unbalanced rationalization. 
According to Weber, modern, formal rationality generates a secular 
society characterized by the separation of cultural value spheres (sci-
ence, morality, art) into distinct expert specializations, which develop 
independently of one another by following up the particular logic of 
their subject matter. Habermas describes this process as "cultural ration-
alization" and holds that it is progressive. For Habermas, the division 
of modern reason into the distinct cultural value spheres follows from 
the structure of speech itself. This involves two steps: 
1. The programme of "universal/formal pragmatics" involves render-
ing explicit "from the perspective of those participating in dis-
courses and interactions ... the pre-theoretical grasp of rules on 
the part of competently speaking, acting and knowing subjects': 
by means of an analysis of what counts as rational action under 
certain conditions (Habermas 1987a: 297-8). For Habermas, 
rational action entails plausible belief, since making an action 
intelligible for a community involves the actor providing reasoned 
arguments for their belief regarding a situation in the world. For 
Habermas, the dialogical justifications that agents provide one 
another for their conduct leads to the intersubjective construction 
of psychological, social and natural reality, through the building 
up of situation definitions regarding the world. Rationality is seen 
as grounded in the intersubjective process of reaching agreement 
through dialogical justifications. In this process, agents manage 
to cooperate because they share rationally agreed situation defini-
tions - and therefore a common world - so that argumentative 
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justification (rational action) generates at once individual auton-
omy and social solidarity. 
2. Argumentative claims presuppose a belief in states of affairs in 
what Habermas calls the objective, social and subjective worlds. 
Just as instrumental transformation of nature is justified with ref-
erence to states of affairs in the objective world, moral conduct 
is justified with reference to states of affairs in the social world 
and self-expression is justified with reference to states of affairs 
in the subjective world of the speaker (Habermas 1984: 75-101). 
Specializations in the different validity claims about the objec-
tive, social and subjective worlds yield the differentiated value 
spheres of natural and social science, morality and law, and art. 
The rise of expert cultures, specialized in one of the value spheres 
to the exclusion of the others, reinforces the autonomy of value 
spheres and the decentring of the modern worldview. A major 
consequence is that rational agreement is now a procedural ques-
tion rather than a substantive one, because the sort of reasons 
varies according to the kind of validity claim. Speech acts "can 
always be rejected under each of the three aspects: the aspect of 
the rightness that a speaker claims for his action in relation to a 
normative context (or indirectly for those norms themselves); the 
truthfulness that the speaker claims for the expression of subjec-
tive experiences to which he has privileged access; finally, the truth 
that the speaker, with his utterance, claims for a statement (or 
for the existential presuppositions of a nominalized proposition)" 
(Habermas 1984: 307). 
The totality of these different sorts of argument Habermas calls "com-
municative reason". There is a neat "tripliciti' to Habermas's schema 
that flows from his somewhat Kantian, approach. This can be laid out 
in a table that I will explain below (see Table I). 
According to Habermas: 
• Cognitive claims about the objective world are valid if they rep-
resent the truth about states of affairs, argumentatively redeemed 
through propositional logic and experimental falsification. 
Knowledge springing from these arguments forms the (natural 
and social) sciences and is deposited in the everyday lives ofindi-
viduals as formal cognitive operations and verified hypotheses. 
• Normative claims about the social world are valid if they repre-
sent guidelines for right conduct that can be agreed upon by all 
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fable 1. Communicative reason and cultural rationalization (based on Habermas 
1984: 23). 
Referential Dimension of Validity claim Cultural value Structure-
world communicative as part of sphere= forming effect 
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affected, argumentatively redeemed through universalistic moral 
reasoning. Knowledge springing from these arguments forms the 
moral basis for modern legislation and is deposited in the eve-
ryday lives of individuals as post-conventional moral discourses, 
such as utilitarian ethics and formal-universal Cdeontological") 
morality. 
• Expressive claims about the subjective world of modern individu-
als are valid if they represent interpretations of human needs and 
cultural values that a community can accept as authentic, that is 
as a truthful expression of desires and feelings that lead to healthy 
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forms of individual self-realization. Knowledge springing from 
these arguments forms modern art and is deposited in the every. 
day lives of individuals as post-traditional motivations, that is as 
a set of attitudes that enables modern persons to select a lifestyle 
for themselves in the context of pluralism. 
To summarize, on Habermas's interpretation, each of the value spheres 
operates according to a distinctive logic, of cognitive (science), norma. 
tive (law and morals) and expressive (aesthetic) reasoning, governed 
by the particular procedures by which their defining validity claims of 
truth (cognitive), rightness (normative) and truthfulness (aesthetic) are 
articulated symbolically and redeemed argumentatively. Because these 
domains are institutionalized as specialized forms of inquiry, liberated 
from religion, protected from the pragmatic pressures of everyday com-
municative action, and shielded from the intrusive predominance of 
one another's validity claims, they can develop expert knowledge about 
the objective, social and subjective worlds (respectively). Ideally, this 
flows back into the everyday existence of modern individuals through 
processes of translation, resulting in the release of rational potentials 
into cultural knowledge, social integration and socialized personalities. 
The intention here is to specify why it is that modernity is an advance 
on pre-modern community, because it leads to differentiated, secular 
knowledge and expanded possibilities for individual self-realization. 
Habermas is now in a position to specify exactly how universal nor-
mative standards, which can be agreed upon by all rational persons, 
represent a critical perspective on the crisis tendencies oflate capitalism. 
The Habermasian ((ideal speech situation: or ((unconstrained communi-
cation': is intended as a counterfactual ideal (or ideal normative stand-
ard) that is latent in modern communicative action but everywhere 
prevented from realization by commodification and bureaucratization. 
Engagement in reasoned argument, Habermas explains, presupposes 
that participants are implicitly committed to the force of the better 
argument alone and that they must reach consensus in order to coop-
eratively act. Another consequence is that the conditions of existence 
for this debate can legitimately be contested, so that the existence of 
exploitation and oppression necessarily call into question the validity of 
any argumentative consensus. Implicitly, then, participants in rational 
debate subscribe to the ideal of an open, democratic community that 
is not disfigured by any inequalities which would prevent participa-
tion in decision-making. In other words, what it is to be human, and 
especially what it is to speak in the modern world, carries with it the 
198 understanding marx1sm 
ideal of emancipation from domination and existence in a meaningful 
social world (Habermas 1984: 398). Habermas formalizes this as follows: 
1. Every subject with the competence to speak and act is 
allowed to take part in a discourse. 
2. (A) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion what-
soever; (B) Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion 
whatsoever into the discourse; ( C) Everyone is allowed to 
express their attitudes, desires and needs. 
3. No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coer-
cion, from exercising their rights as laid down in ( 1) and 
(2) above. (Habermas 1999: 89) 
Against this background, Habermas outlines a programme for post-
conventional moral and legal representations called "discourse ethics': 
designed to spearhead the reconstruction of society within a demo-
cratic framework. Discourse ethics goes beyond deontological morality, 
because it allows speakers to consider generalizable interests as well as 
universal principles, consequences of action as well as norms of con-
duct. Among other things, Habermas intends this as a foundation for 
legislation that would set a normative ceiling on the forms of strategic 
action that can happen in the economy and administration. Having 
defined the conditions for rational discourse (above), he sets up "D': 
the Discourse Principle, as: 
D: Only those norms may claim to be valid that could meet 
with the consent of all affected in their role as participants in 
a practical discourse. (Ibid.: 197) 
On this basis, he defines "U", the Principle of Moral Universalis-
ability, as: 
I 
U: For a norm to be valid, the consequences and side-effects 
of its general observance for the satisfaction of each person's 
particular interests must be acceptable to all. (Ibid.: 197) 
Such a moral criterion is perfectly compatible with social complex-
ity and democratic politics, but it does not redure politics to morality 
(Habermas 1996: 110). Habermas's position takes a process of societal 
rationalization in economics and administration that has run out of 
control, and confronts it with the democratic implications of a process 
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of cultural rationalization that has yet to fulfil its potentials. Habermas 
therefore suggests that the problems of modernity spring from the 
institutionalization of strategic action (instrumental reason in its social 
application), to the exclusion of communicative action. In keeping with 
the investigation oflegitimation and motivation crises, the problems of 
modernity emerge at the level not of system integration but of social 
integration - the central faultline in modern social conflict is system 
versus lifeworld. 
System versus lifeworld 
In the second volume of Ihe Theory of Communicative Action, the 
"lifeworld" is a highly generalized replacement for Habermas's "socio-
cultural system" from Legitimation Crisis, but it remains the locus of the 
crisis tendencies in contemporary capitalism. According to Habermas, 
society is only a "system" when regarded from the perspective of an 
observer interested in the functional differentiation of social actions. 
Society is a "lifeworld" when regarded from the position of a partici-
pant, that is from within the performative attitude adopted by speaking 
subjects in the generation of consensus. Whereas the efficiency of the 
system depends on adaptation to the system's environment, based on 
survival needs, the coherence of the lifeworld depends upon cultural 
reproduction, social integration and personal socialization. Haberrnas 
proposes that modern existence involves a dialectical relation between 
cultural rationalization - the emergence of a new consensus within the 
meaningful whole of the lifeworld - and social rationalization - the 
increasing complexity of a system composed of functional sub-systems. 
Because of the «selective rationalization" of modernity - that is the pre-
dominance of strategic action and instrumental reason - system and 
lifeworld are in conflict. 
Habermas proposes that everyday life happens through a network of 
communicative actions (the mutual negotiation of situation definitions) 
taking place against a background of unquestioned presuppositions. 
Accordingly, coherent social reproduction requires the consistency of 
the cultural framework of everyday life. The reproduction of the life-
world involves ( 1) transmission and renewal of cultural knowledge -
cultural reproduction; (2) maintaining the solidarity of individuals as 
members of a community through providing legitimation for institu-
tions - social integration; and (3) the formation of personal identities 
that can form life histories and have motivations for participation in 
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social life - personal socialization. Thus the reproduction of the life-
world is also the reproduction of the structural components of the 
Iifeworld, culture, society and person (Habermas 1987b: 137-8). Against 
the notion that society is solely a system operating through subjects 
who are mere bearers of a process, Habermas insists that society funda-
mentally consists of conscious participants who take part in a coherent, 
symbolically-structured form of everyday life. The symbolic structures 
of everyday life, he maintains, ('are reproduced by way of the continua-
tion of valid knowledge, stabilization of group solidarity and socializa-
tion of responsible actors" (ibid.: 137). 
In line with hermeneutic theories, Habermas defines the lifeworld 
as a "culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of inter-
pretive patterns" that make shared definitions of worldly situations 
and therefore rational consent to social cooperation possible for par-
ticipants in social life (ibid.: 136). Consonant with this hermeneutic 
conception of the lifeworld, Habermas specifies that it consisis of the 
pre-theoretical and pre-reflexive horizon of pre-understandings (back-
ground assumptions) that supply the context against which actions 
are intelligible. The lifeworld is the global context of knowledge and 
beliefs that must be assumed by actors as the horizon of expectations 
for their action: "everyday communicative practice is not compatible 
with the hypothesis that everything could be entirely different" (ibid.: 
132). Problematic situations make us aware of some of the background 
assumptions that guide our conduct, and these assumptions lose their 
certainty - in Habermasian terms, the assumptions that are thematized 
(highlighted) generate the situations within which the horizon can be 
glimpsed as a horizon. 
The lifeworld is reproduced as a coherent whole when social actors 
can connect new situations with existing or renovated cultural interpre-
tations, legitimate orders and personal histories (ibid.: 140-41). In other 
words, social integration happens when social actors are able to connect 
emergent social conditions with action norms governing pre-existing 
situations, that is with a raft of cultural meanings, legitimate values and 
personality types. People have to know what is happening, what to do 
and who they are during major social change. Lack of answers to any 
of these questions generates disorientation, especially when the collec-
tive generation of new answers - through political debate and social 
mobilization - is systematically blocked by a commodified culture and 
a mediatized democracy. Thus a crisis in the lifeworld results in failure 
of interpretive schemes (loss of meaning), loss of legitimacy (legitima -
tion crisis) and anomie (motivation crisis). 
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• Culture. Seamless cultural reproduction means the adapta-
tion of existing cultural frameworks to new situations and 
therefore the insertion of social actors into institutional roles 
with the sense that their participation is meaningful and 
valid. Cultural reproduction means the maintenance of, or 
innovation within, interpretive frameworks, leading to cul-
tural knowledge that is relevant to new situations. 
• Society. Effective normative integration reinforces the cul-
tural norms and ethical values that legitimate the social 
order as just, and maintains the sense of personal relevance 
to social actors of their social obligations. Normative regu-
lation happens when individuals believe that they have a 
moral duty to other members of their society and that their 
participation will be rewarded in proportion to their deserts. 
• Person. Operative socialization generates personality struc-
tures capable of coping realistically with new situations, 
increasing the capacity for innovatively interpreting and 
integrating new knowledge (culture) and increasing the 
likelihood of motivations for actions that conform to social 
norms. (Habermas 1987b: 141) 
A persistent crisis of social integration can therefore be characterized 
at the levels of culture, society and person. These are marked by: (1 -
culture) cultural disorientation caused by loss of meaning, as existing 
interpretative schemes cannot explain new cultural conditions - prob-
lems of relativism; (2 - society) an erosion of solidarity and the rise 
of alienated/ anomic individualism, because new situations cannot be 
reconciled with the existing normative regulation of social groups - a 
crisis of legitimation; and (3 - person) decline in personal responsibility 
linked to broken generational continuity and the waning of historicity, 
leading to an increase in psychopathologies and to a disconnection 
between generalized competencies for action and personal responsi-
bility- the spread of anomie and pathological narcissism (ibid.: 142-3). 
The rationalization of the lifeworld foregrounds the contingency of 
cultural traditions, social relations and individual biographies. cclhe 
further the structural components of the lifeworld and the processes 
that contribute to maintaining them get differentiated, the more inter-
action contexts come under conditions of rationally motivated mutual 
understanding, that is of consensus formation that rests in the end on 
the authority of the better argument" (ibid.: 145). The key point here 
is that Habermas reconceptualizes the Weberian notion of cultural 
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rationalization as a progressive rationalization of the lifeworld, in order 
to propose a sort of syllogism. (1) The process of redefining cultural 
knowledge, social norms and personal identities through rational argu-
ment, which happens as new situations emerge, leads to an increas-
ingly rational way of life. ( 2) The tendency of late capitalism to crises 
of social integration (interpretive, legitimation and motivation crises) is 
the result of new, post-traditional forms of culture, society and personal-
ity being blocked by system imperatives. (3) Therefore, late capitalism 
is irrational insofar as it generates "cultural contradictions" that could 
be rationally solved, by altering the balance between system and life-
world. Nonetheless, Habermas does not advocate a transparent society 
along lines of Enlightenment rationalism: although rationalization of 
the lifeworld is permanent unless deliberately turned backwards by a 
willed suspension of disbelief, the lifeworld remains a sort of conserva-
tive ballast within the persistence of reflexivity (Habermas 1984: 70). 
A background of pre-reflexive consensus is essential to the conduct 
of everyday life, for reflexive debate about all social conduct would be 
exhausting and impossible. 
According to Habermas, the economy and administration are not 
coordinated through communicative action, but are "steered" by means 
of"media" such as money and power. For Habermas, "media'' turn lin-
guistic coordination of action into coordination through quantitative 
values or qualitative performances. Correspondingly, the social prac-
tices of agents engaged in media-steered sub-systems Cmediatized") 
become predictable performances, within arenas that are normatively 
neutral and governed solely by efficiency. Consequently, he (eventu-
ally) proposes that economy and state are domains of strategic action, 
with a normative ceiling set by legislation reflecting a value-consensus 
emanating from the lifeworld (Habermas 1996: 55-6, 78-9). 
• Economy: according to Habermas, the mediatization of economy 
and politics reduces the burden on communicative action in the 
detraditionalized lifeworld. The real abstraction of monetarized 
systems bypasses the processes of consensus-oriented communi-
cation, because the market functions as an information system, so 
that strategic agents can control the actions of others at a distance 
through price movements (Habermas 1984: 185). The automatic 
coordination of strategic actors and the efficient reproduction of 
material conditions are accomplished by the same mechanism. The 
law of contracts makes an area of social life in which individuals 
can relate strategically - meaning that the burden of legitimation 
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for strategic action in the economy passes from the economic 
subsystem to the legal system, whose legitimacy subsidizes the 
entire network of contracts (Habermas 1996: 187-8). 
• Politics: according to Habermas, disequilibria in the economy are 
managed by the bureaucratic administration that is mediatized 
by "power': The legally constituted authority of the administrative 
personnel results in a predictable hierarchy of qualities (degrees 
of authority) that relate to scientifically specified organizational 
performances, political decisions and manipulations of public 
loyalty (Habermas 1987b: 346-53). It seems to me that "power'' 
is a qualitative medium where "money" is a quantitative medium 
- administrative legislation specifies the qualitative authority of 
state officials and describes their performances in ways that are 
predictable, rather than calculable numerically. Once again, this is 
a domain of strategic action sanctioned by law, whose legitimacy 
underwrites the entire network of performances. 
For Habermas, the contradictions of capitalism have been so suc-
cessfully managed that a continuous rise in living standards and new 
social cleavages have displaced class conflicts. The opposition between 
system and lifeworld constitutes the new shock front in social conflict 
(Habermas 1987b: 345). 
The colonization thesis and the public sphere 
Habermas explores the conflict potential of modern life at the end of 
The Theory of Communicative Action and in Between Facts and Norms. 
According to him, social reproduction must happen in both dimensions 
of social existence - system and lifeworld. Functional integration of the 
sub-systems of the social system is essential for the material produc-
tion oflife and the reproduction of social existence. But the normative 
reproduction of the lifeworld is crucial for social cohesion and personal 
motivation. For Habermas, the problem is that functional (system) inte-
gration depends increasingly on a technocratic society with a managed 
democracy, whereas normative (social) integration tends towards legiti-
mation through public deliberation and self-reflexive social practices. 
The result is the intrusion of system dynamics into the processes of 
the lifeworld, which Habermas describes as the "internal colonization" 
of the lifeworld by the system (Habermas 1987b: 332-73). The imper-
atives of system dynamics, driven by money and power, lead to the 
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111anagement of system disequilibria, such as economic stagnation 
or political crises, through transferring the fallout of these difficul-
ties onto the lifeworld. In short, irrationalities of capital accumulation 
and bureaucratic domination are shunted onto the lifeworld through 
legal management of the normative problems that arise when rational 
agreement fails but processes of the renewal of consensus are blocked. 
According to Habermas, this happens through ('juridification'', the 
recasting normative relations as legal relations. For Habermas, legal 
relations are two-sided: both the missionaries of media colonization 
(as "juridification'') and the pacemakers of normative social evolution 
(as the legislative control of social life based on deliberative democ-
racy; Habermas 1996: 29, 40). (1) Legal relations carve out arenas for 
strategic action by formalizing relations between persons and making 
performances predictable. (2) But legal relations also impose a norma-
tive ceiling on strategic conduct, beyond which even actors who regard 
one another instrumentally cannot go. A clear example of this duality 
of the law is labour law and industrial relations. The key point is that 
the juridification of social relations displaces communicative action, 
and this process is an index of the clash between system and lifeworld. 
Instead of normative agreement, juridification makes possible an 
imposed consensus based on formal performances. The paradigm of 
juridification is the transformation of citizens into clients of welfare 
bureaucracies through the expert management of socialization and 
acculturation, a situation that Habermas describes as "civil privatism'. 
Another instance would be the transformation of communicative rela-
tions into monetary values through the legally sanctioned deregulation 
of market relations in everyday life. The system is driven by internal 
imperatives to reduce the complexity of its environment by eliminat-
ing the risks involved in public debates that aim at achieving cons en -
sus. From the lifeworld perspective, however, social relations become 
formal and abstract, while the state bureaucracy confronts its clients as a 
monolithic apparatus. According to Habermas, social crisis is managed 
by the mediatized sub-systems of economy and politics so effectively 
that crisis tendencies only really emerge in the lifeworld. Internal colo-
nization happens once money and power extend beyond their legiti-
mate domains of application and invade domains of action that require 
communicative consensus to operate successfully. The results are the 
characteristic crises of lifeworld structures (crises of loss of meaning, 
decline of social solidarity (anomie) and rise of psychopathologies). 
This is the Habermasian version of the reification problematic and the 
problem of ((instrumental reason'': 
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I still explain these pathologies by referring to the mechanism 
driving capitalism forward, namely, economic growth, but I 
assess them in terms of the systemically induced predominance 
of economic and bureaucratic ... rationality; within a one-sided 
or "alienated'' communicative practice. 
(Habermas 199Ia: 225) 
The process of colonization is made possible, because of the incomplete 
cultural rationalization of the lifeworld. Although traditional interpreta-
tions have lost their validity, the decline of the public sphere prevents the 
dissemination of the cultural resources needed to oppose the encroach-
ments of mediatized systems. Nonetheless, resistance happens, particu-
larly in the form of the new social movements, breaking out "along the 
seams between system and lifeworld" (Habermas 1987b: 395). 
For Habermas, the environmental crisis, together with the decline of 
social solidarity, that is, a widespread loss of confidence in the legitimacy 
of institutional arrangements, is the major problem in contemporary 
society (Habermas 1996: 445). In complex social systems, which require 
rationalization of the lifeworld to make them possible, social solidar-
ity takes the form of communicatively mediated self-determination. 
According to Habermas, problems in the monetarized-bureaucratic 
systems are diverted into culture and person, to protect the already 
weakened structure of solidarity, as from a system perspective, crises of 
meaning and anomie (e.g. the widespread dissatisfaction that goes with 
consumer hedonism and leads to nihilistic relativism) are preferable to 
crises oflegitimation. Nonetheless, Habermas is adamant that the solu-
tion to the problems of modernity is not political revolution. He protests 
that the complexity of mediatized sub-systems is too great for the leg-
islature (whether a parliament or soviet) to direct society consciously, 
since "no complex society could ever correspond to the model of com-
municative social relations" (ibid.: 326). Because the political is only one 
sub-system in a decentred system, "democratic movements emerging 
from civil society must give up holistic aspirations to a self-organizing 
society, aspirations that also undergirded Marxist ideas of social revo-
lution' (ibid.: 372). Although the political sub-system "continues to be 
the addressee for all unmanaged steering problems': it cannot be imag-
ined as "a macrosubject supposed to bring society as a whole under 
control and simultaneously act for if' (ibid.: 372). Instead, the dream 
of a transparent society needs to be replaced by the prospect of a self-
organizing legal community based on democratic will-formation, in a 
renewal of civil society that aims to restore the public sphere. 
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As a consequence, in Habermas's rethinking, the progressive project 
undergoes a drastic truncation. Habermas rejects state socialism and 
the planned economy, together with insurrectionary politics and the 
working class as subject of history. But he also rejects alternatives such 
as market socialism and versions of democratic socialism that acknowl-
edge the legitimacy of parliamentary democracy and seek to supplement 
this with social movements and political participation. In the place of 
the twentieth-century programme stands a modest programme for the 
renewal of the public sphere and the restoration of civil society, in a 
republican revival of democratic deliberation in advanced capitalism. 
The exemplary instance of this political project is the self-limiting dem-
ocratic revolutions of 1989 (see for instance the Habermas-influenced 
analysis of 1989 in Arato & Cohen 1992). 
For Habermas, the project of the left is to restrain system expan-
sion and protect the social integration performed by the lifeworld. At 
the same time, the economic and administrative sub-systems must be 
protected against rash democratic impulses, which under conditions of 
social complexity might risk a new barbarism. The left must abandon 
the idea of the proletariat or the state as a macro-subject and the pro-
gramme of the de-differentiation of society, to articulate a new balance 
between cultural and societal rationalization. A reinvigorated public 
sphere must be the epicentre for a practice of democratic will-formation 
capable of keeping the economy and administration within the right 
boxes. For Habermas, "only in an egalitarian public of citizens that has 
emerged from the confines of class and thrown off the millennia-old 
shackles of social stratification and exploitation can the potential of an 
unleashed cultural pluralism fully develop" (Habermas 1996: 308). But 
<<throwing off the shackles" seems to involve an impressive broadening 
of the left project at the cost of a surprising loss of depth. The inspira-
tional programmes of deliberative democracy, post-national govern-
ance, a cosmopolitan international order and discourse ethics seem 
supported by disappointingly modest reforms, including the formation 
of a critical public with egalitarian expectations, a reinvigoration of the 
public sphere, equal opportunities supported by participatory rights and 
a programme of reflexive controls over the public authority (Habermas 
1996: 457-62). 
The programme of deliberative democracy is the form taken by this 
effort to reflexively control the economy and administration without 
resorting to political violence or succumbing to the dream of a ration-
ally transparent totality steered by the revolutionary state. Part of the 
problem with revolutionary aspirations was that these located renewed 
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solidarity in the radical virtue of "new post-revolutionary men and 
women': an expectation that was always going to be disappointed in the 
context of a plurality of values. Habermas holds that a revitalized public 
sphere, which includes deepened political participation as well as open 
channels of public debate, is a realistic alternative capable of restoring 
the decaying solidarity of modern societies. On this basis, Habermas 
conceptualizes a procedural form of popular sovereignty arising from 
a radical democratization of society, where public deliberation on the 
legal system would create a balance between system and lifeworld. This 
preserves the legitimacy of the legal system by making it responsive to 
democratic will-formation, correcting the tendencies to legitimation 
crisis through addressing problems of democratic participation and 
substantive inequality. At the same time, cultural rationalization of the 
lifeworld would have to be unblocked, because, according to Habermas: 
even a proceduralized popular sovereignty of this sort cannot 
operate without the support of an accommodating political 
culture, without the basic attitudes, mediated by tradition and 
socialization, of a population accustomed to political freedom: 
rational will-formation cannot occur unless a rationalized life-
world meets it halfway. (Ibid.: 487) 
Habermas proposes that a deliberative democracy would coordinate 
constitutional liberties and political rights with extra-parliamentary 
forms of social activation and democratic citizenship, such as social 
movements and popular councils (ibid.: 299). 
Beyond communication 
Habermas's approach has been extraordinarily influential in Critical 
Theory and beyond, partly because he invites critical debate and responds 
constructively to argumentative challenges. Two of the most important 
instances of this have been the interventions of Nancy Fraser and Seyla 
Benhabib, who have questioned the extent of the critical part in con-
temporary Critical Theory. Although, from the beginning, Habermas 
indicated that Critical Theory would not be a utopian programme in 
the lineage of Romantic anti-capitalism, he insisted that it reconstruct 
the framework of historical materialism in line with its emancipatory 
intentions. Yet Habermas's recent political liberalism and endorsement 
of the idea of a post-secular society are difficult to square with Marx's 
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vision of a radically egalitarian, post-capitalist society guided by par-
ticipatory democracy. While neither Fraser nor Benhabib advocates a 
"return to Marx'', their criticisms probe the question of what must be 
re-naturalized in order to shoehorn Critical Theory into the framework 
of what we might call a ''constructive criticism of actually existing liberal 
d " emocracy. 
The question of gender inequality raises serious concerns with the 
formalism of Habermas's position. By treating gender roles solely as a 
question of cultural rationalization (traditional sex/ gender roles versus 
de-traditionalized sex/gender roles), Habermas neglects the whole 
dimension of the gendered division of domestic labour, labour market 
segmentation, the gendering of social welfare categories and the lack 
of political representation of women. Fraser challenges the distinction 
present in The Theory of Communicative Action between norm-free eco-
nomics and administration and an in-principle power-free lifeworld 
that includes the nuclear family. She draws attention to the structural 
bases in the gendered division of domestic work of the roles of citi-
zen, labourer, client and individual, which means that these catego-
ries cannot be regarded as self-evidently given (as Habermas does). 
Centrally, by excluding domestic labour from the definition of social 
labour, Habermas misses the structural roots of women's subordina-
tion and the material bases for de-traditionalized (but still oppressive) 
masculine gender roles, such as the sole breadwinner (Fraser 1995). 
Benhabib takes this further into a critique of Habermas's account 
of abstract selfhood in his developmental theory, which is based on 
Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral-cognitive developmental stages. 
For Benhabib, it is crucial to recognize that relations to the abstract, 
"generalized other" (the sort of universal reciprocity that yields mutual 
respect and social esteem) are not the only dimension of moral exist-
ence. Relations to concrete "particular others)) are also crucial for 
caring and for responsibility to other individuals (Benhabib 1995). In 
her brilliant Critique, Norm and Utopia, Benhabib argues that although 
Habermas speaks about expressing feelings and interpreting needs, this 
is separate from normative debate. Thus, Benhabib suggests, not only 
is the normative dimension of Critical Theory unnecessarily foreshort-
ened into a procedural formalism, but the utopian dimensions of the 
cultural interpretation of human needs and of concrete sociality are 
also lost (Benhabib 1986). 
Axel Honneth's initial reservations about the Habermasian pro-
gramme have now evolved into a different approach within Critical 
Theory, one that goes beyond Habermas but refuses Benhabib's 
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Adorno-influenced alternative. Somewhat startlingly in the context of 
a post-metaphysical philosophical approach that embraces the intersub-
jective turn, Honneth's idea of recognition struggles in late capitalism 
is built upon a critique of Adorno, Habermas and Foucault - and a 
return to Hegel. This is easily misunderstood. As Jean-Philippe Deranty 
points out in his striking critical study Beyond Communication (2009), 
although Honneth's powerful alternative is responsible for the recent 
interest in applying the Hegelian idea of struggles for recognition in late 
capitalism, this must not be confused with post-structuralist-influenced 
identity politics (Deranty 2009: 426-40). Instead, Honneth's ((return to 
Hegel'' happened in the wake of Habermas, where "reference to Hegel 
was a means to a non-Hegelian end, an alternative way to found a critical 
theory of society whose basic premises were certainly not Hegelian, but 
materialist" (ibid.: 9). Honneth's return to Hegel is a kind of return to 
Marx, not unlike Habermas's earlier claim to have discovered an under-
developed conceptual distinction at the mutual root of Hegel and Marx's 
theories, one with the potential to correct their subsequent mistakes. 
From Honneth's perspective, the return to Hegel means he can also 
correct something highly problematic about the way that Habermas relies 
on functionalism, namely his upholding of "the theoretical fictions of a 
norm-free domain of social reproduction (the economy, the administra-
tion) and of a power-free domain of social integration (the family, the 
public sphere)" (ibid.: 97). As Honneth specifies in his Critique of Power. 
[Habermas's] methodological dualism of "system integration'' 
and "social integration'' that was initially only supposed to 
describe two complimentary perspectives in the analysis of 
one and the same process of evolution is transformed along the 
path toward the rationalisation of social action into the factual 
dualism of "system" and "lifeworld'~ (Honneth 1991: 294) 
These problems - the reification of an analytical distinction into an 
ontological difference, system/lifeworld, and the supposition that these 
correspond to the distinction norm-free/normative - are of course 
related, because they are based on the opposition between strategic 
action and communicative action. 
Honneth's alternative is to think through the way that both work 
and interaction are permeated by the normative dimension, in order to 
reconnect the process of the ~xpansion and deepening of moral univer-
sality with the process of functional differentiation in complex societies. 
His claim is that the young Hegel's Jena manuscripts contain the germ of 
21 O understanding marx1sm 
a theory of moral identity that includes interpersonal, legal-moral and 
cultural-ethical dimensions, before these become reified in the philoso-
phy of right into that famous triad of ethical life, the family, civil society 
and the state. In a complex argument involving moral psychology and a 
deep interest in psychoanalysis, Honneth proposes that the components 
of moral identity are developed by agents in response to their socializa-
tion, which involves an internalization of social expectations as to how 
they treat others, and how they are treated themselves. Describing these 
as three abstract "recognition spheres" that compose every agent's nor-
mative self-relation (i.e. sense of moral selfhood), Honneth discusses 
these components of moral identity in privative terms, defining them 
in terms of how they can be damaged. Accordingly, he defines these 
recognition spheres in terms of: 
• ((love" as an interpersonal bond founded on the non-viola-
tion of the body; 
• ((respect" as a formal, universalistic relation founded on the 
non-denial of rights; 
• "esteem", sometimes also called ''solidarity': as a particular, 
communal relation founded on the non-denigration of indi-
viduals' worth. (Honneth 1995: 106-9) 
Two features of these definitions deserve remark. The first is that these 
are intended as relational definitions of moral identity based in histori-
cally developing forms of ethical life, because the key idea is the violation 
of an agent's expectations through the abuse of their body (beyond what 
they expect), the denial of rights (relative to the ones they actually have) 
and the denigration of their worth (in a communal context of hierarchi-
cal valuations). As Honneth proposes: 
The sequence of forms of recognition follows the logic of a 
formative process that is mediated by the stages of a moral 
struggle. In the course of their identity formation and at their 
current stage of integration into the community, subjects are 
... transcendentally required to enter into an intersubjective 
conflict, the outcome of which is the recognition of claims to 
autonomy previously not socially affirmed. (Ibid.: 69) 
The second feature is that the ambition is to describe social conflict 
in terms not only of interest clashes, but also of normative grievances. 
According to Honneth, this generates a chain of struggles whose effect 
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is the extension and deepening of the normative relations of a histori-
cal form of life: 
[I] n every historical epoch, individual particular anticipations 
of expanded recognition relations accumulate into a system 
of normative demands, and this consequently forces societal 
development as a whole to adapt to the process of progressive 
individuation. (Ibid.: 83-4) 
For Honneth, "the result is a chain of normative ideals pointing in 
the direction of increasing personal autonomy" (ibid.: 84). Following 
Marshall's political sociology of citizenship, Honneth identifies a cumu-
lative development of in modern rights-claims. The scope oflegal rec-
ognition has expanded considerably during the last two hundred years. 
Contemporary discussions distinguish: 
• civil rights guaranteeing liberty (negative rights securing life, lib-
erty and property); 
• political rights guaranteeing participation (positive rights protect-
ing entry into public life); and 
• social rights guaranteeing basic welfare (distribution of basic 
goods). 
For Honneth, this represents an expansion in the scope of rights and 
their progressive extension into spheres - for instance intimacy and 
solidarity - previously regulated by other principles. This is because 
struggles for recognition have resulted in a continuous development in 
the legally safeguarded capabilities regarded as the minimal basis for 
democratic citizenship (ibid.: 114). 
Together, these add up to two extremely serious and important 
claims. (1) Moral progress, at least in the Western world, has been the 
consequence of recognition struggles that have successfully claimed 
expanded rights. These things were not generously handed down by a 
benevolent liberal capitalism. They were won in struggle. And (2) social 
conflict is generally triggered by legitimate normative grievances, with 
the implication that protest movements and reform claims are usually 
justified: 
What motivates individuals or social groups to call the prevail-
ing recognition order into question and to engage in practical 
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resistance is the moral conviction that, with respect to their 
own situations or particularities, the recognition principles 
considered legitimate are incorrectly or inadequately applied. 
(Honneth 2003: 157) 
This is the "motivational basis of all social conflicts" (ibid.: 157). 
Summary of key points 
Differences between Critical Theory and Frankfurt School 
Marxism 
• Critical Theory retrieves normatively grounded forms of demo-
cratic theory for progressive purposes, especially around the idea 
of the public sphere, defined as the "social space generated in 
communicative action", that is the space of rational debates about 
matters concerning the general interest. 
• Critical Theory introduces a distinction between labour (and 
instrumental rationality) and interaction (and communicative 
rationality) designed to prevent the collapse of normative ques-
tions into the theory of social evolution that is typical of unrecon-
structed forms of historical materialism. 
Social structure, crisis tendencies and political conflict 
• Based on conventional definitions of class and state, class conflict 
has become merely latent because of the administrative manage-
ment of economic crises, but this transfers crisis potentials to the 
nation state, which tends to suffer from rationality crises as the 
bureaucracy struggles with social planning. 
• The administrative system transfers rationality crises onto the 
socio-cultural system in the form of potential for legitimation 
and motivation crises based around declining social solidarity 
and the disintegration of the capitalist work ethic. 
• Social structure is best conceptualized in terms of regions of 
strategic action - the capitalist economy and state administra-
tion - where action is coordinated instrumentally, and regions of 
communicative action - the socio-cultural system, better regarded 
as the lifeworld - where action is coordinated through rational 
arguments. 
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• Political conflict, often represented by the new social movements 
breaks out along the seams of the opposition between system and 
lifeworld because of the unbalanced relation between communi~ 
cative and strategic action domains, which is ultimately a conse~ 
quence of capitalist social relations. 
• Ideology is recast as systematically distorted communication, that 
is the internalization of norms and values that have been fixed in 
place to support system processes and protected from debate by 
vested interests, into the self-identity of individuals in a form of 
self-deception. 
Political strategy and radical prospects 
• The ideal of a deliberative democracy seeks to revitalize the public 
sphere and restore democratic controls over the economy and 
administration, without returning to the classical vision of a soci-
ety centred on the revolutionary state and supported by a virtuous 
citizenry. 
• The concept of recognition struggles supports the normative 
grievances that underlie social conflict and political movements, 
locating the root of moral progress and democratic potentials 
in modern society not in rational arguments, but in rationally 
motivated political clashes that respond to oppression. 
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eight 
Post-Marxism 
The "post)) in post-Marxism signifies ambivalence, a politics that is after, 
but not beyond, Marxism. The diversity of post-Marxism is enormous. 
On the one hand, for many contemporary thinkers, "the only possible 
future for Marxism is as one contributing strand among others in the 
new, post-Marxian field" (Aronson 1995: 111, Fraser cited). On the 
other hand, Marx has become an essential reference point for most 
social theory today, so that nobody can really be considered to make 
a serious contribution to the field without engagement with Marxism. 
This is the spirit in which (non-Marxist) philosopher Jacques Derrida 
once wrote that <<there will be ... no future without Marx" (Derrida 
1994: 13). The dispersion and dilution of Marxism is the same thing as 
the breadth and depth of its influence, and this is to be welcomed. As 
Stuart Sim argues, however, a distinction can be made between post-
Marxism and post-Marxism: 
To be post-Marxist is to have turned one,s back on the princi-
ples of Marxism, [whereas] to be post-Marxist is ... to attempt 
to graft recent theoretical developments . . . on to Marxism, 
such that Marxism can be made relevant to a new cultural 
climate. (Sim 1998: 2) 
We are therefore concerned with post-Marxism, a particular part of 
the post-Marxian field. That part explicitly essays a reconstruction of 
Marxism, one designed to retrieve its emancipatory impulse under spe-
cific historical and intellectual conditions. The discrediting of socialism 
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with the collapse of historical Communism is only one factor in a raft 
of developments that problematize Marxism. Significantly, develop-
ments in twentieth-century philosophy, and especially the «linguistic 
turn" and the notion of intersubjectivity, have called into question the 
foundational assumptions of classical social theory. In this sense, then, 
we have already been in the midst of post-Marxism with Analytical 
Marxism and Critical Theory. But for various reasons, these "English" 
and "German" approaches have chosen against describing themselves 
in that way. Post-Marxism as the self-designation of a theoretical cur-
rent and political strategy has been restricted to a particular wing of 
contemporary thinking. The post-Marxists dealt with in this chapter 
include some of the most exciting and influential contemporary think-
ers, such as Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Slavoj Zizek, Judith Butler, 
Jacques Ranciere and Alain Badiou. Although by no means a unified 
current, these post-Marxists have in common that they emerged from 
Structural Marxism under the influence, at least initially, of the phi-
losophy of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan. Laclau, 
Mouffe, Butler and Zizek in particular made efforts at the turn of the 
millennium to form a coherent tendency around a discourse-theoretical 
rethinking of concepts of practice, structure and history, and they will 
be the central focus of this discussion. 
Although post-Marxism has been strongly criticized by many 
Marxists, I am not in agreement with the idea that the new post-Marxian 
field is just an "ex-Marxism without substance" (Geras 1990: 127-68). 
Alongside Analytical Marxism and Critical Theory, post-Marxism rep-
resents a provocative and challenging effort to reconstruct the project of 
the left while preserving the emancipatory impulse of Marxism. More 
activist-focused than other currents, post-Marxists argue that new sorts 
of social movement built around non-class social antagonisms have 
marginalized the politics of the class-based left, in both the industri-
alized countries and the developing world. Meanwhile, mainstream 
politics has shifted from two-party oppositions between liberal and con-
servatives, or social democrats and conservative liberals (depending on 
location), to a bipartisan consensus on economic neoliberalism, authori-
tarian modifications of parliamentary politics and a communitarian 
emphasis on national belonging often larded with ethnic prejudices. The 
world of the great neoliberal consensus is a potentially fragile landscape 
of post-political technocratic management of social conflict, combined 
with frequent resort to right-wing populism in order to recruit electoral 
constituencies. Yet the left has been unable to regain the political initia-
tive, despite the decline in the popular base of the mainstream parties 
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and the massive failure of economic neoliberalism in a global financial 
crisis. By contrast, around the world, radical right-wing movements are 
framing a mass-based challenge to the agenda of neoliberalism, through 
a combination of populist politics with religious fundamentalism. 
The response of post-Marxism is complex and various - consist-
ent with the diversity of this current - but fundamentally based on a 
defence of the ability of the politics of protest to develop into a moment 
of rupture. Indeed, in some respects the "post-Marxism" label reduces 
to two things. First, most have replaced Marx's anti-political utopianism 
with a position that affirms the permanence of politics, understood as 
the necessity and desirability of those social conflicts that contest social 
relations through the mediation of the political community as a whole. 
And second, many find in post-structuralist philosophy an intellectual 
critique of the operation of thinking in fixed essences ("essentialism") 
that grounds perspectives of the end of politics. For Ladau and Mouffe, 
for instance, the key to an anti-essentialist politics of social complexity 
is to embrace the idea of the Democratic Revolution of Modernity. This 
is the idea that the modern revolution is centred on democratic politics 
as the process whereby social relations are contested and modified, in 
an ongoing process of the constitution of society by participating citi-
zens. Accordingly, Laclau and Mouff e develop an agenda that integrates 
socialist strategy within the modern framework of democratic politics 
in order to retain the value pluralism characteristic of political liberal-
ism. According to this conception, the left project involves the exten-
sion of the "Democratic Revolution of Modernity" throughout society, 
completely transforming the classical opposition between socialist and 
democratic revolutions. 
The post-structuralist critique of Marxism 
Laclau and Mouffe's Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Toward a Radical 
Democratic Politics (1985) is a major post-Marxian manifesto. Synth-
esizing some ideas from post-structuralist philosophy, they perform a 
deconstruction of Marxism in order to argue the lack of credibility of 
the classical vision. Laclau and Mouffe propose that Marx's sequence 
of modes of production, unfolding according to the logic of historical 
necessity at the level of the economic foundation, was undermined at 
the level of the superstructures by a series of political contingencies. 
In a long analysis of the development of Marxism in the twentieth 
century, they argue that in the face of the increasing fragmentation 
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of the proletariat and the expansion of the middle strata, the political 
strategy of the communist parties eventually embraced an ideologico-
political strategy focused on creating a national-popular bloc. Here, the 
popular front led by the proletarian party strives to accomplish national 
reconstruction through achieving an ideological hegemony that forges 
a new collective subject (Laclau 1990: 120-21; Ladau & Mouffe 1985: 
47-92). Although this was effectively a concession that acknowledged 
the failure of the classical modeL Marxists (especially Leninists) none-
theless insisted that the creation of national-popular hegemony around 
the proletarian party made it possible to salvage the classical strategy. 
Describing this Leninist politics as a "Jacobin imaginary': Laclau and 
Mouffe reject the effort to save the hypotheses of State and Revolution, 
maintaining that: 
What is now in crisis is a whole conception of socialism 
which rests upon the ontological centrality of the working 
class, upon the role of Revolution, with a capital "r", as the 
founding moment in the transition from one type of society 
to another, and upon the illusory prospect of a perfectly uni-
tary and homogeneous collective will that will render pointless 
the moment of politics. The plural and multifarious character 
of contemporary social struggles has finally dissolved the last 
foundation for that political imaginary. Peopled with "univer-
sal" subjects and built around History in the singular, it has 
postulated "society" as an intelligible structure that could be 
intellectually mastered on the basis of certain class positions 
and reconstituted as a rational, transparent order, through a 
founding act of a political character. Today, the Left is witness-
ing the final act of the dissolution of that Jacobin imaginary. 
(Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 2) 
For Laclau and Mouffe, Marx's theory was economically reductionist, 
predicting a progressive social polarization that would lead to the con-
frontation between fundamental classes. This engaged a messianic vision 
of "an absolutely united working class that will become transparent to 
itself at the moment of proletarian chiliasm" (ibid.: 84-5). They propose 
that Gramsci's theory of hegemony represented the big breakthrough, 
because this makes possible a move beyond economic reductionism and 
revolutionary utopianism. As we recall from Chapter 3) Gramsci sug-
gests that a fundamental class becomes hegemonic when it articulates its 
sectoral interests as the general interest and begins to exert "moral and 
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political leadership" (Gramsci 1971: 57-8, 180-82). Gramsci's analyses 
suggest that fundamental classes struggle for hegemony principally on 
the ideological terrain, where new political subjects are forged, and his 
concept of ideology as the social cement that permeates the social for-
mation significantly modifies the base-and-superstructure model. For 
Laclau and Mouffe, Gramsci explicitly acknowledges the importance of 
the transformation of social alliances into political subjects (Laclau & 
Mouffe 1985: 65-71). As they conclude, ''intellectual and moral leader-
ship constitutes, according to Gramsci, a higher synthesis, a collective 
will, which, through ideology, becomes the organic cement unifying a 
historical bloc" (ibid.: 67). Laclau and Mouffe argue that this represented 
a practical acknowledgement of the fact that instead of fundamental 
classes forming social alliances, politics really consisted of the struggle 
to forge collective unity based on ideological symbols. State power is a 
consequence of the hegemonic position of a new historic bloc, that is, 
of a social alliance forming itself into a national political subject, rather 
than a reflection of the capture of a set of institutions. 
Yet Gramsci's historical blocs form around economic classes, and for 
Laclau and Mouffe, ''this is the inner essentialist core which continues 
to be present in Gramscf s thought, setting a limit to the deconstructive 
logic of hegemony" (ibid.: 69). Accordingly, they argue that Gramsci 
reintroduces the classical Marxist dualism between the political con-
tingencies of the hegemonic struggle, operative primarily on the ideo-
logical terrain, and the historical necessity guaranteed by the economic 
structure, which acts to unify the historic bloc ''in the last instance': By 
contrast, Laclau and Mouffe affirm that "there does not exist a constitu-
tive principle for social agents which can be fixed in an ultimate class 
core; nor are class positions the necessary location of historical interests" 
(ibid.: 84-5). In a prototypical deconstructive move, Laclau and Mouffe 
use the subversive potential of a minor category (hegemony) to invert 
the hierarchy between historical necessity and political contingency 
that, they claim, constitutes the Marxist paradigm. 
After this deconstruction, Laclau and Mouffe maintain, political 
theory can break with the linked ideas of fundamental economic classes, 
closed social totalities, revolutionary transformations from the centre of 
social power and the elimination of social conflict accompanied by the 
end of politics. Then what appears is an immense proliferation of social 
struggles that criss-cross the complex, open-ended territory of the social 
field. Nothing whatsoever pre-determines the political orientation of 
these struggles, because their strategic-relational connection to global 
strategies of social change - from the left or the right - is a question of 
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ideological articulation. Further, because these articulations depend on 
symbolic unification of different interests into a common subjectivity 
through the ideological cement of a hegemonic representation of the 
world, politics is radically indeterminate, that is completely open. In this 
light, they regard the emergence of the new social movements (NSM) 
in the industrialized countries and the developing world - movements 
such as land occupations, civic activism coalitions, peace campaigns, 
anti-nuclear protests, feminism, and so forth - as evidence of the non-
class nature of contemporary politics. For Laclau and Mouffe, the NSM 
continue the fragmentation of the "unitary subject" of classical Marxism 
and highlight "the plurality of the social and the unsutured character 
of all political identiti' (ibid.: 166). The big question for the left shifts 
from "how can the proletariat win moral and political leadership of 
social struggles and thereby gain hegemony?" to "what representation 
of social change can secure a broad social alliance capable of demo-
cratically winning power?': Ladau and Mouffe propose that the best 
frame for responding to this strategic question is to regard the NSM 
as "a moment of deepening of the democratic revolution" (ibid.: 163). 
New social movements and democratic politics 
Laclau and Mouffe formulate their ideas about the open-ended charac-
ter of politics in complex, de-totalized social formations through con-
cepts of discourse that draw heavily on theories of ideology framed by 
post-structuralist linguistics. To see why they do this and to understand 
what they are getting at, it will be helpful to look at their concrete analy-
sis of resistance to capitalism in contemporary society first. 
Laclau and Mouffe emerge from Structural Marxism, rather than 
from classical Marxism. But their analysis proposes that because of its 
insistence on the unification of social formations through the struc-
ture-in-dominance, even Structural Marxism has not grasped the crisis 
dynamics of contemporary society. According to Laclau, instead of the 
capitalist mode of production: 
there are global configurations - historical blocs, in the 
Gramscian sense - in which the "ideological", "economic" and 
"political': and other elements, are inextricably fused and can 
only be separated for analytical purposes. There is therefore 
no "capitalism': but rather different forms of capitalist rela-
tions which form part of highly diverse structural complexes. 
(Laclau 1990: 26) 
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1hey do not deny that there is an anti-capitalist potential in the NSM. 
What Laclau and Mouffe deny is that political resistance to capitalist 
relations needs to tap into a fundamental class in order to transform 
society's dominant structure. Their vision is of hegemonic settlements 
concluded by dominant social alliances. Such hegemonic settlements do 
not involve domination so much as dominance, secured by distributing 
power among alliance partners and granting concessions to subordinate 
groups, which has the effect of fragmenting opposition and disorgan-
izing alternatives. The main mechanism of dominance is the hegemonic 
ideology, and when this is successfully challenged, the social arrange-
ments of a hegemonic settlement also break up. 
Writing in the 1980s, Laclau and Mouffe propose that the NSM are 
the result of the hegemonic post-war formation encountering structural 
limits to its articulation of economics, politics and ideology. To clarify 
this claim, they argue that post-war capitalism involved an intervention-
ist state managing social reproduction through welfare mechanisms and 
economic production through planned investment. Liberal-democratic 
ideology in the post-war era was reformulated in terms of equality, 
which framed wage bargaining and welfare claims as claims to equitable 
rewards and equal opportunities. At the same time, these social arrange-
ments acted as a motor for the commodification and bureaucratiza-
tion of social relations, so that "there is now practically no domain of 
individual or collective life which escapes capitalist relations" (Ladau 
& Mouffe 1985: 161). On this analysis, the NSM emerged in the 1970s 
and 1980s in opposition to commodification and bureaucratization, in 
the context of a refusal to frame the concerns of these movements as 
equality claims. According to Hegemony: 
One cannot understand the present expansion of the field of 
social conflict and the consequent emergence of new political 
subjects without situating both in the context of the commodi-
fication and bureaucratisation of social relations on the one 
hand, and the reformulation of liberal-democratic ideology -
resulting from the expansion of struggles for equality - on the 
other. (Ibid.: 163) 
Laclau and Mouffe's analysis, then, suggests that the NSM need to be 
analysed from a "double perspective': There is the transformation of 
social relations characteristic of the post-war hegemonic formation. But 
in terms of the hegemonic ideology, there is "the effects of the displace-
ment into new areas of social life of the egalitarian imaginary': that is 
the predominance of liberal-democratic equality claims (ibid.: 165): 
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The fact that these "new antagonisms" are the expression of 
forms of resistance to the commodification, bureaucratization 
and increasing homogenization of social life itself explains why 
they should frequently manifest themselves through a prolif-
eration of particularisms, and crystallize into a demand for 
autonomy itself .... Insofar as, of the two great themes of the 
democratic imaginary - equality and liberty - it was that of 
equality which was traditionally predominant, the demands 
for autonomy bestow an increasingly central role upon liberty. 
(Ibid.: 164) 
"It cannot be doubted': Laclau and Mouffe sum up, "that the prolif-
eration of antagonisms and of <new rights' is leading to a crisis of the 
hegemonic formation of the post-war period" (ibid.: 168). 
Next, Laclau and Mouffe seek to substantiate their claim about politi-
cal open-endedness. They argue that the NSM and their demands for 
liberty - not equality- can go either way, to the right or the left, depend-
ing on the sorts of counter-hegemonic project that they get integrated 
into. In the context of the aftermath of Eurocommunism in western 
Europe, we can understand their claim that both right and left want 
to break up the post-war settlement and replace it with something else 
(market socialism, free market capitalism). Both formulate this in terms 
of a "revolution in liberty': rather than a gain in equality (liberal social-
ism within parliamentary democracy, libertarian capitalism hostile to 
the "nanny state"). But the left, from Laclau and Mouffe's perspective, 
remains stuck on the idea of fundamental classes, demanding that the 
NSM accept proletarian leadership and classical strategy, critiquing 
them as <'middle-class protest politics" when they refuse. The neolib-
eral new right (Thatcher, Reagan) has the advantage, by contrast, for 
"its novelty lies in its successful articulation to neoliberal discourse of 
a series of democratic resistances to the transformation of social rela-
tions" (ibid.: 169). 
The new right is an example of successfully challenging the hegem -
onic ideology. It links up the claim for liberty by the NSM (and beyond) 
and uses it to undermine the centrality of equality in the post-war wel-
fare state's ideology. The new right, they claim, articulates liberty to 
free market economics and a restricted democracy, based on reject-
ing the "chain of equivalences, equality = identity = totalitarianism'' 
and the affirmation of the sequence "difference = inequality = liberty" 
(ibid.: 174). "We are thus witnessing the emergence of a new hege-
monic project, that of liberal-conservative discourse, which seeks to 
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articulate the neoliberal defence of the free market economy with the 
profoundly anti-egalitarian cultural and social tradition of conserva-
tism" (ibid.: 175). Drawing upon Stuart Hall's controversial analysis of 
Thatcher's "authoritarian populism" (Hall & Jacques 1983) and Allen 
Hunter's assessment of Reaganite discourse as a "specious egalitarian-
ism" (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 170), Laclau and Mouffe claim that this 
demonstrates the "fundamental ambiguity of the social': Nothing, for 
Laclau and Mouffe, is inherently right or left: there are only relational 
social antagonisms. The NSM demonstrate the "polysemic character of 
every antagonism", which exposes "the impossibility of establishing in a 
definitive manner the meaning of any struggle, whether considered in 
isolation or through its fixing in a relational system" (ibid.: 170). 
Discursive articulation, hegemonic strategy, 
social antagonism 
Against the political background of the NSM, Laclau and Mouffe main-
tain that "only the presence of a vast area of floating elements and the 
possibility of their articulation to opposite camps - which implies con-
stant redefinition of the latter - is what constitutes the terrain permit-
ting us to define a practice as hegemonic" (Laclau & Mou.ffe 1985: 136): 
We will therefore speak of democratic struggles where these 
imply a plurality of political spaces, and of popular struggles 
where certain discourses tendentially construct the division of 
a single political space into two opposed fields. (Ibid.: 13 7) 
For Laclau and Mouffe, rethinking socialist strategy in this context 
involves a reconceptualization of praxis, structure and history in terms 
of discourse, antagonism and hegemony. To do this, they rely upon 
post-structural linguistics, according to which communicative signs are 
theorized as related by their differences from one another, and are con-
sidered to consist of an arbitrary bond between the "signifier" (material 
symbol) and the "signified" (ideational meaning). From this perspective, 
they argue, "every antagonism, left free to itself, is a floating signifier, 
a 'wild' antagonism which does not predetermine the form in which it 
can be articulated to other elements in a social formation" (ibid.: 171). 
A floating signifier is a symbol whose multiplicity of possible mean~ 
ings is in flux, whereas an empty signifier is a symbol that stands in for 
the totality of possible meanings without itself having a determinate 
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meaning. Laclau and Mouffe's former co-thinker Zizek provides the best 
description of what this means in its post-Marxist political application. 
In the struggle for ideological hegemony: 
The multitude of "floating signifiers", of proto-ideological ele-
ments, is structured into a unified field through the interven-
tion of [an empty signifier], which quilts them, stops their 
sliding and fixes their meaning. Ideological space is made of 
non -bound, non -tied elements, "floating signifiers': whose very 
identity is "open: over-determined by their articulation in a 
chain with other elements ... If we "quilt" the floating signi-
fiers by means of "Communism: for example, "class struggle" 
confers a precise and fixed signification to all the other ele-
ments: to democracy (so-called "real democracy': as opposed 
to "bourgeois formal democracy"); to feminism (the exploita-
tion of women as resulting from the class-conditioned division 
of labour); to ecologism (the destruction of natural resources 
as a logical consequence of profit-oriented capitalist produc-
tion); to the peace movement (the principal danger to peace is 
adventuristic imperialism), and so on. What is at stake in the 
ideological struggle is which of the [empty signifiers] will total-
ise, will include in its series of equivalences these free-floating 
elements. (Zizek 1989: 87-8) 
There is something interesting about all this. If we accept Laclau and 
Mouffe's description of the struggle to articulate the claims of the NSM 
into a political project, undertaken by the New Left and the New Right 
in the 1970s and 1980s, then Zizek's description of ideological hegem-
ony seems intuitively plausible. But actually - surprisingly - Laclau and 
Mouffe categorically refuse the restriction of their concept of discourse 
to ideology, insisting that "discursive practice" involves the modifica-
tion of social structures (conceptualized according to a language-based 
model). They define "articulation [as] any practice establishing a relation 
among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the 
articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the articula-
tory practice we will call discourse" (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 105). 
Laclau and Mouffe suppose that "discursive practices" involve the 
construction of relations of equivalence and difference whereby the 
identity of discursive elements is modified. The concept of discourse 
requires that the practice of articulation "must pierce the entire material 
density of the multifarious institutions" it operates on (ibid.: 109). This 
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means that there is no difference between the construction of a political 
alliance, the modification of institutional arrangements and the crea-
tion of a hegemonic worldview. For instance, "enumerative discourse 
[the listing of alliance partners] is a real force which contributes to the 
moulding and constitution of social relations)) (ibid.: 110). They there-
fore speak of ideological subject-positions, social movements, institu-
tional locations and floating signifiers in the same terms. 
There has been a fierce debate about the ontology and epistemology 
of Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory, in which the critics have been 
extremely sceptical towards this transposition of a way of thinking based 
in ideology critique onto the theorization of social formations consid-
ered as a whole (Geras 1990; Miklitsch 1995; Palmer 1990). In response, 
Laclau and Mouffe have vigorously defended their position (Laclau & 
Mouffe 1987), although it has to be said that ZizeKs theoretical slip from 
discourse in general to ideology alone is representative of the somewhat 
uncritical reception of this influential strand of post-Marxism. 
At any rate, according to Laclau and Mouffe, the formation of hege-
mony involves building up a social alliance based on opposition to a 
social antagonist. On the one hand, the empty signifier unifies a series 
of disparate struggles by transforming them into neutral differences 
within a broad identity (e.g. feminism, ecologism, peace, etc. each have 
their specific claims and domain of action in a broad, popular move-
ment). On the other hand, the empty signifier presents the members 
of this alliance as all "the same" in relation to their political adversary 
(e.g. "feminism, ecologism, peace, etc. are all fronts of the communist 
struggle against the anti-popular capitalist oligarchy and its political 
henchmen"). The implication is that political subjectivity is formed in a 
process that renders it inherently incomplete, because identity depends 
on opposition to something held to negate the identity of the subject 
(e.g. "womens rights, nature, peaceful coexistence cannot exist as such 
because of the constant threat to them by the capitalist regime"). To 
concretize the concepts of discursive articulation, hegemony and social 









Figure 5 The structure of hegemonic articulations (based on Laclau 2000: 303). 
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Figure 5 outlines a sort of limit case in Laclau and Mouffe's strategic 
vision. A political alliance of the left has achieved hegemony around 
the empty signifier of "radical democracy': successfully defining the 
meaning of the vast majority of social struggles in terms of claims posed 
within an egalitarian political subjectivity. Between alliance partners, 
neutral relations of difference exist, determining the various subject-
positions, or political identities, within the discursive formation (i.e. 
the social formation considered as a discourse). But in relation to an 
excluded element - marshalled around the signifier "Natural Inequality,: 
selected as the empty signifier of the political right following Norberto 
Bobbio (Bobbio 1996: 60-81) - these subject-positions are all equiva-
lent, as parts of the left. The relation of equivalence constitutes a social 
antagonism, where the social identities in the alliance of the left are 
decompleted by the existence of the right. Both sides seek to negate 
the identity of their antagonist by excluding the other while completely 
defining society. 
The most crucial aspect to Laclau and Mouffe's theory is that this 
social antagonism is ineradicable. Even empty signifiers are still defined 
by difference, although a signifier that stands in for the totality of pos-
sible meanings can only be defined against a meaningless, excluded 
element. From the perspective of the hegemonic left alliance, then, 
the right appears as a radical fringe group, a particular interest lacking 
universal reference. The key point, however, is that the same situation 
could equally well be diagrammed from the right, this time with "natu-
ral inequality" as an empty signifier uniting a right-wing alliance and 
the left as the "meaningless" antagonist. The outcome of this struggle 
depends upon the contingencies of political interventions, so modern 
history really consists of the alternation of hegemonic empty signifiers. 
Radical democracy, democratic citizenship, 
social imaginary 
Because social antagonism is ineradicable, left-wing politics must 
become fully democratic, or risk the delusory slide into totalitarianism 
associated with the "Jacobin Imaginary': Consonant with this position, 
Laclau and Mouffe propose that the "decisive mutation in the politi-
cal imaginary of Western societies took place two hundred years ago" 
with the French Revolution (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 155). Following 
Claude Lefort, Laclau and Mouffe propose that the innovation of the 
French Revolution is representative government, which they describe 
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as "democratic invention" because it involves the shaping of social rela-
tions through democratic politics. This depends, conceptuall 
1 · 1 h h ·d 1 · 1 y, on a po it1ca agreement t at t e I ea un1versa ity of the people, the nation 
and the state, that is, the sovereign power that unifies society, is a sort of 
empty place that different groups temporarily occupy following demo-
cratic elections (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 152-9; Lefort 1988: 16-18). 
Different groups seek to temporarily occupy the place of power with 
their empty signifiers, thereby generating a hegemonic worldview for 
a period of time. 
What happens in alliance-building, Laclau and Mouffe propose, is 
that particular demands become unified by empty signifiers, which 
involves a process of the universalization of the identity of the social 
alliance in question. Recasting Gramsci's national-popular hegemony in 
post-structuralist terms, they argue that hegemony can be theorized in 
terms of the progressive universalization of a subject-position, through 
the emptying out of the particular contents of a political identity, and its 
occupation of a locus of formal universality. Laclau and Mouffe describe 
this as the creation of social imaginaries - that is paradigmatic represen-
tations of the world that set limits to what appears to be possible - and 
argue that the left should seek to construct a new social imaginary rather 
than to take state power and transform capitalism. We must accept 
that "the objective of the Left should be the extension and deepening 
of the democratic revolution initiated two hundred years ago" (Mouffe 
1992a: 1). 
Accordingly, Laclau and Mouffe propose that the task of the left 
"cannot be to renounce liberal-democratic ideology, but, on the con-
trary, to deepen and expand it in the direction of a radical and plural 
democracy [through] expanding the chain of equivalents between the 
different struggles against oppression'' (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 176). 
They reject the idea that a radical democracy would mean the democra-
tization of the entire society, describing this as the "Jacobin temptation'' 
to eliminate antagonism. They insist that the left project must be politi-
cally pluralist. Instead of radical democratization of society, then, their 
project involves the radical democratization of the left, together with the 
democratic radicalization of the forces aligned with post-Marxist cur-
rents. They key to this, they argue, is the idea of democratic citizenship, 
conceptualized in terms of political participation and social contesta-
tion. Clearly, the fundamental strategy is based around social movement 
activism and the permanence of political conflicts as a central part of 
what democratic politics actually is. The linking of democratic citizen-
ship with radical democracy therefore aims against what Laclau and 
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Mouffe regard as depoliticized versions of democracy, which think of 
democratic politics in terms of interest-group negotiations and peak 
representative bodies (Mouffe 1992b). 
At the turn of the millennium, Laclau attempted to form a distinct 
theoretical current around this rvedefinition of socialist strategy by 
engaging Judith Butler and Slavoj Zizek in a debate on political contin-
gency, normative universality and hegemonic strategy. Although Butler 
remains close to Laclau in broad strategic terms, Zizek upset the party 
by raising three searching and provocative questions. His intervention 
was symptomatic of a vigorous re-assertion of radicalism within the 
post-Marxian field and a decisive shift away from coalition politics 
focused on the industrialized world, towards a resumption of the left's 
concerns with the self-emancipation of the oppressed majority of the 
world's population. 
The first probing question was how it was possible that a non-
normative, purely descriptive theory of politics as social antagonism, 
happening between two structurally equivalent social camps, striving 
for hegemony on the logically arbitrary basis of contending empty sig-
nifiers, could possibly issue in a specifically left-wing position. Laclau 
"oscillates between proposing a neutral formal frame that describes the 
working of the political field, without implying any specific [political 
partisanship], and the prevalence given to a particular leftist political 
practice[:] 'radical democracy"' (Zizek 1999: 174). Lacking normative 
claims about materially grounded oppression and structurally deter-
mined interests, Laclau and Mouffe's theory cannot explain why it leads 
to socialist strategy, as opposed to a Machiavellian recipe that can be 
equally applied by left and right. 
The second pointed question concerned the historical origins and 
social coordinates of the Democratic Revolution of Modernity. Why is it 
that this revolution creates a formally universal political arena thereafter 
occupied only by political particulars, yet every subsequent revolution is 
said to belong to the "Jaco bin temptation" and lead only to a "totalitarian 
erasure of democratic space"? "What about': Zizek asks, "changing the 
very fundamental structural principle of society, as happened with the 
emergence of'democratic invention'?" (Zizek 2000: 93). 
The third question flowed from this. Why has the political practice of 
the Left restricted itself to the "critique of actually existing capitalism: 
based on an identity-political strategy of multiple struggles for cul-
tural recognition? Zizek proposes that proponents of radical democratic 
politics "as a rule [neglect to mention] the resignation at its heart - the 
acceptance of capitalism as the 'only game in town: the renunciation 
228 understanding marx1sm 
of any real attempt to overcome the existing liberal capitalist regime" 
(ibid.: 95). 
The post-Marxian field 
Against the conceptual background ofLaclau and Mouffe's radical dem-
ocratic post-Marxism, and Zizek's pointed questions about its political 
implications, we could map out the post-Marxian field by dividing it up 
into three areas, in order of radicalism. All seek to maintain the spirit 
of resistance to capitalism, and most connect this to a refusal to reduce 
democracy to parliamentary lobbying, but none regard revolutionary 
capture of the state apparatus as a strategic goal for progressive forces. 
Marginal subversion 
The politics of marginal subversion, best represented by the work of 
Judith Butler, engages the potential for social role performances to 
subtly shift from improvisations within the regulations to invention of 
new regulations. In Gender Trouble ( [ 1990] 1999) and Bodies that Matter 
{1993), Butler develops this idea in the context of queer politics and the 
rights of transgender individuals. Departing from Althusser's theory 
of ideological interpellation, she rejects the conception of gender as a 
substantial difference expressing an underlying natural sexual division. 
Instead, Butler conceptualizes gender as constructed through social 
rituals supported by institutional power. In line with social construc-
tivism, she proposes that gender identities are cultural performances 
that construct an individuars sexuality. "Gender': Butler writes, "is the 
repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly 
rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance 
of substance, of a natural sort of being" (Butler 1999: 33-4). It follows 
from this that individuals can disrupt the naturalness of gender by pro-
ducing cultural performances of gender roles that underline its artifi-
cial, constructed character, subversively exposing the way that gender 
is ideological rather than biological. The concept of "performativity" is 
intended to highlight the way that ideologically naturalized and cultur-
ally mainstream social identities are actually role performances accord-
ing to a cultural script, one that can, in principle, be altered. 
In The Psychic Life of Power ( l 997b ), Butler explains why these incre-
mental changes through subversive performances necessarily happen at 
the cultural and social margins. Every statement of the rules implies a 
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reference to their infraction, through the inherent transgressions built 
into the "thou shalt not" of the regulations themselves. But the sub-
ject's relation to this opposition between regulation and transgression, 
normality and deviancy, is not one of completely free choice. Instead, 
transgression involves guilt, while conformity involves a melancholic 
subjectivity, because it is founded on the loss of an alternative it never 
knew it had. In her analysis of Althusser, Butler suggests that the ideo-
logical effect of "hailing': or ideological policing of the social norms, is 
not a singular act, but a continuous repetition of ideological interpella-
tions, which means that the subject-citizen is constantly demonstrating 
their innocence through conformist practices. Her central claim is that 
"for Althusser, the efficacy of ideology consists in part in the formation 
of conscience", so that "to become a 'subject' is, thus, to have been pre-
sumed guilty, then tried and declared innocent" (Butler 1995: 13, 16). 
The subject is "driven by a love of the law that can only be satisfied by 
ritual punishment" (ibid.: 24). In the case of gender identity, through a 
complex argument with psychoanalysis, Butler maintains that that (nor-
malized) heterosexuality emerges from a simultaneous repudiation and 
preservation of (transgressive) homosexuality, because heterosexuality 
"requires the very homosexuality that it condemns)) (Butler 1997b: 143). 
Thus social norms, such as what Butler calls the "heterosexual matrix" 
of the supposed normality of heterosexuality, necessarily conjure up 
the possibility of marginalized alternatives. In Excitable Speech ( 1997a), 
Butler suggests "re-signification" (the reclamation of denigration as 
affirmation) might be one way to activate these marginal possibilities 
as a political strategy (Butler 1997a: 16). 
Permanent protest 
The politics of permanent protest, best represented by the work of 
Jacques Ranciere, proposes that real political action involves an unruly 
disturbance that erupts into the space of technocratic social manage-
ment. In Disagreement, Ranciere proposes a fundamental distinction 
between the ontology of the social field, which is characterized by 
hierarchical inequality, and the non-ontological status of the political, 
which is characterized by a radical but formal demand for the principled 
equality of all men and women as speaking beings (Ranciere 1999: 19). 
Ranciere describes the regulation of arrangements that characterize the 
social field as "the police'', and argues that in conventional conceptions 
of politics as negotiation, consensus and management, what is really 
happening is the policing of hierarchy (ibid.: 28). Politics, by contrast, 
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happens when a social group, whose suffering under injustice is gener-
ally concealed by the operations of policing, breaks into the space of 
debate and announces that a wrong has been done. For Ranciere, then, 
"the political': that is politics proper, is theatrical: politics involves the 
entry onto the "political scene" of a hitherto invisible political subject, 
the "part of no part': the group that does not fit in, whose intervention 
first and foremost is simply to assert their right to speak, in order to say 
"no': to disagree (ibid.: 45). The relation between the hierarchical social 
field and the egalitarian field of the political is that of a "twisting': or 
«torsion': that is a permanent tension, in which the day-to-day operation 
of the police is constantly endangered by the presence of wrongs. These 
wrongs can normally be twisted out of sight, because the political is not 
a thing, but a formal potential for the rebellion of egalitarian subjectivity. 
Ranciere is thinking of two cases of the political in particular: the 
nineteenth-century proletariat, which irrupted onto the political stage 
with socialist demands for radical equality, and the contemporary 
struggles of "illegal" immigrants in the European Union, a new super-
exploited and politically marginalized group. If anything, Ranciere sug-
gests, the conditions of immigrants "without papers" is worse than that 
of the classical working class, because the situation of everyday politics 
- the police - has today virtually eliminated political dissent. With the 
advent of"post-democratic" arrangements, through bipartisan consen-
sus on the technocratic management of social problems, the repression 
of the political - its twisting out of sight - has reached a new level 
(Ranciere 1995: 5-38, 1999: 95-122). The combination of the hidden 
character of the political, the theatrical nature of political protest and 
its tendential elimination today explains Ranciere's interest in aesthet-
ics. For Ranciere, the police determines a "distribution of the sensible': 
meaning both commonsense and perception, which effectively hides 
exclusion. Because the political being is the speaking being, to erupt 
onto the stage and begin to speak - even before anything is actually 
said - is the political gesture par excellence, something that links art's 
revelation of the invisible to politics' disclosure of unseen and unheard 
suffering (Ranciere 2006: 12-13). Every disagreement is specific and 
involves particular injustice, which means that Ranciere refuses to insert 
politics within a teleological process of growing equality. Furthermore, 
Ranciere maintains that the sea of suffering cannot be drained, because 
"the community of equals can never become coextensive with the soci-
ety of the unequal, but nor can they exist without the other" (Ranciere 
1995: 84). Accordingly, there is no general emancipation, only a per-
manent potential for resistance. 
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Radical rupture 
Ranciere's anti-ontology of political protest depends upon the assump-
tion of the permanence of the state (and therefore social hierarchy under 
the police), but it does so on the basis of an ontology derived from Alain 
Badiou's Being and Event (May & Love 2008). The polemics between 
Badiou and Ranciere over equality and universality, anti-ontology and 
ontology, need not detain us here. What is crucial is that Badiou)s ontol-
ogy is based around the idea of a radical rupture with the status quo 
that leads up to his conclusion, which is that the communist politics of 
radical egalitarianism cannot involve the capitalist state (Badiou 2005: 
121-8). This conviction is a constant factor despite Badiou's shift from 
1970s Maoism to a form ofhighly radical small-group politics today, one 
that organizes interventions around questions of immigrant workers' 
struggles against oppression and exclusion. Badiou's politics of rupture 
is grounded on a highly abstract ontology based in mathematical set 
theory that Badiou describes as neo-Platonism, partly in order to vig-
orously differentiate his position from the linguistic turn. For Badiou, 
contemporary philosophy, from Anglo-American analytic philosophy 
through to the post-structuralist aestheticization of reason, is a miser-
able, conformist form of postmodern sophism, incapable of saying the 
central thing. This is that neoliberal global capitalism is the ruination 
of universality into a multiplicity of heterogeneous "language games", a 
sort of nihilistic atomization of the social bond in the reign of the pure 
calculability of monetarized social relations (Badiou 1992: 55). 
For Badiou, politics only emerges from the incalculable, in the 
form of an event of rupture with existing arrangements, and political 
subjects only form by virtue of the positions that individuals take on 
these unexpected political events. Badiou's ontology is highly formal 
and logically consistent, up to and including a kind of "formula" for 
the event, but I shall only deal with it descriptively. It is important to 
note that Badiou does not think that being is maths, but instead that 
mathematics describes what can be said about existant things, and that 
because of some technical issues in higher mathematics, it is possible 
to demonstrate that many worlds are possible, that is that many (ulti-
mately mathematical) descriptions of being can be achieved. According 
to Badiou, what exists from the perspective of knowledge of a situation 
(for instance the sociology of a nation) appears to consist of a seamless 
totality, which describes not only the way that the world is, but also the 
only way that the world could be. But in actuality, an element always 
exists that) although it belongs to the situation) does not appear in it 
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because it is denied the status of an existing entity. The event is the 
discovery that an anomaly belongs to the situation, which instantly 
renders existing knowledge a nullity and calls forth a radical process of 
the universal reconstitution of what exists around the site of the event. 
Politics is the making of worlds, and the paradigm is Marx's discovery 
that the proletariat is the "unreason of every reason", that is that what 
Hegel thinks is merely ccthe mob" is in actuality a new universal class that 
utterly undoes Hegel's Philosophy of Right and prompts instead Marx's 
Critique of the Gotha Programme. Accordingly, Badiou maintains that 
'(every historical event is communist, to the degree that 'communist' 
designates the transtemporal subjectivity of emancipation, the egali-
tarian passion, the Idea of justice ... an intolerance of oppression, the 
wish to impose a withering away of the state" (Hallward 2003: 240, 
Badiou cited). 
Enjoyment as a political factor 
Zizek's response to the post-Marxian field synthesizes the politics of 
radical rupture with an eclectic combination of ideas drawn from Hardt 
and Negri's Empire (2000) and Boltanski, Chiapello and Elliott's The 
New Spirit of Capitalism (2007). By inclination disposed to controversial 
intellectual provocations rather than systematic theoretical develop-
ment, Zizek is best interpreted as a wake-up call for the left. Although 
he initially supported radical democratic politics, Zizek now rejects the 
politics of marginal subversion and permanent protest as nothing more 
than a hysterical demand for a new master. The left's acceptance of its 
own marginalization confirms, for Zizek, the psychoanalytic insight that 
political domination depends upon the internalization of the hegemonic 
worldview through unconscious attachments to social authority. The 
left, in other words, is not the equal and opposite of the right, but in the 
same position as the slave before the master, or the hysterical patient 
before paternal authority. Therefore, Zizek proposes, the key to a rein-
vention of left-wing post-Marxist politics resides not in the embrace of 
anti-essentialist theories, but in an intellectual and emotional break with 
unconscious acceptance of the invincibility of capitalism. 
Zizek conceptualizes these libidinal attachments to social authority 
through what he describes as "unconscious enjoyment': for him the 
most fundamental mechanism in political ideology. He synthesizes 
Althusser's concept of ideology, as an ideological imaginary inculcated 
through institutional rituals, with Lacanian psychoanalysis, which 
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points to the paradoxical satisfaction in displeasure obtained by neurotic 
repetition. In psychoanalytic terms, unconscious enjoyment refers to 
an excess of stimulation that is <'beyond [and opposed to] the pleasure 
principle': the horrifying and disgusting way that the subject «gets off" 
in their deepest and darkest fantasies. These fantasies circulate around 
the institutional ritual, which has the force of a neurotic repetition-
compulsion, something that Zizek highlights by investigating not how 
subjects represent their actions to themselves, but what it is that they 
are actually doing. 
What Zizek is driving at is clarified by his pointed analysis of ethno-
centric nationalism as the unconscious inverse of democratic politics, 
for allegiance to the rules of the democratic game implies participation 
in the institutional rituals of the nation state. But, Zizek claims, the 
institutional rituals of the nation state are generally based on ethnic 
exclusions, racist stereotypes and so forth, despite formal political dec-
larations about universal human rights and civil liberties. This obscene, 
unwritten code: 
represents the "spirit of community" at its purest, exerting the 
strongest pressure on the individual to comply with its man-
date of group identification. Yet, simultaneously, it violates the 
explicit rules of community life. . .. Explicit, public rules do 
not suffice, so they have to be supplemented by a clandestine, 
«unwritten" code aimed at those who, although they violate no 
public rules, maintain a kind of inner distance and do not truly 
identify with the ((spirit of community': (Zizek 1994: 54-5) 
Accordingly, Zizek proposes that the ideological cement of any politi-
cal community is incredibly difficult to dislodge, because it is not only 
unconscious, but would be denied by every citizen when confronted 
with the evidence. Yet the exclusionary and vindictive "spirit of com-
munity') is the only way to explain the visceral support that the political 
Right summons when they engage in the politics of scapegoating around 
immigration, for instance. Zizek believes that this splitting into ideologi-
cally sanctioned public law and an obscene unconscious supplement of 
unwritten codes of group belonging is structural, springing from the 
emergence of the autonmnous subject and the division between public 
and private spheres: 
When, as a consequence of bourgeois egalitarian ideology's 
rise to power, the public space loses its directly patriarchal 
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character, the relationship between public Law and its obscene 
superego underside also undergoes a radical change. Intra-
ditional patriarchal society, the inherent transgression of the 
Law assumes the form of a carnivalesque reversal of authority: 
the King becomes a beggar, madness poses as wisdom, and so 
forth .... However, once the public Law casts off its direct patri-
archal dress and presents itself as neutral-egalitarian, the char-
acter of its obscene double also undergoes a radical shift: what 
now erupts in the carnivalesque suspension of the "egalitarian" 
public Law is precisely the authoritarian-patriarchal logic that 
continues to determine our attitudes, although its direct public 
expression is no longer permitted. "Carnival" thus becomes the 
outlet for the repressed social [enjoyment]: Jew-baiting, riots, 
gang rapes... (Ibid.: 56) 
In an extended analysis of the break-up of former Yugoslavia (which 
Zizek, as a Slovene, personally witnessed), he argues that the basic 
mechanism at work in the unconscious enjoyment that ballasts ideo-
logical hegemony is the fantasy of the theft of enjoyment. At the level of 
the unconscious fantasy that can be rationally inferred from an analysis 
of what political subjects actually do in the institutional rituals of their 
nation state, Zizek claims, it is clear that every citizen unconsciously 
believes that their way of life is threatened from outside. Zizek insists 
that "a nation exists only as long as its specific enjoyment continues to be 
materialized in a specific set of social practices and transmitted through 
national myths that structure these practices" (Zizek 1993: 202). In the 
nationalist fantasy, marginalized groups and external enemies con-
stantly endanger the "spirit of community': in effect threatening to steal 
the enjoyment that binds the political community. "The late Yugoslavia: 
Zizek adds, "offers a case study of such a paradox, in which we witness 
a detailed network of 'decantations' and 'thefts' of enjoyment" leading 
up to the genocidal events of the Serbian-led war in Bosnia (ibid.: 204). 
For Zizek, the political implications are straightforward, if extremely 
demanding. The Left must aim its blow against participation in the insti-
tutional rituals of the political community. It must "traverse the fantasy" 
of nationalism, together with the other unconscious supports of capital-
ism. The only way to do this, Zizek argues, is to stage an unequivocal 
identification between the forces of resistance to capitalism and the 
excluded outsiders who are the targets for ideologically motivated efforts 
to bind the political community together by scapegoating them. For 
Zizek, this completely marginalized "part of no part'' varies according 
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to circumstance, but in the contemporary world system, it is most of 
all performed by the untold millions in the slums of the planet and the 
so-called illegal immigrants in the industrialized countries. 
Radicalization of antagonism 
Zizek's intervention seeks to radicalize the concept of social antagonism, 
in order to replace Laclau and Mouffe's horizontal vision of opposed 
camps striving for hegemony on neutral terrain with a vertical concep-
tion of hegemonic struggle reminiscent of Hegel's master-slave dialectic. 
According to Zizek's interpretation, if the empty (or "master") signifier 
determines the dominant mode of subjectivity in a discursive forma-
tion, then marginal identities have an asymmetrical relation to power. 
Political competition happens between parliamentary parties and social 
groups in democratic contestation - liberals versus conservatives, social 
movements versus bureaucratic administration, and so forth. These all 
represent efforts to install their demands in the place of power by groups 
who already have some relation to the ruling or "master" (empty) sig-
nifier. Social antagonism is not the same as political competition: in 
social antagonism, the "slave" is "nothing", a completely excluded ele-
ment whose identity is entirely negative; this is the part of society with 
"radical chains': whose emancipation entails the complete restructuring 
of society. The master signifier, Zizek supposes, divides the slaves from 
themselves. This negative self-relation (the impossibility for the slave to 
arrive at self-identity) is positivized in the figure of the master. Hence 
the slave is the symptom of the master, but the master is the antagonist 
of the slave. ((When we radicalize the antagonistic fight to the point of 
pure antagonism': Zizek writes, "it is always one of the two moments 
which, through the positivity of the other, maintains a negative self-
relationship" (Zizek 1990: 253). 
It has taken two decades of constant research and frenetic publi-
cation for Zizek to draw out two analytically distinct sets of possible 
conclusions from this position (Boucher & Sharpe 2010: 1-28). The 
first inference is Hegelian: the master-slave dialectic between hege-
monic subjectivity and marginalized element triggers a struggle for 
recognition dynamized by an unconscious desire for full identity, which 
ascends through a series of stages of increasing inclusiveness, until a 
more universal form of ethical life is achieved. The Lacanian psycho-
analytic twist in this dialectical schema of the struggle for recognition 
is that the only way to really achieve universality is to renounce the 
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dream of a full identity, that is to abandon the fantasy of a perfectly 
harmonious society and the associated logic of the "theft of enjoy-
ment" that underwrites it. Reminiscent of existentially inflected forms 
of Hegelian philosophy, this is a counter-final dialectic that holds open 
the possibility of social conflict with a progressive potential, refusing to 
postulate a final form of social utopia. This position is expressed, within 
the sometimes difficult terminology of Zizek's Lacanian dialectics) in 
works such as Tarrying with the Negative ( 1993) and For They Know 
Not What They Do (1991). 
The other possible inference is anti-Hegelian: the master-slave dia-
lectic is external to the struggles for recognition happening in society, 
because the revolt of the slave represents a pure, formal universality 
that cannot be accommodated in the existing political field. The slaves 
oppose their radical universality to society as a whole, in an insurgent 
posture that involves a ''blank slate" politics of the total destruction of all 
existing social relations. Writing of the 2006 riots in France, triggered by 
police repression of and government hostility towards (mainly Muslim) 
youth in the satellite suburbs of Paris, Zizek maintains that: 
The fact that the violent protesters wanted and demanded to 
be recognized as full French citizens, of course, signals not 
only the failure to integrate them, but simultaneously the crisis 
of the French model of integration into citizenship, with its 
implicitly racist exclusionary normativeness. . . . This is why 
the protesters' demand to be recognized also implies a rejection 
of the very framework through which recognition takes place. 
It is a call for the construction of a new universal framework. 
(Zizek 2008b: 66) 
Zizek's analysis is sometimes clogged with rhetorical provocations, pop-
cultural detours and a baroque terminology. Thus, for instance, the 
revolt of the "singular universal" against capitalism is to be guided by 
a political theory of "voluntarist decisionism': which is to be combined 
with "Cartesian mechanism': to generate a ''materialist theory of Grace" 
(Zizek 1999: 114-19). There really are some questions to be raised about 
the form and substance of these analyses, especially since Zizek's inter-
pretation of Lacanian psychoanalysis can sometimes be challenged (see 
Boucher 2004; Zizek 2004). 
Nonetheless, at its core, Zize.Ks work is a call to the left to return to the 
struggles of the oppressed and exploited against domination and exclu-
sion, based on a principled normative universality that utterly rejects 
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post-modern communal particularism and liberal identity politics. He 
expresses this in quasi-religious terms as a "messianic" injunction: 
Today, more than ever, one has to insist that the only way open 
to the emergence of an Event is that of breaking the vicious 
cycle of globalization-with-particularization by (re)asserting 
the dimension of Universality against capitalist globalization . 
. . . [W]hat we need today is the gesture that would undermine 
capitalist globalization from the standpoint of universal Truth, 
just as Pauline Christianity did to the Roman global Empire. 
(Zizek 1999: 211) 
Returns to Lenin 
Against this background, Zizek proposes a neo-communist politics 
based on a (sort of) return to Lenin. He maintains that the biggest 
obstacles to a left-wing revival are not liberal democracy and global 
capitalism themselves, but the hesitation of the left based on uncon-
scious psychological attachment to them. His most recent books, In 
Defense of Lost Causes (2008a) and Living in the End Times (2010), 
represent shock therapy for the left, a battery of rhetorical provocations 
and intellectual challenges designed to bring progressives face-to-face 
with proof of their hidden complicity with the very thing they claim to 
oppose. Highly emotive terms such as "revolutionary terror" and "eco-
nomic collapse" are used to elicit visceral reactions of horror from his 
(presumably left-wing) readership, which Zizek then confronts with the 
evidence that these reactions are, in fact, scripted by right-wing defend-
ers of the system. Thus, for instance, Zizek admits that "the true aim of 
[his] 'defence of lost causes' is not to defend Stalinist terror, and so on, 
but to render problematic the all-too-easy liberal-democratic alterna-
tive" (Zizek 2008a: 6). As we have just seen, Zizek's justification for this 
drastic intervention is his belief that the contemporary left has become 
rather comfortable, entrenched in identity-political manoeuvres that 
accept that capitalism is permanent and liberal democracy is desirable, 
or frozen into a posture of negation that falls short of efforts to actually 
transform the state. In other words, in a searing indictment of today's 
left, Zizek thinks that those who claim to be post-Marx have nothing 
to say to the wretched of the earth. 
According to Zizek, the basic analysis of Daniel Bell is correct: there is 
a "cultural contradiction" between atomizing effects of consumer hedon-
238 understanding marx1sm 
ism and the social solidarity required to maintain global capitalism and 
liberal democracy. Advocates of the system have gone two ways. On the 
one side, the "anti-totalitarians': from the New Philosophy through to 
mainstream sociology, have declared that any politics beyond a militant 
defence of human rights leads inevitably to a totalitarian catastrophe 
based on a nightmarish utopia. The contemporary political blackmail, 
Zizek insists, is the forced choice between liberal democracy and funda-
mentalist terrorism, which excludes in advance the radical alternative 
of an anti-capitalist politics based in a governmental regime that is not 
parliamentary liberalism (ibid.: 4). On the other side, both neoliberals 
and neoconservatives (including their social-democratic and new-labour 
clones) are concerned that radical free-market capitalism undermines 
social solidarity. They address this through "a blend of economic liber-
alism with a minimally 'authoritarian' spirit of community" (ibid.: 2), 
so that right-wing populism and anti-liberal legislation make constant 
strides forward. Under conditions where bipartisan agreement between 
the governing parties has shifted so far to the right that liberal parties, such 
as the green parties in Europe or Australia, are regarded as "extremists", 
parliamentary democracy becomes increasingly inflected by authoritar-
ian politics. At the same time, Zizek remarks, the dominant ethos in con-
temporary society is in the spirit of Francis Fukuyama and his idea of the 
"end ofhistori': ''liberal-democratic capitalism is accepted as the finally 
found formula of the best possible society, all that one can do is to render 
it more just, tolerant and so fortn' (ibid.: 421). There has hardly been an 
epoch in human history where it has been so difficult to pose the philo-
sophical questions of the good life and the best political regime as ques-
tions, without a witch-hunt for "totalitarianism" breaking out on all sides. 
To break with such a monolithic consensus requires exceptional 
political willpower, Zizek argues, yet there are signs that the question can 
at least be raised again of whether capitalism is eternal and liberalism 
the only possible governmental form for human society. Metaphorically 
describing these symptoms of impending collapse as the biblical "four 
horsemen of the apocalypse': Zizek lists the four main antagonisms of 
global capitalism as: 
• ecological crisis; 
• new techno-scientific developments, especially genetic science 
and the bio-technological revolution; 
• new forms of intellectual property, which in the context of an 
information revolution challenge private property in knowledge; 
and 
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• new forms of social exclusion, especially the extraordinary prolif-
eration of shanty-towns in the developing world (ibid.: 421-7). 
The first antagonism looks a lot like an external limit to capitalist 
growth, while only the last antagonism yields a minimally plausible 
political agent, namely the excluded masses of the "slum planet': whose 
emergence is "perhaps the crucial geopolitical event of our times" (ibid.: 
424). The increasing unrest in these zones of exclusion from global 
capitalism signifies "a population living outside state control, in condi-
tions half outside the law, in terrible need of the minimal forms of self-
organization'' (ibid.: 424). Generating all of these antagonisms, Zizek 
insists, is the "zero-level antagonism,, between the included and the 
excluded, which provides the matrix for integrating all four outriders 
of crisis into a conceptually unified theory with a consistent political 
strategy (ibid.: 428). 
In the context of this analysis of global capitalism, it is not surprising 
that ZizeKs calls for a «return to Lenin" have been inflected through a 
rehabilitation of Maoism, for this somewhat impressionistic description 
of final crisis and popular opposition is strongly reminiscent of Mao's 
ideas about peasant socialism, military strategy and imperialist break-
down. Zizek now argues for an ecological variant of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat grounded in the "eternal idea of egalitarian communism: 
based on Badiou's presentation of a neo-communist politics: 
In his Logiques des Mandes, Alain Badiou elaborates the eternal 
Idea of the politics of revolutionary justice at work from ... 
the Jacobins to Lenin and Mao. It consists of four moments: 
voluntarism (the belief that one can move mountains, ignor-
ing ((objective" laws and obstacles); terror (a ruthless will to 
crush the enemy of the people); egalitarian justice (its imme-
diate brutal imposition, with no understanding for the "com-
plex circumstances" which allegedly compel us to proceed 
gradually); and, last but not least, trust in the people - suf-
fice it to recall two examples here, Robespierre ... and Mao. 
(Ibid.: 157) 
The joker in the pack is revolutionary terror. This is not the place for 
a full analysis of that particular provocation (but see Boucher 2010). 
Suffice it to note that the link that Zizek affirms between communist 
politics and the Jacobin terror of Robespierre is scripted in advance 
by Laclau and Mouffe's radical democratic analysis of Marxism. All 
Zizek has done is to invert it from criticism into affirmation, without 
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contesting its fundamental terms. But it is Zizek who has shown so 
effectively that this particular idea originates on the "anti-totalitarian" 
right. By accepting the terms of the antagonist, doesn't Zizek in fact 
admit defeat in advance? 
But in recent works designed for accessibility, Zizek is less interested 
in provoking the theoretical left than in communicating to a broad 
audience about the continuing validity of Marxist ideas. Zizek uses his 
intellectual celebrity status to expose the structural violence inherent 
in a global profit system that is completely unchecked by meaningful 
democratic controls or enforceable international regulations (Zizek 
2008b). He probes the moral and political responsibility of politicians 
and economists for the global financial crisis and connects their ideo-
logical blindness in a pointed way to the experience of the millions who 
actually have to pay for the collapse of banking institutions with their 
jobs, homes and family lives (Zizek 2009). Zizek connects the illegal war 
against Iraq and human rights abuses in the ''war on terror" to massive 
contradictions in the West, where ideologically it is said to be impos-
sible to do anything wrong in confrontation with an "axis of evil'~ yet 
the democracy supposedly being defended is less and less meaningful 
(Zizek 2002). He performs a blistering philosophical analysis of how 
neoliberal capitalism, with its promotion of self-interested gratification 
as the highest good, together with the increasingly authoritarian restric-
tions on democratic liberties that belong to security states existing in 
semi-permanent emergency conditions, reduce all values to the value 
of self-preservation, from which craven perspective of raw survival it 
appears that anything at all is legitimate against "global terrorism'' (Zizek 
2005). Finally, Zizek points out that the rapid recruitment of militants 
from the vast slums around most developing cities, to radical Islam or 
Maoist insurgencies, happens because of conditions that can be directly 
attributed to Western imperialism (Zizek 2010). Without for a moment 
endorsing terrorist atrocities, Zizek has the courage to propose that the 
destruction of the twin towers in New York is for the contemporary 
world system the equivalent of the disaster of the Titanic for the world 
that destroyed itself in the First World War (Zizek 2002: 15). The luxu-
rious but atomized "atonal world" of contemporary individualism has 
begun to disintegrate as it runs unstoppably onto internal contradic-
tions (financial crisis, marginal revolts) and external limitations (envi-
ronmental crisis, the rise of Chinese state capitalism), and 9/11 is the 
symbol of this break-up. 
Finally, though, it is Alain Badiou in his The Communist Hypothesis 
(2010) who best summarizes the dilemma of the neo-communist 
post-marx1sm 241 
break-out from post-Marxism. Post-Marxism does not seem to be 
able to escape from ideas about contingent ruptures with all-embracing 
structures. According to Badiou, the Idea of Communism is an egalitar-
ian rupture with business-as-usual capitalism that has had two major 
experimental failures, in nineteenth-century socialism and historical 
Communism. Rather than regarding these as learning processes within 
an emancipatory dynamic, Badiou thinks of incarnations of the egalitar-
ian ideal as radically contingent and therefore entirely different. 
This is reminiscent of existentialist philosophy, with its celebration of 
the arbitrary decision as the projection of individual intentionality onto 
collective history. Badiou proposes that ((the communist Idea is what 
constitutes the becoming-political Subject of the individual as ... her 
projection into History" (Badiou 2010: 237). Indeed, in an Althusserian 
vocabulary, "the communist Idea is the imaginary operation whereby 
an individual subjectivation projects a fragment of the political real into 
the symbolic narrative of History ... [that is] the Idea is ... ideological" 
(ibid.: 240). The spectre that haunts this entire conceptualization is that 
of arbitrariness, linked to political voluntarism (hence the celebrations 
of Mao and Lenin as figures of heroic political willpower). 
Summary of key points 
The radical democratic critique of Leninism 
• Laclau and Mouffe argue that Marxism-Leninism depended on 
a series of classical assumptions about society - the ability of a 
social group to embody normative universality, the reducibility 
of ideologico-political phenomena to economic developments, 
the centrality of the state to the achievement of a rational society 
- that have now been falsified. 
• They propose that in the evolution of Marxism, Gramsci's notion 
of ideological hegemony provides the way out, by thinking about 
politics in terms of the formation of collective subjects based on 
ideological hegemony. The left failed to realize this and articulate 
its project to the New Social Movements in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and therefore paid the price for its fixation on class. 
Discourse, hegemony and antagonism 
• Laclau and Mouffe analyse politics in terms of the creation of 
discursive formations, a concept that unites the Gramscian idea of 
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a historic bloc with a post-structuralist theory of discourse as the 
creation of chains of equivalence and difference in the articulation 
of socio-political identities. 
• They propose that hegemony means the creation of a collective 
subject whose worldview defines what can be imagined in society, 
through the installation of that collective subject's defining master 
signifier in the empty place of political power. 
• Nonetheless, no hegemony is total, because every collective 
subject is defined by its opposition to a social antagonist, with 
the consequence that political conflict is a permanent feature of 
social life. 
New concepts of political strategy 
• For Laclau and Mouffe, the implication is that the left must 
become radically democratic, seeking to develop an egalitarian 
politics whose strategic aim is left-wing hegemony (as defined 
above), rather than the elimination of the social antagonist. 
• Concepts of democratic citizenship as active participation in 
political movements and democratic politics as the permanent 
contestation of social relations, together with an embrace of the 
idea of the Democratic Revolution of Modernity, are the way, for 
Laclau and Mouffe, to avoid relapse into the "Jacobin temptation" 
of Marxist-Leninist politics. 
• For other post-Marxists, marginal subversion, permanent pro-
test and moments of radical rupture provide points of entry for 
left-wing politics into a contemporary landscape dominated by 
an ideological belief in the technocratic management of social 
problems that effectively tries to eliminate real politics altogether. 
Ziiek's return to Lenin 
• Zizek's analysis suggests that this sort of left-wing participation 
in democratic politics, without any strategic objective of trans-
forming society and revolutionizing the state, really evidences an 
unconscious attachment to the permanence of capitalism. 
• His alternative is to conceptualize social antagonism on Hegelian 
lines as a master-slave dialectic, something that leads him eventu-
ally to propose new forms of universality and a revolutionary ori-
entation to the state, expressed through calls to "return to Lenin'. 
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Further reading 
Readers wishing to follow up Western Marxism in more depth should 
begin with the most comprehensive work, Martin Jay's Marxism and 
Totality ( 1984). Perry Anderson's Considerations on Western Marxism 
(1979) remains a classic short work and Goran Therborn's From 
Marxism to Post-Marxism (2009) brings the story up to date with his 
impressive survey. Alex Callinicos's Marxism and Philosophy (1986) is 
an excellent critical study of the major schools of Marxism from a per-
spective sympathetic to both Classical and Analytical currents. Alvin 
Gouldner's The Two Marxisms ( 1980) makes a pertinent distinction 
between "scientific" and "critical" Marxism similar to the difference 
between scientific socialism and social philosophy operating in this 
book. Leslek Kolakowski's Main Currents of Marxism ( 1978) is a three-
volume survey with a vast amount of valuable information, unfortu-
nately animated by the spirit of positivist demolition of Marxism. David 
McLellan's Marxism after Marx (2007) is a major social history of the 
Marxist movement in terms of the communist politics of working-class 
organizations, tracing Marxist doctrinal evolution from nineteenth-
century Europe, through Russia and China, to the developing world 
in the post-war era. His Karl Marx: His Life and Thought ( 1973) is an 
excellent introduction to Marxhimsel£ In Marxism and History (1998), 
S. H. Rigby provides sympathetic overview of Marxist historical research 
from a non-Marxist perspective, while Paul Blackledge, in Reflections on 
the Marxist Theory of History (2006), provides the Marxist perspective. 
Ernest Mandel's Late Capitalism (1975) and Michel Aglietta's A 
Theory of Capitalist Regulation (1979) are places to begin reading about 
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Marxist political economy today. (There are some more specialized ref-
erences in Chapter 1.) Giovanni Arrighi's The Long Twentieth Century 
(1994), Ellen Wood's Empire of Capital (2003), Immanuel Wallerstein's 
The World We Are Entering, 2000-2050 (2002) and David Harvey's The 
Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism (2010) bring these posi-
tions up to date. Beyond that, I strongly recommend that the reader look 
into Regulation Theory, especially Michel Aglietta, Bob Jessop and Alain 
Lipietz, as one of the most serious and interesting research programmes 
in political economy around. 
Robert Wolff's Understanding Rawls (1977) makes a number of 
penetrating criticisms of modern political liberalism, as does C. B. 
Macpherson in The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice (1987). G. A. 
Cohen's Rescuing Justice (2008) is probably the most impressive egali-
tarian reply to Rawls. Moishe Postone, in Time, Labor and Social 
Domination (1996), develops a critique of capitalism based on a concep-
tion of human flourishing drawn from Marx's Grundrisse. Ellen Wood's 
Democracy against Capitalism (1995) represents everything that is best 
in contemporary post-classical Marxism; I interpret her contribution 
as a theory of the civic virtue of political participation, with radical 
consequences. Alex Callinicos's Equality (2000) is a spirited Marxist 
rejoinder to liberalism, defending egalitarianism from a non-market 
socialist perspective. Habermas's Between Facts and Norms (1996) is an 
impressive effort to articulate a political republicanism that incorpo-
rates the best ofliberalism without accepting its atomistic conception of 
human existence. David Ingram's Habermas: Introduction and Analysis 
(2010) is an excellent critical introduction to the most recent elements 
of this complex theory. Honneth's Das Recht der Freiheit - Grundriss 
einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit [The Right to Freedom: Foundations of 
a Democratic Form of Ethical Life] (2011) is an important new contribu-
tion to Marxist-influenced theories of social justice, arguing on dialecti-
cal lines for the solidaristic and egalitarian implications of norms that 
have historically developed within capitalism. 
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